tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-23213206955840696962024-03-06T12:00:16.298-08:00Hugh Woodwww.woodandmeredith.comHugh Woodhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/01021049579391065763noreply@blogger.comBlogger123125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2321320695584069696.post-10876396561293990552019-10-16T17:36:00.000-07:002019-10-16T17:36:10.035-07:00Estate Administration Boot Camp: Everything You Need to Know about Effectively Administering an Estate Hugh C Wood and Other Speakers 11 20 2019 and 11 21 2019 Atlanta, Georgia Estate Administration Boot Camp: Everything You Need to Know about Effectively Administering an Estate Hugh C Wood and Other Speakers 11 20 2019 and 11 21 2019 Atlanta, Georgia<br />
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<br /><a href="https://www.nbi-sems.com/ProductDetails/83869ER?ctname=SPKEM">Estate Administration Boot Camp Everything You Need to Know about Effectively Administering an Estate</a><br />
<br />
& & &<br />
<br />
Hugh C. Wood and other Speakers<br />
<br />
Seminar<br />
Estate Administration Boot Camp<br />
Everything You Need to Know about Effectively Administering an Estate<br />
DATE<br />
2 Day Seminar<br />
Wednesday, November 20, 2019 -<br />
Thursday, November 21, 2019<br />
TIME<br />
November 20 - 9:00 AM - 4:30 PM<br />
November 21 - 9:00 AM - 4:30 PM<br />
PRODUCT ID#<br />
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CREDIT INFORMATION<br />
Continuing Legal Education<br />
12.00 - GA CLE<br />
including - Ethics: 1.00<br />
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CPE for Accountants<br />
14.00 - CPE for Accountants/NASBA<br />
including - Regulatory Ethics: 1.00<br />
Specialized Knowledge: 5.00<br />
Taxes: 8.00<br />
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Other<br />
1.20 - IACET<br />
Basic<br />
ESTATE PLANNING, TRUSTS & PROBATE<br />
SELECT A COURSE FORMAT<br />
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OVERVIEW<br />
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Program Description<br />
Everything You Need to Know about Effectively Administering an Estate<br />
<br />
Are you fully confident in your knowledge of the latest court and tax rules and the most effective transfer tools to ensure each client's estate is laid to rest according to the decedent's wishes, with minimal tax burden? This comprehensive 2-day instruction will give you all the skills you need to administer estates that include trusts and/or business interests without a hitch. Register today!<br />
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Don't miss any crucial notice and filing requirements when opening the estate - learn what must be done right away.<br />
Get helpful forms and checklists that will help you in administration.<br />
Understand how income and estate tax deductions interact and find the most advantageous way to structure the tax returns<br />
Learn how to use disclaimers more effectively.<br />
Clarify what must be done when the trust becomes irrevocable.<br />
Protect your professional reputation with a practical legal ethics guide focused on trusts and estates practice.<br />
Prevent mistakes in final petition and ensure each estate is closed quickly and without disputes.<br />
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Who Should Attend<br />
This two-day, basic level seminar is designed for:<br />
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Attorneys<br />
Accountants/CPAs<br />
Tax Professionals<br />
Financial Planners<br />
Trust Officers/Administrators/Managers<br />
Paralegals<br />
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Course Content<br />
DAY 1<br />
<br />
Forms of Administration and When They are Used<br />
First Steps and Notices, Executor Duties, Opening the Estate<br />
Marshalling the Assets<br />
Key Intestacy Laws You Must Know<br />
Handling Debts and Claims Against the Estate<br />
Spouse Elective Share and Disclaimers<br />
Trusts that Affect Estate Administration<br />
DAY 2<br />
<br />
Income Tax Returns<br />
Portability and Estate, Gift, GST Taxes<br />
Handling Distributions<br />
Business Interests in Estate Administration<br />
Legal Ethics in Estate Administration<br />
Closing the Estate and Final Accounting<br />
Estate and Trust Contests, Disputes, ChallengesHugh Woodhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/01021049579391065763noreply@blogger.com2tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2321320695584069696.post-63373600317832543322019-09-17T19:30:00.000-07:002019-09-17T19:43:42.483-07:00Can A Lawyer Take A Percentage Interest In A Probate Estate? Maybe Not. <br />
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<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgRnWIoI6DiqP-DburFOJhQORTsqDR1Z2W_EKEaR1qmYOFtGx8FoGvNrTpDH4NmeCnnsSfz5fkYhFPbMGp7pekPtHvPq7UQBSXp2THfQLZ8bC7FIytVpfncaX9bM06UvROqiD0UxZbZN6BO/s1600/No+Attorneys+Fees+in+Inheirited+Property.JPG" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="461" data-original-width="593" height="248" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgRnWIoI6DiqP-DburFOJhQORTsqDR1Z2W_EKEaR1qmYOFtGx8FoGvNrTpDH4NmeCnnsSfz5fkYhFPbMGp7pekPtHvPq7UQBSXp2THfQLZ8bC7FIytVpfncaX9bM06UvROqiD0UxZbZN6BO/s320/No+Attorneys+Fees+in+Inheirited+Property.JPG" width="320" /></a></div>
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<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 13.5pt;">Can a lawyer take a
percentage interest in a probate estate? Maybe not. It
has to be a contested recovery.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; text-indent: .5in;">
<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 13.5pt;">Be careful of giving a
probate lawyer a percentage interest in your probate case or your estate
case. Here are the reasons why. If you and your family
already stand to recover inherited property (that is property you owned at the moment
your mother, father, or grandfather dies) then it is improper for an attorney
to take a percentage recovery in that land or those funds. However,
if there's a significant dispute over something that the estate may or may not
recover (a disputed loan to a third party) then, like any other disputed
contract or tort case, an attorney is allowed to take a percentage recovery in
that disputed amount.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; text-indent: .5in;">
<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 13.5pt;">Consider the following
scenarios. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in;">
<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 13.5pt;">SCENARIO ONE (Undisputed
Inherited Property):<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; text-indent: .5in;">
<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 13.5pt;">Your mother has passed
away and then your father (despite lots of advice from lawyers) dies without a
Will. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; text-indent: .5in;">
<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 13.5pt;">You don't know what to
do after your father dies so you visit your local estate and probate
lawyer. She says “[D]on't worry, you don't have to pay me anything
now, you just give me a third interest in everything that gets resolved in the
estate”. You and your two brothers sign the fee agreement with the
lawyer. You and your two brothers go to the safe deposit box at the
bank to look for additional assets and you find a deed to some land in South
Georgia that you never heard of that is worth $600,000.00.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; text-indent: .5in;">
<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 13.5pt;">So, after you and your
brothers discover this unexpected windfall of a deed in South Georgia you visit
the property and learn that you are in fact entitled to this $600,000.00
property and you apparently inherited it – even though your father died without
a Will. See, OCGA § 53-2-1. You get appointed
administrator. The debts get paid and you're ready to settle the estate
and pay the lawyer. The lawyer pulls out her fee agreement that says
I'm entitled to a third of everything in the estate; and, she says you all need
to write me a check for $200,000.00 or sell the land and give me $200,000.00
and you three heirs can keep the other $400,000.00 of the unexpected unknown
piece of land in South Georgia.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in;">
<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 13.5pt;"> What
result?<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in;">
<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 13.5pt;"> Is
the lawyer entitled to $200,000.00? Or anything?<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in;">
<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 13.5pt;"> Well
lots of folks, even sophisticated lawyers, seem not to know the answer to the
question. If the property is owned at the time of death instanter by
intestate succession, then the three brothers owned it at the time they visited
the lawyer and signed the fee agreement. The lawyer recovered
nothing because the property was owned at the time the fee agreement was signed
(or the property would as a matter of law eventually go to them) and thus
nothing was "recovered." <i>Brown v. Welch,</i> 253
Ga. 118, 317 S.E.2d 520 (1984). [1]<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<br /></div>
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<i><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 13.5pt;">Brown's one-fifth interest vested immediately
upon his father's death. OCGA § 53–4–8 [Code Ann. § 113–901]. He “recovered” no
assets of the estate which had devolved to the other heirs, therefore, nothing
was restored through the partition action. “It does not appear that the
conclusion of the litigation resulted in any monetary or property accrual to
any of the defendants which they would not have had in their status as heirs of
the deceased ... and there is accordingly nothing on which the [attorney's]
lien could operate.” Griner v. Foskey, 158 Ga.App. 769, 770, 282 S.E.2d 150
(1981). <o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
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<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in;">
<i><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 13.5pt;">Id</span></i><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 13.5pt;">. See Also, <i>Hornsby, et al.
v. Hunter,</i> 262 Ga. App. 598, 585 S.E.2d 900 (2003).<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<br /></div>
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<i><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 13.5pt;">In order for a contingent fee contract to
entitle an attorney to any participation in a right or entitlement which is
already vested in the client (as is here in this case) or which is immediately
and unequivocally available to the client (as in an offer of settlement), such
an intention on the part of both the attorney and their client must appear in
plain and unambiguous terms. <o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
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<br /></div>
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<i><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 13.5pt;">Hornsby</span></i><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 13.5pt;"> at 603. [2] <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in;">
<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 13.5pt;"> Under
law, title to land (and generally other personal property) vests immediately to
its ultimate owners. In the case of such things as administration
you may have an intervening trustee or administrator title holder while the
ownership is being resolved. However, the ultimate ownership of land
vests immediately upon death of the owner even if ownership cannot be
determined shortly after the death of the owner. So, the individuals
who own property at their father's death own it immediately and no attorney can
take a "percentage" in resolving the issues of the estate and taking
back a percentage in collection. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; text-indent: .5in;">
<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 13.5pt;">The lawyer would not get
a “zero” fee, but would be entitled to the number of hours he or she worked on
your case times the reasonable acceptable rate for that work. That
is a <i>quantum meruit</i> recovery of fees.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; text-indent: .5in;">
<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 13.5pt;">So be vigilant if you
enter into an agreement with a probate attorney who wants to take back a percentage
of "recovery." That recovery should not include property
that you stand to inherit without regard to any action or non-action of the
attorney.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in;">
<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 13.5pt;">SCENARIO TWO (Disputed
Property):<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; text-indent: .5in;">
<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 13.5pt;">Let's change the
scenario to where the property in South Georgia is disputed. Suppose
that after your father dies the brothers go to the attorney and sign a fee
contract that says they will pay 33 percent to the attorney for the
recovery of any disputed assets of the estate. When the brothers open
the safe deposit box and find the land in South Georgia there's a note that
says “<i>Dear Sons: I think we own this land but the farmer next door disputes
this title and asserts that he too owns this 40 acres. Love Dad</i>”. The Estate attorney
gets involved she finds out that she has to file a lawsuit to quiet the title
to the property in South Georgia and she eventually recovers it in the estate's
favor. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; text-indent: .5in;">
<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 13.5pt;">Is the attorney then
entitled to her one third fee interest?<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; text-indent: .5in;">
<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 13.5pt;">Yes. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; text-indent: .5in;">
<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 13.5pt;">The property and title
were both actively disputed, and it was not apparent that the land was subject
to clear and undisputed inheritance at the time of the father's
death. Because the land was in dispute and because the lawyer
resolved the title dispute (it doesn't have to be resolved through a lawsuit)
the attorney would be entitled to her one third fee interest in a recovery in
that situation.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in;">
<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 13.5pt;"> The
most standard method of compensation in probate is an hourly rate for hours
worked to resolve the case. Some attorneys do abide by fixed fee
structures for relatively simplistic estate cases. However, any estate that is
going to generate significant administrative work or significant litigation
almost always has a customary hourly rate for that work at the
time. With regard to other professionals employed on behalf of the
estate: accountants, CPAs, bookkeepers, etc. they charge their
hourly rate or their standard fees. There are also statutory
payments to executors and administrators which are a relatively small
percentage of every dollar received (money flowing into the estate) and every
dollar paid (money flowing out of the estate) on behalf of the
estate. The process and percentage changes from state to state and
is subject to whether it is a stated executor or appointed
administrator. Please consult your own counsel for the exact
percentage payable to executors or administrators. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
</div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; text-indent: .5in;">
<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 13.5pt;">If you have any
questions concerning whether a fee agreement is appropriate (or legal) in
estate resolution or estate litigation, please do not hesitate to give us a
call. 404.633.4100 or hwood@woodandmeredith.com<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
&&&</div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
Endnotes<o:p></o:p></div>
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<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
&&&<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
[1]<o:p></o:p><br />
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
317 S.E.2d 520 (PDF)<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
253 Ga. 118<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
Supreme Court of Georgia.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
BROWN<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
v.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
WELCH.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
No. 41097.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
June 29, 1984.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
Synopsis<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
Attorney brought action against client for fees allegedly
owed him for his representation of client in land partition action. The
Superior Court, Towns County, Jack N. Gunter, J., directed verdict for attorney
on all issues except unconscionability of contract and granted attorney
judgment notwithstanding verdict on issue of unconscionability, and client
appealed. The Supreme Court, Weltner, J., held that where attorney undertook to
represent client in attempt to secure title to client's father's entire farm
from father's estate, and attorney and client agreed that attorney would receive
percentage of assets recovered from estate, recovery of assets from estate was
condition precedent to attorney's entitlement to fee, and thus, where client
was awarded only his intestate share of estate, attorney was entitled to
nothing.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
Judgment reversed.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
Attorneys and Law Firms<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
**520 *119 Nisbet S. Kendrick, III, Fishman, Freeman &
Kendrick, P.C., Atlanta, for James N. Brown.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
Robert F. Oliver, Oliver & Oliver, Clarksville, for
Martin W. Welch.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
Opinion<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
*118 WELTNER, Justice.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
Welch sued Brown for attorney fees allegedly owed him for
his representation of Brown in a land partition action.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
Brown lived on his father's farm and claimed ownership
through oral gift. The father died intestate, and Brown's siblings sought
equitable partition of the land.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
Welch undertook to represent Brown in his attempt to secure
title to the entire tract. They agreed orally that Welch would receive
“twenty-five percent (25%) of all assets and money recovered from the James N.
Brown, Sr. estate.” The agreement was reduced to writing two years later.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
The trial court ruled that Brown was entitled only to a
one-fifth share by intestacy. Welch then claimed that the contract entitled him
to 25% of that interest, and this action ensued.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
The trial court directed a verdict for Welch on all issues
except that of unconscionability of contract. The jury found the contract
unconscionable and the trial court granted to Welch a judgment notwithstanding
the verdict.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
1. The trial court construed the contract as one for a
contingency fee, wherein no fee can be received unless the specific contingency
comes about. Sellers v. City of Summerville, 208 Ga. 361, 67 S.E.2d 137 (1951).
The contingency here is a recovery from the estate. “Recovery” has been defined
**521 as the “restoration of a right by solemn judgment of a court of justice.”
Daughtry v. Cobb, 189 Ga. 113, 119, 5 S.E.2d 352 (1939).<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
Brown's one-fifth interest vested immediately upon his
father's death. OCGA § 53–4–8 [Code Ann. § 113–901]. He “recovered” no assets
of the estate which had devolved to the other heirs, therefore, nothing was
restored through the partition action. “It does not appear that the conclusion
of the litigation resulted in any monetary or property accrual to any of the
defendants which they would not have had in their status as heirs of the deceased
... and there is accordingly nothing on which the [attorney's] lien could
operate.” Griner v. Foskey, 158 Ga.App. 769, 770, 282 S.E.2d 150 (1981).<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
1 Recovery of assets from the estate is the condition
precedent to Welch's entitlement. That never occurred, and hence Welch is
entitled to nothing. Any issue of unconscionability is therefore immaterial.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
2 In reaching this conclusion, we apply this strict
construction to contingent fee contracts: in order for a contingent fee
contract to entitle an attorney to any participation in a right or entitlement
which is already vested in the client (as is here the case) or which is
immediately and unequivocally available to the client (as in an offer of
settlement), such an intention on the part of both attorney and client must
appear through plain and unambiguous terms. Otherwise, an ambiguously worded
agreement must be construed against the party which prepared it. Kennedy v.
Brand Banking Co., 245 Ga. 496, 266 S.E.2d 154 (1980).<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
Judgment reversed.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
All the Justices concur.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
All Citations<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
253 Ga. 118, 317 S.E.2d 520<o:p></o:p><br />
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
&&&&<o:p></o:p><br />
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
[2]<o:p></o:p><br />
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
585 S.E.2d 900 (PDF)<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
262 Ga.App. 598<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
Court of Appeals of Georgia.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
HORNSBY et al.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
v.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
HUNTER.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
No. A03A0243.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
July 16, 2003.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
Reconsideration denied July 31, 2003.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
Certiorari Denied Nov. 17, 2003.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
Synopsis<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
Attorney brought action against clients and developer
holding option to develop land to foreclose attorney's statutory lien on
clients' real property. Following a jury trial, the Superior Court, Columbia
County, Fleming, J., awarded attorney parcel of land. Clients and developer
appealed to Supreme Court, which transferred case. The Court of Appeals,
Phipps, J., held that: (1) jury issue existed as to whether letter from
clients' new attorney terminated attorney's representation; (2) jury issue
existed as to whether attorney's right of action did not accrue until attorney
completed defense of clients' title to land; and (3) contingency fee contract
did not obligate clients to convey 20 percent of inherited real property.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
Reversed.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
Blackburn, P.J., concurred in judgment only.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
Attorneys and Law Firms<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
**901 *604 Warlick, Tritt & Stebbins, Charles C.
Stebbins III, Hull, Towill, Norman, Barrett & Salley, David E. Hudson,
Augusta, for appellants.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
Tucker, Everitt, Long, Brewton & Lanier, John B. Long,
Augusta, for appellee.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
Opinion<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
*598 PHIPPS, Judge.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
Attorney Robert W. Hunter III brought an action to foreclose
an attorney's statutory lien on real property owned by Walter S. Hornsby III
and his sister, Willena Hornsby Butler (collectively the Hornsbys). Because the
Hornsbys had extended an option to Southeastern Family Homes, Inc. to develop
the land, Hunter named the Hornsbys and Southeastern as defendants. At the
close of evidence at the jury trial, the Hornsbys and Southeastern moved for a
directed verdict on several grounds. The trial court denied their motions and
submitted the case to the jury, which returned a verdict in Hunter's favor,
awarding him “44.65 acres of land.” The court adopted the verdict and further
awarded post-judgment interest. The Hornsbys and Southeastern appealed to the
Supreme Court of Georgia, which transferred the case to this court. Appellants
contend that they were entitled to a directed verdict and that the award of
post-judgment interest was unauthorized. Because the record demonstrates that
the appellants were entitled to a directed verdict, we reverse. The issue of
post-judgment interest is moot.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
1 A directed verdict is authorized only when there is no
conflict in the evidence as to any material issue, and the evidence introduced,
construed most favorably to the party opposing the motion, demands a particular
verdict.1 The appellate standard used to review the grant or denial of a
directed verdict is the any evidence test.2<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
The Hornsbys were co-owners of over 700 acres of property
that had been owned by their maternal grandfather, Paul Dixon, who had died in
1941. The property, which was located near the Savannah River in Columbia
County, had been in their family since 1870. Certain of the Hornsbys' relatives
were living on and farming the land, and Walter Hornsby testified that he had
retained Hunter to “clear the title of [that] heir property.”<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
In September 1986, Hornsby, his sister, and their mother3
hired *599 Hunter as their attorney. Their engagement contract, supplied by
Hunter, provided,<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
We, PAULINE D. HORNSBY, WALTER S. HORNSBY, III, and WILLENA
HORNSBY BUTLER, employ Robert W. Hunter, III, as our attorney to represent us
and our heirs in all of our claims arising out of our inheritance of the Estate
of Mr. Paul H. Dixon, Jr., consisting mainly of real estate located in said
County.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
We agree to pay said attorney Twenty (20%) percent of the
gross proceeds in this case, whether the result of suit or negotiation,
regardless of whether any such proceeds paid are paid under any preexisting
rights we may have, either statutory or at common law. This agreement covers
any causes of action we have in order to fully vest title to any property in
our names, including any petitions for partitioning and quieting title.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
We also agree to reimburse him all out-of-pocket expenses,
costs, advances, etc., incurred by him in pursuing these claims, which will be
deducted prior to determining the gross proceeds.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
We do hereby constitute and appoint Robert W. Hunter, III,
as our true and lawful attorney in fact, for us and in our name, place and stead,
to sign our names to any pleading, notice, release, check, draft or other paper
necessary or advisable in the pursuit of any of these claims. We hereby **902
grant him complete power and authority in these claims, or all of them, and all
matters attendant thereto, to do generally all things necessary, or advisable,
or desirable in their pursuit. The power and agency herein granted is coupled
with an interest and is irrevocable by death or incompetence.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
We have read this agreement and agree that it binds our
heirs, assigns, executors, administrators and any other successor in interest.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
Hunter testified that, under this agreement, his fee was
contingent upon “get [ting] marketable title to Willena and Walter.” He stated
that he had negotiated with the attorney representing “the other side” and that
an agreement was reached as to the division of the property. In December 1988,
the probate court accepted the proposed division. The Hornsbys received deeds
for four tracts of land totaling 371 acres. Hunter thereafter asked the
Hornsbys for his fee. The Hornsbys disputed Hunter's claim that the agreement
entitled *600 him to 20 percent of their land. In 1989, having not received a
fee, Hunter recorded a lien for attorney fees against the property under OCGA §
15–19–14.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
In 1991, a lawsuit was filed, challenging the deed by which
Willena Butler had claimed an interest to the original undivided estate. Walter
Hornsby testified that after he and his sister were served, he gave the papers
to Hunter because he had not “received any kind of title to my property” and
because “[Hunter] was still on the case.” Hunter defended the Hornsbys' title,
and that case was resolved in their favor in 1995.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
In 1992, a second lawsuit challenged the Hornsbys' property
interest. Walter Hornsby testified that he took that case to Hunter also
because he expected Hunter to defend his family's interest because “he [had]
agreed to give us a clear title.” During the pendency of that case, the
Hornsbys entered into a joint venture agreement with Southeastern that gave the
company an option to develop the property. The Hornsbys hired Southeastern's
attorney for the limited purposes of resolving the issue of Hunter's fee. That
attorney wrote Hunter a letter, dated September 29, 1994, stating that the
Hornsbys believed that Hunter “[was] claiming too much in the way of a fee.”
The letter further stated that the Hornsbys considered the contract's language
ambiguous. The letter stated, “If you wish to withdraw from representing them,
I believe you are entitled to be paid the reasonable value of your services to
date. If you elect to continue to represent them, I believe you are entitled to
be paid a reasonable fee.” Hunter continued working on the Hornsbys' behalf,
later testifying, “my clients did not ask me to withdraw.” He successfully
defended the Hornsbys' interest in that case, which was resolved in April 1996.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
In February 1999, a third lawsuit challenged the Hornsbys'
title. Hunter testified that Walter Hornsby told him that he had an obligation
under the contract to represent them in that matter. In a letter dated March
19, 1999, Hunter informed the Hornsbys that he had prepared responsive
pleadings and that, “I have undertaken this representation of you under the
assumption that it reaffirms our contract for representation with regard to
this same property.” Hunter represented the Hornsbys in that action, and in
December 1999, that case concluded with summary judgment entered in favor of
the Hornsbys.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
In September 2000, Hunter sought to foreclose on his
attorney's lien, seeking 20 percent of the Hornsbys' property, or in the
alternative, sale of their land and receipt of 20 percent of the proceeds. At
trial, Hunter clarified, “I want the land.” The jury returned a verdict in
favor of Hunter for 44.65 acres. The court adopted the verdict and then awarded
post-judgment interest thereon. After a hearing, the *601 court determined that
the value of the property was $15,000 per acre. Citing OCGA § 9–12–10, the
court determined, “[g]iven the award to [Hunter] of 44.65 acres undivided
interest in said property, the value of [Hunter's] judgment for the purposes of
calculating post judgment interest is $669,750.” Finally, the court stated, “
If [Hunter] wishes to have his interest in the real property in question
separated out, he should proceed by initiating a statutory partitioning.”<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
**903 2 1. Appellants contend that the court erred in
denying their motions for a directed verdict, arguing that the Hornsbys' new
counsel's letter of September 24, 1994 terminated the contingency fee contract
before the contingency vested. We disagree.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
3 While it is true that “a client has the absolute right to
discharge the attorney and terminate the relation at any time,”4 the cited
letter did not purport to do that. No evidence shows that the Hornsbys ever
told Hunter that they were discharging him. Hunter continued to represent the
Hornsbys through 1999. And regarding whether Hunter was obligated to defend
their title in those subsequent challenges, Walter Hornsby testified, “[Hunter]
would not have fulfilled that contract if he would not have.” Because there was
evidence that the September 29, 1994 letter did not terminate the
representation, the trial court correctly denied the motions for directed
verdict on this ground.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
45 2. Appellants contend that the court erred in denying
their motions for directed verdict, arguing that Hunter's claim was barred by
the statute of limitation. Foreclosure on a lien to secure a debt is
time-barred when a claim on the underlying debt has become time-barred.5
Therefore, the dispositive issue is whether the statute of limitation barred an
action on the underlying debt at the time Hunter sought to foreclose his
attorney's lien.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
6 The statute of limitation begins to run when the right of
action accrues.6 Appellants argue that Hunter's right of action accrued in
December 1988, when the probate court's partitioning order was entered. They
claim that since Hunter did not seek to foreclose on the lien until almost 12
years later, his action to foreclose the lien was time-barred.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
Hunter counters that his right of action did not accrue in
December 1988 because he had an ongoing obligation to defend title for the
Hornsbys, as he did in three subsequent lawsuits. He claims that the statute of
limitation could not have started running until the latest *602 lawsuit was
concluded in 1999. Because he filed the instant action the next year, he
argues, it was not time-barred.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
The engagement
contract shows that the Hornsbys agreed that Hunter would represent them “in
all of our claims arising out of our inheritance of the Estate of Mr. Paul H.
Dixon, Jr., consisting mainly of real estate....” The contract further shows
that the Hornsbys agreed that, “This agreement covers any causes of action we
have in order to fully vest title to any property in our names, including any
petitions for partitioning and quieting title.” While the contract's language
may have obligated Hunter to represent the Hornsbys only to obtain title, the
parties' actions demonstrated, as confirmed by their trial testimony, that they
understood that Hunter was contractually obligated to defend the Hornsbys'
title through 1999.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
7 “An open account for continuous service of an attorney,
for which he is entitled to be paid only after a particular result is procured
and accepted by his employer, is not barred until four years after such result
is accepted.”7 Here, Hunter continued to work on the Hornsbys' behalf through
1999. Because there was evidence that Hunter's right of action did not accrue
until 1999, which was within four years of the date Hunter filed this action,
the trial court did not err in denying the motions for directed verdict on the
statute of limitation defense.8<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
8 3. Appellants
contend that the trial court erred in denying their motions for directed
verdict on the ground that the engagement contract was unenforceable with
regard to land inherited by the Hornsbys. They complain that the contract
sought to **904 collect a contingent fee where there was no contingency. The
Hornsbys claim that before they employed Hunter, they already owned an
undivided interest in the original estate and that the probate court decree
merely granted them specific acreage. Further, they claim, the term “gross
proceeds” was too vague to be understood as encompassing the actual land inherited.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
In Brown v. Welch, 9 an attorney claimed part of his
client's inheritance under a fee contract providing that the attorney would be
compensated with a percentage of “all assets and money recovered” from the
estate of the client's father. The Supreme Court of Georgia reasoned that the
client had not “recovered” any estate assets that had devolved to the other
heirs, but had received only what he was due via intestacy. Thus, the Court
ruled, the attorney was entitled to *603 nothing. In Brown, the Court
instructed that the following “strict construction” be applied to contingent
fee contracts:<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
[I]n order for a contingent fee contract to entitle an
attorney to any participation in a right or entitlement which is already vested
in the client (as is here the case) or which is immediately and unequivocally
available to the client (as in an offer of settlement), such an intention on
the part of both attorney and client must appear through plain and unambiguous
terms. Otherwise, an ambiguously worded agreement must be construed against the
party which prepared it.10<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
Appellants argue that the engagement agreement did not
plainly and unambiguously show an intent that Hunter would be entitled to a
percentage of the Hornsbys' land.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
The engagement contract required the Hornsbys to “pay”
Hunter 20 percent of the “gross proceeds in this case,” including “such
proceeds paid ... under any preexisting rights ... either statutory or at
common law.” But the contract did not expressly obligate the Hornsbys to convey
to Hunter 20 percent of the inherited real property. Hunter testified that he
understood “gross proceeds” to mean “recovery,” “whether it be timber, whether
it be crops, whether it be money, whether it be land.” But the contract did not
define that term. Black's Law Dictionary defines proceeds, not as land
inherited, but as<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
[i]ssues; income; yield; receipts; produce; money or
articles or other thing[s] of value arising or obtained by the sale of
property; the sum, amount, or value of property sold or converted into money or
into other property. Proceeds does not necessarily mean only cash or money.
[Cit.] That which results, proceeds, or accrues from some possession or
transaction....11<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
In this case, an interpretation of “gross proceeds” as
contemplating the payment of money and not inherited real property is indicated
by the fact that elsewhere in the contract the Hornsbys agreed to reimburse
Hunter for various expenses that he incurred by deducting such expenses, costs,
and advances “prior to determining the gross proceeds.” Furthermore, Hunter
testified that he was paid a 20 percent share of funds obtained by the Hornsbys
from a sale of timber from the land.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
In accordance with Brown,12 having applied a strict
construction to the contract in this case, we are unable to find “plain and
unambiguous terms” in it that show that the Hornsbys intended for Hunter to be
compensated by a percentage of their inherited land. Accordingly, the court
erred in denying appellants' motions for a directed verdict.13<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
4. Although the Hornsbys contend that the trial court erred
in awarding interest on the judgment, that contention is now moot.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
Judgment reversed.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
ELLINGTON, J., concurs.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
BLACKBURN, P.J., concurs in judgment only.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
All Citations<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
262 Ga.App. 598, 585 S.E.2d 900, 03 FCDR 2351, 03 FCDR 2437<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
Footnotes<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
1<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
OCGA § 9–11–50(a); Beasley v. Paul, 223 Ga.App. 706, 707(2),
478 S.E.2d 899 (1996).<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
2<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
City of Columbus v. Barngrover, 250 Ga.App. 589, 594(2), 552
S.E.2d 536 (2001).<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
3<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
Their mother, Pauline Dixon Hornsby, died in 1996 or 1997.
Walter Hornsby received his mother's interest by deed. Willena Hornsby Butler
received her interest from an uncle by deed. The grantors conveyed real estate
interests “that will become [theirs] from the settling of” the estate of Paul
Dixon.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
4<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
(Citation and punctuation omitted.) AFLAC, Inc. v. Williams,
264 Ga. 351, 353(1), 444 S.E.2d 314 (1994).<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
5<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
Jones v. Wellon, 237 Ga.App. 62, 66–67, 514 S.E.2d 880
(1999).<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
6<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
Kicklighter v. Woodward, 267 Ga. 157, 158(1), 476 S.E.2d 248
(1996); OCGA § 9–3–25.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
7<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
City of Summerville v. Sellers, 94 Ga.App. 152, 163(13), 94
S.E.2d 69 (1956).<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
8<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
See Kueffer Crane &c. Svc. v. Passarella, 247 Ga.App.
327, 329–330(2), 543 S.E.2d 113 (2000).<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
9<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
253 Ga. 118, 317 S.E.2d 520 (1984).<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
10<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
Id. at 119, 317 S.E.2d 520.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
11<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
Black's Law Dictionary (6th ed. 1990), p. 1204.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
12<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
Supra.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
13<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
See Id.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
&&&&<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
[3]<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
504 S.E.2d 480 (PDF)<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
233 Ga.App. 534<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
Court of Appeals of Georgia.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
WINBURN, LEWIS & BARROW, P.C.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
v.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
RICHARDSON et al.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
RICHARDSON et al.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
v.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
WINBURN, LEWIS & BARROW, P.C.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
Nos. A98A0587, A98A0588.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
July 6, 1998.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
Reconsideration Denied July 21, 1998.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
Certiorari Denied Dec. 3, 1998.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
Synopsis<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
After law firm represented clients, who were estate's
contingent beneficiaries, in litigation and settlement negotiations against
trustee of testatrix' marital trust, which resulted in consent judgment and
settlement agreement providing clients with vested interests in equal shares of
family farm's sale proceeds, law firm filed attorney's lien and declaratory
judgment action against clients. Firm alleged that it was entitled to one third
of clients' share of farm's sale proceeds under retainer letter executed by
clients, which provided that clients would pay firm $75 per hour plus
“one-third of the value of proceeds of recovery in your individual behalves, if
any.” The Superior Court, Jackson County, McWhorter, J., entered judgment on
jury verdict finding that “proceeds of recovery” did not encompass any proceeds
from sale of farm. Firm appealed. The Court of Appeals, McMurray, P.J., held
that: (1) evidence supported jury's verdict, and (2) firm “opened the door” to
evidence concerning appropriateness of its professional judgment.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
Affirmed.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
Blackburn, J., issued specially concurring opinion in which
Eldridge, J., joined.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
Attorneys and Law Firms<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
**481 *539 Cashin, Morton & Mullins, Harry L. Cashin,
Jr., Troutman Sanders, Richard W. Gerakitis, Gambrell & Stolz, Irwin W.
Stolz, Jr., Seaton D. Purdom, Atlanta, for appellant.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
Stewart, Melvin & Frost, Frank Armstrong III,
Gainesville, for Appellees.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
Opinion<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
*534 McMURRAY, Presiding Judge.<o:p></o:p></div>
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These appeals concern interpretation of an hourly plus
contingency attorney fee contract between Winburn, Lewis & Barrow, P.C.
(“the firm”) and contingent beneficiaries to the Estate of Smith Bridges (“the
estate”), Carol B. Richardson, Lavern Parton and Jeanene Pass (“the clients”).
The clients initially agreed to pay the firm $85 per hour to account for their
brother's, Kenneth Bridges', suspected waste of estate property while he was
serving as trustee of their mother's marital trust. After probate court
proceedings confirmed that Kenneth Bridges had squandered about half of the
estate's estimated gross value-leaving the Bridges' family farm (“the farm”) as
the estate's primary asset, the firm posted an attorney fee retainer letter to
the clients indicating that the firm would file a superior court action against
Kenneth Bridges and others to recover the estate's lost assets if the clients
would pay the firm $75 per hour plus “one-third of the value of proceeds of
recovery in your individual behalves, if any.”1 The clients executed this letter
(“the retainer *535 letter”), and the firm proceeded on the clients' behalf in
two consecutive superior court actions and an appeal in Richardson v. Bridges,
260 Ga. 62, 389 S.E.2d 215. The firm also represented the clients during
negotiations which resulted in a consent judgment and a settlement agreement
providing the clients with vested interests in equal shares of the farm's sale
proceeds. This settlement provided Kenneth Bridges with a lesser share of the
farm's sale proceeds. The case sub judice arose when the clients challenged the
firm's claim to a third of their share of the farm's sale proceeds.<o:p></o:p></div>
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The firm filed an attorney's lien and a declaratory judgment
action to determine its rights under the retainer letter. The clients filed
undue influence, unreasonableness, unconscionability, illegality, fraud and
breach of fiduciary duty defenses, pertinently claiming that the firm unfairly
inserted the contingent fee provision in the modified retainer agreement
without explaining the scope of the provision's coverage. The trial court,
however, struck these defenses because the clients did not file a supporting
expert's affidavit in compliance with OCGA § 9-11-9.1. The trial court also
denied the parties' opposing motions for summary judgment, allowing a jury to
resolve the scope of the retainer letter's “proceeds of recovery” terms. Before
trial, the trial court granted the firm's motion in limine to exclude any
evidence concerning the clients' malpractice claims.<o:p></o:p></div>
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The clients' trial testimony indicates that the firm never
explained the scope of the retainer letter's “proceeds of recovery” terms; that
there were no discussions or negotiations regarding a need to replace the **482
existing $85 per hour retainer agreement; and that the firm did not advise the clients
(until after the clients had settled their claims against Kenneth Bridges)
about its position that the retainer letter gave the firm a stake in the
Bridges' family farm. The clients explained during trial that they understood
the retainer letter's “proceeds of recovery” terms to mean that the firm would
be entitled to a third of any funds returned to the estate by Kenneth Bridges
and others. The clients testified that they never intended the “proceeds of
recovery” terms to cover their share of the Bridges' *536 family farm. The firm
challenged these explanations in a motion for directed verdict, urging that the
“proceeds of recovery” language should be construed in its favor by the trial
court as a matter of contractual construction.<o:p></o:p></div>
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The trial court denied the firm's motion for directed
verdict, and the jury returned a special verdict finding that the retainer
letter's “ ‘value of proceeds of recovery’ ” terms do not encompass any
proceeds from the sale of the Bridges' family farm. The firm filed an appeal in
Case No. A98A0587 after the trial court entered judgment on this verdict, and
the clients filed a cross-appeal in Case No. A98A0588. Held:<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
Case No. A98A0587<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
1 1. Citing Brown v. Welch, 253 Ga. 118, 317 S.E.2d 520, and
Daughtry v. Cobb, 189 Ga. 113, 5 S.E.2d 352, the firm contends the retainer
letter's “proceeds of recovery” language requires the clients to pay the firm a
percentage of the farm's sale proceeds.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
In Brown v. Welch, 253 Ga. 118, 317 S.E.2d 520, supra, an
attorney claimed part of his client's inheritance under a fee contract
providing the attorney with a percentage of “ ‘all assets and money recovered’
” from the client's father's estate. Because the client did not “recover” more
than he was due via intestacy, the Supreme Court of Georgia held that the
attorney was due nothing. The Supreme Court of Georgia reasoned that the fee
agreement's “ ‘all assets and money recovered’ ” language did not include the
client's vested interest in his father's estate because, absent clear and
unambiguous contractual terms stating an opposite intent, such broad terms will
not be presumed to provide an attorney with a right to participate in an
entitlement which is already vested in the client or which is immediately and
unequivocally available to the client. Id. at 119, 317 S.E.2d 520. Extending
this logic in the case sub judice, the firm urges that the retainer letter's
“proceeds of recovery” terms require the clients to pay over a percentage of
the farm's sale proceeds because, before settling with Kenneth Bridges and
others, the clients only had contingent interests in the farm. This reasoning
is not in line with the basis of the holding in Brown.<o:p></o:p></div>
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2 The Brown decision was based on strict construction of an
attorney fee agreement which did not precisely set out the scope of its
coverage. The Supreme Court of Georgia thus concluded that the attorney fee
contract was “ambiguous” and construed it against the attorney who drafted the
agreement. Id. at 119, 317 S.E.2d 520. While the case sub judice is like Brown
in that the retainer letter's “proceeds of *537 recovery” language may be
construed broadly, the retainer letter is unlike the attorney fee agreement in
Brown because it goes further by suggesting a contingent attorney fee based
only on the “proceeds of recovery” from a lawsuit to bring wasted assets back
into the estate. This difference brings the case sub judice more in line with
the analysis in Daughtry v. Cobb, 189 Ga. 113, 5 S.E.2d 352, supra.2<o:p></o:p></div>
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**483 In Daughtry, an attorney claimed a percentage fee under
a contingency attorney fee contract which was based on the client's recovery
from an estate. The Supreme Court of Georgia read this contract's percentage of
“recovery” language in conjunction with another contractual provision and found
that the apparent ambiguity injected by these provisions authorized a jury's
finding that the parties intended for the attorney to take a percentage of the
client's inheritance. Applying this analysis in the case sub judice, we find
that the retainer letter's suggestion that the “proceeds of recovery” terms
apply only to gains the clients may acquire in a lawsuit to bring wasted assets
back into the estate injects ambiguity in the retainer letter which takes the
contract's “proceeds of recovery” language outside the definition of the term,
“recovery,” set out in Brown v. Welch, 253 Ga. 118, 317 S.E.2d 520, supra.
Accordingly, finding no rule of law or contractual construction controlling the
scope of the retainer letter's coverage, we hold that the trial court properly
allowed the jury to resolve the parties' intent with regard to the retainer
letter's “proceeds of recovery” terms. See CareAmerica v. Southern Care Corp.,
229 Ga.App. 878, 880(1), 881, 494 S.E.2d 720.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
The clients' testimony that they understood the retainer letter's
coverage to include only gains from a lawsuit to bring wasted assets back into
the estate and that the firm's attorneys never told them otherwise (before
settling their dispute with Kenneth Bridges) authorizes the jury's finding that
the retainer letter's “ ‘value of proceeds of recovery’ ” terms do not apply to
the farm's sale proceeds. Accordingly, just as in Daughtry v. Cobb, 189 Ga.
113, 118(2), 5 S.E.2d 352, supra, the jury's verdict was authorized. The trial
court did not err in denying the firm's motion for directed verdict. A party is
not entitled to a directed verdict if there is any evidence to support the
jury's verdict. OCGA § 9-11-50(a); Denson v. City of Atlanta, 202 Ga.App. 325,
326(1), 414 S.E.2d 312.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
*538 2. The firm next contends that the trial court erred in
entering judgment on the jury's verdict because, even under the clients'
explanation of intent, the undisputed facts reveal that the lawsuits against
Kenneth Bridges enhanced the clients' interest to the extent that Kenneth Bridges,
in settling with the clients, compromised his right to an equal share of the
farm's sale proceeds. We do not agree. Although Kenneth Bridges settled for a
lesser percentage of the farm's sale proceeds, the evidence adduced at trial
indicates that this compromise did not bring any of the assets he allegedly
wasted back into the estate. The jury's verdict was therefore in line with the
evidence and the client's understanding of the retainer letter's “proceeds of
recovery” terms. Since this Court must view and resolve the evidence and any
doubt or ambiguity in favor of the verdict, the trial court did not err in
entering judgment on the jury's verdict. Denson v. City of Atlanta, 202 Ga.App.
325, 326(1), 414 S.E.2d 312, supra.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
3 3. Lastly, the firm challenges the trial court's judgment
on the jury's verdict, contending Carol B. Richardson violated the trial
court's pre-trial order excluding evidence of the firm's alleged malpractice by
testifying that the firm unnecessarily modified the parties' initial attorney
fee agreement (because the clients could afford the firm's $85 per hour
charges); that the firm needlessly filed the superior court actions (because
the dispute could have been resolved in the existing probate court action); and
that the firm unnecessarily named the clients' mother as a party to the
underlying dispute. The firm cannot complain about this testimony because it
“opened the door” to the appropriateness of its professional judgment by
offering professional testimony regarding the reasonableness of its decision to
modify the existing attorney fee agreement. See Krebsbach v. State, 209 Ga.App.
474(1), 475, 433 S.E.2d 649.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
Case No. A98A0588<o:p></o:p></div>
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4. Our holding in Case No. A98A0587 renders it unnecessary
to address the clients' cross-appeal.<o:p></o:p></div>
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Judgments affirmed.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
BLACKBURN and ELDRIDGE, JJ., concur specially.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
**484 BLACKBURN, Judge, concurring specially.<o:p></o:p></div>
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I agree that the judgment below must be affirmed, but write
separately to address plaintiff's claim that the trial court erred in entering
judgment on the jury's verdict.<o:p></o:p></div>
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In its second enumeration of error, plaintiff contends that
the trial court erred in entering judgment on the verdict, because there was no
evidence to support the jury's finding that the parties did not intend for the
term “value of proceeds of recovery” to include monies recovered from Bridges
out of his share of the farm proceeds. In essence, plaintiff is contending
that, even if it is not entitled to one-third of the entire proceeds from the
sale of the farm, it is entitled to some recovery because, under the consent
judgment, defendants received more than they would otherwise have been entitled
to upon the sale of the farm. Plaintiff contends that this extra amount, coming
out of Bridges' share of the proceeds, constitutes a recovery for which it is
entitled to a contingency fee.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
4 However, plaintiff did not move for a directed verdict on
this specific ground. Moreover, plaintiff did not object to the special
interrogatory submitting this issue to the jury. Accordingly, plaintiff cannot
now complain of the trial court's entry of judgment upon the jury's special
verdict on this issue. See Sun v. Bush, 179 Ga.App. 80, 81(4), 345 S.E.2d 85
(1986) (party not entitled to judgment n.o.v. in absence of motion for directed
verdict on issue); Knisely v. Gasser, 198 Ga.App. 795, 796-797(1), 403 S.E.2d
85 (1991) (party waived claim that special verdict was inconsistent with
evidence by failing to timely object to special verdict form).<o:p></o:p></div>
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I am authorized to state that Judge ELDRIDGE joins in this
opinion.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
All Citations<o:p></o:p></div>
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233 Ga.App. 534, 504 S.E.2d 480, 98 FCDR 2844<o:p></o:p></div>
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Footnotes<o:p></o:p></div>
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1<o:p></o:p></div>
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This letter pertinently provides as follows: “Re: Carol B.
Richardson, et al. v. Kenneth S. Bridges, et al., Jackson County Superior
Court.... You have retained us to represent your interests further in the
matter involving the Bridges Estate, and to that end we are proceeding in the
Superior Court of Jackson County as reflected in the copy of the Complaint
enclosed herewith. After conferring with each of you, and with Ms. Richardson
who will assist us in communications with each other, we have agreed to
represent your interests on the following basis: ... Our fee for services in
this matter will be based on the hourly rate of $75.00 per hour for all time
expended in the prosecution of the Superior Court civil action only from here
on out. In addition, and in consideration of the fact that this represents less
than our usual hourly fee, we have also agreed to accept as additional
compensation for services rendered an amount of money equal to one-third of the
value of the proceeds of recovery in your individual behalves, if any. It is understood
that this portion of our fee agreement is contingent only, in that if nothing
is recovered for you in your individual behalves, then our sole compensation
for services rendered in this matter shall be the amount calculated on the
basis of the hourly rate set forth above.... If this arrangement is agreeable
with you, then please indicate by signing your name to the place provided
below, returning the signed copy of this letter for our files and keeping the
enclosed copy for your records.”<o:p></o:p></div>
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2<o:p></o:p></div>
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Another distinction is that Brown involves an attorney fee
contract made at inception of the attorney-client relationship while the
retainer letter at issue in the case sub judice was made during the
attorney-client relationship. Under such circumstances, many jurisdictions
adhere to the view that the fee agreement is presumptively invalid, with the
burden of proving the agreement's validity on the attorney. See annotation,
Validity & Effect or Contract for Attorney's Compensation Made After
Inception of Attorney-Client Relationship, 13 ALR3d 701, 731, § 13(a). No such
presumption arises in Georgia, however, absent proof that the modified fee
agreement was the result of “overreaching, duress, fraud or violation of the
confidential relationship, etc.” O'Kelley v. Evans, 119 Ga.App. 167, 169(2),
166 S.E.2d 392. See Bailey v. Devine, 123 Ga. 653, 656(5) (51 S.E. 603), and 13
ALR3d 701, 737, § 13(c), supra. While the clients contend in the case sub
judice and in their cross-appeal that the retainer letter was the result of
such wrongdoing, we need not address these contentions in light of the
disposition in the case sub judice. See Brown v. Welch, 253 Ga. 118, 119, 317
S.E.2d 520, supra.<o:p></o:p><br />
<br /></div>
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</div>
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&&&&<o:p></o:p><br />
<br />
END</div>
<br />Hugh Woodhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/01021049579391065763noreply@blogger.com2tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2321320695584069696.post-63637530538896896942019-03-16T07:25:00.000-07:002019-03-16T07:25:09.823-07:00Documents for Re: Topic and Paper for 17th Annual General Practice and Trial Institute March 28-30 | St. Simons Island | Offering 12 CLE Hours (12/1/1/3)<br />
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<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: .5in; margin-top: 0in;">
<span style="background: white; color: #222222; font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 14pt;">Attorney’s Fees: Defending and Proving
the Ugly Ones. OCGA § 9-11-68 (Offers of Settlement); OCGA §
9-15-14 (Frivolous Litigation); OGCA § 13-6-11 (Bad Faith); OCGA § 15-19-14
(Notice of Filing Attorney’s Lien), etc. Hugh C. Wood, Wood &
Meredith, LLP, Atlanta (Tucker), GA</span><strong><span style="color: black; font-size: 14.0pt; font-weight: normal;"><o:p></o:p></span></strong></div>
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Hillman et al. v. Bord et al., 820 SE2d 482 (2018)<o:p></o:p></div>
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[ Add Link ]</div>
<br />
$544,000 awarded at OCGA Sec. 9-15-14 Attorney's Fees<br />
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Bubniak v Kamler Superior Court of Cobb County 13-1-8555-52 02192019<br />
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https://drive.google.com/drive/folders/1Vb2B5I2WcYlqFWedRoP6y9gO_kL9689G<br />
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<br />Hugh Woodhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/01021049579391065763noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2321320695584069696.post-5140371913690674902018-07-10T12:50:00.000-07:002018-07-10T12:50:34.499-07:00Navigating [Probate] Court Rules, Processes and Procedures<br />
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<br /></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; text-align: center;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt;">VI. Navigating Court Rules, Processes and Procedures<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; text-align: center;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt;">Written and Presented by Hugh C. Wood in
Atlanta and Macon.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt;">A.<span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>Do You Even Have a Case? Preparing for
Litigation<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt;">B.<span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>Trust/Estate Litigation vs. Civil
Litigation Procedures<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt;">C.<span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>Filing and Responding to the Suit:
Jurisdiction and Pleadings<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt;">D.<span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>Discovery, Depositions and Examinations<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt;">E.<span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>Motion Practice<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt;">F.<span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>Evidence Rules and Admission Tips<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt;">G.<span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>Trial and Appeals: Key Pointers<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt;">H.<span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>Sample Documents<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt;"><br /></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in;">
<a href="https://www.scribd.com/document/383603294/Navigating-Georgia-Probate-Court-Rules-Probate-NBI-2018">Navigating [Georgia Probate] Court Rules :: Probate NBI 2018</a></div>
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<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in;">
<a href="https://www.scribd.com/document/383600441/Exhibit-A-and-Exhibit-B">Exhibit A: Form for a Georgia Last Will and Testament Caveat Exhibit B: Forms for Third Party Discovery in a Georgia Last Will and Testament Dispute</a></div>
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<span style="font-family: Times New Roman, serif;"><br /></span></div>
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<br /></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: center;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">&&&&&<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">IV.<span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>NAVIGATING
COURT RULES, PROCESS, AND PROCEDURES<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>A.<span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>DO YOU
HAVE A CASE?<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>PREPARING FOR LITIGATION<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">The
probate court, unlike the superior court, is a court of limited
jurisdiction.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The superior courts in
Georgia are courts of plenary jurisdiction; however, original jurisdiction as
to probate courts is carved out of the superior court's plenary
jurisdiction.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The types of litigation
that seem relevant to this topic are associated with proving up a will, or
fighting the caveat to a will.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Also
there are issues associated with accounting actions against the executor and
challenges the fiduciaries.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-indent: .5in;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Two
(2) issues that are deeply intertwined with probate concern trusts and title to
land.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Both the trust issues and the
final determination of title to land are, generally, superior court issues not
probate court issues.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>It is perhaps instructive to look at the types of
petitions that may be filed in probate court.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>While one can refer to the statutes it's perhaps more instructive to
simply look at the types of petitions that can be found filed in probate court in
Georgia.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"><a href="http://gaprobate.gov/content/2017-2018-fillable-pdf-standard-forms">http://gaprobate.gov/content/2017-2018-fillable-pdf-standard-forms</a></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%;">
[Note: Clicking on the above link will take you to PDF Downloads at the Council of Probate Court Judges of Georgia]</div>
<br />
<br />
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: 0in; margin-top: 0in;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt;">General
Instructions<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: 0in; margin-top: 0in;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt;">Form 2: Petition
for Temporary Letters of Administration<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: 0in; margin-top: 0in;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt;">Form 3: Petition
for Letters of Administration<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: 0in; margin-top: 0in;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt;">Form 4: Petition
to Probate Will in Common Form<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: 0in; margin-top: 0in;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt;">Form 5: Petition
to Probate Will in Solemn Form<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: 0in; margin-top: 0in;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt;">Form 6: Reserved
See Supplement 6<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: 0in; margin-top: 0in;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt;">Form 7: Petition
to Probate Will in Solemn Form & for Letters of Administration w/ Will
Annexed<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: 0in; margin-top: 0in;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt;">Form 8: Petition
for Letters of Administration with Will Annexed (Will Previously Probated)<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: 0in; margin-top: 0in;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt;">Form 9: Petition
for Order Declaring No Administration Necessary<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: 0in; margin-top: 0in;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt;">Form 10:
Petition for Year's Support<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: 0in; margin-top: 0in;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt;">Form 11:
Petition for the Appointment of an Emergency Guardian and/or Conservator for a
Proposed Ward<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: 0in; margin-top: 0in;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt;">Form 12:
Petition for the Appointment of a Guardian and/or Conservator for a Proposed
Ward<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: 0in; margin-top: 0in;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt;">Form 13:
Petition of Personal Representative for Leave to Sell Property<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: 0in; margin-top: 0in;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt;">Form 14:
Petition of Conservator for Leave to Sell Property or Rent, Lease, or Otherwise
Dispose of Property<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: 0in; margin-top: 0in;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt;">Form 15:
Petition for Leave to Sell Perishable Property by Conservator<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: 0in; margin-top: 0in;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt;">Form 16:
Reserved See Supplement 1<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: 0in; margin-top: 0in;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt;">Form 17:
Petition for Leave to Convey or Encumber Property Previously Set Aside as
Year's Support<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: 0in; margin-top: 0in;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt;">Form 18:
Petition for Presumption of Death of Missing Individual Believed to be Dead<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: 0in; margin-top: 0in;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt;">Form 19:
Petition to Compromise Doubtful Claim of Minor/Ward<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: 0in; margin-top: 0in;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt;">Form 20:
Petition for Leave to Encroach on Corpus<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: 0in; margin-top: 0in;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt;">Form 21: Bond of
Administrators, Conservators, & Executors, Etc.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: 0in; margin-top: 0in;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt;">Form 22:
Petition to Establish Custodial Account for Minor or Incapacitated Adult<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: 0in; margin-top: 0in;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt;">Form 23: GPCSF
23 through 27 Reserved/Relocated<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: 0in; margin-top: 0in;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt;">Form 28:
Petition for Temporary Letters of Guardianship of Minor<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: 0in; margin-top: 0in;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt;">Form 29:
Petition for Permanent Letters of Guardianship of Minor<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: 0in; margin-top: 0in;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt;">Form 30:
Petition for Letters of Conservatorship of Minor<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: 0in; margin-top: 0in;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt;">Form 31:
Application for Permit to Conduct Public Fireworks Display<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: 0in; margin-top: 0in;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt;">Form 32:
Petition by Personal Representative for Waiver of Bond and/or Grant of Certain
Powers<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: 0in; margin-top: 0in;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt;">Form 33:
Petition for Discharge of Personal Representative<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: 0in; margin-top: 0in;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt;">Form 34:
Petition of Conservator for Final Settlement of Accounts and Discharge from
Office and Liability<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: 0in; margin-top: 0in;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt;">Form 35:
Reserved See Supplement 4<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: 0in; margin-top: 0in;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt;">Form 36:
Petition for the Appointment of a Temporary Medical Consent Guardian for a
Proposed Medical Consent Ward<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: 0in; margin-top: 0in;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt;">Form 37: 37
through 52 Reserved/Relocated<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: 0in; margin-top: 0in;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt;">Form 53:
Commission to Administer Oath<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: 0in; margin-top: 0in;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt;">Form 54: Service
upon Minor or Adult Ward through Service Upon Guardian<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: 0in; margin-top: 0in;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt;">Form 55: GPCSF
55 through 57 Reserved/Relocated<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: 0in; margin-top: 0in;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt;">Form 58: Adult
Conservatorship Inventory and Asset Management Plan<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: 0in; margin-top: 0in;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt;">Form 59: Minor
Conservator Inventory and Asset Management Program<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: 0in; margin-top: 0in;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt;">Form 60: GPCSF
60 Reserved<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: 0in; margin-top: 0in;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt;">Form 65:
Petition for the Restoration of an Individual Found to Be in Need of a Guardian
and/or Conservator<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: 0in; margin-top: 0in;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt;">Form 70:
Certificate in Accordance with Uniform Probate Court Rule 5.9(D)<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: 0in; margin-top: 0in;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt;">Form 71:
Petition for Leave to Sell Perishable Property by Personal Representative<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: 0in; margin-top: 0in;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt;">Form 72:
Petition for Determination of Right of Disposition of Remains of a Decedent<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: 0in; margin-top: 0in;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt;">Supplement 1:
Determination by Court that a Person May Act as Guardian or Appointment of
Guardian Ad Litem<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: 0in; margin-top: 0in;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt;">Supplement 2:
Appointment of Special Process Server<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: 0in; margin-top: 0in;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt;">Supplement 3:
Certificate of Service<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: 0in; margin-top: 0in;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt;">Supplement 4:
Guardian/Conservator/Personal Representative Oath<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: 0in; margin-top: 0in;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt;">Supplement 5:
Petition for Letters of Testamentary Guardianship<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: 0in; margin-top: 0in;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt;">Supplement 6:
Interrogatories to Witness to Will<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: 0in; margin-top: 0in;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: 0in; margin-top: 0in;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt;"><o:p><a href="http://gaprobate.gov/content/2017-2018-fillable-pdf-standard-forms">http://gaprobate.gov/content/2017-2018-fillable-pdf-standard-forms</a></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: 0in; margin-top: 0in;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt;"><o:p><br /></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>From the Georgia probate judges’ website we found they
have 72 forms (above) for the filing of probate claims.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The most common in terms of this type of
litigation arise out of <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-indent: .5in;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">Form 5: Petition to
Probate a Will in Solemn Form; and,<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-indent: .5in;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">Form 7:<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Petition to Probate a Will in Solemn Form
& For Letters of Administration with Will Attached (previously known
as:<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Administration CTA).<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>While adult guardianship and adult conservator (Form 11
and Form 12) consume a great deal of activity in the probate court, it's
difficult to discuss their highly particular litigation in terms of our review
of litigation in this short topic.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-left: .75in; mso-list: l0 level1 lfo1; text-indent: -.25in;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman";"><span style="mso-list: Ignore;">1.<span style="font: 7.0pt "Times New Roman";"> </span></span></span><!--[endif]--><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">Presumption
of Probate<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>Before a caveat asserting undue influence arises, the
Propounder of the will must come forward and establish the <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">factum</i> of the will.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The Propounder
must prove that the document and the attendant circumstances in order to set up
the <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">prima facie</i> case for the validity
of the will.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Once that is established the
burden shifts to those challenging the will (caveators) to come forward with
evidence, such as undue influence, to invalidate the existence of the <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">prima</i> facie will.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">Ellers
v. Rheinberger</i>, 204 Ga. 226, 49 S.E.2d 535 (1948).<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: .75in; mso-list: l0 level1 lfo1; text-indent: -.25in;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman";"><span style="mso-list: Ignore;">2.<span style="font: 7.0pt "Times New Roman";">
</span></span></span><!--[endif]--><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Caveat Litigation<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>The most common form of challenge in probate (within
litigation) is probably the challenge the will itself by caveat.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The petition to probate the will in solemn
form (Form 5) or (Form 7) is filed and a <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">prima
facie</i> case is made out for the probate of the will.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>That is, the petitioner proves up the death
of the decedent, that the decedent authored a written document that is a
will.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The petitioner shows that the
testator signed the will in the presence of <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">sui
juris</i> witnesses who testify that they saw the testator execute the will and
then Propounder moves the will into the court as the testator's last request
for the disposition of his or her property.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span><o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-indent: .5in;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Once
that <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">prima facie</i> case has been made
the heirs are then served by law and if no objection the will goes forward as
the last instructions of the testator.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>However, in litigation we generally receive a caveat.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>In Georgia caveats are required to be filed
10 days after the heirs are served (as discussed below, an answer may be posed
within 25 days in some circumstances).<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-indent: .5in;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Caveat
challenges include.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The Will was not
attested correctly according to law; that is, one of the required witnesses is
missing or that witness was not qualified to witness the will in question; <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-indent: .5in;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">The formalities of the
Will were not followed;<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-indent: .5in;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">The document propounded
is not a Last Will and Testament (is may be missing necessary language);<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-indent: .5in;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">One or more of the
witnesses was incompetent at the time the Will was witnessed (this may also
disqualify the self-proving affidavit, if one is presented for Probate);<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-indent: .5in;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">The Testator was unduly
influenced to make the Will propounded;<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-indent: .5in;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">The Testator was unduly
influenced to insert certain bequest and/or legacies in the Will, which were
not the intent of the Testator;<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-indent: .5in;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">The Testator was insane
or incompetent to make a Will at the time it was attested;<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-indent: .5in;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">The Testator was so
weak and infirm that the Testator could not have known what was in the Will at
the time he or she signed it;<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-indent: .5in;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">The Testator did not
know what he or she was signing at the time it was attested;<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-indent: .5in;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">The will was revoked by
tearing or burning or was revoked by a will that was executed AFTER the date of
the propounded Will and thus the propounded Will is not the final Last Will and
Testament of the Testator.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-indent: .5in;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;"><a href="http://hughwood.blogspot.com/2016/05/how-to-file-caveat-objection-to-last.html">http://hughwood.blogspot.com/2016/05/how-to-file-caveat-objection-to-last.html</a>
; Hinkel, Daniel F., <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">Ga. Probate &
Administration: Georgia Probate and Administration with Forms</i> § 4:1 (4th
ed.)(2015).<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-indent: .5in;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">A Form Fill-in for a
Caveat is Attached.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Exhibit A.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-left: 1.0in; mso-list: l0 level1 lfo1; text-indent: -.25in;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman";"><span style="mso-list: Ignore;">3.<span style="font: 7.0pt "Times New Roman";"> </span></span></span><!--[endif]--><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">Opening
Default in Caveat<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>A caveat is barred if not filed within ten (10) days of
service on the heir or beneficiary.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>However, it can, under some circumstances, be extended to twenty-five
(25) days.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>The methods to open default in superior court allow a
party that is beyond the 30 days to file an answer <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>(which is granted as a matter of right) to
open default under O.C.G.A. §9-11-55.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>If
the party filing the motion pays the cost the case opens.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The default is set aside and an answer
entered.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Until the 1990’s it was an unanswered
question whether default could be opened in caveat litigation.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>In <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">Green
et al. v. Woodward</i>, 198 Ga.App. 427, 41 S.E.2d 617 (1991) (concerning the
opening of default on a petition for year support) the Court of Appeals applied
O.C.G.A. §9-11-55(a) to probate court pleading and said that default could be
opened.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>In a more recent case, <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">In Re Estate of Loyd</i>, 328 Ga.App. 287,
761 S.E.2d 833 (2014), the Court of Appeals specifically reviewed the ability
of the probate section on default O.C.G.A. §15-9-47 and compared it to O.C.G.A.
§9-11-55(b) and found that default in probate may be opened by the payment of
costs in filing of an answer.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The
practical effect of <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">In Re Loyd, supra</i>,
is that all is not lost if you encounter a caveator between the 10th and 25th
day.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>A caveat may be successfully
interposed by opening default and paying for costs.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: 0in; margin-top: 0in;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt;">B.<span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>TRUST\ESTATE LITIGATION VERSUS <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: 0in; margin-top: 0in; text-indent: .5in;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt;">CIVIL LITIGATION
PROCEDURES <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: 0in; margin-top: 0in;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>Any discussion of jurisdiction in probate court needs to
start with the overview that probate court has exclusive jurisdiction of probate
of wills and of guardians of adults and minors and that the superior court has
exclusive jurisdiction of trusts.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>In probate court we revisit the distinction between Metro
(above 90,000 residents and rural below 90,000 residents) jurisdiction in Georgia.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Wherever you file (or defend) be aware that
O.C.G.A. § 15-9-120(2) separates Georgia probate courts based on
population.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Large county (Metro)
counties act as superior courts (within limited probate jurisdiction) and
appeals are taken directly to the Georgia Court of Appeals.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Rural probate courts (populations less than
90,000) are akin to magistrate courts and appeals are taken to the superior
court by Writ of Certiorari.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: .5in; margin-top: 0in;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">O.C.G.A.<i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"> §
15-9-120. Definitions<o:p></o:p></i></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: .5in; margin-top: 0in;">
<i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">As used in this
article, the term:<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: .5in; margin-top: 0in;">
<i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">(1)<span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>"Civil case" means those civil
matters:<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: .5in; margin-top: 0in;">
<i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">(A)<span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>Over which the judge of the probate court
exercises judicial powers;<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: .5in; margin-top: 0in;">
<i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">(B)<span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>Within the original, exclusive, or
general subject matter jurisdiction of the probate court; and<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: .5in; margin-top: 0in;">
<i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">(C)<span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>Which, if not for this article and Code
Section 5-6-33, could be appealed to superior court for a de novo investigation
with the right to a jury trial under Code Sections 5-3-2 and 5-3-29.<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: .5in; margin-top: 0in;">
<i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">(2)<span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>"Probate court" means a
probate court of a county having a population of more than 90,000 persons
according to the United States decennial census of 2010 or any future such
census in which the judge thereof has been admitted to the practice of law for
at least seven years.<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>The original jurisdiction of probate is stated at
O.C.G.A. §15-9-30.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>In its most general
form it covers all probative wills, granting of letters testamentary and
administration of wills and resolving controversies concerning executors and
administrators associated with those.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>With regard to venue – the question arises: where do you
file when someone dies? Generally, and historically, the probate estate opens
in the county where the individual died.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>O.C.G.A. § 15-9-31.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>However, the
general assembly – being aware that many elderly pass away in nursing homes not
near their resident county – allowed for venue to exist either county –
historical residence or nursing home residence.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>No longer do you have to follow the anomaly that if a decedent passes
away in a distant county that probate is required in the distant county.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>O.C.G.A. §15-9-31 and 32.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>In the event a non-resident decedent is
required of probate, that probate may be originated in any county in Georgia
where property is found.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: .5in; margin-top: 0in;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">O.C.G.A. <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">§
15-9-30. Subject-Matter Jurisdiction; Powers and Duties Generally; Copy of
Official Code of Georgia Annotated Furnished for Each Judge<o:p></o:p></i></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: .5in; margin-top: 0in;">
<i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">(a)<span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>Probate courts have authority, unless
otherwise provided by law, to exercise original, exclusive, and general
jurisdiction of the following subject matters:<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: .5in; margin-top: 0in;">
<i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">(1)<span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>The probate of wills;<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: .5in; margin-top: 0in;">
<i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">(2)<span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>The granting of letters testamentary and
of administration and the repeal or revocation of the same;<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: .5in; margin-top: 0in;">
<i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">(3)<span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>All controversies in relation to the
right of executorship or administration;<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: .5in; margin-top: 0in;">
<i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">(4)<span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>The sale and disposition of the property
belonging to, and the distribution of, deceased persons' estates;<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: .5in; margin-top: 0in;">
<i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">(5)<span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>The appointment and removal of guardians
of minors , conservators of minors, guardians of incapacitated adults, and
conservators of incapacitated adults and persons who are incompetent because of
mental illness or intellectual disability;<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: .5in; margin-top: 0in;">
<i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">(6)<span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>All controversies as to the right of
guardianship and conservatorship, except that the probate court shall not be an
appropriate court to take action under Code Section 19-7-4;<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: .5in; margin-top: 0in;">
<i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">(7)<span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>The auditing and passing of returns of
all executors, administrators, guardians of property, conservators, and
guardians;<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: .5in; margin-top: 0in;">
<i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">(8)<span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>The discharge of former sureties and the
requiring of new sureties from administrators , guardians of property,
conservators, and guardians;<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: .5in; margin-top: 0in;">
<i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">(9)<span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>All matters as may be conferred on them
by Chapter 3 of Title 37;<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: .5in; margin-top: 0in;">
<i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">(10)<span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>All other matters and things as appertain
or relate to estates of deceased persons and to persons who are incompetent
because of mental illness or intellectual disability; and<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: .5in; margin-top: 0in;">
<i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">(11)<span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>All matters as may be conferred on them by
the Constitution and laws.<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: .5in; margin-top: 0in;">
<i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">(b)<span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>In addition to the jurisdiction granted
in subsection (a) of this Code section and unless otherwise provided by law,
the probate courts shall have the power to carry out the following duties as
assigned by specific laws:<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: .5in; margin-top: 0in;">
<i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">(1)<span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>Perform county governmental
administration duties;<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: .5in; margin-top: 0in;">
<i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">(2)<span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>Perform duties relating to elections;<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: .5in; margin-top: 0in;">
<i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">(3)<span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>Fill vacancies in public offices by
appointment;<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: .5in; margin-top: 0in;">
<i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">(4)<span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>Administer oaths to public officers;<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: .5in; margin-top: 0in;">
<i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">(5)<span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>Accept, file, approve, and record bonds
of public officers;<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: .5in; margin-top: 0in;">
<i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">(6)<span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>Register and permit certain enterprises;<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: .5in; margin-top: 0in;">
<i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">(7)<span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>Issue marriage licenses;<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: .5in; margin-top: 0in;">
<i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">(8)<span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>Hear traffic cases;<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: .5in; margin-top: 0in;">
<i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">(9)<span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>Receive pleas of guilty and impose
sentences in cases of violations of game and fish laws;<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: .5in; margin-top: 0in;">
<i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">(10)<span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>Hold criminal commitment hearings; and<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: .5in; margin-top: 0in;">
<i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">(11)<span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>Perform such other judicial and ministerial
functions as may be provided by law.<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: .5in; margin-top: 0in;">
<i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">(c)<span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>To assure proper administration of the
court's duties, the judge of the probate court of each county shall be
furnished a copy of the Official Code of Georgia Annotated and annual
supplements to the Code to keep it current. The costs of such Code and
maintenance thereof shall be paid by the governing authority of each such
county from the county library fund, if sufficient, otherwise any additional
amount required shall be paid from the general funds of the county.<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>Thorny issues associated with trusts.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>It is unfortunate, this author has had a
number of cases where trusts and probate litigation runs on dual tracks in both
the superior and probate court, but exclusive jurisdiction over trusts is found
in the superior courts.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Despite requests
for modifications of this provision in the general assembly, there seems to be
no change to jurisdiction of trusts in superior court and jurisdiction of
probate in probate court for the foreseeable future.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The practitioner should be aware that if
dispute arising with regard to a trust (they are very common in probate) only
the superior court has jurisdiction over the trust.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>O.C.G.A. § 53-12-6.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>In these rather cumbersome dual litigation
matters, this author can only suggest you work with (as much as possible)
opposing counsel and try to coordinate the orders of the superior and probate
court on issues such as timing, scheduling and particularly discovery.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Having the discovery available for use in
both superior and probate court and providing for similar timing issues in
discovery is very helpful.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>However, such
coordination is at the pleasure of both the probate and superior court judge
and opposing counsel.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>In some counties,
probate judge will allow him or herself to be designated by the superior court
for that particular claim. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: .5in; margin-top: 0in;">
<i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">O.C.G.A. §
53-12-6. Jurisdiction of Suits by or Against Trustee<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: .5in; margin-top: 0in;">
<i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">(a)<span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>Trusts are peculiarly subjects of equity
jurisdiction. Suits by or against a trustee which sound at law may be filed in
a court of law.<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: .5in; margin-top: 0in;">
<i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">(b)<span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>Actions concerning the construction,
administration, or internal affairs of a trust shall be maintained in superior
court except as otherwise provided in Code Section 15-9-127.<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: .5in; margin-top: 0in;">
<i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">(c)<span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>Any action by or against the trustee or
to which the trustee is a party may be maintained in any court having
jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter except as provided in
subsection (b) of this Code section.<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-indent: .5in;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Concurrent
Jurisdiction between Superior And Probate Court.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The general assembly has declared certain
jurisdiction overlaps between superior and probate court with regard to trust
and estates.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>O.C.G.A. § 15-9-127.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>For example, declaratory judgments with
regard to fiduciaries; tax motivated estate planning; approval of settlement
agreements; appointment of a new trust; conversion to a unitrust (a tax issues
associated with converting a low interest distributions to a higher paying
distribution) and adjudication of petitions for directions of construction of a
will, are concurrent.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: .5in; margin-top: 0in;">
<i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">O.C.G.A. § 15-9-127.
Additional Concurrent Jurisdiction with Superior Courts<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: .5in; margin-top: 0in;">
<i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">Probate courts
subject to this article shall have concurrent jurisdiction with superior courts
with regard to the proceedings for:<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: .5in; margin-top: 0in;">
<i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">(1)<span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>Declaratory judgments involving
fiduciaries pursuant to Code Sections 9-4-4, 9-4-5, and 9-4-6 ;<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: .5in; margin-top: 0in;">
<i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">(2)<span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>Tax motivated estate planning
dispositions of wards' property pursuant to Code Sections 29-3-36 and 29-5-36 ;<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: .5in; margin-top: 0in;">
<i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">(3)<span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>Approval of settlement agreements
pursuant to former Code Section 53-3-22 as such existed on December 31, 1997,
if applicable, or Code Section 53-5-25<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: .5in; margin-top: 0in;">
<i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">(4)<span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>Appointment of new trustee to replace
trustee pursuant to Code Section 53-12-201;<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: .5in; margin-top: 0in;">
<i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">(5)<span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>Acceptance of the resignation of a
trustee upon written request of the beneficiaries pursuant to Code Section
53-12-220;<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: .5in; margin-top: 0in;">
<i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">(6)<span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>Acceptance of resignation of a trustee
upon petition of the trustee pursuant to Code Section 53-12-220;<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: .5in; margin-top: 0in;">
<i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">(7)<span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>Motions seeking an order for
disinterment and deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) testing as provided in Code
Section 53-2-27 ;<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: .5in; margin-top: 0in;">
<i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">(8)<span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>Conversion to a unitrust and related
matters pursuant to Code Section 53-12-362; and<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: .5in; margin-top: 0in;">
<i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">(9)<span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>Adjudication of petitions for direction
or construction of a will pursuant to Code Section 23-2-92.<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>Superior courts have broader powers to modify a trust
than this author ever imagined.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Early on
I was surprised at, despite language in a trust that says it was irrevocable
and not subject to modification, trust practitioners (far superior to this
author) were able to go in superior court completely modify the trust and come
out with something not resembling the original trust.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Be aware that O.C.G.A. § 53-12-62 allows very
substantial changes to a trust if the trustee or some interested party can show
that the trust no longer makes sense in the present for the reason that is was
designed.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: .5in; margin-top: 0in;">
<i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">O.C.G.A. §
53-12-62. Modification by Court; Petition for Modification by Trustee; Notice
of Petition to Modify<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: .5in; margin-top: 0in;">
<i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">(a)<span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>The court may:<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: .5in; margin-top: 0in;">
<i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">(1)<span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>Modify the administrative or dispositive
provisions of a trust if, owing to circumstances not known to or anticipated by
the settlor, compliance with the provisions of the trust would defeat or
substantially impair the accomplishment of the purposes of such trust;<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: .5in; margin-top: 0in;">
<i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">(2)<span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>Modify the administrative provisions of
a trust if continuation of the trust under its existing provisions would impair
such trust's administration; or<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: .5in; margin-top: 0in;">
<i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">(3)<span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>Modify the trust by the appointment of
an additional trustee or special fiduciary if the court considers the
appointment necessary for the administration of the trust.<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: .5in; margin-top: 0in;">
<i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">(b)<span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>A petition for modification may be filed
by the trustee or any beneficiary or, in the case of an unfunded testamentary
trust, the personal representative of the settlor's estate.<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: .5in; margin-top: 0in;">
<i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">(c)<span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>Notice of a petition to modify the trust
shall be given to the trustee and all beneficiaries.<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: .5in; margin-top: 0in;">
<i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">(d)<span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>The court may modify the trust
regardless of whether it contains spendthrift provisions or other similar
protective provisions.<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: .5in; margin-top: 0in;">
<i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">(e)<span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>An order for modification shall conform
as nearly as practicable to the intention of the settlor.<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-indent: .5in;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Or,
that significant changes need to be made because of changes with regard to the
beneficiary, his or her income, changes in the ownership property that
dramatically affect the trust and its usefulness or (rather common) significant
tax changes.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>So, when sometimes it seems
all else fails, simply go in and modify or destroy the trust.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>I've seen it done more than once.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-left: 1.0in; text-indent: -.5in;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">C.<span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>FILING AND RESPONDING TO THE SUIT;
JURISDICTION AND PLEADINGS<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>See. Section B.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-indent: .5in;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">D.<span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>DISCOVERY, DEPOSITIONS AND EXAMINATIONS<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-indent: .5in;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Discovery
in Probate.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>After the caveat (or
whatever form of Petition is filed and opposed) is filed the case then proceeds
forward into discovery.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The petitioner
has already met his or her burden of proof by proving up the existence and the
attestation of the will.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The caveator now
has the burden of proof to prove its caveat survives and defeats the will.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The great bulk of probate caveat litigation
turns on whether the caveator can carry his or her burden.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>It is important to note that discovery moves along in a
very similar pathway in probate court in Georgia as the pathway to superior
courts.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>While the superior courts are
governed by the Uniform Superior Court Rules, the probate courts are governed
by the Uniform Probate Court Rules.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>The
full Uniform Probate Court Rules may be found at this URL:<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-indent: .5in;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">https:www.georgiacourts.org/content/uniform-rules-probate-court<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>Civil discovery works in a similar fashion as in superior
court.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>However, be aware that in
non-Article 6 probate courts (probate courts and counties with less than 90,000
individuals in population) discovery only runs for two (2) months.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>In other courts discovery runs for six (6)
months as is similar to the superior courts.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>The rules on civil discovery and probate court being
uniform probate court Rules 7.1 through 7.4 are reproduced below:<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: .5in; margin-top: 0in;">
<i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt;">Rule
7. Civil Discovery<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: .5in; margin-top: 0in;">
<i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt;">7.1
Time for discovery.<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: .5in; margin-top: 0in;">
<i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>(A) In non-Article 6 Probate Courts, in
order for a party to utilize the court's compulsory process to compel
discovery, any desired discovery procedures must first be commenced promptly,
pursued diligently and completed without unnecessary delay, and within two (2)<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: .5in; margin-top: 0in;">
<i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt;">months
after the filing of the answer, unless for cause shown the time has been
extended or shortened by court order.<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: .5in; margin-top: 0in;">
<i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>(B) In Article 6 Probate Courts as
defined in Rule 2.7, in order for a party to utilize the court's compulsory
process to compel discovery, any desired discovery procedures must first be
commenced promptly, pursued diligently and completed without unnecessary delay,
and within six (6) months after the filing of the answer, objection, or other
response. At any time, the court, in its discretion, may extend, reopen or
shorten the time for discovery.<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: .5in; margin-top: 0in;">
<i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt;">7.2
Filing requirements.<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: .5in; margin-top: 0in;">
<i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>(A) Depositions and other original
discovery material shall not be filed with the court unless or until required
by the provisions of OCGA § 9-11-29.1 (a) (1)-(5).<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: .5in; margin-top: 0in;">
<i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>(B) A party serving interrogatories,
requests for production of documents, requests for admission, and answers or
responses thereto upon counsel, a party or a non-party may file with the court
a certificate indicating the pleading which was served, the date of service (or
that the same has been delivered for service with the summons), and the persons
served.<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: .5in; margin-top: 0in;">
<i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt;">7.3
Depositions upon oral examination.<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: .5in; margin-top: 0in;">
<i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Unless otherwise authorized by the court
or stipulated by the parties, the duration of a deposition is limited to one
(1) day of seven (7) hours. The court must allow additional time if needed for
a fair examination of the deponent or if the deponent or another person or other
circumstance impedes or delays the examination.<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: .5in; margin-top: 0in;">
<i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt;">7.4
Failure to make discovery and motion to compel discovery.<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: .5in; margin-top: 0in;">
<i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>(A) Prior to filing a motion to compel
discovery, counsel for the moving party shall confer with counsel for the
opposing party in a good faith effort to resolve the matters involved. At the
time of filing the motion, counsel shall also file a statement certifying that
such conference has occurred, and that the effort to resolve by agreement the
issues raised failed. If some of the issues have been resolved by agreement,
the statement shall specify the issues remaining unresolved.<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: .5in; margin-top: 0in;">
<i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>(B) Motions to compel discovery in
accordance with OCGA § 9-11-37 shall:<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: .5in; margin-top: 0in;">
<i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>1. Quote verbatim or attach a copy as an
exhibit of each interrogatory, request for admission, or request for production
to which objection is taken;<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: .5in; margin-top: 0in;">
<i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>2. Include the specific objection or
response said to be insufficient;<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: .5in; margin-top: 0in;">
<i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>3. Include the grounds assigned for the
objection (if not apparent from the objection); and<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: .5in; margin-top: 0in;">
<i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>4.
Include the reasons assigned as supporting the motion. Such objections and
grounds shall be addressed to the specific interrogatory, request for
admission, or request for production and may not be made generally.<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: .5in; margin-top: 0in;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>Cases proceed such as superior court cases through motion
hearings and motions for summary judgment.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>Uniform Probate Court Rule 6.5.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>However note:<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>unlike superior
courts that generally provide court reporters at any significant motion
hearing, please be aware that court reporters are almost always the election of
the party in probate court.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Uniform
Probate Court Rule 10.4.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-indent: .5in;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">This
author does not know if there's any particular hard and fast rule in
probate.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Metro probate courts tend to
have a court reporter available and Article 2 probate courts almost never have
a court reporter available unless you request one.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Simply be advised that if you are proceeding
to a hearing in a rule probate court and you haven't reserved a court reporter
you may be forced to rely on a recording device brought by the probate judge or
you may need to obtain your own court reporter.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>FORMS: <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: 0in; margin-top: 0in; text-indent: .5in;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt;">Form Request for
Production of Documents [Medical Records]; and,<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 2;"> </span>Forms to Take Deposition
of Medical Records or Attorney with Records.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span><o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: 0in; margin-top: 0in; text-indent: .5in;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt;">Exhibit B.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: 0in; margin-top: 0in; text-indent: .5in;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-indent: .5in;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">E.<span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>MOTION PRACTICE IN PROBATE<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; text-indent: .5in;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Motion
practice is highly similar to superior court motion practice.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>However, be aware that in a rural probate
court (less than 90,000 population), you may find that the hearing or trial
arrives before your time to respond (or file a motion) runs.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>This
is because the court can schedule the hearing after the two (2) month discovery
period. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-indent: .5in;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">Relevant rules on
Probate Motion practice are:<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: 0in; margin-right: .5in; margin-top: 0in; text-indent: .5in;">
<i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt;">Rule 6. Motions and Applications<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: .5in; margin-top: 0in; text-indent: .5in;">
<i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt;">6.1 Filing.<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: .5in; margin-top: 0in; text-indent: .5in;">
<i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Every
motion made prior to trial, except those consented to by all parties, when
filed shall include or be accompanied by citations of supporting authorities
and, where allegations of unstipulated fact are relied upon, supporting
affidavits, or citations to evidentiary materials of record. The clerk shall
promptly upon filing furnish a copy provided by the attorney of such motions
and related materials to the judge.<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: .5in; margin-top: 0in; text-indent: .5in;">
<i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt;">6.2 Reply.<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: .5in; margin-top: 0in; text-indent: .5in;">
<i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Unless
otherwise ordered by the judge, each party opposing a motion shall serve and
file a response, reply memorandum, affidavits, or other responsive material not
later than thirty (30) days after service of the motion.<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: .5in; margin-top: 0in; text-indent: .5in;">
<i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt;">6.3 Hearing.<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: .5in; margin-top: 0in; text-indent: .5in;">
<i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Unless
otherwise ordered by the court, all motions in civil actions, including those
for summary judgment, may be decided by the court without oral hearing, except
motions for new trial and motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict.<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: .5in; margin-top: 0in; text-indent: .5in;">
<i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>Provided, however, oral argument on a motion for summary judgment shall
be permitted upon written request made in a separate pleading bearing the
caption of the case and entitled “Request for Oral Hearing”, and provided that
such pleading is filed with the motion for summary judgment or filed not later
than five (5) days after the time for response.<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: .5in; margin-top: 0in; text-indent: .5in;">
<i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt;">6.4 Motions for summary judgment.<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: .5in; margin-top: 0in; text-indent: .5in;">
<i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Upon any
motion for summary judgment pursuant to the Georgia Civil Practice Act, there
shall be annexed to the notice of motion a separate, short and concise
statement of each theory of recovery and of each of the material facts as to
which the moving party contends there is no genuine issue to be tried. The
response shall include a separate, short and concise statement of each of the
material facts as to which it is contended there exists a genuine issue to be
tried.<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: .5in; margin-top: 0in; text-indent: .5in;">
<i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt;">6.5 Time for filing summary judgment motions.<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: .5in; margin-top: 0in; text-indent: .5in;">
<i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Motions
for summary judgment shall be filed sufficiently early so as not to delay the
trial. No trial shall be continued by reason of the delayed filing of a motion
for summary judgment.<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: .5in; margin-top: 0in; text-indent: .5in;">
<i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt;">6.6 Motions in emergencies.<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: .5in; margin-top: 0in; text-indent: .5in;">
<i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Upon
written notice and good cause shown, the judge may shorten or waive the time
requirement applicable to emergency motions, except motions for summary
judgment, or grant an immediate hearing on any matter requiring such expedited
procedure. The motion shall set forth in detail the necessity for such
expedited procedure.<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: .5in; margin-top: 0in; text-indent: .5in;">
<i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt;">6.7 Motions for new trial (applies to Article 6
Probate Courts only). <o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: .5in; margin-top: 0in; text-indent: .5in;">
<i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt;">[ * * *] <o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: .5in; margin-top: 0in; text-indent: .5in;">
<i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt;">6.8 Default judgments pursuant to OCGA § 15-9-47. [*
* *]<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: .5in; margin-top: 0in; text-indent: .5in;">
<i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt;">6.9 Leaves of absence. [ * * * ]<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: .5in; margin-top: 0in; text-indent: .5in;">
<i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt;">6.10 Recusal. [ * * * ]<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: .5in; margin-top: 0in; text-indent: .5in;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; text-indent: .5in;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt;">F.<span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>EVIDENCE RULES AND ADMISSION TIPS<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: 0in; margin-right: .5in; margin-top: 0in;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: 0in; margin-right: .5in; margin-top: 0in;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>Georgia revised its Evidence Code in
2012 – after years and years of demands to bring the Georgia Evidence Code into
the modern age.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The fundamental change
is that current Georgia Evidence Code parallels the Federal Evidence Code which
became law in 1973 (and replaced the Field Code).<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Georgia retains a few evidence issues not
conforming to the Federal Rules.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>For
every change you wish to read, it may be found at:<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Milich, Paul S. <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">Ga S. U. Law Rev</i>., 2 Winter 2012 Article 3, Vol. 28.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: 0in; margin-right: .5in; margin-top: 0in;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: 0in; margin-right: .5in; margin-top: 0in; text-indent: .5in;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt;"><a href="https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol28/iss2/3/">https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol28/iss2/3/</a><o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: 0in; margin-right: .5in; margin-top: 0in;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: 0in; margin-right: .5in; margin-top: 0in;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>The entire code is found at Chapter
24.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: 0in; margin-right: .5in; margin-top: 0in;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: 0in; margin-top: 0in;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt;">CODE OF GEORGIA
(2015)<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: 0in; margin-top: 0in;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt;">Title 24.
Evidence (§§ 24-1-1 - 24-14-47)<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: 0in; margin-top: 0in;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Chapter 1. Generally (§§ 24-1-1 - 24-1-106)<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: 0in; margin-top: 0in;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Chapter 2. Judicial Notice (§§ 24-2-201 -
24-2-221)<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: 0in; margin-top: 0in;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Chapter 3. Parol Evidence (§§ 24-3-1 -
24-3-10)<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: 0in; margin-top: 0in;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Chapter 4. Relevant Evidence (§§ 24-4-401 -
24-4-417)<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: 0in; margin-top: 0in;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Chapter 5. Privilege (§§ 24-5-501 - 24-5-510)<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: 0in; margin-top: 0in;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Chapter 6. Witnesses (§§ 24-6-601 - 24-6-658)<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: 0in; margin-top: 0in;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Chapter 7. Opinions or Inferences And Expert
Testimony (§§ 24-7-701 - 24-7-707)<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: 0in; margin-top: 0in;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Chapter 8. Hearsay (§§ 24-8-801 - 24-8-826)<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: 0in; margin-top: 0in;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Chapter 9. Authentication And Identification
(§§ 24-9-901 - 24-9-924)<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: 0in; margin-top: 0in;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Chapter 10. Best Evidence Rule (§§ 24-10-1001
- 24-10-1008)<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: 0in; margin-top: 0in;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Chapter 11. Establishment of Lost Records (§§
24-11-1 - 24-11-29)<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Chapter 12. Medical and Other Confidential
Information (§§ 24-12-1 - 24-12-31)<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Chapter 13. Securing Attendance of Witnesses
And Production And Preservation Of Evidence (§§ 24-13-1 - 24-13-154)<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Chapter 14. Proof Generally (§§ 24-14-1 -
24-14-47)<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>With regard to probate there are few differences
concerning the introduction of evidence in a bench trial and jury trial from
that of superior court. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>As a matter of practice, this author has noticed that
evidentiary issues in Probate Court are less problematic than in superior
court.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Perhaps the reasons is that in
mediation – hearsay is admissible.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>And,
in bench trials, the Judge will generally “hear” the evidence and decide later
whether it should be technically admissible.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>That is certainly allowed in a bench trial. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>Handwriting expert proof becomes extremely technical and
be prepared for significant opposition to a handwriting expert if you propose
one/oppose one.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Medical testimony can
be problematic.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The issue with medical
testimony may turn on whether the doctor knew or was a treating physician prior
to the testator’s death.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>And, statements
the deceased testator made to third parties prior to death.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Until the Dead Man’s Rule was replaced in
1979, such comments were completely barred.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>While now they are admitted, they are still viewed with some
skepticism.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Most of those statements
are self serving. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt;">G.<span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>TRIAL AND APPEALS: KEY POINTERS<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; text-indent: .5in;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Concerning the strategy with regard to
trial and a potential appeal, the most important jurisdictional issue to look
at initially is whether the probate court is a metro or rural probate
court.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>While those are not terms of art,
a metro court (being a court in a county in excess of 90,000 people) is a probate
court designated under O.C.G.A. § 15-9-120(2).<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>That is, a court in a county of a population in excess of 90,000
people.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">A rural (less than 90,000) probate
appeal is by writ of certiorari to the superior court.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">On a <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">de
novo</i> appeal from a rural probate court to the superior court of the county,
the review of the record of the issues is not limited to the matters that were
presented to the probate court.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>On a <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">de novo</i> appeal to the superior court the
superior court may consider new evidence not related to those issues that were
raised before the probate court.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>O.C.G.A. § 5-3-29; <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">Garren v.
Garren</i>, 316 Ga.App. 646, 730 S.E.2d 123 (2012).<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; text-indent: .5in;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">The court of appeals wrote:<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">An
appeal taken from the probate court to superior court comes up de novo where
the issues are tried anew as if no trial had been had.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>"It is not the province of the superior
court on such appeal to review and affirm …, but to try the issue anew and pass
original judgments on the questions involved as if there had been no previous
trial."<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>All competent evidence may
be introduced in the superior court whether or not it was submitted before the
probate court.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in;">
<i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Garren, supra</span></i><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">,
at 126.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">An Article 6 probate court (over 90,000
in population) <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>has the ability to seat a
jury and its judgments are final just as the superior court.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Appeals are taken directly from an Article 6
court to the Georgia Court of Appeals.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>In a "rule" probate court, being a county with less than
90,000 citizens, that court does not have the power to seat a jury and an
appeal is by writ of certiorari to the superior court of the county.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt;">O.C.G.A.
§ 5-3-2. Right to Appeal From Probate Courts; Exception<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
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<br /></div>
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<i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt;">(a)<span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>An appeal shall lie to the superior
court from any decision made by the probate court, except an order appointing a
temporary administrator.<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: .5in; margin-top: 0in;">
<i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt;">(b)<span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>Notwithstanding subsection (a) of this
Code section, no appeal from the probate court to the superior court shall lie
from any civil case in a probate court which is provided for by Article 6 of
Chapter 9 of Title 15.<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
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<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; text-indent: .5in;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">Once a case is taken up on final appeal,
the ordinary rules of appellate procedure apply to direct appeal from the metro
probate court to the Georgia Court of Appeals.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>O.C.G.A. § 15-9-123(b).<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt;">O.C.G.A.
§ 15-9-123. Appeal<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
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<br /></div>
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<i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt;">(a)<span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>Either party to a civil case in the
probate court shall have the right of appeal to the Supreme Court or the Court
of Appeals, as provided by Chapter 6 of Title 5.<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
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<i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt;">(b)<span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>The general laws and rules of appellate
practice and procedure which are applicable to cases appealed from the superior
courts of this state shall be applicable to and govern appeals of civil cases
from the probate courts.<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
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<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; text-indent: .5in;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">There is no appeal from an order
admitting a Will to probate in common form.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>Rather where a Will has been admitted to probate in common form, and the
propounder does not thereafter alter the Will or probate in solid form, an
adverse party may petition the probate court for the issuance of a citation to
the propounder of the Will to offer the Will in solid form.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>It is from the petition to offer the probate
of a Will in solid form from which the right of appeal lies.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>10 Ga.Jur. Georgia Juris Prudence: Decedent's
Estates and Trusts § 5:27.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>March 2018.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; text-indent: .5in;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">The pathway for an appeal the Georgia
Court of Appeals has changed dramatically in the last few years.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>For as long as the Georgia Constitution has
existed and been amended (there have been ten (10) Georgia Constitutions
through the 1983 Constitution) challenges to wills and titles to land have been
a direct appeal to the Georgia Supreme Court.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>That pathway was eliminated on January 1, 2017.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>With the passage of the <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">Appellate Jurisdiction Reform Act of 2016</i> the pathway for probate,
divorce and land title appeals changed dramatically.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>In the past, practitioners were able to take
appeals of "will" or "no will" directly to the Georgia
Supreme Court.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The same direct appeal
was true of land titles and to a limited extent divorces.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>(Some years ago the Georgia Supreme Court
eliminated direct appeals of divorces through a pilot project that has now been
folded into the new legislation).<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>With
the new amendments to O.C.G.A. § 15-3-3.1, probate practitioners should not
docket appellate will contests in the Georgia Supreme Court.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>They should, however, be docketed in the
Georgia Court of Appeals.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The
modification and revisions to the statute read as follows:<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt;">O.C.G.A.§
15-3-3.1.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>(Effective January 1, 2017)
Appellate jurisdiction of Court of Appeals<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
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<i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt;">Universal
Citation: GA Code § 15-3-3.1 (2016)<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
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<i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt;">(a)
Pursuant to Article VI, Section VI, Paragraph III of the Constitution of this
state, the Court of Appeals rather than the Supreme Court shall have appellate
jurisdiction in the following classes of cases:<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
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<br /></div>
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<i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt;">(1)
Cases involving title to land;<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
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<br /></div>
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<i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt;">(2)
All equity cases, except those cases concerning proceedings in which a sentence
of death was imposed or could be imposed and those cases concerning the
execution of a sentence of death;<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
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<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: .5in; margin-top: 0in;">
<i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt;">(3)
All cases involving wills;<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
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<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: .5in; margin-top: 0in;">
<i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt;">(4)
All cases involving extraordinary remedies, except those cases concerning
proceedings in which a sentence of death was imposed or could be imposed and
those cases concerning the execution of a sentence of death;<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
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<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: .5in; margin-top: 0in;">
<i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt;">(5)
All divorce and alimony cases; and<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
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<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: .5in; margin-top: 0in;">
<i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt;">(6)
All other cases not reserved to the Supreme Court or conferred on other courts.<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
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<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: .5in; margin-top: 0in;">
<i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt;">(b)
This Code section shall not otherwise affect the jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court or the Court of Appeals.<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
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<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; text-indent: .5in;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">As is true of a superior court's findings
of fact, the probate court's findings of fact will not be set aside unless it's
clearly erroneous.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">Brown v. Brown</i>, 277 Ga. 594, 592 S.E.2d 854 (2004).<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>And a jury finding will be affirmed if there
is any evidence to support the jury's decision.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>This is similar to the finding in superior court.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">McDaniel
v. McDaniel</i>, 288 Ga. 711, 707 S.E.2d 60 (2011).<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>H.<span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>Sample
Documents<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%;">FORMS: <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-indent: .5in;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">How to file a Caveat <a href="http://hughwood.blogspot.com/2016/05/how-to-file-caveat-objection-to-last.html">http://hughwood.blogspot.com/2016/05/how-to-file-caveat-objection-to-last.html</a>
; Hinkel, Daniel F., <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">Ga. Probate &
Administration </i>§ 4:1 (4th ed.)(2015).<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>Georgia Probate and Administration with Forms<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-left: .5in; text-indent: .5in;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">A
Form Fill-in for a Caveat is Attached. <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Exhibit A<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: 0in; margin-top: 0in; text-indent: .5in;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt;">Form Request for
Production of Documents [Medical Records]; and,<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 2;"> </span>Forms to Take Deposition
of Medical Records or Attorney with Records.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span><o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: 0in; margin-top: 0in; text-indent: .5in;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt;">Exhibit B.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: center;">
<br /></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: center;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%;">END<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
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<br />Hugh Woodhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/01021049579391065763noreply@blogger.com2tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2321320695584069696.post-50366312141773136802018-07-10T11:48:00.000-07:002018-07-10T12:57:19.466-07:00TESTAMENTARY CAPACITY AND UNDUE INFLUENCE IN LITIGATION<div style="text-align: center;">
TESTAMENTARY CAPACITY AND</div>
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UNDUE INFLUENCE IN LITIGATION</div>
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[This material was Presented at NBI Conference on Probate & Trust Litigation at the Cobb Galleria, Atlanta, Georgia on June 26, 2018. By Hugh C. Wood]</div>
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<a href="https://www.scribd.com/document/383599505/II-Testamentary-Capacity-and-Undue-Influence-05082018?secret_password=G3jE2AKyiB1auh9Oh5yO">Testamentary Capacity and Undue Influence in Litigation</a></div>
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<a href="https://www.scribd.com/document/383600441/Exhibit-A-and-Exhibit-B?secret_password=rQazoI6o9NWNZk8zvWeA">Form Georgia Caveat to Last Will and Testament AND Forms for Third Party Discovery from Medical Providers</a></div>
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A.<span style="white-space: pre;"> </span>TESTAMENTARY CAPACITY<br />
<br />
All discussions of testamentary capacity concerning a will start at Georgia at O.C.G.A. § 53 4 11.<br />
This statute states in total as follows:<br />
O.C.G.A. § 53-4-11. Testamentary capacity<br />
Currentness<br />
(a) Testamentary capacity exists when the testator has a decided and rational desire as to the disposition of property.<br />
(b) An incapacity to contract may coexist with the capacity to make a will.<br />
(c) An insane individual generally may not make a will except during a lucid interval. A monomaniac may make a will if the will is in no way connected with the monomania. In all such cases, it must appear that the will expresses the wishes of the testator unbiased by the insanity or monomania with which the testator is affected.<br />
(d) Neither advancing age nor weakness of intellect nor eccentricity of habit or thought is inconsistent with the capacity to make a will.<br />
Credits<br />
Laws 1996, p. 504, § 10.<br />
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<span style="white-space: pre;"> </span>Testamentary capacity exists in Georgia when a testator has a "decided and rational desire … to dispose of property". O.C.G.A. § 53-4-11(a). This statute specifically separates out that the capacity to make a will is lower than the capacity to make a contract and provides specific allowance that an insane individual may make a will during a lucid period and even one suffering monomania may make a will. As is stated in the Comments to the Michie Code and from headnotes, "the requirement for testamentary capacity is a modest requirement, as testamentary capacity may be possessed by weak-minded or feeble individuals, [ * * *] absence of mind does not destroy testamentary capacity. Meadows v. Bean, 302 Ga. 494, 807 S.E.2d 339 (2017).<br />
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<span style="white-space: pre;"> </span>"In the context of testamentary capacity to execute a will, the controlling question is whether the testator had sufficient testamentary capacity at the time of executing the will.” Ashford v. Van Horne, 276 Ga. 636, 580 S.E.2d 201 (2003).<br />
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<span style="white-space: pre;"> </span>The testator can distribute property via a will as long as he or she knows that it is a will. The testator possesses testamentary capacity so long as he understands that he is executing a document that will dispose of his property after death. He possesses testamentary capacity if he is capable of remembering the property that is subject to his distributions and the individuals that are to receive (the bounty). Amerson v. Phal, 292 Ga. 79, 734 S.E.2d 399 (2012).<br />
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<span style="white-space: pre;"> </span>Great intellect is not required to prepare a will. The testator has a decided and rational desire to dispose of his property. He knows where it is going and he possesses "sufficient intellect" to make a will. Manly v. Combs, 197 Ga. 768, 30 S.E.2d 485 (1944); Fowler v. Fowler, 197 Ga. 53, 28 S.E.2d 458 (1943).<br />
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<span style="white-space: pre;"> </span>How much mental capacity is required to make a will?<br />
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<span style="white-space: pre;"> </span>Not much.<br />
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The weak have the same rights as the strong minded to dispose of their property by will. Only a total absence of mind destroys testamentary capacity. Griffin v. Barnett, 183 Ga. 152, 187 S.E. 828 (1936) decided under former Code § 113-205 (Code 1933). The date and time of making the will is important to determine testamentary capacity. It's not the general overall mental capacity of the individual for weeks, months and years but the mental capacity at the time the will is prepared. The controlling issue is what is the condition of the testator's mind at the moment of the execution of the will. Crews v. Crews, 219 Ga. 459, 134, S.E.2d 27 (1963). The same mental capacity to pass an inheritance is also required for a disinheritance. But the same testamentary that is required to create a will is also the one that is necessary to disinherit the child or spouse in probate. Whitfield v. Pitts, 205 Ga. 259, 53 S.E.2d 549 (1949). Dementia, by itself, will not eliminate the ability of an individual to make a will. Bishop v. Kenny, 266 Ga. 231, 466 S.E.2d 581 (1996).<br />
Although testatrix was diagnosed with primary degenerative dementia and general anxiety disorder in her advanced years, finding that she did not lack testamentary capacity to execute a will was supported by physician's testimony that testatrix was capable of reasoned decisions at the time she executed the will and testimony that the testatrix recognized her relatives and was able to articulate reasons she desired to execute the new will and leave her estate to her niece, which demonstrated a decided and rational desire regarding the disposition of her property.<br />
Id. [Interpreting O.C.G.A. §§ 53-2-21 and 53-2-25.]<br />
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B.<span style="white-space: pre;"> </span>THE WILL MAY BE EVIDENCE OF LOST CAPACITY<br />
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<span style="white-space: pre;"> </span>In the modern era there are basically three parts to a will.<br />
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<span style="white-space: pre;"> </span>1.<span style="white-space: pre;"> </span>The will has to be in writing. There are no longer oral wills or purely holographic wills in Georgia.<br />
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<span style="white-space: pre;"> </span>2.<span style="white-space: pre;"> </span>The will needs to spell out a proper executor and define the proper distribution of the provisions of the testator's estate. It needs to define the individuals to take (or default to the testator's heirs) and, generally, should have a rest residue and remainder clause. [And in the modern age: Digital Rights].<br />
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<span style="white-space: pre;"> </span>3.<span style="white-space: pre;"> </span>The will must be properly attested. Some of the largest fights concern the lack of proper attestation on the will. For a will to be done in Georgia (and in most other states) the testator must sign in front of two sui juris witnesses. The witnesses must see the testator sign the will and they must know it's an important document. The cases differ on whether they have to know that it's a will. If the witnesses are not present at the time the testator signs or they're in different locations the will attestation fails.<br />
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<span style="white-space: pre;"> </span>The statute that governs the writing and minimal terms of a will reads:<br />
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O.C.G.A. § 53-4-20. (Revised Probate Code of 1998) Required writing; signing; witnesses; codicil<br />
(a) A will shall be in writing and shall be signed by the testator or by some other individual in the testator's presence and at the testator's express direction. A testator may sign by mark or by any name that is intended to authenticate the instrument as the testator's will.<br />
(b) A will shall be attested and subscribed in the presence of the testator by two or more competent witnesses. A witness to a will may attest by mark. Another individual may not subscribe the name of a witness, even in that witness's presence and at that witness's direction.<br />
(c) A codicil shall be executed by the testator and attested and subscribed by witnesses with the same formality as a will.<br />
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C.<span style="white-space: pre;"> </span>EVIDENCE OF UNDUE INFLUENCE OR DURESS<br />
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<span style="white-space: pre;"> </span>Any discussion of undue influence or duress, in Georgia, should start with the code section defining same.<br />
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<span style="white-space: pre;"> </span>O.C.G.A. § 53-4-12 defined what is the voluntary execution of a will.<br />
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Free and Voluntary Execution Required<br />
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A will must be freely and voluntarily executed. A will is not valid if anything destroys the testator's freedom of volition, such as fraudulent practices upon the testator's fears, affections or sympathies; misrepresentations; duress; or undue influence whereby the will of another is substituted for the wishes of a testator.<br />
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<span style="white-space: pre;"> </span>In its most basic form “undue influence” constitutes an outside individual influencing the testator (at the time of execution of the will) to make a distribution (or even make the will itself) in a way that conforms to the wishes of the outside third party as opposed to the testator.<br />
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<span style="white-space: pre;"> </span>Undue influence has been defined by Georgia courts over 150 years. Most recently the Georgia Court of Appeals stated that undue influence is:<br />
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Undue influence which overturns an otherwise legal contract [or will] is the exercise of sufficient control over the person, the validity of whose act is brought into question, to destroy his free agency and to constrain him to do what he would not have done if such control had not been exercised." (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Cobb v. Garner, 158 Ga.App.110, 111 (1), 279 S.E.2d 280 (1981). To maintain a claim of undue influence, the requisite control must operate on the mind of the person at the time he or she is executing the document in question. See Simmons v. Norton, 290 Ga. 223, 224, 719 S.E.2d 421 (2011). However, a claim of undue influence "may be supported by a wide range of testimony such as influence can seldom be shown except by circumstantial evidence." (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Skelton v. Skelton, 251 Ga. 613, 634 (5), 308 S.E.2d 838 (1983). Furthermore, as our Supreme Court has acknowledged, evidence as to the facts and circumstances that occurred before and after the execution of the documents at issue may be considered by the trier of fact when determining whether undue influence existed at the time the documents were executed. See Knox v. Knox, 213 Ga. 677, 679 – 680 (2), 101 S.E.2d 89 (1957).<br />
Slosberg v. Giller, 341 Ga.App. 581, 582, 801 S.E.2d 332 (2017).<br />
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In definitions prior to Slosberg, supra, Georgia defined undue influence as that which amounts to “force or fear” over the testator. Undue influence invalidating a will must amount to force or fear in effect to make the mental offspring of some other person and it must be operative on the testator's mind at the time the will was executed. Gornto v. Gornto, 217 Ga. 136, 121 S.E.2d 139 (1961). It must be the type of fear, force or over persuasion that destroys the testator's free agency and willpower at the time of the making of the will. Bailey v. Bailey, 204 Ga. 556, 50 S.E.2d 617 (1948). See also Butler v. Lashley, 197 Ga. 461, 29 S.E.2d 508 (1944).<br />
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For additional definitions of Undue Influence see: Redfearn Wills and Administration in Georgia § 4:8, Undue Influence.<br />
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1.<span style="white-space: pre;"> </span>Vulnerability of the Testator to Influence<br />
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<span style="white-space: pre;"> </span>While not controlling, the vulnerability of the testator to outside influence such as failing mind, poor health and other mental or physical enfeeblements are evidence that may lead toward the finding of undue influence. Brown v. Bryant, 220 Ga. 80, 137 S.E.2d 36 (1964).<br />
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<span style="white-space: pre;"> </span>Mere persuasion to draft a will is not undue influence. The fact that someone other than the testator requests or even slightly pressures the testator to take action is not enough to constitute undue influence. Simple persuasion to create a will or write a will in a certain way even if that persuasion is constant and accompanied by tears and entreaties does not, in and of itself, constitute "undue influence". There must be something else. Morgan v. Ivey, 222 Ga. 850, 152 S.E.2d 833 (1967).<br />
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2.<span style="white-space: pre;"> </span>Confidential Relationship<br />
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<span style="white-space: pre;"> </span>Confidential relationship is one element toward the potential finding of undue influence in a challenge to a will. It is not conclusive. A person standing in a confidential relation to another is not prohibited from exercising any influence whatever to obtain a benefit from himself and to invalidate a will. The influence of a confidential relationship must rise to provable "undue influence" to overcome the making of the will. Morgan, supra at 851; Bailey v. Bailey, 204 Ga. 556, 50 S.E.2d 617 (1948).<br />
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<span style="white-space: pre;"> </span>There is no presumption of undue influence merely because one occupying a confidential relationship with a testator drafts, assists or causes another to draft a will. There is no presumption even if the confidential relation individual is named as executor. White v. Irwin, 220 Ga. 836, 142 S.E.2d 255 (1965). The undue influence must occur at the same "time" as the making of the will. For undue influence to invalidate a will the timing must be such that it occurred at the execution of the will. Morgan, supra.<br />
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<span style="white-space: pre;"> </span>Prior undue influence is not sufficient. Prior undue influence, not occurring at the time of the making of the will, is not undue influence. There must be direct evidence that the propounder of the will was subject to the undue influence at or about the time the will was executed and there could not be a mere showing that undue influence existed prior to the time that the will was drafted. Stevens v. Brady, 209 Ga. 428, 73 S.E.2d 182 (1952).<br />
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3.<span style="white-space: pre;"> </span>Presumption of Undue Influence<br />
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<span style="white-space: pre;"> </span>The presumption of undue influence arises when a beneficiary under a will occupies a confidential relationship and is not the natural bounty of the testator. It may also arise if that individual takes an active part in the planning, preparation of execution of the will. Johnson v. Burrell, 294 Ga. 301, 751 S.E.2d 301 (2013).<br />
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To invalidate a will on the ground of undue influence, evidence must show that the influence amounted to fear, force, over persuasion or coercion to the extent of destroying free will, power of the testator and, in effect, making the will the mental offspring of another, and it must be shown that undue influence was operating on the mind of the testator at the time the will was executed and published. Crawford v. Crawford, 218 Ga. 369, 128 S.E.2d 53 (1962). <br />
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Notice that “fear and force” was a prior standard in Georgia – which may still be used. The more nuanced modern standard is to “destroy free agency”. Slosberg, supra.<br />
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4.<span style="white-space: pre;"> </span>Circumstantial Evidence Alone is not enough.<br />
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<span style="white-space: pre;"> </span>Circumstantial evidence or evidence which shows a mere opportunity to influence the testator is not enough to carry the burden of undue influence. Odom v. Hughes, 293 Ga. 447, 478 S.E.2d 839 (2013). Undue influence is a jury question. Questions of undue influence over a testator are generally toward the finder of fact – the jury. Johnson v. Burrell, 294 Ga. 301, 751 S.E.2d 301 (2013).<br />
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5.<span style="white-space: pre;"> </span>Undue Influence is a Jury Question.<br />
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<span style="white-space: pre;"> </span>Undue influence in the context of a caveat is generally questions for a jury. Stevens v. Bonner, 174 Ga. 128, 162 S.E. 383 (1932).<br />
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Having said that the issues are primarily for a jury is aware that in Georgia obtaining a jury in probate is somewhat difficult. This author assisted some lawyers with preparation of jury instructions a few years ago and was surprised to learn that the jury trial being tried in probate in a metro county was the first jury trial allowed by the court in nine (9) years before that trial. While that doesn't have anything to do with the technical statement that undue influence should be tried to a jury it does speak volumes for the fact that obtaining a jury trial is difficult in probate.<br />
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The type of difficult arises not in the way the law or the uniform probate rules are designed. Rather, it is an intense desire by the probate courts to continue to shoehorn disputes into mediation, alternative dispute resolution and sometimes arbitration. It's just simply difficult to get an issue to a jury.<br />
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D.<span style="white-space: pre;"> </span>USING MEDICAL AND OTHER WITNESSES IN PROBATE<br />
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<span style="white-space: pre;"> </span>Medical witnesses, in the context of probate litigation, almost always arise in an issue associated with was (or whether) the testator was in his or her right mind the time the will and contract was drafted. Or, was the testator subject to undue influence at the time the will or contract was drafted.<br />
If the litigators who filed the caveat on undue influence are good lawyers, expect a request for third-party medical requests to come out in discovery. A Caveat Fill in Form is attached. Exhibit A. That is, the party with the burden of proof in undue influence almost always seeks to obtain request in discovery or subpoena the physician's records concerning the testator and his or her final illness. The most common physician records subpoenaed are the treating physician. And while I found that the treating physician is always in the mix, there seems to be now (maybe because people live so long in nursing homes) the primary physician assigned to the nursing home. Many times there will be alternate physicians such as neurologists, ophthalmologists, psychiatrists, psychologists and other records that are relevant to determination of undue influence. However, I cannot recall a single case where the family physician/treating physician (however long ago the testator saw the doctor) was not part of the request for medical records.<br />
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Forms to Take Deposition of Medical Records or Attorney with Records is attached at Exhibit B.<br />
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<span style="white-space: pre;"> </span>Generally the expert needs to have seen the deceased testator as a patient. But that is not a hard and fast rule. Expert testimony is not a mechanism by which hearsay forms the sole basis of an expert's opinion to be placed before a jury.<br />
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<span style="white-space: pre;"> </span>If the testimony is admitted the "expert's" lack of personal knowledge presents a jury question as to the weight to be accorded the expert's opinion. Roberts v. Baker, 265 Ga. 902, 903, 463 S.E.2d 694 (1995); King v. Browning, 246 Ga. 46, 47, 268 S.E.2d 653 (1980).<br />
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<span style="white-space: pre;"> </span>In a case where a caveat successfully blocked the presentation of a will, appeal was taken over the improper admission of expert's testimony. The Supreme Court found that a foundation had been laid, the expert's testimony was presented to the jury; the will was found to be the product of undue influence and the caveat sustained. Roberts, supra. Earl contends that the trial court erred in allowing into evidence the videotaped deposition of Caveators' expert, Dr. Davis, because Davis based his opinion solely upon the inadmissible hearsay of other experts' opinions, thereby acting as a mere conduit. The contention fails. The doctor's opinion was not premised solely on the out of-court opinions of other medical personnel. Davis reviewed Roberts' medical records, which were admitted at trial without objection, testified that his opinion was based on his experience and his review of the records as a whole. See Doctor's Hospital v. Barner, 195 Ga.App. 152, 159, 392 S.E.2d 897 (1990). Even when "an expert's testimony is based on hearsay, the lack of personal knowledge on the part of the expert does not mandate the exclusion of the opinion but, rather, presents a jury question as to the weight which should be assigned the opinion. The evidence should go to the jury for whatever it's worth. [Cits.]" King v. Browning, 246 Ga. 46, 47, 268 S.E.2d 653 (1980).<br />
Roberts, supra at 903.<br />
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<span style="white-space: pre;"> </span>While perhaps admissible, experts' opinions are based solely upon a review of medical records and had no personal contact with the decedent are "entitled to little weight". Burns v. Kaboul, 107 Pa. Super. 289, 595 A.2d 1153 (1991).<br />
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E.<span style="white-space: pre;"> </span>Litigation Avoidance For Estate Planners<br />
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<span style="white-space: pre;"> </span>Litigation avoidance in its most theoretical aspect is to create an entity or document that routes around and outside of probate. Drafting documents that go through probate, such as a will, exposed both the testator, the beneficiaries, the estate and perhaps the drafter to litigation in probate.<br />
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<span style="white-space: pre;"> </span>As a matter of theory any entity that has a perpetual existence or lives on outside of probate will overcome the requirements of probate.<br />
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<span style="white-space: pre;"> </span>For example, creating and using a limited liability company (LLC) to accomplish certain activities desired by a family or by the testator will route around probate. That is, whatever the LLC is able to accomplish during the lifetime of the testator (assuming that the LLC does not become administratively dissolved) will be able to continue on in the life of a perpetual entity such as an LLC. This also applies as a matter of theory for an Inc.<br />
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A discussion of trusts and family limited partnerships goes beyond this small outline. However, they both have perpetual existence and the use of a trust routes both the corpus of the trust and the trustees around and outside of probate. The trustees, of course, would be subject to their own fiduciary duties perhaps to be litigated in Superior Court instead of Probate Court.<br />
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Another issue that this author sees in the area of real estate is to avoid tenancy in common, if possible, in probate. Tenancy in Common gives on a partial ownership. Whereas Joint tenancy with right of survivorship (JTWROS) gives complete ownership at death. JTWROS allows the property to jump directly to the surviving joint tenant without the necessity of probate. For some reason, this title ownership always comes up in the settlement of the estate. Those beneficiaries who had expected to own part of the land in the joint tenancy right of survivorship and do not are always surprised to learn that the party on the joint tenancy right of survivorship takes without operation of probate.<br />
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<span style="white-space: pre;"> </span>Also, pay on death (POD) accounts at banking institutions and financial institutions allow the survivor of a joint account to take and own it all. This author is not a fan of PODs because there generally is still distrust in the family structure and always seem to end up in the allegations of misuse (whether founded or unfounded) in the settlement of an estate.<br />
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FORMS<br />
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<span style="white-space: pre;"> </span>OPEN SOURCE COPY OF:<br />
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<span style="white-space: pre;"> </span>Revised Handbook for the Probate Judges of Georgia. (2017) (1142 pages)<br />
http://gaprobate.gov/sites/default/files/probate/benchbook-handbooks/2016%20Probate%20Court%20Handbook%20Update_January2017.pdf<br />
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<a href="http://icje.uga.edu/documents/Probate/2010%20Handbook%20Complete.pdf">Revised Handbook for Probate Judges in Georgia</a><br />
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A Form Fill-in for a Caveat is Attached. Exhibit A<br />
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Form Request for Production of Documents [Medical Records]; and,<br />
<span style="white-space: pre;"> </span>Forms to Take Deposition of Medical Records or Attorney with Records.<br />
<br />
Exhibit B.<br />
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END<br />
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Hugh Woodhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/01021049579391065763noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2321320695584069696.post-1435359636113457422016-12-29T22:55:00.000-08:002016-12-30T05:30:55.992-08:00 Mineral Rights May Be Lost In Seven (7) Years<div class="MsoNormal">
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<b>Mineral Rights May Be Lost In Seven
(7) Years<o:p></o:p></b></div>
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By: Hugh Wood</div>
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<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEickElYSYRX-ALX1zbLTCa5prfY3W8PmuS2qa_Z9N5AeonEc6FGit0vCh2nwlbm-viTLxpGhNfTRRaetBgGDuQLEghE9mecA9CEFqwrRl2wqxi39T9-97_KDo79Zn-ec_TBlyaIshqnsZ4v/s1600/Loss+of+Mineral+Rights.JPG" imageanchor="1" style="clear: right; float: right; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-left: 1em;"><img border="0" height="320" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEickElYSYRX-ALX1zbLTCa5prfY3W8PmuS2qa_Z9N5AeonEc6FGit0vCh2nwlbm-viTLxpGhNfTRRaetBgGDuQLEghE9mecA9CEFqwrRl2wqxi39T9-97_KDo79Zn-ec_TBlyaIshqnsZ4v/s320/Loss+of+Mineral+Rights.JPG" width="302" /></a></div>
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Mineral rights in Georgia are lost if the minerals are not
worked (mined) and/or specific taxes on the minerals are not paid within seven
(7) years. This loss does not apply
to written mineral leases or licensed mining companies. <o:p></o:p></div>
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I was recently asked to opine concerning any other a
minerals reservation in a deed was of such concern so as to generate a specific
title exception.<o:p></o:p></div>
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The conveyance in question concerned 300 acres of land
for development in north Georgia. The
title is completely clear; however, there is a well defined reservation of the
minerals and minerals rights for mining.
No mining had been conducted on the property since, at least 1919, and
the question arose whether the mineral and mining reservation constituted an
objection to clear and marketable title.<o:p></o:p></div>
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The specific reservation of mining
rights in the deed reads: <o:p></o:p></div>
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<i>All reservation of minerals, mining
rights, mineral privileges and rights associated with dams in the Etowah River,
including those contained in warranty deeds from [redacted] Trustees for
Standard Pyrites Company to [redacted] all being recorded in Cherokee County,
Georgia records.<o:p></o:p></i></div>
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Quick Summary: <o:p></o:p></div>
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Since no mining has occurred for
more than seven (7) years prior to the conveyance of the property and since no specific
<i>ad valorem</i> taxes have been paid to
keep the mineral interest alive as a separate fee interest, the mineral
interest has been lost (actually lapsed).
The mineral fee has merged (by lapse or adverse possession/prescription)
into the surface fee. OCGA § 44‑5‑168(a). Because the right to dam the Etowah River is
“incidental,” to mining (which has now been lost), the right to dam (and build
earthworks) has also been lost. OCGA §
44-9-73. <o:p></o:p></div>
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That is all the explanation needed for
the CliffsNotes<span style="font-size: 8pt;">® </span>summary.<o:p></o:p></div>
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The extended backstory is as
follows:<o:p></o:p></div>
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Owners, who seek development in the future, are concerned
about whether their 300 acre acquisition in Cherokee County, Georgia is clear,
given that the conveyancing deeds (1919) contain a very specific and very well
defined reservation of all minerals for mining.
Additionally, the mineral conveyance contains a reservation to the
mining owner to build “dams upon the Etowah River,” which includes by law the
building of earthworks, and other structures incidental to mining. <o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-indent: .5in;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-indent: .5in;">
The title question then became: For current and present
surface development, does the severance of the mineral rights and mineral title
pose a title exception? Stated another
way, does the owners of the surface fee expose his or her commercial developer
to risk of mining (or interference) by the owner of the mineral rights fee?<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
PROPERTY
LOCATION:<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-indent: .5in;">
While I don't think that the owners know the background
of their property, they walked into one of the more colorful conveyances of
minerals in the history of Georgia. </div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEitwawug0aGdBdwKLeKYvpinhg7oBh0gfu6GSFXMBFqdEg8EItAmpfF2_m-LVXG3eKom_Tu1Pkb1Eqxbz4rEF_ayzsQrkuIoLD0_92TKH-tU3swecA0L3YbL5uMIP6Sr2dibKULg-bh3a5R/s1600/Standard+Pyrites.JPG" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" height="210" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEitwawug0aGdBdwKLeKYvpinhg7oBh0gfu6GSFXMBFqdEg8EItAmpfF2_m-LVXG3eKom_Tu1Pkb1Eqxbz4rEF_ayzsQrkuIoLD0_92TKH-tU3swecA0L3YbL5uMIP6Sr2dibKULg-bh3a5R/s320/Standard+Pyrites.JPG" width="320" /></a></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-indent: .5in;">
It appears that the property the owners acquired is a sub‑portion
of the old “Standard Mine,” and/or the “Rich Mine” in Cherokee County, Georgia. Both mines were active pyrite mines in the
early part of the 20<sup>th</sup> Century.
A statement about the property,
no doubt unknown to the owners, reads as follows:<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-indent: .5in;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: .5in; margin-top: 0in;">
<i>[T]he Standard Pyrites Company owns 170 forty acre lots, a total of
about 6800 acres of land, lying on the Third District First Section
Forsythe County; and in the Third District Second Section Cherokee County. About 4600 acres of this area is held in
fee simple and 2200 acres of the mineral rights are in another
company. The mine is a lot 462 Third
District Second Section Cherokee County, 7.3 miles by road southeast of
Ball Green, a station of the Louisville & Nashville Railroad. This property is the site of the Old Franklin
or Crighton Goldmine, which was operated for about 75 years. The goldmining operations have been described
in two previous bulletins of the survey.
The last goldmining was done by the Crighton Goldmining Company and the
Franklin Gold, Pyrites and Pyrite Company, under the management of Barry
Searle. These companies were reorganized
form in the standard Pyrites Company, which has worked the Pyrites. </i>[1]</div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-indent: .5in;">
The owner’s deed contains Land Lots in ranges that
overlap the old Standard Mine. <o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-indent: .5in;">
<br /></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjepJ_niIzxvHGYRzb3efNlb2ojmwECkbwofLUph_NYhHh983eDkhZQiXbfCmsUjPDYD9U4Pxt57tk4NlVWfSoLQNZiEVTlXvJWBQBjDvb7XftwrK-C0EnAiLp-fPwwmbmVvtXF-vBj1Z8S/s1600/Land+Lot+400.JPG" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" height="222" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjepJ_niIzxvHGYRzb3efNlb2ojmwECkbwofLUph_NYhHh983eDkhZQiXbfCmsUjPDYD9U4Pxt57tk4NlVWfSoLQNZiEVTlXvJWBQBjDvb7XftwrK-C0EnAiLp-fPwwmbmVvtXF-vBj1Z8S/s320/Land+Lot+400.JPG" width="320" /></a></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-indent: .5in;">
The Standard Mine initially mined gold <span style="text-indent: 0.5in;">(in the mid to
late 1800s) and then later pyrites. Land
lots overlapping and near the current conveyance appear in documents associated
with the Standard Mine. <i>Id</i>.</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-indent: .5in;">
<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
After the gold worked out of the
area in question, mining commenced (with significant intensity) in
pyrites. [2] The current land can be mined for
pyrite. One might wonder why pyrites
would be mined at all. In the era at
and before World War I pyrites were mined and worked for the purpose of
obtaining sulphur and sulphuric acid (H2S04).
Sulphuric acid, at that time, was a main ingredient in agriculture
fertilizer. The largest amount of
sulfuric acid – mined in this are in the early 1900s -- was used to make
phosphoric acid. That, in turn, was used
to make the phosphate fertilizer. Thus,
the demand for pyrite mining, particularly after World War I was used, in part,
to serve the agriculture needs of the United States.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
With regard to clearing the title to
the surface, the issue concerns whether this very real mineral presents a
problem to conveyance of the surface fee.
It probably does not. The
current Georgia statute in question concerning the loss of the mineral or
mineral interest in land is OCGA § 44-5-168.
It provides that if the minerals have not been mined or “worked” within
seven (7) years prior to conveyance and no specific ad valorem taxes have been
paid (specifically set aside by the tax commissioner for the severed mineral
interest) the mineral interest is lost (lapsed). It is
deemed to have merged with the surface fee and the surface fee now owns the
entire fee, being both the surface fee and mineral fee. <o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
The statute reads:<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: .5in; margin-top: 0in;">
<i>OCGA § 44-5-168. Presumptive adverse
possession for certain classes of property<o:p></o:p></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: .5in; margin-top: 0in;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: .5in; margin-top: 0in;">
<i>(a) Whenever mineral rights are
conveyed or whenever real property is conveyed in fee simple but the mineral
rights to such property are reserved by the grantor, the owner of the real
property in fee simple or his heirs or assigns may gain title to such mineral
rights by adverse possession if the owner of the mineral rights or his heirs or
assigns have neither worked nor attempted to work the mineral rights nor paid
any taxes due on them for a period of seven years since the date of the
conveyance and for seven years immediately preceding the filing of the petition
provided for in subsection (b) of this Code section.<o:p></o:p></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: .5in; margin-top: 0in;">
<i>(b) In order to obtain absolute title
to mineral rights in the circumstances described in subsection (a) of this Code
section:<o:p></o:p></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: .5in; margin-top: 0in;">
<i>(1) The owner of the real property in
fee simple or his heirs or assigns may file in the superior court for the
county where the land is located a petition requesting relief in the nature of
declaratory judgment. The petition:<o:p></o:p></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: .5in; margin-top: 0in;">
<i>(A) Shall contain all essential,
required paragraphs, including jurisdiction;<o:p></o:p></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: .5in; margin-top: 0in;">
<i>(B) Shall contain the name and last
known address of the grantor of the property reserving the mineral rights and
the names and last known addresses of his heirs or assigns or any other person
known by the plaintiff to have an interest in the mineral rights;<o:p></o:p></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: .5in; margin-top: 0in;">
<i>(C) Shall show:<o:p></o:p></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: .5in; margin-top: 0in;">
<i>(i) That the plaintiff or his
predecessors in title were granted and obtained a deed for the property in
question;<o:p></o:p></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: .5in; margin-top: 0in;">
<i>(ii) That the conveyance reserved
mineral rights or that the plaintiff or his predecessors in title conveyed the
mineral rights and reserved or retained the fee simple title to the real
property; and<o:p></o:p></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: .5in; margin-top: 0in;">
<i>(iii) That, for a period of seven
years preceding the filing of the petition after the conveyance, the owner of
the mineral rights or his heirs or assigns have neither worked nor attempted to
work the mineral rights nor paid taxes on them; and<o:p></o:p></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: .5in; margin-top: 0in;">
<i>(D) Shall include any and all prayers
regarding the land that the plaintiff may desire. Specifically, the petition
may pray that the court find that the plaintiff has obtained title to the
mineral rights through adverse possession and that the plaintiff be granted
title to mineral rights;<o:p></o:p></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: .5in; margin-top: 0in;">
<i>(2) Upon a finding in the plaintiff's
favor, the court shall issue a judgment and decree declaring that the mineral
rights involved have been lost and that the plaintiff has gained absolute title
to such mineral rights; and<o:p></o:p></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: .5in; margin-top: 0in;">
<i>(3) Service shall be perfected in the
same manner as service on defendants in an in rem proceeding, including service
by publication.<o:p></o:p></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: .5in; margin-top: 0in;">
<i>(c) Nothing in this Code section shall
restrict the court from granting further plenary relief, whether legal or
equitable; and the failure of the petition in the plaintiff's favor shall not
affect the right of the plaintiff to any other relief, legal or equitable, to
which he may be entitled.<o:p></o:p></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: .5in; margin-top: 0in;">
<i>(d) Any person named in the petition
or any person having an interest in the mineral rights shall have the right to
intervene in a case brought under this Code section.<o:p></o:p></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: .5in; margin-top: 0in;">
<i>(e) In order to maintain the status
quo pending the adjudication of the questions or to preserve equitable rights,
the court may grant injunctions and other interlocutory extraordinary relief.<o:p></o:p></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: .5in; margin-top: 0in;">
<i>(f) Nothing in this Code section shall
apply to a lease for a specific number of years nor to an owner of mineral
rights who has leased the mineral rights in writing to a licensed mining
operator as defined in Part 3 of Article 2 of Chapter 4 of Title 12.</i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-indent: .5in;">
Since the owners state there was no segregated mineral <i>ad valorem</i> tax and a search of the tax
records confirms same, we can eliminate the possibility of the mineral fee
survival based on the payment of mineral ad valorem taxes. And, since pyrite has not been mined on the
property since, at least 1926, we can determine that the mineral fee cannot
have survived by mining or “working,” the minerals.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-indent: .5in;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-indent: .5in;">
Thus, pursuant to OCGA § 44‑5‑168(a), it is somewhat
conclusive that the titles have merged. [3]
This type of loss or taking has been upheld as constitutional. [4] This taking also happens automatically. The surface owner does not need to do
anything for the mineral fee to merge into the surface fee. [5] It
would appear that (absent additional facts) the surface fee can be commercially
developed without worrying whether the owner would face some future economic
threat from the “owner” of the mineral fee.
<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-indent: .5in;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-indent: .5in;">
The owner posed a more nuanced title question. Does the reservation to build dams on the
Etowah River pose a separate or additional exception to title? The prior deeds contain the right to build a
dam on the Etowah River. [6] That is, does the reservation of the right to
create a dam or earthworks on the Etowah River in any way change the analysis
of the merger of the mineral fee into the surface fee? It would seem to be “no” for a different
reason. <o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-indent: .5in;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-indent: .5in;">
In Georgia law as far back as 1868, the General Assembly determined
that the right to mine shall carry with it the incidental right to dam nearby
waterways for use in the mine or cut ditches and canals or tunnels necessary
for mining. It is clear though that the
creation of dams or earthworks is "incidental" to actual mining. The statute in question is OCGA § 44‑9‑73. It concerns: Privileges incidental to
mining: canals; tunnels, flumes and
dams. <o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-indent: .5in;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-indent: .5in;">
It reads in its entirety as follows:<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: .5in; margin-top: 0in; tab-stops: 6.0in;">
<i>OCGA § 44-9-73.
Privileges incidental to mining; canals; tunnels; flumes; dams<o:p></o:p></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: .5in; margin-top: 0in; tab-stops: 6.0in;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: .5in; margin-top: 0in; tab-stops: 6.0in;">
<i>(a) The owner of any
mine shall have the right to enter upon any land between the mine and the water
power upon which the mine is dependent and to cut thereon such ditch, canal, or
tunnel or to construct such flume or other aqueduct and to build such dam as
may be necessary to control the water power; provided, however, that the mine
owner shall first have the damages assessed arising to the owner of the
intervening land or to the owner of the land on which the dam is to be erected
and shall pay such damages to the owner of the land so intervening or on which
such dam is to be erected.<o:p></o:p></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: .5in; margin-top: 0in; tab-stops: 6.0in;">
<i> (b) After giving the owner of the land to be
entered upon at least five days' notice of his intention to make such
application, the owner of the mine shall present to the judge of the probate
court of the county his written application for the right and privilege of
cutting such ditch, canal, or tunnel or constructing such flume or aqueduct or
erecting such dam.<o:p></o:p></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-indent: .5in;">
Thus the reservation to erect dams on the property does
not change the analysis that the mineral fee merged into the surface fee that
caused the election of dams, canals, flumes is incidental to mining. When the mineral fee was lost the former
owner of the minerals also lost the right to dam the Etowah River. <o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-indent: .5in;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-indent: .5in;">
While this author believes that the loss of the mineral
fee by the former owner is so clear as not require the further complication of
obtaining a Judge’s Order confirming same.
However, if the grantee or owner needs a further level of confidence in
the title and/or the commercial title insurance company will not insure ever
this opinion, then and in that event the statute provides a solution. That method is that the Superior Court in
which the property is located may issue "a judgment and decree declaring
that the mineral rights involved have been lost and the plaintiff is deemed
absolute title to such mineral rights" OCGA § 44‑5‑168(d). [7]<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-indent: .5in;">
The action for the judgment concerning the mineral rights
is fundamentally petitioned for as a declaratory judgment on the title. The petition declares jurisdiction; all of
the former owners that can be found and title (relevant title) are served (good
luck with that when your base title is 1919) a Lis Pendens is filed against the
property. A hearing is eventually held
by the Superior Court concerning whether the mineral fee has merged with the
surface fee. If the Court finds the fees
have merges it issues a Court Order to that effect and the Order is recorded in
the case and upon the land records of the County. The cross-reference of that Order into the
title chain forever eliminates the risk of hostile activity by the mineral
owner. <o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-indent: .5in;">
CONCLUSION:<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-indent: .5in;">
The development of 300 Acres in Cherokee County, Georgia
seems to be free from any risk of the mineral fee. The mineral fee conveyance has been lost by
the former mineral owner by its failure to mine or pay taxes on the mineral
interest for seven (7) years prior to the conveyance. Additionally, all rights to build earthworks
and dams on the property have been lost, because they are deemed to be only
“incidental,” to the working of mines.
The property seems to be free and clear of the severed mineral fee. <o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
Hugh Wood, Esq.</div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
Wood & Meredith, LLP</div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
3756 LaVista Road</div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
Suite 250</div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
Atlanta (Tucker), GA 30084</div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
hwood@woodandmeredith.com</div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
www.hughwood.blogspot.com</div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
Phone: 404-633-4100</div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
Fax: 404-633-0068</div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<o:p><br /></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<o:p> </o:p><span style="text-indent: 0.5in;">ENDNOTES:</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-indent: .5in;">
<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
[1]<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
Shearer, H.K.
and Hull, J.P.D. <i>The Pyrites Deposits of
Georgia</i>, Index Printing Company, State Printers, Atlanta, Georgia (1918) at
164.<br />
<br />
<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<a href="https://www.scribd.com/document/335105846/Shearer-H-D-and-Hull-J-P-D-The-Pyrites-Deposits-of-Georgia-State-Printing-Atlanta-Georgia-1918?secret_password=asWleYM5ASGp95usn7hD">https://www.scribd.com/document/335105846/Shearer-H-D-and-Hull-J-P-D-The-Pyrites-Deposits-of-Georgia-State-Printing-Atlanta-Georgia-1918?secret_password=asWleYM5ASGp95usn7hD</a><br />
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
[2]<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
The gold
worked out and is presently not economical to mine. <o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
[3]<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
See also,
Hinkle, Daniel F., 2Ga. <i>Real Estate Law
& Procedure</i> § 12:68 (7th Ed.) (2016).<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
[4] <o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
This type of
a statutory taking has been held constitutional. Many years ago multiple cases arose over
whether this type of loss of mineral rights was a “taking” without due
process. In a case arising out of the 20‑year
lapse statute in Indiana, Ind. Code 32‑5‑11‑1 through 8 reached the United
States Supreme Court. In that case, <i>Texaco, Inc. v. Short</i>, 454 U.S. 516, 102 S.Ct. 781, 70 L.Ed.2d 738
(1982), the United States Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of
(fundamentally) all mineral loss statutes across the United States. While Georgia refers to its mineral rights
statute as “adverse possession” or prescription, much of the remainder of the
country refers to these acts as the "dormant mineral" acts. They are constitutional.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
[5] <o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
The owner of
the surface fee does not need to take any act or do anything for the mineral
fee to merge into the surface fee.
"[The] surface owner who conveyed mineral rights did not have to
assert any acts of dominion over the surface estate in order to make claim
under the statute, but only allege that he had to deed the property an issue,
the mineral rights had been severed from the fee simple estate, and make the
requirement of non‑use and non‑pay of taxes had been satisfied." Headnote.
<i>Mixon v. One Newco, Inc.,</i> 863
F.2d. 846 (1989). “[N]otwithstanding
these references to “adverse possession,” our analysis of OCGA § 44-5-168 and
Georgia cases construing it convinces us that the statute actually is a “lapse”
statute rather than a traditional “adverse possession” law.” <i>Mixon</i>,
supra at 848. Thus, in our current
analysis the owner of the Cherokee fee need only assert that he held the
surface fee for more than 7 years. (And that may be extended by tacking to a
prior owner).<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
[6] <o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
No doubt the
drafters in 1919 were unaware of the problems this would present in the modern
age of getting approval to build a dam from the US Army Corps of Engineers, EPA
and the Georgia Dept. of Natural Resources.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
[7]<br />
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
Note: If the minerals are owned by a “licensed
mining company,” in Georgia there are special exceptions to loss of mineral
rights which go beyond the scope of this note.
Also, a recorded mining lease changes this analysis and stops the loss
of minerals as described in this note. <o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
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End</div>
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Hugh Woodhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/01021049579391065763noreply@blogger.com3tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2321320695584069696.post-72858955532383386222016-11-18T20:31:00.000-08:002016-11-19T20:18:17.071-08:00Showdown on “Excess Funds” from Tax Sales Is Headed to the Georgia Supreme Court<div class="MsoNormal">
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<span style="font-size: large;">Hugh C. Wood, Esq.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgajC2JLuZoJ-9wfMwTTtGniuZ4XvkS8aaSgaGIDa4f5bMjNjYqmvM2SgodGHpo25fh1pCfwSdITN7X4QAETTVPJLy9A2yBu6x1j6RaTjh7qujsGR6YDYMA5w5Zbwzx6ZQSIm9LkBpL9VPO/s1600/Showdown.JPG" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" height="179" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgajC2JLuZoJ-9wfMwTTtGniuZ4XvkS8aaSgaGIDa4f5bMjNjYqmvM2SgodGHpo25fh1pCfwSdITN7X4QAETTVPJLy9A2yBu6x1j6RaTjh7qujsGR6YDYMA5w5Zbwzx6ZQSIm9LkBpL9VPO/s320/Showdown.JPG" width="320" /></a></div>
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<span style="font-size: large;">Which entity is entitled to the excess funds from a tax sale? We shall know (with legal certainty) in a few
months. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-size: large;">The Georgia Supreme Court has accepted certiorari of a
Georgia Court of Appeals case that will settle or resolve which creditor (or the
owner) has the priority of claim to the “excess funds” that are generated from
a tax sale. [1]<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-size: large;"><br /></span></div>
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<span style="font-size: large;">In the most simplistic
terms the appeal concerns, who is entitled to the claim the excess funds? Is it the owner of the property who lost the
property at tax sale and/or the first mortgage holder entitled to the excess
proceeds? Or, is the redeeming creditor
(after the tax sale) first in line to claim the excess proceeds? <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-size: large;"><br /></span></div>
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<span style="font-size: large;">This confusing
question is set to be resolved (finally) by the supreme court. A long time ago, those of us who worked this
area of the law just assumed (perhaps inartfully) that the owner or the holder
of the first security deed on the property was first in line and entitled to
the excess proceeds. [2]<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-size: large;"><br /></span></div>
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<span style="font-size: large;">As this method of investing (buying tax sale property) continued
to mature (and accelerated after the real estate crash of 2008 - 2011) very real
disputes began to arise concerning which entity was entitled to claim the
excess proceeds that remained after a forced tax sale on the courthouse
steps. Did the owner have a priority claim
to the funds? Did the bank which held
the legal title (the first security deed) and to whom the owner was indebted
have a priority claim to the excess funds? Or,
in creditor redemption, did the redeeming creditor have both title to the
property and the first priority claim to the excess proceeds? <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-size: large;"><br /></span></div>
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<span style="font-size: large;">This continuing uncertainty to the ownership (by priority)
to the excess funds caused the Georgia General Assembly to enact the
Interpleader statute for this issue in 2006.
OCGA § 48-4-5. [3]<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-size: large;">The outcome of this pending writ of certiorari [1] is going
to establish a bright line for priority of claims to excess funds. If the case on appeal is upheld, then the
date of the tax sale and priority established on the day of the tax sale
becomes “the date,” from which all claims are established. If the case on appeal is overturned, then
Wester, infra, and United Capital, infra, will be reinstated and a redeeming
creditor will have a priority claim to the excess funds. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-size: large;"><br /></span></div>
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<span style="font-size: large;">Both sides have sound policy arguments on
appeal. [4] [5] While I
personally think the “super lien,” is somewhat harsh to the defaulted owner (because
it allows the loss of the property, the shortening of the potential one (1)
year right to redeem and the loss of the excess proceeds), the interpretations
of the statute by Wester [6] and United Capital [7] are both logical and sound. However, I welcome a supreme court decision
that will settle and resolve this muddy corpus of claims to excess funds in tax
redemption cases. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-size: large;"><br /></span></div>
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<span style="font-size: large;">We will know in a few months whether the date of the tax
sale is “the” date by which practitioners are to calculate all priority claims
to excess funds. Or, we will learn whether we are to go
back to the Wester [6] and United Capital [7] methods of calculation. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-size: large;"><br /></span></div>
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<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in;">
<span style="font-size: large;">Hugh Wood, Esq.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in;">
<span style="font-size: large;">Wood & Meredith, LLP<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in;">
<span style="font-size: large;">3756 LaVista Road<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in;">
<span style="font-size: large;">Suite 250<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in;">
<span style="font-size: large;">Atlanta (Tucker), GA 30084<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in;">
<span style="font-size: large;">www.woodandmeredith.com<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in;">
<span style="font-size: large;">hwood@woodandmeredith.com<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in;">
<span style="font-size: large;">www.hughwood.blogspot.com<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-size: large;">Phone: 404-633-4100<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-size: large;">Fax: 404-633-0068</span><o:p></o:p></div>
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Endnotes:<o:p></o:p></div>
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[1]<o:p></o:p></div>
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“Did the Court of Appeals err in its determination that a
redeeming creditor after a tax sale does not have a first priority claim on
excess tax funds? See Wester v. United Capital Financial of Atlanta, LLC, 282
Ga. App. 392 (638 SE2d 779) (2006) and United Capital Financial of Atlanta v.
American Investment Assoc., 302 Ga. App. 400 (691 SE2d 272) (2010).” Grant of
Cert on September 16, 2016 in DLT List, LLC et al. v. M7ven Supportive Housing &
Development Group, 335 Ga.App. 318, 779 S.E.2d 436 (2015). <o:p></o:p></div>
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[2]<o:p></o:p></div>
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[E]xcess funds shall be distributed by the superior court to
the intended parties, including the owner, as their interests appear and in the
order of priority in which their interests exist. OCGA §
48-4-5(b).<o:p></o:p></div>
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[3]<o:p></o:p></div>
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OCGA § 48-4-5. Payment of Excess [Interpleader]<o:p></o:p></div>
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(a) If there are any
excess funds after paying taxes, costs, and all expenses of a sale made by the
tax commissioner, tax collector, or sheriff, or other officer holding excess
funds, the officer selling the property shall give written notice of such
excess funds to the record owner of the property at the time of the tax sale
and to the record owner of each security deed affecting the property and to all
other parties having any recorded equity interest or claim in such property at
the time of the tax sale. Such notice shall be sent by first-class mail within
30 days after the tax sale. The notice shall contain a description of the land
sold, the date sold, the name and address of the tax sale purchaser, the total sale
price, and the amount of excess funds collected and held by the tax
commissioner, tax collector, sheriff, or other officer. The notice shall state
that the excess funds are available for distribution to the owner or owners as
their interests appear in the order of priority in which their interests exist.<o:p></o:p></div>
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(b) The tax
commissioner, tax collector, sheriff, or other officer may file, when deemed
necessary, an interpleader action in superior court for the payment of the
amount of such excess funds. Such excess funds shall be distributed by the
superior court to the intended parties, including the owner, as their interests
appear and in the order of priority in which their interests exist. The cost of
litigation of such an interpleader action, including reasonable attorney's
fees, shall be paid from the excess funds upon order of the court.<o:p></o:p></div>
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(c) After five years
have elapsed from the tax sale date, the tax commissioner, tax collector,
sheriff, or other officer holding excess funds shall pay over to the department
any excess unclaimed funds and for which no action or proceeding is pending in
a claim for payment. Once excess funds are placed in the possession of the
department, only a court order from an interpleader action filed in the county
where the tax sale occurred, by the claimant for the funds, shall serve as
justification for release of the funds.<o:p></o:p></div>
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[4] <o:p></o:p></div>
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Brief of Appellant. Design
Acquisition, LLC<o:p></o:p></div>
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<div nbsp="" style="-x-system-font: none; display: block; font-family: Helvetica,Arial,Sans-serif; font-size-adjust: none; font-size: 14px; font-stretch: normal; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 12px auto 6px auto;">
<a href="https://www.scribd.com/document/331590851/Brief-of-Appellant-Design-Aquisition-LLC-Georgia-Supreme-Court-Appeal-No-Sl6C0646-Cert-of-DLT-List-LLC-et-al-v-M7ven-Supportive-Housing-De#from_embed" nbsp="" style="text-decoration: underline;" title="View Brief of Appellant, Design Aquisition, LLC, Georgia Supreme Court Appeal No. Sl6C0646. Cert. of DLT List, LLC et al. v. M7ven Supportive Housing & Development Group, 335 Ga.App. 318, 779 S.E.2d 436 (2015). on Scribd">Brief of Appellant, Design Aquisition, LLC, Georgia Supreme Court Appeal No. Sl6C0646. Cert. of DLT List,...</a> by <a href="https://www.scribd.com/user/20175081/Hugh-Wood#from_embed" nbsp="" style="text-decoration: underline;" title="View Hugh Wood's profile on Scribd">Hugh Wood</a> on Scribd</div>
<iframe class="scribd_iframe_embed" data-aspect-ratio="0.7694278394534586" data-auto-height="false" frameborder="0" height="600" id="doc_88693" scrolling="no" src="https://www.scribd.com/embeds/331590851/content?start_page=1&view_mode=scroll&access_key=key-5We9Czaj709qbo8MRtB1&show_recommendations=true" width="100%"></iframe></div>
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[5] <o:p></o:p></div>
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Brief of Appellee. M7ven Supportive Housing & Development Group, Inc. </div>
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<div nbsp="" style="-x-system-font: none; display: block; font-family: Helvetica,Arial,Sans-serif; font-size-adjust: none; font-size: 14px; font-stretch: normal; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 12px auto 6px auto;">
<a href="https://www.scribd.com/document/331591009/Brief-of-Appellee-M7ven-Supportive-Housing-Development-Group-Inc-Georgia-Supreme-Court-Appeal-No-Sl6C0646-Cert-of-DLT-List-LLC-et-al-v-M7#from_embed" nbsp="" style="text-decoration: underline;" title="View Brief of Appellee, M7ven Supportive Housing & Development Group, Inc., Georgia Supreme Court Appeal No. Sl6C0646. Cert. of DLT List, LLC et al. v. M7ven Supportive Housing & Development Group, 335 Ga.App. 318, 779 S.E.2d 436 (2015). on Scribd">Brief of Appellee, M7ven Supportive Housing & Development Group, Inc., Georgia Supreme Court Appeal No. Sl6...</a> by <a href="https://www.scribd.com/user/20175081/Hugh-Wood#from_embed" nbsp="" style="text-decoration: underline;" title="View Hugh Wood's profile on Scribd">Hugh Wood</a> on Scribd</div>
<iframe class="scribd_iframe_embed" data-aspect-ratio="0.7674616695059625" data-auto-height="false" frameborder="0" height="600" id="doc_84909" scrolling="no" src="https://www.scribd.com/embeds/331591009/content?start_page=1&view_mode=scroll&access_key=key-LuTY4TNqPwQxCE8au2ze&show_recommendations=true" width="100%"></iframe></div>
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<o:p></o:p></div>
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[6]<o:p></o:p></div>
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Wester v. United Capital Financial of Atlanta, LLC, 282 Ga.
App. 392, 638 S.E.2d 779 (2006).<o:p></o:p></div>
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[Copyright material removed] <o:p></o:p></div>
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Attorneys and Law Firms<o:p></o:p></div>
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**779 Thomas C. Sanders, for appellant.<o:p></o:p></div>
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**780 Mason B. Rountree, William T. Cable, Jr., Willie C.
Carouthers, Vinson, Talley, Richardson & Cable, for appellee.<o:p></o:p></div>
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Opinion<o:p></o:p></div>
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BLACKBURN, Presiding Judge.<o:p></o:p></div>
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*392 In this interpleader action to distribute excess funds
($73,275.15) received by the county from a tax sale of certain real property,
Thomas A. Wester as a judgment lienholder on the property appeals summary
judgment granted to a fellow lienholder (United Capital Financial of Atlanta,
LLC), who for $97,200 had redeemed the property from the tax sale. Wester
argues that because his judgment lien on the property was prior in time to the
judgment lien of United Capital, he should be entitled to the excess funds
before any are distributed to United Capital. We hold that as the redeemer of
the property, United Capital is entitled to the excess funds to the extent of
its redemption payment before any other entity or interest. Accordingly, we
affirm summary judgment in favor of United Capital.<o:p></o:p></div>
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Summary judgment is only proper when there is no genuine
issue of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law.1 A de novo standard of review applies to an appeal from a grant of summary
judgment, and we view the evidence, and all reasonable conclusions and
inferences drawn from it, in the light most favorable to the nonmovant.
Matjoulis v. Integon Gen. Ins. Corp.2<o:p></o:p></div>
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The undisputed facts show that in February 2000 in Paulding
County Superior Court, Wester obtained a judgment against a Paulding County
real property owner and had a writ of fi. fa. in the amount of $59,508.95
entered on the county general execution docket. Another creditor of the property
owner obtained a judgment in May 2000 (a subsequent term of court) and had a
writ of fi. fa. in the amount of $5,135.53 entered on the county general
execution docket at that time. This later judgment and fi. fa. were
subsequently assigned to United Capital.<o:p></o:p></div>
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To collect past due taxes, the Paulding County tax
commissioner sold the real property at a tax sale in February 2005 for $81,000
to a tax sale purchaser. United Capital paid $97,200 to the tax sale purchaser
to redeem the property, resulting in the tax sale purchaser conveying the
property back to the property owner in a properly recorded quitclaim deed.
After satisfying the tax debt, the tax commissioner had $73,275.15 left over
from the tax sale, which the tax commissioner interpleaded into Paulding County
Superior Court, *393 naming the property owner, Wester, and United Capital as
defendants. Wester and United Capital both moved for summary judgment.3 Denying
Wester's motion, the court granted United Capital summary judgment and ordered
that the funds in the court registry be paid to United Capital, giving rise to
this appeal.<o:p></o:p></div>
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OCGA § 48-4-5 governs the distribution of excess funds from
a tax sale. Subsection (b) provides that the tax commissioner may file an
interpleader action in superior court for the payment of the amount of such
excess funds and instructs that “[s]uch excess funds shall be distributed by
the superior court to the intended parties, including the owner, as their
interests appear and in the order of priority in which their interests exist.”
If the only interests of Wester and United Capital were as judgment
lienholders, then the timing of the obtaining and recording of those liens
would be dispositive in determining their relative rights to the funds. Cf.
NationsBank, N.A. v. Gibbons4 (“the relative position of judgment liens is
determined by seniority; an older Georgia judgment has priority over a newer
judgment”).<o:p></o:p></div>
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But United Capital's primary interest in this matter is its
status as the redeemer of the property. OCGA § 48-4-43 provides: When property has been redeemed, the effect
of the redemption shall be to put the **781 title conveyed by the tax sale back
into the defendant in fi. fa., subject to all liens existing at the time of the
tax sale. If the redemption has been made by any creditor of the defendant or
by any person having any interest in the property, the amount expended by the
creditor or person interested shall constitute a first lien on the property
and, if the quitclaim deed provided for in Code Section 48-4-44 is recorded as
required by law, shall be repaid prior to any other claims upon the property.<o:p></o:p></div>
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Thus, in its status as redeemer of the property, United
Capital has a first lien on the property in the amount of the $97,200 it paid
to redeem the property (which lien is in addition to its more subordinate
judgment lien for $5,135.53), which first lien “shall be repaid prior to any
other claims upon the property.” Id. As stated by the Supreme Court of Georgia
in Nat. Tax Funding v. Harpagon Co.,5 “[i]f a creditor of the original taxpayer
redeems the property, the amount paid by the *394 redeeming creditor becomes a
first lien on the property. The redeeming creditor then has first priority to
repayment-a ‘super-lien’ for the redemption price.” Wester's assertion that
United Capital is only entitled to priority on the real property per se and not
on the excess funds is without foundation. United Capital's right to repayment,
whether from the excess tax sale funds or from any foreclosure it may pursue on
the property, takes priority over any other claims on the property.<o:p></o:p></div>
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Accordingly, the trial court properly held that United
Capital's interest as the redeeming creditor took priority over Wester's and
the property owner's interests and that therefore United Capital should be
granted summary judgment. Because the amount of United Capital's interest
exceeded the amount held in the registry of the court, the trial court
correctly ordered that the entire amount be paid to United Capital.<o:p></o:p></div>
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Judgment affirmed.<o:p></o:p></div>
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MIKELL and ADAMS, JJ., concur.<o:p></o:p></div>
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All Citations<o:p></o:p></div>
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282 Ga.App. 392, 638 S.E.2d 779, 06 FCDR 3399<o:p></o:p></div>
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Footnotes<o:p></o:p></div>
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1OCGA § 9-11-56(c).<o:p></o:p></div>
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2Matjoulis v. Integon Gen. Ins. Corp., 226 Ga.App. 459(1),
486 S.E.2d 684 (1997).<o:p></o:p></div>
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3Due to a bankruptcy consent order with the property owner
arising out of the property owner's bankruptcy, Wester asked that the first
$21,200 be paid to the property owner as an exempt asset and that Wester
receive the remainder.<o:p></o:p></div>
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4NationsBank, N.A. v. Gibbons, 226 Ga.App. 610, 611, 487
S.E.2d 417 (1997).<o:p></o:p></div>
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5Nat. Tax Funding v. Harpagon Co., 277 Ga. 41, 42(1), 586
S.E.2d 235 (2003).<o:p></o:p></div>
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[7]<o:p></o:p></div>
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United Capital Financial of Atlanta v. American Investment
Assoc., 302 Ga. App. 400, 691 S.E.2d 272 (2010).<o:p></o:p></div>
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[copyright material removed]<o:p></o:p></div>
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Attorneys and Law Firms<o:p></o:p></div>
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**273 Richard C. Bellows, for appellant.<o:p></o:p></div>
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Michael A. Petersen, for appellee.<o:p></o:p></div>
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Opinion<o:p></o:p></div>
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DOYLE, Judge.<o:p></o:p></div>
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*400 United Capital Financial of Atlanta, LLC, and American
Investment Associates, Inc., asserted competing claims to the excess funds from
the tax sale of certain property belonging to David W. Fletcher. Following a
bench trial, the trial court awarded the excess funds to American Investment.
United Capital appeals, and we reverse because United Capital, as the creditor
who redeemed Fletcher's property from the purchaser at the tax sale, held a
first priority lien *401 against the property.<o:p></o:p></div>
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The record shows that Keith Echols, in his capacity as tax
commissioner for Hall County, filed a complaint for interpleader against
Fletcher, Consolidated Lien Services, LLC, United Capital, and others alleging
that certain property belonging to Fletcher had been sold on October 2, 2007,
for the purpose of paying Hall County and State of Georgia property taxes for
the year 2006. According to the complaint, the property was sold to
Consolidated Lien for $21,100, leaving an excess of $20,495.61 after payment of
overdue taxes, penalties, interest, and costs of sale. The complaint further
showed that United Capital redeemed the property from Consolidated Lien for the
redemption amount of $25,320, and that Consolidated Lien then conveyed the
property back to Fletcher through a quitclaim deed.<o:p></o:p></div>
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United Capital and American Investment each filed a claim
for the excess funds. In light of the conflicting claims to the funds, the tax
commissioner paid the excess funds into the registry of the court and prayed
that the court order the defendants to interplead the action. Following a bench
trial, the trial court awarded the excess funds to American Investment, and
United Capital appeals.<o:p></o:p></div>
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“In a bench trial[,] the court sits as the trier of fact[,]
and his findings shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous.... However,
the court's judgment in a non-jury trial will be reversed where it is apparent
that it rests on erroneous reasoning or on an **274 erroneous legal theory.”1
United Capital did not file a transcript of the trial. “[A]bsent a transcript,
we must presume that the trial court's findings of fact are correct.”2<o:p></o:p></div>
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As applicable to this appeal, the trial court found that United Capital ... became a creditor of ...
Fletcher via an assignment of a debt for $71.00 from Dynamic Recovery Services,
a collection agency, on the day of the tax sale. United Capital ... had never
obtained a judgment or a lien for this debt by the time it redeemed the
property.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
Further, Defendant American Investment ... obtained a
judgment against ... Fletcher on March 12, 1992 for $6,669.87 plus interest,
and Writ of Fi. Fa. was issued on July 14, 1992. The *402 amount due pursuant
to this judgment as of October 2, 2007, the date of the tax sale, was
$29,000.23.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
1. After a tax sale, if there are any excess funds after
paying taxes, costs, and expenses of the sale, the tax commissioner is
authorized to file an interpleader action in superior court for payment of such
excess funds, which “shall be distributed by the superior court to the intended
parties, including the owner, as their interests appear and in the order of
priority in which their interests exist.”3 The trial court awarded the excess funds
to American Investment in this case because its judgment was first in time and
because United Capital failed to establish a first lien under OCGA § 48–4–43.
United Capital contends that the trial court erroneously construed other
statutes to deny it the first priority lien established by OCGA § 48–4–43,
contrary to controlling authority legislative intent, and principles of equity.
We agree that the trial court misapplied OCGA § 48–4–43.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
OCGA §§ 48–4–40 through 48–4–48 address the redemption of
property sold for taxes. Pursuant to OCGA § 48–4–40, if property is sold under
an execution issued for the collection of state and certain local taxes, “the
defendant in fi. fa. or any person having any right, title, or interest in or
lien upon such property may redeem the property from the sale....” “If the
property is redeemed, the tax sale is essentially rescinded and a quitclaim
deed is executed by the tax sale purchaser back to the owner of the property at
the time of levy and sale.”4 OCGA § 48–4–43 provides that if the redemption has
been made by “any creditor of the defendant or by any person having any
interest in the property,” then the amount expended by the creditor or
interested person constitutes a first lien on the property, and “shall be
repaid prior to any other claims upon the property,” so long as the quitclaim
deed to the defendant in fi. fa. is recorded as required by law.5<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
We have previously analyzed the first or “super-lien”6
established by OCGA § 48–4–43 in the context of competing claims to excess
funds from a tax sale. In Wester v. United Capital Financial of Atlanta7 we
concluded that, notwithstanding the general rule that the timing of the
obtaining and recording of judgment liens is *403 dispositive in determining
competing lienholders' rights,8 the appellee's status as the redeemer of the
property afforded it a first priority lien in the amount it paid to redeem the
property.9 Accordingly, we found that the trial court correctly directed that
the excess funds held in the registry of the court be paid to the **275
redeeming creditor.10 United Capital argues that Wester controls here.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
Unlike the appellee in Wester, United Capital was not a
lienholder with respect to the property at the time of the redemption, nor did
the trial court find it had any other interest in the property. The trial court
found United Capital's lack of a lien or interest in the property controlled
for purposes of OCGA § 48–4–43, concluding that “the statutory scheme seems to
be that a judgment[ ] or lienholder may redeem the property to create a
super-lien, not that merely any creditor of the taxpayer may redeem the
property to create a super-lien,” and that United Capital, as a creditor
without a lien, had not otherwise satisfied the condition of OCGA § 48–4–41
contemplating a sale of the property after redemption under a judgment in favor
of the creditor.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
“Laws of this state governing the right to redeem are to be
construed liberally and most favorably to persons allowed by the statute to
redeem.”11 Under OCGA § 48–4–43, the first priority lien for the redemption
price arises as to “any creditor of the defendant [in fi. fa.]” who redeems the
property. The trial court found as a matter of fact that United Capital was
Fletcher's creditor. “Well-established principles of statutory construction
require that the literal meaning of the words of a statute must be followed
unless the result is an absurdity, contradiction, or such an inconvenience that
it is clear that the legislature must have intended something else.”12 It follows
that, based on a literal interpretation of the statute, United Capital had a
first lien for the amounts expended for the redemption.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
There are some apparent inconsistencies in the statutory
scheme, but we conclude that none requires a reinterpretation of the literal
language of OCGA § 48–4–43. Notably, OCGA § 48–4–40 suggests that the only
persons who may redeem property sold in a tax sale include “the defendant in
fi. fa. or any person having any right, title, or interest in or lien upon such
property,” which would appear to exclude a creditor without a lien, right,
title, or interest in the property from exercising a right of redemption.
Nevertheless, and *404 pretermitting whether it was required to do so, the
purchaser at the tax sale permitted United Capital to redeem the property,
which the purchaser quitclaimed back to Fletcher. By virtue of OCGA § 48–4–41,
which contemplates the redemption of a creditor without a lien, and OCGA §
48–4–43, which governs the effect of a redemption, including that by “any
creditor,” the law necessarily allowed United Capital to redeem the property.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
As between OCGA §§ 48–4–41 and 48–4–43, OCGA § 48–4–41
provides that “[i]f the property is redeemed by a creditor of the defendant in
fi. fa. who has no lien,” the creditor has a claim against the property for the
amounts advanced to redeem the property if “[t]here is any sale of the property
after the redemption under a judgment in favor of the creditor.” OCGA § 48–4–41
does not address, however, the priority of this claim and whether it
constitutes a separate lien, which are matters addressed by OCGA § 48–4–43.
There is not such an absurdity, contradiction, or inconvenience in the
application of OCGA § 48–4–43, as written, to require us to interpret “any
creditor” to mean other than what it says. It follows that the effect of the
redemption was to return title to the property to Fletcher, subject to all
liens existing at the time of the tax sale,13 but that United Capital had a
first priority lien for the amounts it expended to redeem the property. Under
Wester, the first priority of United Capital's lien entitled it, as the
redeeming creditor, to priority over American **276 Investment in the
distribution of the excess funds to the extent of the redemption price.14<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
2. American Investment contends that the trial court erred
in holding that United Capital became Fletcher's creditor via an assignment of
a debt from Dynamic Recovery Services. But American Investment did not assert
its claim of error through a cross-appeal. Further, its claim is not supported
by reference to the record, but by the argument that United Capital failed to
present certain evidence at trial, notwithstanding the lack of a transcript
before this court.15 Viewing American Investment's claim as material to the
claims of error asserted by United Capital, and thus reviewable notwithstanding
the lack of a cross-appeal,16 American Investment *405 nevertheless does not
present any basis for this court to find that the trial court erred in its
finding that United Capital was Fletcher's creditor.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
Judgment reversed.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
BLACKBURN, P.J., and ADAMS, J., concur.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
All Citations<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
302 Ga.App. 400, 691 S.E.2d 272, 10 FCDR 480<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
Footnotes<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
1(Citation and punctuation omitted.) CRS Sirrine v. Dravo
Corp., 213 Ga.App. 710, 721(4), 445 S.E.2d 782 (1994).<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
2State of Ga. v. Davis, 292 Ga.App. 387, 389, 665 S.E.2d 350
(2008). The lack of a transcript is not fatal to the appeal because at issue
are questions of law. Vance v. Vance, 246 Ga. 456, 459(4), 271 S.E.2d 853
(1980).<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
3OCGA § 48–4–5.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
4Nat. Tax Funding v. Harpagon Co., 277 Ga. 41, 42(1), 586
S.E.2d 235 (2003).<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
5OCGA §§ 48–4–43; 48–4–44. The trial court found that in
this case the quitclaim deed was recorded as required by law.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
6Nat. Tax Funding, 277 Ga. at 42(1), 586 S.E.2d 235.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
7282 Ga.App. 392, 638 S.E.2d 779 (2006).<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
8See OCGA § 48–4–5.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
9Wester, 282 Ga.App. at 393, 638 S.E.2d 779.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
10Id. at 394, 638 S.E.2d 779.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
11Dixon v. Conway, 262 Ga. 709, 710, 425 S.E.2d 651 (1993).<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
12(Citation and punctuation omitted.) Effingham County Bd.
of Tax Assessors v. Samwilka, Inc., 278 Ga.App. 521, 522, 629 S.E.2d 501
(2006).<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
13See OCGA § 48–4–43 (“When property has been redeemed, the
effect of the redemption shall be to put the title conveyed by the tax sale
back into the defendant in fi. fa., subject to all liens existing at the time
of the tax sale.”).<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
14See Wester, 282 Ga.App. at 393–394, 638 S.E.2d 779.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
15See Davis, 292 Ga.App. at 389, 665 S.E.2d 350 (trial
court's findings of fact presumed correct in absence of a transcript).<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
16See Brady v. Elevator Specialists, 287 Ga.App. 304, 306,
653 S.E.2d 59 (2007) (“[A] ruling that becomes material to an enumeration of
error urged by an appellant may be considered by the appellate court without
the necessity of a cross-appeal.”) (punctuation omitted).<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<br />
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: center;">
END<o:p></o:p></div>
Hugh Woodhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/01021049579391065763noreply@blogger.com1tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2321320695584069696.post-8014626308395776442016-07-22T21:02:00.000-07:002016-07-22T21:02:15.819-07:00Georgia's Offer of Settlement Statute: OCGA § 9-11-68 (2015 Revisions) :: Shifting Attorney's Fees to the Loser in Litigation <a href="https://www.scribd.com/document/319057385/Georgias-Offer-of-Settlement-Statute-OCGA-9-11-68">https://www.scribd.com/document/319057385/Georgias-Offer-of-Settlement-Statute-OCGA-9-11-68</a><br />
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Hugh C. Wood, Attorney</div>
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<br />
This paper will: 1) review the mechanics of OCGA § 9-11-68, 2) it will review the subparts of the statute, 3) it will review the “good faith” portion of the statute, 4) it will review the jury driven homologue to OCGA § 9-15-14 and 5) it will review recent Georgia cases decided under OCGA § 9-11-68. <br /> I. OCGA § 9-11-68, GEORGIA'S OFFER OF SETTLEMENT STATUTE<br /> A. The Offer of Settlement Statute: OCGA § 9-11-68<br />OCGA § 9-11-68. Offer of Settlement <br />(a) At any time more than 30 days after the service of a summons and complaint on a party but not less than 30 days (or 20 days if it is a counteroffer) before trial, either party may serve upon the other party, but shall not file with the Court, a written offer, denominated as an offer under this Code section, to settle a tort claim for the money specified in the offer and to enter into an agreement dismissing the claim or to allow judgment to be entered accordingly. Any offer under this Code section must:<br />(1) Be in writing and state that it is being made pursuant to this Code section;<br />(2) Identify the party or parties making the proposal and the party or parties to whom the proposal is being made;<br />(3) Identify generally the claim or claims the proposal is attempting to resolve;<br />(4) State with particularity any relevant conditions;<br />(5) State the total amount of the proposal;<br />(6) State with particularity the amount proposed to settle a claim for punitive damages, if any;<br />(7) State whether the proposal includes attorney´s fees or other expenses and whether attorney´s fees or other expenses are part of the legal claim; and<br />(8) Include a certificate of service and be served by certified mail or statutory overnight delivery in the form required by Code Section 9-11-5.<br />(b)(1) If a defendant makes an Offer of Settlement which is rejected by the plaintiff, the defendant shall be entitled to recover reasonable attorney ´s fees and expenses of litigation incurred by the defendant or on the defendant ´s behalf from the date of the rejection of the Offer of Settlement through the entry of judgment if the final judgment is one of no liability or the final judgment obtained by the plaintiff is less than 75 percent of such Offer of Settlement.<br />(2) If a plaintiff makes an Offer of Settlement which is rejected by the defendant and the plaintiff recovers a final judgment in an amount greater than 125 percent of such Offer of Settlement, the plaintiff shall be entitled to recover reasonable attorney ´s fees and expenses of litigation incurred by the plaintiff or on the plaintiff ´s behalf from the date of the rejection of the Offer of Settlement through the entry of judgment.<br />(c) Any offer made under this Code section shall remain open for 30 days unless sooner withdrawn by a writing served on the offeree prior to acceptance by the offeree, but an offeror shall not be entitled to attorney´s fees and costs under subsection (b) of this Code section to the extent an offer is not open for at least 30 days (unless it is rejected during that 30 day period). A counteroffer shall be deemed a rejection but may serve as an offer under this Code section if it is specifically denominated as an offer under this Code section. Acceptance or rejection of the offer by the offeree must be in writing and served upon the offeror. An offer that is neither withdrawn nor accepted within 30 days shall be deemed rejected. The fact that an offer is made but not accepted does not preclude a subsequent offer. Evidence of an offer is not admissible except in proceedings to enforce a settlement or to determine reasonable attorney´s fees and costs under this Code section.<br />(d)(1) The Court shall order the payment of attorney ´s fees and expenses of litigation upon receipt of proof that the judgment is one to which the provisions of either paragraph (1) or paragraph (2) of subsection (b) of this Code section apply; provided, however, that if an appeal is taken from such judgment, the Court shall order payment of such attorney ´s fees and expenses of litigation only upon remittitur affirming such judgment.<br />(2) If a party is entitled to costs and fees pursuant to the provisions of this Code section, the Court may determine that an offer was not made in good faith in an order setting forth the basis for such a determination. In such case, the Court may disallow an award of attorney´s fees and costs.<br />(e) Upon motion by the prevailing party at the time that the verdict or judgment is rendered, the moving party may request that the finder of fact determine whether the opposing party presented a frivolous claim or defense. In such event, the Court shall hold a separate bifurcated hearing at which the finder of fact shall make a determination of whether such frivolous claims or defenses were asserted and to award damages, if any, against the party presenting such frivolous claims or defenses. Under this subsection:<br />(1) Frivolous claims shall include, but are not limited to, the following:<br />(A) A claim, defense, or other position that lacks substantial justification or that is not made in good faith or that is made with malice or a wrongful purpose, as those terms are defined in Code Section 51-7-80;<br />(B) A claim, defense, or other position with respect to which there existed such a complete absence of any justiciable issue of law or fact that it could not be reasonably believed that a Court would accept the asserted claim, defense, or other position; and<br />(C) A claim, defense, or other position that was interposed for delay or harassment;<br />(2) Damages awarded may include reasonable and necessary attorney´s fees and expenses of litigation; and(3) A party may elect to pursue either the procedure specified in this subsection or the procedure specified in Code Section 9-15-14, but not both. History. Amended by 2006 Ga. Laws 589, §1, eff. 4/27/2006.<br />Added by 2005 Ga. Laws 1, §5, eff. 2/16/2005.<br /> B. The Mechanics of the Statute<br /> OCGA § 9-11-68(a): The statute applies only to tort cases. While this author is certain that some creative practitioners will attempt to expand the scope of this charming statute to probate, hybrid-contract actions and other actions, it by its language, presently only applies to “tort” actions. Thus, your case must have the prerequisite of a tort claim to be able to make an Offer of Settlement. [1]<br /> With regard to timing, the offer may only be made thirty (30) days after the service of the summons and complaint (Note: it does not refer to the Answer, but only service) and not less than thirty (30) days before trial.<br /> Assuming that your case has a tort claim and the offer is made within the proper timing parameters (thirty (30) days after service or thirty (30) days before trial) then it must contain the following elements:<br /> OCGA § 9-11-68(a)(1): It must be in writing and it must specifically state that it is made under the Offer of Settlement statute 9-11-68;<br /> OCGA § 9-11-68(a)(2): It must particularly identify which parties are making the offer [assuming that there are multiple parties in addition to a simply plaintiff and defendant]; it must also identify the target of the offer;<br /> OCGA § 9-11-68(a)(3): It must identify, generally, the claim or claims concerning which the Offer desired to settle; [2]<br /> OCGA § 9-11-68(a)(4): The offer must “state with particularity any relevant conditions.” What is the legal meaning of “relevant conditions?” This definition escapes this author. <br /> OCGA § 9-11-68(a)(5): The offer must state the total dollar ($) amount of the proposal.<br /> OCGA § 9-11-68(a)(6): The offer must state with particularity the amount that offeror proposes to settle any punitive damage claim;<br /> OCGA § 9-11-68(a)(7): The offer must state specifically whether it includes “attorney’s fees” and/or other expenses and whether attorney’s fees or other expenses are part of the underlying legal claim;<br /> OCGA § 9-11-68(a)(8): The offer must include a certificate of service and be served by certified or statutory overnight delivery (read that UPS or FedEx) in the form required by OCGA § 9-11-5.<br /> Under Section OCGA § 9-11-68 (c) any offer made must remain open for Thirty 30 days unless withdrawn in writing served on the Offeree prior to acceptance. [3]<br /> OCGA § 9-11-68(b). Liability for a Rejected Offer. It is somewhat difficult to state the liability for a rejected offer, however: <br /> If defendant makes an Offer and it is rejected, plaintiff must beat the offer at trial by, at least, 75% of the rejected offer or pay defendant’s attorney’s fees.<br /> If plaintiff makes an Offer and it is rejected, defendant is not liable for plaintiff’s attorney’s fees unless plaintiff beats the rejected offer by 125% of the amount of the offer.<br /> C. The Good Faith Defense <br /> The statute appears to allow the trial Court, upon motion of the non prevailing party under an Offer of Settlement, to request that the Court find that Offeror knew that Offer of Settlement was not made “in good faith”. OCGA § 9-11-68(d)(2). If the Court finds the offer was not made in good faith, then the Offer of Settlement is just considered either void or null.<br /> D. The Jury Version Homologue of OCGA § 9-15-14<br /> OCGA § 9-11-68(e). The 1987 enactment of OCGA § 9-15-14 motion for attorney’s fees for frivolous litigation and claims was supposed to be the remedy enacted by the legislature which merged all common law claims of malicious abuse and malicious use of prosecution into one statute. However, since the enactment of OCGA § 9-15-14, we have seen the enactment of OCGA § 51-7-80 through 85 and now a jury-driven version of OCGA § 9-15-14. Under subparagraph (e) of OCGA § 9-11-68 a prevailing party at the end of a jury trial may move the Court to allow the jury (then impaneled) to hear a bifurcated discussion of whether the claims advanced by the non prevailing party were frivolous, lacked substantial justification or were not made in good faith. <br /> If the jury finds that those claims were made during trial were frivolous then and in that event the jury may proceed to award damages against the non-prevailing party pursuant to OCGA § 9-11-68(e). It is possible that a motion under subparagraph (e) may be made to the judge; however, it is clear that the General Assembly wanted to give the prevailing party the opportunity to present frivolous claims to the jury then impaneled.<br /> A prevailing party may not use both OCGA § 9-15-14 and OCGA § 9-11-68(e) for the same factual conduct by the non-prevailing party.<br /> II. RECENT GEORGIA CASES INTERPRETING OCGA § 9-11-68<br />A. 2015 Cases <br />1. Alessi v. Cornerstone Associates, Inc., 334 Ga.App. 490, 780 S.E.2d 15 (2015).<br /> No OCGA § 9 11 68 awards in Arbitration. The case involved homeowners purchasing a house from Cornerstone Associates Inc. in Locust Grove, Georgia. The contractor purchase indicated that binding arbitration would be conducted before an arbitrator named by Cornerstone. The year before the arbitration Cornerstone offered the homeowners an OCGA § 9 11 68 offer of $3,000.00 to settle the claim. The homeowners proceeded to binding arbitration pursuant to the contract and recovered nothing as did Cornerstone. Both sides received nothing in arbitration. Based upon the fact that homeowner did not exceed or meet the $3,000.00 by 75 percent at the arbitration, Cornerstone brought a motion in the trial court for the $67,268.41 it had spent in defending the case. The Superior Court of Paulding County awarded the attorney's fees pursuant to OCGA § 9 11 68 and homeowner appeal. The Court of Appeals and apparently what appears to be a case of first impression determined that OCGA § 9 11 68 attorney's fees applies only in the context of court driven civil litigation. The Court of Appeals reasoned that the statute should be granted in strict construction and 9 11 68 that the general assembly made no reference to alternative dispute resolution in the statute. Also, by the use of the word trial, the general assembly must have intended to exclude Award in arbitration. Thus, 9 11 68 does not apply in arbitration. [The underlying case was discussed last year at Alessi, et al. v. Cornerstone Associates, Inc., 329 Ga.App. 420, 765 S.E.2d 630 (2014).]<br />2. Tiller v. RJJB Associates, LLP, 331 Ga.App. 622, 770 S.E.2d 883 (2015).<br /> Award Reversed for Vagueness. The Court of Appeals reversed a grant of OCGA § 9 11 68 to a shopping center mall operated that housed anchor store J. C. Penney in the amount of $24,696.28. While the corporation for the mall obtained summary judgment against a slip and fall plaintiff and the slip and fall plaintiff recovered nothing, the Court of Appeals held that the offer was too vague to be unenforceable. Particularly, the movant under OCGA § 9 11 68 sent an OCGA § 9 11 68 of settlement which referred to provisions of the complaint. Because the slip and fall plaintiff had filed a lengthy amended complaint the Court of Appeals held that the offer could not be accepted as written. This is yet another case that describes the importance of confirming the OCGA § 9 11 68 letter to the exact facts of the case in order to be enforced. <br />3. Bell v. Waffle House, Inc., 331 Ga.App. 443, 771 S.E.2d 132 (2015)<br /> No Fee Hearing Required if not Requested. In an OCGA § 9 11 68 award of attorney's fees in favor of Waffle House in the amount of $27,276.37, the Court of Appeals affirmed the award even though no evidentiary hearing was held. Generally under OCGA § 9 11 68 (as is required under OCGA § 9 15 14 (a hearing is required pursuant to OCGA § 9 11 68 (e)). The Court of Appeals affirmed because the plaintiff Bell (against whom the award was made) failed to formally request a hearing in his moving papers and waived it by the language of his motion. Thus, the fee award was affirmed without a necessity of a hearing.<br />B. 2014 Cases<br /> In Couch II, infra, the Supreme Court applied OCGA § 9-11-68 to the State of Georgia and held that sovereign immunity was waived as to an attorney fee application against the State. In Crane Composites, infra, the court held that OCGA § 9-11-68 may be applied when the injury occurred before the date of the statute but the action was filed after the date of the statute. And in the second appearance of Canton Plaza, infra, again reveals that to obtain an OCGA § 9-11-68 award that will survive appeal requires segregation of attorney’s fees to the negligence report claim on which the losing party failed to accept the tendered offer.<br /><br />1. Ga. Department of Corrections v. Couch, 295 Ga. 469, 759 S.E.2d 804 (2014) (Couch II ) reversing Ga. Department of Corrections v. Couch, 322 Ga.App. 234, 744 S.E.2d 432 (2013).<br /> <br /> Sovereign Immunity Waived OCGA § 9-11-68. David Lee Couch filed a tort lawsuit against the Georgia Department of Corrections. After the Department rejected Couch's offer to settle the case for $24, 000, the case proceeded to trial, where the jury returned a verdict for Couch in the amount of $105, 417. Based on Couch's 40% contingency fee agreement with his attorneys, the trial court ordered the Department to pay Couch $49,542 in attorney fees – 40% of his total recovery, after appeal, including post-judgment interest – as well as $4,782 in litigation expenses, pursuant to the "offer of settlement" statute, OCGA § 9-11-68 (b) (2). [The contingent award was reversed on appeal. It consisted in part of fees on appeal which are not within the statute. It seems somewhat unclear whether a contingent fee may stand (alone) for an award under OCGA § 9-11-68.] <br /> <br /><br /> <br /> This Supreme Court then granted certiorari to address sovereign immunity.<br /> 1. Did the Court of Appeals err when it held that the sovereign immunity of the Department was waived by the Georgia Tort Claims Act as to Couch's attorney fees?<br /> 2. If the sovereign immunity of the Department was waived as to Couch's attorney fees, did the Court of Appeals err by failing to prorate the 40% contingency fee to reflect that some of the fees were incurred before the settlement offer was rejected?<br /> For the reasons discussed below, we hold that the sovereign immunity of the Department was waived as to the attorney fees award under OCGA § 9-11-68 (b).<br /><br />2. Crane Composites, Inc. v. Wayne Farms, LLC, et al., 296 Ga. 271, 765 S.E.2d 921 (2014) <br /> <br /> The question for decision in this case is whether OCGA § 9-11-68, can be applied to a negligence action in which the injury occurred prior to the effective date of the statute, but in which the action was filed after that date. The Court answered this question affirmatively and, in so doing, they overruled L. P. Gas Industrial Equipment Co. v. Burch, 306 Ga.App. 156, 701 S.E.2d 602 (2010).<br /> <br />3. McCarthy, et. al. v. Yamaha Motor Man. Corp., 994 F.Supp.2d 1329 (N.D.Ga. 2014).<br /> In an unusual case the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia applied Georgia's fee shifting statute under OCGA § 9-11-68 to a personal injury claim that occurred in Queensland, Australia. The plaintiff was severely injured, with spinal injuries, in a Yamaha WaveRunner™ accident in Queensland. The Yamaha WaveRunner™ was manufactured by Yamaha in Newnan, Georgia.<br /> The plaintiff chose to sue in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia instead of the Commonwealth Courts in Queensland, Australia. The Court accepted the claim based on diversity pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332 and retained the case. While the Court's order only proceeds through the application of which law shall apply, the parties struggled concerning whether to apply the legal standards of Australia or Georgia. <br /> For simplicity Georgia tends not to apply fixed caps to products liability claims or punitive damages whereas the Commonwealth Courts in Queensland apply a cap of approximately $230,000.00 (AUD) to compensatory damages (general damages including emotional distress, pain and suffering and other economic damages and Australia provides a $274,000.00 (AUD) cap on strict liability claims.) Australia also capped lost income. The plaintiffs argued for the application of Georgia law even though the injury occurred in Australia and the Court eventually applied Australian law. The plaintiff was unable to show that the public policy of Georgia was such that Australian caps on damages and punitive damages should not be applied.<br /> However, the determination of attorneys' fees was decided by the Court to apply Georgia law. Australian expert affidavits showed that Queensland would apply the "English rule," that generally provides the winner of the lawsuit is able to shift the attorneys' fees to the loser. Georgia, instead, applies statutory fee shifting including, which the Court discussed at some length. Because the Australia law was general common law in Georgia had specific statutes on point, including OCGA § 9-11-68, the Court decided to apply the specific Georgia statute instead of the general common law of Australia on attorneys' fees.<br /> The resolution of the case is not revealed in the published Order.<br /> 4. Weinberg, Wheeler, Hudgins, Gunn & Dial, LLC v. Teledyne Technologies, Inc., 090913 GANDC, 1:12-cv-0686-JEC<br /> OCGA § 9 11 68 is mentioned as part of an Order in case by an Atlanta law firm to collect its fees. The law firm prevailed on the collection of fees. However, the Order contains a discussion of the denial of the application of OCGA § 9 11 68.<br /> In the underlying case (which generated the fee litigation based on losing Defendant’s nonpayment of the law firms fees) Plaintiff’s (in the underlying case) asked the jury for $17,000,000.00. The jury returned $1,700,000.00. Defendant offered $3,000,000.00 prior to trial to settle, apparently within OCGA § 9 11 68(a). The Court refused to apply the fee shifting statute citing the offer as 5 days late. While perhaps obvious on the application of the statute, this Order again shows the rigid application of this statute and how every part of the offer must come within the four (4) corners of the statute.<br />C. 2013 Cases<br /><br />1. Canton Plaza, Inc. et al. v. Regions Bank, Inc., 325 Ga.App. 361, 749 S.E.2d 825 (2013)<br /> <br /> Bank failed to segregate the fees and expenses associated with prosecuting its counterclaims, tort and contract. Fee award reversed. Canton Plaza, Inc. and Chaim Oami (" the plaintiffs" ) appeal from an award of attorney fees and expenses in favor of Regions Bank, Inc. (" the Bank" ) under OCGA § 9-11-68, Georgia's offer of settlement statute. The plaintiffs contended that the trial court erred in awarding the Bank its attorney fees and expenses because the Bank failed to segregate its recoverable fees and expenses from those which were non-recoverable; and, because the award, as against plaintiff Oami, was inappropriate. Fee award reversed and remanded for hearing on segregated fee claims.<br /> <br />2. Graham, et al. v. HHC FT Simons, Inc., 322 Ga.App. 693, 746 S.E.2d 157 (2013).<br /> OCGA § 9-11-68 offer must be accepted according to its strict terms or will be vacated. This OCGA § 9-11-68 case seems to turn more on the ordinary rules concerning offer, acceptance and consideration than the specifics of OCGA § 9-11-68. In Graham, supra, the father (Graham, Sr.) brought a wrongful death action against a mental health facility at Saint Simons Island for the wrongful discharge of his son. His son killed himself eight hours after he was discharged.<br /> In the interplay of offer, acceptance and consideration, the defendant mental health facility sent an OCGA § 9-11-68 offer of compromise offering $100,000.00 in exchange for the standard dismissal and other events associated with the OCGA § 9-11-68 offer. Within the 30 days Graham rejected the offer and requested $200,000.00 by counter-offer. In what can only be derived between the lines as bad drafting, the mental health facility rejected the $200,000.00 counteroffer and "reiterated" its $100,000.00 offer. Graham purportedly tried to accept, during that period of time the court granted summary judgment to the mental health facility and the mental health facility stood on the dismissal and refused to pay the $100,000.00 settlement.<br /> On appeal the Court of Appeals found that the OCGA § 9-11-68 reiteration offer required that the plaintiff do certain things including dismiss the action. Even though the language of the second reiteration was murky, the plaintiff may have been able to accept if it had dismissed but it did not. Since the case remained pending while it attempted to accept there was no clear acceptance pursuant to the specific rule of OCGA § 9-11-68 did not apply to the reiteration. <br />3. Eaddy v. Precision Franchising, LLC, 320 Ga.App. 667, 739 S.E.2d 410 (2013)<br /> Settlement agreement between franchisor and franchisee's liability insurer did not prevent franchisor from seeking an award of attorney fees from individual pursuant to the offer of judgment statute. Eaddy v. Precision Franchising, LLC, supra, shows that a successful plaintiff can face attorneys’ fees by one defendant on an OCGA § 9-11-68 motion despite a relatively successful conclusion in the outcome.<br /> The opinion doesn’t seem to state all of the necessary facts to understand what occurred in the trial court; however, Eaddy was apparently beaten up at an automobile service business (that is not named in the case) for which Precision Franchising, LLC was the franchisor.<br /> Eaddy apparently sued the local automobile establishment, the individual who actually hit him and its franchisor Precision Franchising, LLC. The disclosed insurance company, Central Mutual Insurance Company, refused to provide a defense for Precision (franchisor) and Precision apparently provided its own attorneys paid for out of its pocket.<br /> Eaddy’s damages must have been significant. Early on in the litigation Precision Franchising (not the local store but the national franchising company) made a $1,000.00 offer to settle pursuant to OCGA § 9-11-68. Eaddy rejected this by refusal to respond within 30 days. Shortly thereafter, the trial court granted summary judgment only as to the franchisor, Precision Franchising, LLC’s claims against Eaddy. <br /> Eaddy appealed the grant summary judgment. While that appeal was pending, Eaddy settled with Central Mutual and eliminated all claims against the remaining defendants including the local store. The settlement took out any potential liability Precision would have if the appeal was reversed. Thus, Eaddy achieved $200,000.00 for the altercation based on that settlement.<br /> Meanwhile Precision sued Central Mutual for nonpayment of its attorneys’ fees in defending the claim and was able to extract $118,000.00 over Central Mutual’s refusal to pay for attorneys to defend Precision during the lawsuit.<br /> As if matters can’t get stranger in the world of OCGA § 9-11-68 after all of the settlements are completed but the claims remained pending in the trial court, Precision moved on its OCGA § 9-11-68 Motion (for which it had originally only offered $1,000.00 to clear Eaddy off a claim that he eventually recovered $200,000.00) for the attorneys’ fees necessary to obtain the grant of summary of judgment against Eaddy. Recall, Precision Financing (the parent franchisor) was successful in eliminating Eaddy’s claims despite the fact if Eaddy eventually settled with the other defendants. A hearing was held on Precision Franchisor’s OCGA § 9-11-68 claim against Eaddy and the trail court awarded $28,656.37 of attorneys’ fees against Eaddy to the parent franchisor. That amount was affirmed on appeal.<br /> This case shows how OCGA § 9-11-68 continues to play out in unusual circumstances. Despite the fact that Eaddy recovered a substantial amount against the local defendants, he did not recover against the national franchisor. The national franchisor (apparently having ultimately no liability to anyone) was able to recover $28,000.00 from Eaddy under OCGA § 9-11-68 even though it would appear at the outset that Eaddy was reasonable in rejecting the $1,000 offer of settlement. <br />4. Gowen Oil Company v. Biju Abraham, et al., 511 F. App’x, 930, 936 (11th Cir. 2013).<br /><br /> A frivolous case can generate a massive fee claim. In the 2013 overview of this area of the law, Gowen Oil Company v. Biju Abraham, et al, stands out as the poster-child for an OCGA § 9-11-68 award of attorney's fees in Federal court. <br /> In that convoluted legal malpractice case where Abraham asserts that his former counsel Greenberg Traurig, LLP preferred some of his existing clients over Abraham and caused him damages based on the sale of convenience stores in south Georgia, his action to sue Greenberg Traurig backfired significantly in attorney's fees. As stated in the Southern District of Georgia trial court, Greenberg Traurig offered $63,000.00 early on to settle the claim and be done with it. The case continued for a number of months whereupon the Southern District of Georgia granted summary judgment in favor of Greenberg Traurig and awarded in excess of $300,000.00 of attorney's fees (primarily generated by Rogers & Harden of Atlanta) against Plaintiff.<br /> The trial court found that the case was without merit, that the attorney's fees were appropriate, that it really didn't make any difference whether they used Atlanta attorney's fees or Brunswick-based attorney's fees because the amounts were similar based on a 10 percent discount, that paralegal fees were recoverable and (more specifically) that defendant is entitled to determine how many paralegals and lawyers it intends to use to defend the case within reason and the fact that plaintiff used only two lawyers and two paralegals did not control what resources Greenberg Traurig felt were necessary to defend itself.<br /> Perhaps one of the more cogent arguments is that appellant argued Greenberg Traurig should not be entitled to attorney's fees because those fees were covered by an insurance policy for legal malpractice. The court rejected that argument and did not weigh into the possibility of a double recovery where the attorney's fees were recovered despite the fact they'd been paid for by insurance. The court simply said that OCGA § 9-11-68 is designed to encourage settlements and it refused to look at whether the fact that fees were covered by insurance. Malpractice insurance did not insulate Gowen from the payment of legal fees and expenses under OCGA § 9-11-68. <br /> III. IMPORTANT ISSUES IN INTERPRETING OCGA § 9-11-68<br />A. Paying A Big Firm's Fees In A Plaintiff's Loss; Gowen Oil Company<br /> A plaintiff in the Southern District of Georgia ended up paying a large firms attorneys' fees of $300,000.00 for a loss on a Motion for Summary Judgment in a complex case.<br /> Plaintiff Gowen Oil Company, Inc. ("Gowen") sued Greenberg Traurig for legal work done by Greenberg Traurig for its previous client Biju Abraham. While the facts are somewhat complex, Gowen asserted that Greenberg Traurig conspired with its prior client Abraham to interfere with Gowen's contractual rights to purchase a number of filling stations in Georgia. Gowen Oil Company, Inc., v. Biju Abraham; Greenberg Traurig, LLP, United States District Court for the Southern District of Georgia, CV-210-157 (March 30, 2012). <br /> Gowen asserted that Greenberg Traurig tortuously interfered with Gowen's Right of First Refusal with regard to a pending sale of the filling stations. Gowen asserted violations of Georgia's Bulk Transfer Act in Superior Court. Greenberg Traurig (or perhaps another defendant) removed the case to the Southern District of Georgia based on diversity jurisdiction.<br /> According to the Court, the case was complex, involved extensive discovery and substantial motion practice. Both parties sought extended discovery due to the large number of parties and witnesses and some discovery was necessary outside of the United States. <br /> This case is particularly instructive for the application of Georgia's OCGA § 9-11-68 attorney's fees statute when applied in federal court. At least at the district level, OCGA § 9-11-68 has been found to be substantive law. Given that it's substantive, a federal court sitting in diversity must apply it as the rule of decision.<br /> Greenberg Traurig hired outside counsel of Rogers & Hardin in Atlanta and while discovery was pending Rogers & Hardin sent an OCGA § 9-11-68 offer of settlement. While the amount is not referred to in the case, a review of the docket on Pacer shows that the offer to settle, including attorneys' fees and punitive damages was set at $63,000.00. Gowen neither accepted nor rejected but went silent, which under the statute is a rejection. Two months later Greenberg Traurig filed a Motion for Summary Judgment. The Motion for Summary Judgment on all the substantive claims was granted and some months thereafter Greenberg Traurig filed a Motion for its attorney’s fees under 9-11-68.<br /> Gowen's initial claim made out a claim for $35 million and by the time Greenberg Traurig had succeed in obtaining a dismissal of all of the claims and asserting its request for fees, it was entitled to fees in excess of $300,000.00. Due to various withdrawals of certain claims and voluntary reductions on behalf of Greenberg Traurig's part, the Court granted fees in the amount of $281,000.00 and Court costs of $35,000.00.<br /> The case is instructive for a number of reasons.<br /> The Court sided with Greenberg Traurig that given the potential exposure, $35 million, plaintiff was not well grounded in its assertion that plaintiff used two lawyers and a few paralegals while Greenberg Traurig employed eight lawyers and five support staff. The Court found that Greenberg Traurig had a reasonable explanation for each attorney and each paralegal and therefore granted fees for them all at a slightly reduced rate.<br /> On a practice level, the case also provides a clear exhibit that was used by Greenberg Traurig, prepared by Rogers & Hardin, from which a fairly clear OCGA § 9-11-68 demand letter may be crafted. Exhibit A.<br /> Additionally, the Motion prepared by Rogers & Hardin on behalf of Greenberg Traurig is a fairly good form for use in federal court (and could be easily modified for Superior Court). It is attached hereto as Exhibit B.<br /> Gowen was affirmed in Gowen Oil Company vs. Greenberg Traurig, et al., United States Court of Appeals for the 11th Cir. (December 13, 2011) (Unpublished).<br />B. Potential Bad Press Associated With Seeking Attorney's Fees: Hall v. 84 Lumber<br /> In an Order in Charles D. Hall, Plaintiff v. 84 Company; Darren Richardson; Keith Conner; Robert Venal; Robert C. Venal, Inc., Defendants, United States District Court for the Southern District of Georgia Savannah Division, Judge William T. Moore, (March 28, 2012), Judge Moore “encouraged” the Defendants not to seek fees. Judge Moore, while finding the OCGA § 9-11-68 Motion was hyper technically not ripe, cautioned the Defendants concerning whether they should seek attorneys' fees of in excess of $250,000.00 from the Plaintiff who lost his case. <br /> The Court, in Hall v. 84 Lumber, supra, stated that:<br />Mr. Hall is not some deep pocket corporate entity. Rather, he was simply an unfortunate delivery driver who suffered an injury when one of defendant's employees ran over his foot with a forklift. Mr. Hall brought a legitimate claim before this Court: whether defendants qualified as statutory employers under Georgia law and, as a result, were shielded from liability for his injury. In this Court's opinion, defendants need to ask themselves whether the mere fact that Mr. Hall's counsel failed to convince this Court that his client was meritorious should result in saddling an injured blue collar worker with not only the fallout from his injury but also $271,000.00 of fees and expenses. This Court wonders whether this is truly a position that a customer-service oriented business like 84 Lumbar should take. Perhaps the limited and general partners of defendant 84 Lumbar should ask themselves the same question." <br />Hall v. 84 Lumber, supra at 5. (Order of March 28, 2012). <br /> A review of the docket sheet concerning Southern District Case No. 4:09-CV-00057-WTM-GRS shows that 84 Lumber dismissed the motion with prejudice and did not refile it.<br /> C. Small Jury Verdict for Plaintiff Equals Judgment for the Defendant<br /> Abraham v. Hannah, 306 Ga.App. 735, 702 S.E.2d 904 (2010), is a case that has a fairly shocking outcome under OCGA § 9-11-68. While Abraham was reversed on appeal because the plaintiff did not have notice of the OCGA § 9-11-68 hearing, it shows how a plaintiff may win and then lose under OCGA § 9-11-68.<br /> Abraham (Plaintiff) recovered $850.00 in a jury verdict (this author admits that it's in a tiny sum); however, prior to the jury verdict Hannah (defendant) had offered $2,500.00 to Abraham to settle the case. After the jury verdict in Abraham's favor of $850.00, the trial Court held a hearing and granted attorney's fees, pursuant to OCGA § 9-11-68, to Hannah in the amount of $2,425.00. Once the jury verdict of $850.00 was subtracted from that amount the defendant (though the defendant lost at trial) had a judgment in its favor against the successful plaintiff, Abraham, of $1,575.00. <br /> While this case was reversed for lack of notice, it displays in stark contrast the painful reality of an unaccepted offer in the face of a small jury verdict. <br /> D. Punitive Damages Count Toward the 75% - 125%<br /> In Wildcat Cliffs Builders, LLC v. Hagwood, 229 Ga. App. 244, 663 S.E.2d 818 (2008), (This case was decided under prior law), plaintiff in the underlying action, Hagwood, recovered a $90,000.00 compensatory award, $100,000.00 punitive damage award and $14,688.56 in OCGA § 9-11-68 attorney’s fees. <br /> The facts most favorable to Hagwood showed that Wild Cliffs Builders knowingly encroached upon Hagwood’s property, built a retaining wall, refused to remove it and then offered Hagwood only $10,000.00 in an effort to purchase an easement and a complete release of liability. A jury awarded to Hagwood the amounts stated above. Though decided under prior law, an interesting nuance out of the Wildwood Builders case is that defendant/appellant’s took the position on appeal that punitive damages should not be counted in calculating the OCGA § 9-11-68 award. Although it is unclear whether the Georgia Court of Appeals simply said that they would or would not consider the inclusion of punitive damages, they held that it was “moot” once they affirmed the punitive damage award. Wildcat Cliffs, at 822.<br /> In sum, the evidence showed that Wildcat had no interest in remedying or lessening the run-off problem or compensating Hagwood for the property damage he had sustained. Rather, it was amenable only to paying Hagwood for an easement and a release from all liability arising from the retaining walls it had constructed on Hagwood's property. The foregoing evidence was sufficient to authorize the jury's conclusion that, after it learned of its trespass onto Hagwood's property and its creation of a continuing nuisance thereon, Wildcat acted with a conscious indifference to the consequences of its conduct. <br /> Hagwood requested and received attorney fees and expenses pursuant to OCGA § 9-11-68(b)(2). Prior to trial, Hagwood offered to settle the case for $110,000. After the jury awarded him a total of $190,000 in damages, he was, therefore, statutorily entitled to recover his attorney fees and expenses.<br /> On appeal, Wildcat argued that this award must be overturned, because, in the absence of the punitive damages award, Hagwood did not recover greater than 125% percent of his Offer of Settlement. The Court of Appeals held that since it sustained the award of punitive damages, that argument is moot.<br /> It affirmed the entry of judgment against Wildcat in favor of Hagwood, including the award of $100,000 in punitive damages and $14,688.56 in attorney fees and expenses. <br /> E. A Dismissal Without Prejudice Did Not Trigger the Award<br /> In McKesson Corporation, et al. v. Green, et al., 286 Ga. App. 110, 648 S.E.2d 457 (2007), (decided under prior law), the Court of Appeals declined to award OCGA § 9-11-68 attorney’s fees where a demand had been made but plaintiff took a dismissal without prejudice (OCGA § 9-11-41) prior to proceeding to trial. While the McKesson case turned on complex issues associated with stockholdings, RICO allegations concerning stockholdings and plaintiff’s apparent lack of an expert immediately prior to trial, the OCGA § 9 11-68 issue was resolved by the Court of Appeals in that a voluntary dismissal does not constitute the type of judgment or final judgment which will invoke liability under the OCGA § 9-11-68 statute. The Court of Appeals wrote in that regard as follows:<br />McKesson contends that the trial Court erred in denying its motion for attorney’s fees under OCGA § 9-11-68(b)(1). That code section provides that a defendant whose settlement offer is rejected shall recover attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation “if the final judgment is one of no liability or the final judgment obtained by the plaintiff is less than 75 percent of such Offer of Settlement.” The trial Court in this case entered no final judgment within the meaning of the statute, and therefore did not err in denying this motion. A right to dismiss voluntarily without prejudice would be meaningless if doing so would trigger the payment of defendant’s attorney’s fees. Without explicit language establishing that the legislature intended to excise a plaintiff’s right to dismiss in this manner, this Court will not engraft such an intention into the statute. <br />McKesson, at 462.<br /> F. Courts Struggle With “Offers Not Made in Good Faith”<br /> The trial courts and Georgia Court of Appeals have struggled with the defining what constitutes and Offer not made in “good faith.” It is, somewhat, like trying to put a subjective concept into an objective box. However, given that the General Assembly has foisted O.C.G.A. § 9-11-68 upon us, we must do it. The most prominent case on point is, Great West Cas. Co. v. Bloomfield, 313 Ga.App. 180, 721 S.E.2d 173 (2011). <br /> A masterful overview of Bloomfield, at the trial level is found at: Clay, Jr., Charles "Chuck" and Paupeck, Michael, Recent Decision Highlights Additional Issues with Georgia's Tort Reform Act, Weinburg, Wheeler, Hudgins, Gunn & Dial, December 29, 2011. I reproduce it below (without indentions).<br /> “On December 1, 2011 the Georgia Court of Appeals issued an opinion that complicates efforts by defendants and their insurers to obtain fees and costs, particularly in large damages cases. See, Bloomfield, supra. This appeal was taken from a trial court’s denial of a motion for fees and costs pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 9-11-68, Georgia’s offer of settlement statute. This statute is quite specific regarding the procedure and essential terms of the written offer. If complied with, the statute states that a defendant shall be entitled to recover reasonable attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation incurred from the date an offer was rejected through entry of judgment, if the final judgment is one of no liability or less than 75 percent of such offer of settlement. That is, unless the trial judge determines that the offer was not made in “good faith.” <br /> In Bloomfield, Judge Patsy Porter of the Fulton County State Court ruled that the Great West Defendants’ $25,000.00 offer of settlement did not constitute a “good faith” offer in a wrongful death trucking case, and, thus, she disallowed an award of $69,000.00 in fees and costs to which these defendants were otherwise entitled under the statute. The trial judge’s ruling and the ultimate decision on appeal were somewhat surprising because these defendants won at trial and their written offer, in all technical aspects, complied with the requisites of O.C.G.A. § 9-11-68. Moreover, in June of 2011, the Court of Appeals held that a $750 offer was not made in bad faith in a slander case and, therefore, upheld a $84,000.00 award of fees and expenses. The Bloomfield decision makes clear that winning at trial does not guarantee a recovery of attorneys’ fees and costs. Unfortunately, it provides limited explanation as to exactly why the particular offer was deficient and creates ambiguous precedent. <br /> The underlying case in Bloomfield involved two separate collisions. In the first collision, the tractor-trailer driver insured by Great West struck another vehicle while changing lanes, causing an accident. Subsequently, the vehicle in which Mrs. Bloomfield was a passenger slowed while approaching the original wreck and was struck from behind by a second tractor-trailer, the driver of which admitted fault and was ultimately assessed 100% liability. A Fulton County jury awarded $10.4M compensatory damages and $44M in punitive damages (which were capped at $250,000.00 by statute) against the defendants associated with the second tractor-trailer. <br /> The specific issue on appeal was whether the trial court had abused its discretion pursuant to subsection (d)(2) of O.C.G.A. § 9-11-68 in disallowing the fees and costs to which the Great West Defendants were otherwise entitled. Subsection (d)(2) reads, “If a party is entitled to costs and fees pursuant to the provisions of this Code section, the court may determine that an offer was not made in good faith in an order setting forth the basis for such a determination.” (emphasis added). The trial court initially denied the motion for fees without providing the statutorily required basis, so the Court of Appeals first vacated that order and remanded the case back with instructions to explain the basis for finding bad faith. See Great West Cas. Co. v. Bloomfield, 303 Ga. App. 26, 693 S.E.2d 99 (2010); cf Cohen v. Alfred and Adele Academy, Inc., 310 Ga. App. 761, 714 S.E.2d 350 (2011) (trial courts are not required to make written findings of fact or conclusions of law should they find that an offer was made in good faith). On remand, the Bloomfield trial court supported its denial by stating: 1) $25,000.00 was not a reasonable offer or realistic assessment of liability in a wrongful death case; 2) the subject truck driver paid a traffic ticket fine for improper lane change; 3) defense counsel made the offer without having even deposed a police officer on the scene who later testified at trial; and 4) that the Great West Defendants eventually made a $1M offer during trial, which Plaintiff rejected. <br /> The case then went to the Court of Appeals a second time. Initially, it was assigned to a three-judge panel which included Judges Anne Elizabeth Barnes, Harris Adams and Keith Blackwell. They split 2-1 in favor of reversing the trial court on the grounds that it had failed to justify the finding of bad faith. Because there was a split, an expanded seven-judge panel was employed to resolve the split. Judge Barnes apparently convinced the additional panel members to side with her, and in a 5-2 decision focusing heavily upon the abuse of discretion standard of review, the majority upheld the trial court’s denial of fees and costs.<br /> While upholding the trial court’s ruling, the Court of Appeals’ majority opinion offered almost no analysis of the trial court’s four-part rationale for finding a lack of good faith. The dissent raised frustration with that approach and then proceeded to delve into a more detailed analysis in which they challenged each of Judge Porter’s four reasons. Instead, the majority broadly stated that the trial court’s determination of the reasonableness of an offer “is a factual determination, based on the trial court’s assessment of the case, the parties, the lawyers, and all of the other factors that go into such determination, which the trial court has gathered during of the case.” They did not address: 1) whether the $25,000 offer was per se unreasonable in a wrongful death case; 2) whether the fact that the subject truck driver paid a traffic ticket fine for improper lane change properly supported a finding of bad faith; or 3) whether defense counsel’s failure to depose a police officer on the scene who later testified at trial was indicative of bad faith. The Court of Appeals did analyze the trial court’s fourth factor and held that the trial court properly considered the fact that Great West made a $1M settlement offer during trial.”<br />Id.<br /> G. OCGA § 9-11-68 is Constitutional<br /> Smith et al. v. Baptiste, et al., 287 Ga. 23, 694 S.E.2d 83 (2010), stands for the proposition that the Supreme Court of Georgia found OCGA § 9-11-68 to be constitutional.<br /> The Baptistes filed a complaint for damages against Chuck Smith and the radio station WQXI 790 AM after WQXI broadcast defamatory statements about the Baptistes. While the case was pending and pursuant to OCGA § 9-11-68(a), Smith and WQXI offered to settle the case for $5,000.00. The Baptistes did not respond to the offer which was deemed a rejection under OCGA § 9-11-68(c). The Court granted summary judgment. <br /> Smith and WQXI moved for attorney’s fees pursuant to OCGA § 9-11-68(b)(1); however, after a hearing, the trial Court denied Smith and WQXI’s motion for attorney’s fees and found that the scheme enacted under OCGA § 9-11-68 was unconstitutional and violated various provisions of the Georgia constitution.<br /> In the Baptiste, supra, Mr. Justice Carley sketched out the background of OCGA § 9-11-68. He wrote that OCGA § 9-11-68 was enacted as part of the Tort Reform Act of 2005. The scheme enacted under OCGA § 9-11-68(a) specifies that in a tort claim either party may serve on the other party a written demand or offer to settle that tort claim. If the settlement demand or offer is rejected, that party may be entitled to recover attorney’s fees pursuant to OCGA § 9-11-68(b).<br /> The Georgia Supreme Court overturned the trial Court on the finding that OCGA § 9-11-68 violated the “uniformity” clause of the Georgia constitution. The trial Court apparently found that OCGA § 9-11-68 was non-uniform in that it applied only to tort cases and not to civil cases including contract claims or other claims. That is, because it did not apply to the entire class of civil cases but only to tort claims inside civil cases it was therefore (in the trial Court’s opinion) unconstitutional.<br /> The Georgia Supreme Court wrote that “our state Constitution only requires a law to have uniform operation across all laws.” Baptiste, at 88.<br /> Because the Supreme Court found that OCGA § 9-11-68 applied uniformly across the state to all similarly situated tort claims, it was a general law and was therefore uniform across those types of claims. It was therefore constitutional. Id.<br /> IV. FEDERAL COURT APPLICATION OF OCGA § 9-11-68 <br /> OCGA § 9-11-68 is Substantive Law in Federal Court.<br /> Wheatley v. Moe's Southwest Grill, LLC, et al. 580 F. Supp. 2d 1324 (N.D. Ga. 2008), sheds light on some of the difficulties of the enforcement of OCGA § 9-11-68 (the Georgia Offer of Settlement) in Federal Court. While many parts of this long and messy case go beyond a simple discussion of OCGA § 9-11-68, it turned on an offer of 50,000 shares of stock in Moe's and related corporations [Mama Fu's Noodle House, Inc. and Raving Brands Holding, Inc.] when Plaintiff, Wheatley, was promoted from employee to company vice president with an equity share. When Wheatley resigned from the corporation, she sought the 50,000 shares by written certificate. Because of the lack of writing and ambiguity, litigation arose concerning whether the shares had to be issued. <br /> An award of OCGA § 9-11-68 attorney's fees may not be had for the attorney's fees incurred from an appeal from the District Court through the 11th Circuit and on remittitur back to the District Court. Attorneys for Moe's Southwest moved for $49,000.00 of attorney's fees incurred while the case was appealed from the District Court through the 11th Circuit and back on remand to District Court. The United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia, gave a short shrift to the request for attorney's fees on appeal in federal Court and wrote: "The motion that seeks attorney's fees and expenses of litigation incurred on appeal is meritless. The statute expressly limits the award of attorney's fees and expenses to those incurred from the date of the rejection of the Offer of Settlement to the date of entry of judgment … " 580 F. Supp. 2d 1326.<br /> It is unclear, from Wheatley and similar cases, how practitioners are to deal with cases that are a combination of contract claims, tort claims and hybrid claims. In Wheatley, the Plaintiffs contended they were suing on contract for the 50,000 shares. The defendants contended that it was a meritless tort suit, suit on breach of fiduciary duties, conversion and other counts. The federal Court struggled with the question concerning whether an OCGA § 9-11-68 Offer of Settlement could properly be made to a case that had some contract claims buried in amongst tort claims. 580 F. Supp. 2d 1325 1327. <br /> While the trial court did not resolve this area of the law, he found that the statute applied to any suit that involved a "tort claim" in the action. Thus, perhaps reading between the lines, one can make an Offer of Settlement if any portion of Plaintiff's complaint includes a well-defined "tort" claim. 580 F. Supp. 2d 1327. Perhaps the most important determination out of Wheatley, supra, is that the Court specifically and unequivocally held that OCGA § 9-11-68 offers apply as substantive law in federal Court. While the Plaintiff argued that the Georgia statute was merely procedural and could not be applied in federal Court, the Court found otherwise. The Court cited, Erie Railroad Company v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 58 S.Ct. 817, 82 L. Ed. 1188 (1938) and its progeny, the Court found that it could (and perhaps was obliged to) apply state substantive law on this particular issue. Id. <br /> The Wheatley case goes on to show that it certified three (3) questions to the Georgia Supreme Court. Research reveals that while the record was transferred to the Georgia Supreme Court and the issues were placed before the Supreme Court, the parties settled their claims and the Supreme Court allowed the case to return to the District Court on remittitur without answering the certified questions posed in Wheatley. See, the Order of the Supreme Court of Georgia dated April 28, 2009 and Wheatley, returning the file to the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia without an answer. Document 173 in United States District Court Northern District of Georgia Case. No. 1:05 CV 02174 TCB.<br /> V. CONCLUSION<br /> The Georgia Offer of Settlement statute OCGA § 9-11-68 is a powerful tool to shift an opponent off the status quo and toward a resolution of the case. This paper has shown that the drafter of the Offer must carefully follow the statute. A plaintiff must recover more than 75% percent of a rejected offer or bear the defendant's fees and a defendant must be confident that a plaintiff can recover no more than 125% percent of a rejected offer or risk paying plaintiff’s counsel’s fees. This paper has reviewed the statute’s potential for legal malpractice if an Offer is not made or not employed correctly. It has reviewed the recent finding of constitutionality of the statute and looked at additional recent cases.<br />Hugh Wood, Esq.<br />Wood & Meredith, LLP<br />3756 LaVista Road<br />Suite 250<br />Atlanta (Tucker), GA 30084<br /><br />hwood@woodandmeredith.com<br />Phone: 404-633-4100<br />Fax: 404-633-0068 <br /><br /><br /><br /><br />Note: The 2012 Version of this paper extensively reviewed OCGA § 9-11-68 as a statutory scheme of “Betting the Spread,” in game theory. That paper also reviewed academic statistical reviews of whether Offers of Settlement statutes (throughout the United States) do, in fact, reduce litigation? <br />Prior versions of this Paper, 2011 to 2014, reviewed the application of Fed.R.Civ.P. 68 to case. Those prior versions are available from ICLEGA, Athens, GA<br /><br /><br />&&&<br />ENDNOTES<br />[1]<br />In 1989 the Georgia General Assembly, in its wisdom, gave us OCGA §§ 51-7-80 through 51-7-85. In that abusive litigation/malicious prosecution scheme we, as practitioners, had to stay within the confines of two paragraphs of OCGA § 51-7-84 to write a cogent and enforceable notice by certified mail to be able to enforce a claim after the end of the suit. The General Assembly, in its wisdom, has now given us twenty-three (23) paragraphs under OCGA § 9-11-68 to make an appropriate Offer of Settlement during a case.<br />[2]<br />What if the Complaint, is part in tort and part in contract? May one submit an OCGA § 9-11-68 Offer of Settlement for the tort portions of the action? The United States District Court, Northern District of Georgia struggled with this issue in Wheatley v. Moe’s Southwest Grill, LLC, et al., 580 Fed. Supp. 2d 1324 (2008). Unfortunately, there is no clear answer from that case. The Federal Court certified the question to the Georgia Supreme Court; however, the case then settled without an answer. Wheatly, supra, contains and interesting “chart,” delineating “tort,” causes of action from “contract,” causes of action. 586 Supp. 2d 1324, 1326. This author’s personal opinion, though is that this expands litigation and makes the offers unwieldy and unfair, but “yes,” one can make Offers of Settlement to the tort claims (inside) a larger complaint or petition. <br />[3]<br />There are substantial nuances in the concerning the making of an Offer of Settlement with regard to a counter-offer and nuances with regard the effect of the withdrawal of an Offer on the collection of on attorney’s fees. These are beyond the scope of this article.<br /><br />Exhibits A & B are located in the Scribd downloadHugh Woodhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/01021049579391065763noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2321320695584069696.post-8517337796403912962016-07-04T20:34:00.001-07:002016-07-06T19:35:56.001-07:00Probate Estates Never Close. Or, Do They? 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<![endif]--><span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;">Probate Estates
Never Close. Or, Do They?<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Does The Five
Year Rule Close Probate Estates <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">Sub
Silentio</i>?<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span></span><br />
<br />
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">Hugh Wood, Esq., Atlanta, GA </span></span>
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<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-indent: .5in;">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;">Does the Five Year Automatic Dismissal Rule apply to the
closure of estates in Georgia. <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>OCGA §
9-2-60(b)? [1] <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>If your client is being
sued by an estate the executor or an administrator of the estate you might want
to check the probate court docket to see if any order has been entered in the
last five (5) years.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Granted the vast majority
of estate claims are received during the time that an estate is in active
litigation.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>However, this author has
been involved in a number of claims where the action brought by an
administrator or executor was pursued well beyond five (5) years beyond any
activity in the estate.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-indent: .5in;">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;">There appears to be no definitive answer to this question
in Georgia.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-indent: .5in;">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;">The pertinent part of the Five Year Rule states as
follows: “Any action or other proceeding filed in any of the courts of this
state in which no written order is taken for a period of five years shall
automatically stand dismissed.” [1]</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-indent: .5in;">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;">It is clear that a probate filing is a “proceeding.”<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>However, what is unclear is whether the lack
of activity for more than five (5) years silently closes estates.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>While anecdotal, this author’s guess is that
if you polled “estate” experts they would dismiss this defense out of
hand.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>But should they? </span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-indent: .5in;">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;">There is at least one Georgia case where this issue was
raised as a serious defense.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The
settlement of that case on other grounds caused this defense to not be
reviewed. <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>However, it was considered a
serious defense within the context of the litigation. [2] </span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>Georgia probate, at least in
litigation, substantially follows the Georgia Superior Court Rules.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Georgia does have its own Uniform Probate Court
Rules. [3]<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>OCGA § 9-2-60 is a specific
Georgia code section and only the Georgia courts can definitively state how it
applies to litigation.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>However,
California has a five year rule and many decades ago California’s five year
rule was applied to bar litigation by an Estate.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>In the context of caveat litigation, the
California Court of Appeals dismissed the caveat based on California’s
application of its own five (5) year rule.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">In Re Morrison's Estate</i>,125
Cal.App. 504, 14 P.2d 102 (1932).<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>[4] </span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-indent: .5in;">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;">Georgia has 72 official probate forms.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Many Georgia Probate Forms allow for the
opening of probate estates, but strangely, none provide for the closure of estates.
<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>[5].<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>So how does one close and estate?<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>The best legal opinions in the Bar, is that you don’t close estates.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>In fairness, much of this article may not
apply to estates that are worth more than 5.4 million dollars or, like the
Estate of Elvis Aaron Presley, Memphis, Tennessee, have ongoing year to year
income.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>This analysis does not apply to
active estates.</span><br />
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<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-indent: .5in;">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The real “closure,”
if any, is based on when the largest threatened creditor, the IRS, officially
releases the estate with the Estate Tax Closing Letter.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>[6] In the Probate system, the filing of Form 33, if granted, allows for the discharge of the Personal Representative [Executor or Administrator] and in most probate courts leads to the administrative closure by the clerks (but not always). [5] [at Form 33]. The instructions for discharge, which may be relevant if you choose to discharge your personal representative, are listed below beside Form 33. <i>Id</i>. </span><br />
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-indent: .5in;">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;">The Georgia Court of Appeals allowed an accounting
petition to go forward even though it was well beyond the ten (10) year applicable
statute of limitations claim for petitioning for an accounting. <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>[7] <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">In re Estate of John Malcolm Wade</i>, 331
Ga.App. 535, 771 S.E.2d 214 (Ga.App. 2015).<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>In fact, it was the “Wade,” case that caused this author to ponder
whether there were other defenses available to the Wade Executor to block the
Petition some 25 years after it could have been filed.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The alleged “final” distribution was filed
while Reagan was President in 1988, and yet the Georgia Court of Appeals
allowed the petition for an accounting to go forward in the 2<sup>nd</sup> term
of President Obama’s administration.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>That is long stretch of time, in this humble author’s opinion.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span></span></div>
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<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>The Court of Appeals has applied the
five (5) year rule, despite its unintended harsh consequences.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>[8] <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">Paul et al. v.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Smith, Gambrell & Russell</i>, 323 Ga.App.
447, 746 S.E.2d 739 (2013), the Georgia Court of Appeals allowed the
application of the five year rule to bar further trial court litigation – even
though the five years ran while the case was on appeal.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Recall that a filed Notice of Appeal acts as
supersedeas and no action may be taken in the trial court while a case is on
appeal.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The Court found that five (5)
years had run in the trial court, even though almost two years of the five years
was due to appeal supersedeas.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>How were the litigants to file anything in the
trial court to stop the draconian action of the five (5) year cutoff?<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>That was not answered in the opinion nor is
it answered in the statute.</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-indent: .5in;">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;">This author believes that the five (5) year rule is not
nuanced, but rather is a blunt instrument.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>It is used to terminate old or stale litigation.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Whether correct policy or not, it just
is.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>The five (5) year rule may stop
zombie debt collection (and prosecution).<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>Granted that zombie debt is not common in the context of estate litigation,
but this author has seen it.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Aged chain
store debt and aged credit card debt sold to zombie collectors may fall to this
defense if they are pursued more than five (5) years after any estate action.</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-indent: .5in;">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;">So what is the conclusion of this matter?<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>If your client is being pursued on a debt
that seems significantly aged and closed out of an estate there is no downside
not to raise the Five Year Rule.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>If you
are preparing to bring an action on behalf of an estate, its executor or
administrator, you might want to check the status of the probate estate to see
that some activity has occurred within the last five (5) years, if your claim
is aged.</span></div>
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<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-indent: .5in;">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;">Happy litigating.</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
Hugh Wood, Esq.<br />
Wood & Meredith, LLP<br />
3756 LaVista Road<br />
Suite 250<br />
Atlanta (Tucker), GA 30084<br />
<br />
www.woodandmeredith.com<br />
hwood@woodandmeredith.com<br />
www.hughwood.blogspot.com<br />
Phone: 404-633-4100<br />
Fax: 404-633-0068<br />
<br />
<div style="text-align: center;">
& & &</div>
</div>
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<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;">Endnotes:</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;">[1]</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;">OCGA §
9-2-60. Dismissal for want of prosecution; costs; recommencement within six
months</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;">(a) For the
purposes of this Code section, an order of continuance will be deemed an order
and the word "proceedings" shall be held to include, but shall not be
limited to, an appeal from an award of assessors or a special master in a
condemnation proceeding.</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;">(b) Any
action or other proceeding filed in any of the courts of this state in which no
written order is taken for a period of five years shall automatically stand
dismissed with costs to be taxed against the party plaintiff.</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;">(c) When an
action is dismissed under this Code section, if the plaintiff recommences the
action within six months following the dismissal then the renewed action shall
stand upon the same footing, as to limitation, with the original action.</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;">HISTORY: Ga.
L. 1953, Nov.-Dec. Sess., p. 342, 1, 2; Ga. L. 1967, p. 557, 1; Ga. L. 1984, p.
597, 1.</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;">[2]</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;">It is the Probate case that was associated with the following case; however, the citation is not available as of the date of this writing (mostly because the file is not available in an online searchable format). The Probate case filed in 2003 in the Probate Court of Fulton County is the underlying probate case associated with the RICO case that is shown by citation as follows: </span><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;">Rosario Diego Jimenez, Plaintiff vs.
Mari Luisa de Gregoriao, et al.,</span></i><span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;"> USDC for NDGa – ATL Div., Case No. 1:03-cv-1638-BBM.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Removed from Superior Court in a companion filing to In Re: The Estate of Natividad Jimenez
del Ray, Deceased, Probate Court of Fulton County, State of Georgia, Estate No.
185213.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> A probate matter in the county of Spain was in play with a companion probate filing in the United States. In the Fulton County Probate case a defense of the Five Year Rule was raised, but not reviewed. Unfortunately, without access to the litigants files, no copy is available for attachment to this article. </span>Interview with probate
litigation attorney, Walter Hamberg, III, June 30, 2016.</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;">[3]</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;">Uniform
Probate Court Rules</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;">[4]</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;">125 Cal.App.
504, 14 P.2d 102 (1932)</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;">District
Court of Appeal, First District, Division 1, California.</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;">In Re
Morrison's Estate.</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;">Goldborten Et
Al.v. Scott.</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;">Gryzolet Et
Al. v. Scott.</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;">Civ. 8322.</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;">Aug. 26,
1932.Rehearing Denied Sept. 24, 1932.Hearing Denied by Supreme Court Oct. 24,
1932.</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;">Appeals from
Superior Court, Alameda County; Lincoln S. Church, Judge.</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;">Petitions by
Zysla Brucha Goldborten and another and by Chaja Malta Gryzolet and others against
Maud Scott, also known as Marion Scott, to revoke the probate of the will of
Leon Morrison, deceased. From orders of dismissal, contestants appeal.</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;">Orders
reversed.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>[Copyright material removed]</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;">Attorneys and
Law Firms</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;">**103 *505
Livingston & Livingston, of San Francisco, for appellants.</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;">William J.
Cullinan and Stanley Burke, both of San Francisco, for respondent.</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;">Opinion</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;">JOHNSON,
Justice pro tem.</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;">In this
proceeding there are consolidated appeals from orders dismissing two petitions
to revoke probate of the will of Leon Morrison, deceased, one filed by persons
describing themselves as sisters of the deceased, the other by persons
declaring themselves to be nieces. The orders of dismissal were based on
section 583 of the Code of Civil Procedure, under which, in the absence of a
written stipulation for an extension of time, it is made the duty of the court
to dismiss an action not brought to trial within five years after the filing of
the answer.</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;">Leon Morrison
died on June 20, 1921; and, after a contest by the state of California, an
instrument dated January 12, 1921, purporting to be the will of the deceased,
was admitted to probate on August 14, 1923. An appeal from the order was taken
by the state, and on February 17, 1926, the remittitur from the Supreme Court
was filed showing affirmance of the order. Estate of Morrison, 198 Cal. 1, 242
P. 939.</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;">Meanwhile a
petition by the alleged sisters of the deceased to revoke probate of the will
was filed on October 23, 1923, and another petition by the alleged nieces on
July 18, 1924. Answers to these petitions were filed respectively on March 16
and March 23, 1926, by the respondent, Maud Scott, as the proponent of the
will. A date was then set for the trial of the contests; but, as the time drew
near, the contestants concluded that the evidence available to them would not
suffice to overcome testimony in favor of the will given at the time of its
admission by two witnesses, John W. McKenzie and Barney Hoffman. Accordingly a
settlement was *506 arranged whereby the contestants received $2,000, and
thereupon, on June 16, 1926, dismissed their contests. A minute order to like
effect was made by the court on the same day.</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;">Thereafter,
on July 8, 1926, McKenzie and Hoffman made a confession to the district
attorney of Alameda county that the testimony given by them in support of the
will had been false, and they stated that they had been procured to commit
perjury by said Maud Scott and others acting in her behalf. These men, on being
brought to trial on a charge of perjury, pleaded guilty, and were sentenced to
serve a term in the penitentiary.</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;">Upon learning
of these disclosures, the contestants on August 13, 1926, filed notice of
motion to vacate the dismissals of their contests, and by order signed December
2, 1926, in fulfillment of a minute order made November 18, 1926, that motion
was granted with authorization to the contestants to proceed in due course with
the prosecution of their contests. A period of six months, lacking fourteen
days, thus intervened between the dismissal of the contests on June 16 and
their reinstatement on December 2, 1926. An appeal from the order of
reinstatement was undertaken by Miss Scott, but was dismissed on July 1, 1929,
on the ground that the order was not appealable. While that appeal was pending,
efforts were made by the contestants to procure depositions of McKenzie and
Hoffman and also of witnesses in Chicago, but delays ensued, due largely to
continuances requested by attorneys for Miss Scott.</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;">On motion of
the contestants, the contests were finally set for trial for May 26, 1931; but
on May 1 Miss Scott filed notice of motion to dismiss both contests. By reason
of such motions, the trial of the contests was postponed by the court to August
5, 1931; and meanwhile, on July 23, the court made its orders granting the
motions on the sole ground that the contests had not been brought to trial
within five years after the answers were filed. The time which elapsed between
the earlier answer of Miss Scott and the date of the dismissals by the court
was five years, four months, and seven days.</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;">From the
orders of dismissal, the contestants prosecute these appeals.</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;">In addition
to the contests filed by the contestants as already mentioned, a petition to
revoke probate of the will *507 of said deceased was filed anew by the same
contestants on January 7, 1927. Certain questions affecting the status of that
petition are dealt with in the companion proceeding in prohibition of Maud
Scott v. Superior Court (Cal. App.) 14 P.(2d) 99, in which our opinion is this
day filed.</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;">Upon the
present appeal, there are two questions presented for consideration, one as to
the applicability of section 583 of the Code of Civil Procedure to a contest to
revoke probate of a will, the other as to the disallowance of credit in the
computation of time for the interval of approximately six months during which
the contests were suspended by virtue **104 of the dismissals effected by
concurrence of the parties. If this period of time is deductible, then the
contests cannot be treated as having been at issue for five years before the
dismissals in question.</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;">1 While
section 583 must necessarily have a limited application to probate proceedings
in general, we are of the opinion that it may properly be extended to include a
contest to revoke probate of a will.</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;">Such a
contest is an adversary proceeding, and in its essence is an action for
recovery of property claimed to be unlawfully taken, or about to be taken, from
the ownership of the contestant. He comes into court in the character of a
possessor of a chose in action, founded on the violation of a vested property
right by means of an instrument not truly testamentary; and, subject to certain
qualifications, he is entitled to have the merits of his cause determined by a
jury. Estate of Baker, 170 Cal. 578, 586–588, 150 P. 989; Estate of Clark, 94
Cal. App. 453, 460–461, 271 P. 542. The trial of a will contest has the
characteristics of a trial of an ordinary civil action involving title to
property; and, by section 1713 of the Code of Civil Procedure in force at the
time of the orders of dismissal, it was prescribed that, except as otherwise
specially provided, proceedings in probate should be governed by the rules of
practice in civil actions.</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;">In People v.
Central Pac. R. R. Co., 83 Cal. 393, 404, 23 P. 303, 307, the court, quoting
from a law lexicon, defined practice as “that which regulates the formal steps
in an action or other judicial proceeding. It therefore deals with writs,
summonses, pleadings, affidavits, notices, motions, *508 petitions, orders,
trials, judgments, appeals, costs, and executions.”</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;">Rules of
practice are designed to establish the manner of bringing parties into court,
and, when they are there, prescribe the course to be followed by the parties
and the court throughout the various stages of the litigation, in hearing,
dealing with, and disposing of the matters in dispute. 49 C. J. 1312. The
purpose is to harmonize and facilitate the conduct of litigation; and, since
such rules deal with all phases of a case from its inception to final judgment,
the time within which an action or proceeding shall either be brought to trial,
or dismissed as burdensome to an adversary and to the court as well, is a
proper subject for an administrative formula in aid of a definite and uniform
mode of procedure.</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;">It is the
policy of the law to expedite the administration of estates; and it would seem
that the reasons which influenced the adoption of section 583 justify an
interpretation of the word “action” sufficiently broad to include a proceeding
such as the contest of a will.</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;">The
appellants rely with much confidence, however, on the ruling of the court in
Estate of Simmons, 168 Cal. 390, 395, 143 P. 697, whereby section 581a, Code of
Civil Procedure, authorizing dismissal for failure to have summons issued in an
action within one year, was held to be inapplicable to a will contest, wherein
a year had been allowed to pass without issuance of a citation. The rationale
of that decision is that, as section 1328, Code of Civil Procedure, then in
force, prescribed the period of one year for issuance of a citation, without
annexing any penalty for the omission, the court was free to exercise its
discretion in relieving the contestant from default and authorizing the
issuance of a citation, notwithstanding the lapse of time. In other words, the
court took the view that there was a probate rule which forbade application of
the rule governing similar defaults in civil actions.</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;">Appellants
invoke also the decision in Estate of Joseph, 118 Cal. 660, 50 P. 768, rendered
in 1897, wherein insistence was laid upon the distinction between an action and
a special proceeding; and, by a strict interpretation of the word “action,” the
right to demand an undertaking from a nonresident plaintiff as security for
costs was limited to *509 the defendant in a civil action only. By an amendment
made in 1903, however, the benefit of the section was made available in special
proceedings also.</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;">While no sure
guide to the extension of the rules of civil practice to proceedings in probate
is furnished by the numerous decisions in this state on various points of
probate procedure, it may at any rate be said with certainty that the use of
the word “action” by itself in a Code section is not controlling. This is
illustrated in Estate of Knauft, 59 Cal. App. 536, 211 P. 29, where section
354, Code of Civil Procedure, was made to toll the statute of limitations in
behalf of an alien enemy who had instituted a will contest after expiration of
the ordinary statutory period; and in the course of its opinion, in reference
to a dismissal without prejudice, the court declared that it saw no reason why
section 581, Code of Civil Procedure, subdivision 4, was not applicable to a
proceeding in probate. A portion of that opinion is quoted with approval in
Estate of Cook, 205 Cal. 581, 588, 271 P. 1083, and is followed by the
statement of the Supreme Court that the pronouncement approved is authority
that the rule governing dismissal of actions generally under section 581 is
applicable to probate proceedings.</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;">Since the
orders under review were made, section 1713 of the Code of Civil Procedure has
been reframed in section 1233 of the Probate Code; and, with a view to
clarification, that section now provides that the rules of civil practice shall
be applicable to proceedings under the Probate Code “with regard to trials, new
trials, appeals, records on appeal, **105 and all other matters of procedure.”
In so far as trials are concerned, we do not interpret this section as
enlarging the scope of former section 1713, Code of Civil Procedure; and to our
minds section 583, depriving the court of jurisdiction to try an action when
there has been a delay of five years, is, and always has been, as much a
general rule, affecting actions and special proceedings alike, as a rule
declaring when an action or special proceeding is at issue and ready for trial.</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;">2 We are now
brought to the second question, the elimination of the period of suspension
intervening between the conventional dismissals on June 16, 1926, and the
reinstatement of the contests by the court on December 2, 1926.</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;">*510 The
respondent insists that the suspension had no effect whatever so far as section
583 is concerned, and relies on a statement of the court in Miller & Lux,
Inc., v. Superior Court, 192 Cal. 333, 338, 219 P. 1006, that nothing short of
a written stipulation expressly extending the time of trial beyond the
five–year period, or expressly waiving the right to a dismissal, will suffice
to toll the running of the statutory time. The court was there reiterating the
general rule in its relation to a stipulation in that particular case which was
found insufficient to meet the requirements of the law. Attention was not then
being centered upon a situation which temporarily deprived the trial court of
jurisdiction to proceed with the trial of the action. If such a situation had
been in the mind of the court, reference would doubtless have been made to
Kinard v. Jordan, 175 Cal. 13, 164 P. 894, 895, where it was held that, while
an appeal was pending, the case was removed from the jurisdiction of the trial
court, and necessarily exempt from the operation of section 583. Again, in
Allyne v. Superior Court, 200 Cal. 661, 664, 254 P. 564, in dealing with the
application of the section to the prosecution of an action after entry of an
order granting a new trial, the court declared that the plain and obvious
purpose of the section was to regulate the matter of compulsory dismissals only
under one set of circumstances, namely, where the action had not been brought
to trial within five years after filing of the answer, and that, so far as a
retrial was concerned, the section had no relevancy.</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;">In Kruly v.
Superior Court (Cal. App.) 10 P.(2d) 178, several years intervened between the
resting of the case after introduction of certain evidence and the resetting
for trial. The trial court having denied a motion to dismiss under section 583,
a writ of mandamus was applied for, but was denied upon the ground that suspension
of proceedings after commencement of the trial did not set the statute in
motion.</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;">Situations
are thus recognized which repel a strained construction of the statute.</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;">No logical
distinction can be made between a temporary suspension of proceedings in the
trial court, consequent upon a dismissal induced by fraud or mistake, and a
suspension of the power of the trial court to proceed by reason of the pendency
of an appeal. In either case, the action or proceeding *511 is withdrawn from
the cognizance of the court of first instance during the period of suspension.
And as in Kinard v. Jordan, supra, the case was taken out of the operation of
section 583 while an appeal was pending, so in like manner the period of
suspension here should be excluded in computing the quinquennium at the end of
which the jurisdiction of the court expires by operation of law. In Kinard v.
Jordan, begun in March, 1906, there was a motion to dismiss the action, made in
September, 1914, and based on that portion of section 583, which empowers the
court in its discretion to dismiss an action, if not brought to trial within
two years after filing of the answer. There had previously been a judgment for
the plaintiff on the merits, but on appeal that judgment had been reversed in
March, 1909. 10 Cal. App. 219, 101 P. 696. Thereupon certain proceedings were
had which resulted in another judgment in November, 1911, and another reversal
on appeal therefrom in March, 1914, 167 Cal. 333, 139 P. 797. Then came the
motion to dismiss, which was granted, but upon appeal the order was reversed.
In reversing the order, the Supreme Court, after referring to the judgment of
November, 1911, said: “That judgment, however erroneous it may be, purported to
determine the case. The aforesaid appeals taken therefrom suspended all power
of the court below to proceed, and necessarily took the case out of the
operation of section 583 while the appeals remained pending.”</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;">The
respondent, citing Wolters v. Rossi, 126 Cal. 644, 59 P. 143, and Page v.
Superior Court, 76 Cal. 372, 18 P. 385, contends that the dismissals in
question, being based upon a written request to the clerk by the attorneys of
the contestants, did not suspend proceedings at all, but left the contests at
all times pending.</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;">But the
dismissals in the cases cited were before the amendment made in 1897 to section
581 of the Code of Civil Procedure, authorizing dismissal by entry in the
clerk's register upon written consent of the attorney of the party requesting
dismissal. Consequently, those cases are no longer declaratory of the law on
that point. Hopkins v. Superior Court, 136 Cal. 552, 555, 69 P. 299. Moreover,
there does appear to have been a minute order of dismissal by the court.</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;">*512 It is
contended further on behalf of respondent that the order vacating the
dismissals had the effect of nullifying the intermission and placing the
contests in the same situation in all respects as if there had been no
dismissals at all. While the order **106 of restoration brought the contests
again under the jurisdiction of the court, it cannot be said that by its own
flat the court could create for itself a retroactive jurisdiction. When it is
stated that upon the vacation of an order or judgment the case is restored to
the previously existing status, that means that the parties are placed in their
original situation for the purpose of litigating the matters in controversy.
The restoration revives the right to enforce whatever claims or obligations
existed at the commencement of the action, and makes them subject to future
determination in due course. That is far from indulging a fiction that the case
was in court for purposes of trial when it was not.</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;">Thus the
question is merely whether the time when the contests were out of court shall
be counted. In Kinard v. Jordan, supra, the Supreme Court established the
precedent of disregarding the time during which the jurisdiction of the trial
court was suspended, thereby setting reality above artificiality; and in our
judgment it is our duty, under the circumstances shown in the record before us,
to follow that precedent.</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;">The orders
dismissing the petitions of said contestants to revoke probate of the will of
said deceased are each reversed.</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;">We concur:
KNIGHT, Acting P. J.; CASHIN, J.</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;">All Citations</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;">[5]</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;">Cumulative
Form Listing (name and GPCSF number)</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>General Instructions</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Form 2: Petition for Temporary Letters of
Administration</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Form 3: Petition for Letters of
Administration</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Form 4: Petition to Probate Will in Common
Form</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Form 5: Petition to Probate Will in Solemn
Form</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Form 6: Reserved See Supplement 6</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Form 7: Petition to Probate Will in Solemn
Form & for Letters of Administration w/ Will Annexed</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Form 8: Petition for Letters of
Administration with Will Annexed (Will Previously Probated)</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Form 9: Petition for Order Declaring No
Administration Necessary</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Form 10: Petition for Year's Support</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Form 11: Petition for the Appointment of an
Emergency Guardian and/or Conservator for a Proposed Ward</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Form 12: Petition for the Appointment of a
Guardian and/or Conservator for a Proposed Ward</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Form 13: Petition of Personal
Representative for Leave to Sell Property</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Form 14: Petition of Conservator for Leave
to Sell Property or Rent, Lease, or Otherwise Dispose of Property</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Form 15: Petition for Leave to Sell
Perishable Property by Conservator</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Form 16: Reserved See Supplement 1</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Form
17: Petition for Leave to Convey or Encumber Property Previously Set Aside as
Year's Support</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Form 18: Petition for Presumption of Death
of Missing Indvividual Believed to be Dead</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Form 19: Petition to Compromise Doubtful
Claim of Minor/Ward</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Form 20: Petition for Leave to Encroach on
Corpus</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Form 21: Bond of Administrators,
Conservators, & Executors, Etc.</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Form 22: Petition to Establish Custodial
Account for Minor or Incapacitated Adult</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Form 23: GPCSF 23 through 27 Reserved/Relocated</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Form 28: Petition for Temporary Letters of
Guardianship of Minor</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Form 29: Petition for Permanent Letters of
Guardianship of Minor</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Form 30: Petition for Letters of
Conservatorship of Minor</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Form 31: Application for Permit to Conduct
Public Fireworks Display</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Form 32: Petition by Personal
Representative for Waiver of Bond and/or Grant of Certain Powers</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Form 33: Petition for Discharge of Personal
Representative</span><br />
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;"> <span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;"><br /></span></span><i><span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;"><span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;">PETITION FOR DISCHARGE OF PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE </span></span><br /><span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;"><span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;">INSTRUCTIONS</span></span><br /><span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;"><span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;">I. Specific Instructions</span></span><br /><span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;"><span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;">1.
This form is to be used for a Petition for Discharge of a Personal
Representative pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 53-7-50 or Discharge of a
Temporary Administrator pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 53-7-52. A Personal
Representative may, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 53-7-50(e), petition the
court solely for discharge from office but not from all liability.</span></span><br /><span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;"><span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;">2.
If the Petition is filed by a Personal Representative, the notice to
debtors and creditors must have been published for four weeks, and three
months must have elapsed from the date of the last publication.
O.C.G.A. §§ 53-7-41, 53-11-4.</span></span><br /><span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;"><span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;">3. Signatures of heirs who acknowledge
service must be sworn to before a notary public or the Clerk of any
Probate Court of this State. It is not necessary that all
acknowledgments appear on the same page. An attorney at law may
acknowledge service on behalf of an heir; however, the attorney must
certify that he or she currently represents that heir with regard to the
pending matter and, in order to comply with O.C.G.A. § 53-11-6, the
attorney's signature must be sworn to as provided above. With regard to a
power of attorney, the attorney-in-fact may acknowledge service on
behalf of the grantor of the power, provided that the power of attorney
grants such authority, the signature of the attorney-in-fact is
attested, a copy of the power of attorney is attached, and the
attorney-in-fact certifies that the copy is a true copy and is still in
effect.</span></span><br /><span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;"><span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;">4. O.C.G.A. § 53-11-2 provides that a party to a probate
proceeding who is not sui juris must be represented by a guardian
provided that the Court may appoint a guardian ad litem or determine
that the natural guardian, guardian, conservator, or testamentary
guardian has no conflict and may serve. Should a guardian ad litem be
necessary because a party is not sui juris, use Supplement 1.</span></span><br /><span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;"><span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;">5. Use Supplement 2 if the Court determines it is appropriate to appoint a special process server.</span></span><br /><span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;"><span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;">6. Use Supplement 3 when an additional certificate of service is necessary.7.
In the event the Decedent died intestate, Paragraph 3 requires that a
definitive statement be made to show to the court that the persons named
in Paragraph 2 constitute all of the heirs of the Decedent and that
there are no heirs of the same or closer degree according to O.C.G.A. §
53-2-1. Provide the date of death for any deceased heirs. [NOTE: If you
are uncertain how to determine the heirs of a Decedent, please refer to
the “Heirs Determination Sheet” available from the probate court or at
www.gaprobate.gov.] Examples of such statement would be: (a) “Decedent
was or was not married at the time of his death and had no children
born, adopted, living or deceased, other than listed herein”; (b)
“Decedent had no other siblings half or whole other than those listed
herein”; (c) “the Decedent’s brother who died previously had no other
children born, adopted, living or deceased, other than listed herein.”</span></span></i><span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;"><i><span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;">8.
According to Probate Court Rule 5.6 (A), unless the Court specifically
assumes the responsibility, it is the responsibility of the moving party
to prepare the proper citation and deliver it properly so it can be
served according to law. All pages after the Notice regarding Uniform
Probate Court Rule 5.6 (A) are to be completed by the moving party,
unless otherwise directed by the Court.</span></i> </span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Form 34: Petition of Conservator for Final
Settlement of Accounts and Discharge from Office and Liability</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Form 35: Reserved See Supplement 4</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Form 36: Petition for the Appointment of a
Temporary Medical Consent Guardian for a Proposed Medical Consent Ward</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Form 37: 37 through 51 Reserved/Relocated</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Form 52: Default Certificate</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Form 53: Commission to Administer Oath</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Form 54: Service upon Minor or Adult Ward
through Service Upon Guardian</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Form 55: GPCSF 55 through 57
Reserved/Relocated</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Form 58: Adult Conservatorship Inventory
and Asset Management Plan</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Form 59: Minor Conservator Inventory and
Asset Management Program</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Form 60: GPCSF 60 Reserved</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Form 65: Petition for the Restoration of an
Individual Found to Be in Need of a Guardian and/or Conservator</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Form 70: Certificate in Accordance with
Uniform Probate Court Rule 5.9(D)</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Form 71: Petition for Leave to Sell
Perishable Property by Personal Representative</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Form 72: Petition for Determination of
Right of Disposition of Remains of a Decedent</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Supplement 1: Determination by Court that a
Person May Act as Guardian or Appointment of Guardian Ad Litem</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Supplement 2: Appointment of Special
Process Server</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Supplement 3: Certificate of Service</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Supplement 4: Guardian/Conservator/Personal
Representative Oath</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Supplement 5: Petition for Letters of
Testamentary Guardianship</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Supplement 6: Interrogatories to Witness to
Will</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;">See.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>www.gaprobate.gov<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>/ forms</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;">[6]</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;">When can I
expect the Estate Tax Closing Letter?</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;">For all
estate tax returns filed on or after June 1, 2015, estate tax closing letters
will be issued only upon request by the taxpayer. Please wait at least four
months after filing the return to make the closing letter request to allow time
for processing. To request a closing letter please call (866) 699-4083 and
provide the following information:</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Name of the decedent;</span></div>
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<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Decedent’s social security number;</span></div>
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<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Date of Death.</span></div>
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<br /></div>
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<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;">The closing
letter will be prepared and issued to the executor at the address of record.
For any additional questions about estate tax closing letter requests or the
status of the return, call (866) 699-4083.</span></div>
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<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;"><a href="https://www.irs.gov/businesses/small-businesses-self-employed/frequently-asked-questions-on-estate-taxes"><span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;">https://www.irs.gov/businesses/small-businesses-self-employed/frequently-asked-questions-on-estate-taxes</span></a></span></div>
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<br /></div>
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<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;">See also, </span></div>
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<br /></div>
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<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;">Am I required
to file an estate tax return?</span></div>
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<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;">If the
decedent is a U.S. citizen or resident and decedent's death occurred in 2016,
an estate tax return (Form 706) must be filed if the gross estate of the
decedent, increased by the decedent's adjusted taxable gifts and specific gift
tax exemption, is valued at more than the filing threshold for the year of the
decedent's death. The filing threshold for 2016 is $5,450,000, for 2015 is
$5,430,000, for 2014 is $5,340,000, for 2013 is $5,250,000, for 2012 is
$5,120,000, and for 2011 is $5,000,000. An estate tax return also must be filed
if the estate elects to transfer any deceased spousal unused exclusion (DSUE)
amount to a surviving spouse, regardless of the size of the gross estate or
amount of adjusted taxable gifts. The election to transfer a DSUE amount to a
surviving spouse is known as the portability election.</span></div>
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<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;">An estate tax
return may need to be filed for a decedent who was a nonresident and not a U.S.
citizen if the decedent had U.S.-situated assets. Refer to Some Nonresidents
with U.S. Assets Must File Estate Tax Returns to learn more.</span><br />
<br />
<div style="text-align: center;">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;">&&&</span></div>
<div style="text-align: center;">
<br /></div>
<div style="text-align: left;">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;">See also, the discharge of personal liabiltiy by the personal represenative for the taxes owed the federal government by the testator/estate. 26 U.S. Code § 6905 - Discharge of executor from personal liability for decedent’s income and gift taxes: (a) Discharge of liability. In the case of liability of a decedent for taxes imposed by subtitle A or by chapter 12, if the executor makes written application (filed after the return with respect to such taxes is made and filed in such manner and such form as may be prescribed by regulations of the Secretary for release from personal liability for such taxes, the Secretary may notify the executor of the amount of such taxes. The executor, upon payment of the amount of which he is notified, after 9 months after receipt of the application if no notification is made by the Secretary before such date, shall be discharged from personal liability for any deficiency in such tax thereafter found to be due, and shall be entitled to a receipt or writing showing such discharge. (b) Definition of executor. For purposes of this section, the term “executor” means the executor or administrator of the decedent appointed, qualified, and acting within the United States. (c) Cross reference. For discharge of executor from personal liability for taxes imposed under chapter 11, see section 2204. (Added Pub. L. 91–614, title I, § 101(e)(1), Dec. 31, 1970, 84 Stat. 1837; amended Pub. L. 91–614, title I, § 101(f), Dec. 31, 1970, 84 Stat. 1838; Pub. L. 94–455, title XIX, § 1906(b)(13)(A), Oct. 4, 1976, 90 Stat. 1834.).</span></div>
</div>
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<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>[7]</span></div>
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<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;">In re Estate
of John Malcolm Wade, 331 Ga.App. 535, 771 S.E.2d 214 (2015).</span></div>
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<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;">A14A2013</span></div>
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<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;">Court of
Appeals of Georgia</span></div>
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<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;">March 25,
2015</span></div>
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<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Estate. Charlton Superior Court.
Before Judge DeVane.</span></div>
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<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Brown, Readdick, Bumgartner, Carter,
Strickland & Watkins, G. Todd Carter, Emily R. Hancock, for appellant.</span></div>
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<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Gibson & Associates, Adrienne J.
Gibson, Douglas L. Gibson, Kenneth A. Taft, for appellee.</span></div>
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<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>OPINION</span></div>
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<br /></div>
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<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Branch, Judge.</span></div>
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<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>In a 1982 will, John Malcolm Wade
named all five of his children as co-executors of his estate. Soon after Wade
died in 1987, the probate court issued letters testamentary to all five
children, thereby appointing them as</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
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<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;">Page 215</span></div>
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<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;">co-executors.
Almost 25 years later, in August 2012, appellant Mary Virginia Wade petitioned
the probate court to obtain an accounting of her siblings' dealings on behalf
of the estate. After a trial, the probate court concluded that the siblings had
[331 Ga.App. 536] violated the terms of their father's will and ordered an
accounting of the estate. Three of the four siblings -- Bonnie Conner, Dorothy
Vuturo, and Malcolm Wade[1] -- appealed to the superior court, where they moved
for summary judgment on grounds including that Mary's action for an accounting
was time-barred. On this appeal from the superior court's grant of the
siblings' motion, Mary argues that her action is not time-barred because the
estate was still open and because there was no adverse possession by her
siblings that would have caused her cause of action to accrue and the statute
of limitation to have run. We agree and therefore reverse.</span></div>
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<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>On appeal from the decision of a probate
court, the superior court conducts a de novo investigation of the probate
court's proceedings, and in doing so, will consider the records from the
probate court, as well as other competent evidence which may not have been
presented to the probate court.</span></div>
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<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;">Garren v.
Garren, 316 Ga.App. 646, 647 (2) (730 S.E.2d 123) (2012), citing OCGA § 5-3-29.
" 'It is not the province of the superior court on such an appeal to
review and affirm, but to try the issue anew and pass original judgments on the
questions involved as if there had been no previous trial.' " Id. at 648
(3), quoting Knowles v. Knowles, 125 Ga.App. 642, 645 (1) (188 S.E.2d 800)
(1972). " To prevail at summary judgment under OCGA § 9-11-56, the moving
party must demonstrate that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that
the undisputed facts, viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving
party, warrant judgment as a matter of law." Lau's Corp. v. Haskins, 261
Ga. 491 (405 S.E.2d 474) (1991) (citations omitted). This Court reviews a trial
court's grant of summary judgment de novo, construing the record in the light
most favorable to the nonmovant. Ethridge v. Davis, 243 Ga.App. 11, 12 (530
S.E.2d 477) (2000).</span></div>
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<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Thus viewed in favor of Mary, the
record, which is scant, shows that on December 29, 1987, all five of the Wade
children were sworn in as co-executors. At some point shortly after their
appointment, the siblings orally agreed that Mary would be the "
coordinating executor" charged with paying the estate's bills. At some
later point, however, the siblings agreed that any three of them could
authorize payments by the estate and that Bonnie should administer its assets
so as to wind up its affairs within six years. At an unspecified date, Mary
took [331 Ga.App. 537] a share of the estate's personal property according to a
system of apportionment also agreed upon by all five children. By another
unspecified date, Mary had packed up the estate's papers and shipped them to
Bonnie.</span></div>
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<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>In March 1988, a bank sent all five
siblings checks and stock certificates representing what the bank called a
"final distribution" from the estate's account at that bank. Of the
five siblings, only Mary did not sign and return receipts for this attempted
distribution. In August 1988, Malcolm negotiated a $1 million loan from a
second bank to the estate in exchange for an interest in estate assets
including real property in North Carolina and Georgia as well as nearly 9,000
shares of stock in the privately held " N. G. Wade Investment Co." In
March 1989, Malcolm executed a power of attorney as to estate matters in favor
of Bonnie.</span></div>
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<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>In February 1991, all five siblings
received a summary from a certified public accountant valuing the estate's
assets at approximately $1.2 million. By January 1993, Mary had received a
four-carat diamond and documents concerning the estate's assets from Dorothy.
In March 1993, Mary contacted the estate's accountant to ask for documents and
noted that " until I have adequate financial records to see that Estate
assets are distributed properly, I will not sign any papers to close the
Estate[.]" In the same document, Mary also asserted that estate funds
" ha[d] been spent without [her] knowledge or consent."</span></div>
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<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;">Page 216</span></div>
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<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;">In March
1994, Mary asked Bonnie for copies of documents relevant to the estate,
including transfers of a house and an automobile and a copy of a sale agreement
concerning timber on property located in North Carolina. In January 1999, Mary
paid $60,000 on her own behalf and Bonnie paid $60,000 on behalf of the four
remaining siblings to close out the 1988 loan to the estate. In the same year,
Carolyn demanded that Bonnie allow her to review the estate's financial
records.</span></div>
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<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>In January 2009, Bonnie wrote to Mary
asking for her signature on an agreement between all the siblings to harvest
timber from the estate's land in Charlton County and share the proceeds
thereof, estimated at $27,700. The draft agreement noted that " a fire or
pine beetles among other disasters could dev[a]state this gain offered to [the
siblings] at any time." Bonnie also asked for Mary's signature on a second
document requesting the probate court to close the estate, " all the
business thereof being completed," and a recent bank statement showing an
estate account balance of $9,547.76. Bonnie later averred that the siblings also
sought to divide the Charlton County parcel at this time. Mary did not sign or
return either the draft agreement or the request to close the estate.</span></div>
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<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>[331 Ga.App. 538] In August 2012,
Mary filed her petition for an accounting in probate court. As they had
previously, Dorothy and Malcolm filed notarized documents in the probate court
authorizing Bonnie to act on their behalf concerning the estate. Dorothy stated
that Bonnie had generated " remarkable amounts of money" for the
beneficiaries, had " found the highest prices to be paid for timber and
land sales," and " created and oversaw many positive outcomes for her
brother and sisters." After the November 2012 hearing, at which only Mary
and Bonnie appeared,[2] the probate court held that that in light of Bonnie's
admission that she or others had " intentionally destroyed" many
estate records, " any difficulty the co-executors have had in preparing an
accounting [would] be entirely self-inflicted." The probate court also
concluded that " decisions regarding the administration of the
estate" had been made " by a majority of the co-executors,"
rather than unanimously, in apparent violation of both OCGA § 53-7-5 (a)[3] and
the terms of John Malcolm Wade's will, which did not contain any provision for
majority rather than unanimous action. The probate court ordered an accounting
within 90 days.</span></div>
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<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>In January 2013, the siblings appealed
the probate court's ruling to the superior court. Both sides moved for summary
judgment -- the siblings on the grounds that Mary's petition was time-barred
and that she had refused to relinquish the diamond or otherwise agree to a
division of the estate's property, and Mary on the ground that the siblings
were required to render an accounting as a matter of law. In an August 2013
affidavit, Bonnie testified that the estate's only remaining undistributed
assets were the 29-acre Charlton County parcel of land and the diamond Mary had
received many years before. Also in August 2013, the siblings filed a
counterclaim against Mary for conversion of the family diamond. In April 2014,
the superior court granted the siblings' motion for summary judgment without
explanation and without ruling on the siblings' counterclaim. This appeal
followed.</span></div>
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<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>[331 Ga.App. 539] 1. As the parties
agree, the first question is whether Mary's petition for an accounting is
time-barred under OCGA § § 53-7-62 (a)</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;">Page 217</span></div>
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<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;">and 9-3-27.
Mary argues that she may seek an accounting at any time while the estate
remains open, while the siblings argue that Mary was required to bring such an
action no later than ten years and six months after the appointment of the
co-executors. Both of these contentions miss the mark.</span></div>
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<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>OCGA § 53-7-62 (a) provides in
relevant part that " [a]ny person interested as an heir or beneficiary of
an estate or the probate court may, after the expiration of six months from the
granting of letters, cite the personal representative to appear before the
probate court for a settlement of accounts." OCGA § 9-3-27 provides that
" [a]ll actions against executors, administrators, or guardians, except on
their bonds, shall be brought within ten years after the right of action
accrues." The ten-year limitation period of OCGA § 9-3-27 applies to
petitions for an accounting. Rowland v. Rowland, 204 Ga. 603, 608 (5) (50
S.E.2d 343) (1948).</span></div>
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<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The five original co-executors
received their letters testamentary in December 1987, with the result that Mary
could have brought an action for accounting as early as June 1988, or six
months after their appointment. OCGA § 53-7-62 (a). As co-executors, however,
each of the five siblings owes all the others, who are also co-beneficiaries,
the care required of a fiduciary. Bloodworth v. Bloodworth, 260 Ga.App. 466,
471 (1) (579 S.E.2d 858) (2003) (" [a]s fiduciaries," co-executors
" acquired a number of legal duties in relation to the
beneficiaries," including " full and fair disclosure in a timely
manner of all things adversely affecting" the beneficiaries' rights).
Because of the high standard of care imposed on executors, the Supreme Court of
Georgia has long refused to apply the ten-year statute of limitation to bar a
beneficiary's action for accounting by an executor in the absence of evidence
that the executor has held the estate's property adversely to the beneficiary:</span></div>
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<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>[I]t is well settled in [Georgia] that not
only in express or implied trusts, but in other fiduciary relations, the
statute [of limitation] will not begin to run so long as the trust or duty with
regard to specific property continues, is acknowledged to be subsisting, and
there is no change of status to show an adverse holding of such property; that
as long as a person who is in possession of the property of another, using the
same for the owner's benefit, recognizes the latter's ownership, no lapse of
time will bar the owner from asserting his title as against the person in
possession ; that before any lapse of time will be a bar to the owner it must
appear that the [331 Ga.App. 540] person in possession has given notice, or
there must be circumstances shown which would be equivalent to notice to the
owner that the person in possession claims adversely to him ; that in such a
case the statute will begin to run from the date of such notice; and that until
the owner has such notice he has the right to treat the possession of the other
person as his own.</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;">Reynolds v.
Dorsey, 188 Ga. 218, 221 (2) (3 S.E.2d 564) (1939) (citations omitted; emphasis
supplied); Salter v. Salter, 209 Ga. 90, 95 (2) (70 S.E.2d 453) (1952); Manry
v. Manry, 196 Ga. 365, 369 (2) (26 S.E.2d 706) (1943) (" So long as the
executors h[o]ld the title and possession of [an] estate as such, it [is] a continuing
executory trust, and the bar of the statute of limitations does not run against
such a trust until its termination or repudiation." ) (citations omitted);
see also In re Estate of Holtzclaw, 293 Ga.App. 577 (667 S.E.2d 432) (2008)
(concerning fee awards arising from a petition for accounting brought in 2005
against an executor appointed in 1984, but not addressing the accrual of the
petitioner's cause of action).</span></div>
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<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>It is true that in her 1993 letter to
the estate's accountant, Mary both asked for information as to the estate and
accused at least one of her siblings of " spending" at least some of
the estate's assets without her " knowledge or consent." This letter
was sent to the estate's accountant, not to any of her co-executors, however,
and it sought to reserve Mary's own right as co-executor to review the
documents, and not to exercise her right as a beneficiary to obtain an
accounting. Compare Rowland, 204 Ga. at 604, 608 (5) (applying OCGA § 9-3-27 to
bar an action for accounting where the executor, " although requested to
do so," had " never made any accounting or settlement</span></div>
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<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;">Page 218</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;">with the
[beneficiaries] for their interest in [an] estate" ). Further, we have
seen nothing in the record to suggest that the siblings ever denied Mary's
status as a co-beneficiary of any specific property owned by the estate. To the
contrary, the record also shows that whatever disagreements may have arisen
about the disposition of the estate, no sibling ever repudiated any other
sibling's right to a proportionate share in those contents, as when the
siblings presented Mary with a proposed settlement of the estate's assets in
1988, only four months after the appointment of the co-executors, and in 2009,
when they attempted to dispose of the Charlton County land parcel and to close
the estate.</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>A question of fact thus remains as to
whether any of the siblings' actions before the filing of Mary's petition put
Mary on notice that they had claimed any estate property adversely to her.
Because we cannot say as a matter of law that the siblings adversely held the
[331 Ga.App. 541] estate's assets or repudiated Mary's claim on them at any
time before Mary filed her petition, a jury must decide whether the ten-year
bar of OCGA § 9-3-27 began to run before that time. It follows that the trial
court erred when it granted summary judgment to the siblings on this basis.
Salter, 209 Ga. at 96-97 (affirming overruling of demurrer to petition for
accounting where nothing on the face of the petition showed that the trust at
issue " was not acknowledged to be subsisting or that there was any change
of status to show an adverse holding by the executors that would bring this
case within the statute of limitations" ); Manry, 196 Ga. at 369 (2)
(where a will did not direct when a division of an estate was to be made, a
beneficiary's action for accounting was not time-barred when the executors had
qualified 15 years before but had not disposed of the estate's assets until six
years before the filing of the action).</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>2. The record shows that the siblings also
moved for summary judgment on the ground that Mary had refused to agree to a
division of the estate's property. The trial court made no finding on this
question, and the parties have not briefed the matter on appeal. We therefore
leave it to further proceedings below. See City of Gainesville v. Dodd, 275 Ga.
834, 835-836 (573 S.E.2d 369) (2002) (appellate court may exercise its
discretion to determine whether a ground for summary judgment raised but not
ruled on below is properly affirmed). Our decision also moots Mary's assertion
that the trial court erred in failing to grant her summary judgment.</span></div>
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<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Judgment reversed.</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Barnes, P. J., and Boggs, J., concur.</span></div>
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<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;">---------</span></div>
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<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;">Notes:</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;">[1]The
fourth<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>sibling, Carolyn, did not appear
at the hearing before the probate court below and is not a party to this
appeal.</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;">[2]The record
does not include a transcript of the hearing before the probate court.</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;">[3]OCGA §
53-7-5 (a) of the Revised Probate Code of 1998 provides that</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>" [i]f more than one personal
representative is qualified and unless the will provides otherwise ... , [t]he
personal representatives must act by their unanimous action[.]" The same
subsection also specifies, however, that " [t]he personal representatives
may delegate in writing to one or more of them the authority to act for all of
them; provided, however, that all the personal representatives remain liable
for the actions<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>of the personal
representative who is authorized to act." Id. Mary has not asserted any
error as to the application of the Revised Probate Code to this dispute. See
OCGA § 53-1-1 (b) (Revised Probate Code of 1998 became effective on January 1
of that year, " provided, however, that no vested rights of title, year's
support, succession, or inheritance shall be impaired" ); McPherson v.
McPherson, 307 Ga.App. 548, 550-551 (1) (a) (705 S.E.2d 314) (applying Revised
Trust Code of 2010 to earlier trust instrument and transactions where that
application did not affect any " vested rights" ).</span></div>
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<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;">[8]</span></div>
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<i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;">Paul et al. v.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Smith, Gambrell & Russell</span></i><span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;">, 323 Ga.App. 447, 746 S.E.2d 739 (2013)</span></div>
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<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;">July 16, 2013</span></div>
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<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Reconsideration denied July 29, 2013
-- Cert. applied for.</span></div>
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<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Dismissal; five-year rule. Fulton
State Court. Before Judge Forsling.</span></div>
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<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Frank J. Beltran, for appellants.</span></div>
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<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Weinberg, Wheeler, Hudgins, Gunn
& Dial, Shawn D. Scott , Robert G. Tanner, for appellee.</span></div>
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<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>MILLER, Judge. Barnes, P. J., and Ray,
J., concur in judgment only.</span></div>
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<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>OPINION</span></div>
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<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Miller, Judge.</span></div>
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<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>This is the third appeal arising out
of a legal malpractice action that Appellants G. Douglas Paul, Sharon V. Paul,
Catspaw Productions, Inc. (" CPI" ), Catspaw, Inc., Atlanta Catco,
Inc., and Recording Studio, Inc. (" RSI" ) commenced against Smith,
Gambrell & Russell (" Smith Gambrell" ) in 2002. See Paul v.
Smith, Gambrell & Russell, 267 Ga.App. 107 (599 S.E.2d 206) (2004) ("
Paul I " ); Paul v. Smith, Gambrell & Russell, 283 Ga.App. 584 (642
S.E.2d 217) (2007) (" Paul II " ). In Paul II, the parties filed
cross-appeals from the trial court's April 11, 2005 order granting in part and
denying in part Smith Gambrell's second motion for summary judgment. 283
Ga.App. at 584-585. For the next five years after the April 11, 2005 order, no
written order was entered in the trial court. On July 12, 2011, the trial court
entered an order memorializing the automatic dismissal of the case pursuant to
OCGA § § 9-2-60 (b) and 9-11-41 (e), concluding that more than five years had
elapsed since the last order was entered in the case. On appeal, Appellants
argue, among other things, that the five-year period was tolled during the
pendency of the cross-appeals in Paul II. Finding this and Appellants' other
arguments unavailing, we affirm.</span></div>
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<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>This appeal presents a question of
law subject to de novo review. See Jinks v. Eastman Enterprises, 317 Ga.App.
489, 489-490 (731 S.E.2d 378) (2012).</span></div>
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<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>As recounted in greater detail in Paul
II, Appellants' action arises out of Smith Gambrell's representation of
Appellants prior to and during a lawsuit Ralph Destito, a shareholder of RSI
and a former employee of CPI, commenced against Appellants for fraud, breach of
fiduciary duty, and related claims (the " Destito action" ). 283
Ga.App. at 584-587. The Destito action resulted in a substantial verdict and
judgment against Appellants, and the judgment was affirmed on appeal.[1] Id. at
584.</span></div>
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<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>In the first of two motions for
summary judgment in the present case, Smith Gambrell sought summary judgment on
the issue of [323 Ga.App. 448] punitive damages and its liability for failing
to call an accounting expert at trial in the Destito action, and the trial
court granted its motion on both issues. See Paul I, supra, 267 Ga.App. at
107-108. On appeal, this Court affirmed on the issue of punitive damages but
reversed as to the claim for failure to call an accounting expert. Id. at 108.
Prior to the decision in Paul I, Smith Gambrell filed its second motion for
summary judgment on the issues of its alleged malpractice in preparing
documents to merge RSI into CPI and subsequent Articles of Correction to
reverse the merger and its failure to prepare the Pauls to testify at trial in
the Destito action. Smith Gambrell's second motion did not address the claim
regarding the failure to call an accounting expert, as the trial court had
granted summary judgment in its favor on that claim.</span></div>
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<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>In its April 11, 2005 order, the trial
court granted Smith Gambrell summary judgment on the issue of failing to
prepare the Pauls for trial but denied summary judgment on the issue of Smith
Gambrell's failure to exercise reasonable care in preparing the merger
documents. The parties filed cross-appeals, and this Court affirmed the April
11, 2005 order. Paul II, supra, 283 Ga.App. at 585.</span></div>
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<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>No written order was entered in the
record following the April 11, 2005 order until an order was entered on
December 13, 2010 specially setting the matter for trial. After a jury was
empaneled on April 12, 2011, the trial court declared a mistrial, finding that</span></div>
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<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;">Appellants
failed to identify one of its claims and supporting expert opinions during
discovery. Smith Gambrell subsequently moved to strike the action from the
docket under OCGA § § 9-2-60 (b) and 9-11-41 (e), and the trial court entered
an order memorializing the automatic dismissal of the case.</span></div>
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<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>1. Appellants argue the trial court
erred in concluding that its action was dismissed by operation of law because
the five-year period under OCGA § § 9-2-60 (b) and 9-11-41 (e) was tolled
during the pendency of the cross-appeals in Paul II. We disagree.</span></div>
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<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>" OCGA § § 9-2-60 (b) and 9-11-41
(e) are the statutory embodiment of the 'five-year rule.' Together, they
provide for the automatic dismissal of any action filed in a Georgia court of
record when 'no written order is taken for a period of five years[.]' "
Zepp v. Brannen, 283 Ga. 395, 396 (658 S.E.2d 567) (2008). The five-year rule
is " a reasonable procedural rule" that serves " the dual
purpose of preventing court records from becoming cluttered by unresolved and
inactive litigation and of protecting litigants from dilatory counsel."
(Citation and punctuation omitted.) Brown v. Kroger Co., 278 Ga. 65, 68 (597
S.E.2d 382) (2004). These Code sections are mandatory, and dismissal occurs by
operation of law. Republic Claims Svc. Co. v. Hoyal, 264 Ga. 127, 128 (441
S.E.2d 755) (1994); Roberts v. Eayrs, 297 Ga.App. 821, 822 (2) [323 Ga.App.
449] (678 S.E.2d 535) (2009). We apply a bright-line rule for determining
whether an order is sufficient to reset the five-year clock. Windsor v. City of
Atlanta, 287 Ga. 334, 336 (2) (695 S.E.2d 576) (2010). " [I]n order to
toll the running of the five-year period that results in automatic dismissal
for non-action, an order must be written, signed by the trial judge, and
properly entered in the records of the trial court by filing it with the clerk."
(Citation and punctuation omitted.) Id.</span></div>
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<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Here, it is undisputed that more than
five years elapsed following the entry of the April 11, 2005 order before
another written order was entered in the record. Appellants attempted to avoid
the otherwise straightforward application of the fiveyear rule by arguing that
the five-year period was tolled for 22 months while the April 11, 2005 order
was on appeal in Paul II because a supersedeas was in effect pursuant to OCGA §
5-6-46 (a), depriving the trial court of jurisdiction. We have recognized that
the five-year period may be tolled under certain circumstances when a trial
court completely loses jurisdiction over a case. See, e.g., Jinks, supra, 317
Ga.App. at 491 (bankruptcy stay); Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Perry,
168 Ga.App. 387, 388 (308 S.E.2d 848) (1983) (removal to federal court). It is
well established, however, that " [t]he supersedeas that stems from the
filing of [a] ... notice of appeal is limited in that it supersedes only the
judgment appealed; it does not deprive the trial court of jurisdiction as to
other matters in the same case not affecting the judgment on appeal."
(Citation and punctuation omitted.) Avren v. Garten, 289 Ga. 186, 190 (6) (710
S.E.2d 130) (2011).</span></div>
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<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Appellants argue that the trial court
was divested of all jurisdiction in the case during the Paul II cross-appeals
because Smith Gambrell's second motion for summary judgment stated that Smith
Gambrell was entitled to summary judgment on the " entire case." Once
this Court issued its decision in Paul I reinstating Appellants' claim
regarding the failure to call an accounting expert, however, it was apparent
that a portion of Appellants' case would remain pending even if Smith Gambrell
prevailed on its second motion for summary judgment. As such, the trial court
had jurisdiction to proceed with at least part of the case during the pendency
of the cross-appeals, see Craft's Ocean Court v. Coast House, Ltd., 255 Ga.
336, 337-338 (2) (338 S.E.2d 277) (1986), and we conclude that no tolling of
the five-year period occurred.[2]</span></div>
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<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>[323 Ga.App. 450] Nelson v.
Haugabrook, 282 Ga.App. 399 (638 S.E.2d 840) (2006), upon which Appellants
rely, does not support a contrary result. In Nelson we held that the five-year
period was not tolled in between the time a certificate of immediate appellate
review of an interlocutory order was filed in the trial court and the
appellant's application for interlocutory review was denied. 282 Ga.App. at
401-402 (1) (b). Since the application was denied, the appellant in Nelson
never filed a notice of appeal effecting a supersedeas, and no loss of
jurisdiction occurred. Id. at 402 (1) (b). In Nelson, we did not address
whether a supersedeas would provide a basis for tolling the five-year period,
and indeed, we acknowledged that a supersedeas effects a loss of jurisdiction
only " as to matters contained within the appeal." (Footnote
omitted.) Id.</span></div>
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<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>2. Relying on Simmerson v. Blanks, 183
Ga.App. 863 (360 S.E.2d 422) (1987), Appellants contend that the Court should
reverse the trial court's dismissal order to avoid a " manifest
injustice." We disagree. In Simmerson, the trial court dismissed an action
under the five-year rule, concluding that a prior continuance order that would
have prevented dismissal was invalid because it was entered ex parte and
without a written motion. Id. This Court disagreed that the continuance order
was invalid and applied the rule that a trial judge may not revoke a granted
continuance where " manifest injustice would result." (Citation and
punctuation omitted.) Id. at 864. The Court concluded that revocation would
result in a manifest injustice because revocation occurred three years after
the continuance was granted and five years had passed from the last written
order prior to the continuance order. Id. No similar circumstances are present
here, and the trial court in this case did not enter any order at all for a
period in excess of five years after the April 11, 2005 order.</span></div>
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<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>3. Appellants also rely on Jefferson
v. Ross, 250 Ga. 817 (301 S.E.2d 268) (1983), to argue that dismissing their
case would not serve the purposes of the five-year rule. In Jefferson, the
Supreme Court of Georgia held that a trial court's authority to enter judgment
at any time after a jury verdict is not extinguished by the passage of five
years from the date of the verdict, finding that " the reasons behind the
Code sections ... no longer exist once the case has been prosecuted to
verdict." Id. at 818. Jefferson stands for the proposition that the [323
Ga.App. 451] five-year rule " applies to cases awaiting disposition, not
to cases already adjudicated by verdict or judgment." (Citations omitted.)
Lott v. Arrington & Hollowell, P.C., 258 Ga.App. 51, 55 (2) (b) (572 S.E.2d
664) (2002). Appellants' action never proceeded to verdict. Further, the issue
here is not the passage of five years following a disposition in the case.
Rather, five years passed without a written order before this case was set for
trial. Since the case was automatically dismissed as a matter of law, a trial
and verdict would have been a " mere nullity." (Citations omitted.)
Goodwyn v. Carter, 252 Ga.App. 114, 116 (555 S.E.2d 474) (2001). The holding in
Jefferson cannot save Appellants' action from automatic dismissal.</span></div>
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<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>4. Finally, Appellants cite to news
stories reporting that the trial judge's case manager had engaged in misconduct
such as discarding original orders and pleadings and hiding files in a utility
closet. They argue that " [w]hile there is no evidence that any files
related to this case were discovered [in the closet], a reasonable probability
exists that [the] case manager hid or threw away orders in this case."
While the accounts that Appellants reference are disturbing, " [t]he mandatory
duty ... falls upon the plaintiff to obtain a written order and have it entered
upon the record to prevent an automatic dismissal." (Punctuation and
footnote omitted.) Roberts, supra, 297 Ga.App. at 822 (2). As it was
Appellants' responsibility to obtain and file an order, they cannot avoid
dismissal by speculating about</span></div>
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<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;">unspecified
orders that were possibly mishandled by a court employee.</span></div>
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<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Judgment affirmed.</span></div>
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<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Barnes, P. J., and Ray, J., concur in
judgment only.</span></div>
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<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;">[1]See Paul
v. Destito, 250 Ga.App. 631 (550 S.E.2d 739) (2001).</span></div>
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<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;">[2]In their
reply brief Appellants argue that due to statements in Smith Gambrell's
Appellant's Brief in Paul II, as to the scope of the merger-related issues on
appeal, Appellants reasonably believed the " entire case" was before
this Court, and, as a result, the five-year period was tolled, at a minimum,
for the eight months between the filing of Smith Gambrell's brief and the
remittitur from this Court. Given that the claim regarding the failure to call
an accounting expert was indisputably still pending in the trial court,
Appellants' alleged belief that the entire case was on appeal was not
reasonable. In any event, an alleged mistaken impression as to the issues on appeal
would not relieve Appellants of the duty to ensure that a written order signed
by the trial judge was entered in the record. See Willis v. Columbus Medical
Center, 306 Ga.App. 331, 333 (702 S.E.2d 673) (2010) (counsel's mistaken belief
that Office of Dispute Resolution filed mediation order with clerk, as was its
usual practice, could not prevent dismissal).</span></div>
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Hugh Woodhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/01021049579391065763noreply@blogger.com1tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2321320695584069696.post-5810579019777613582016-07-04T20:34:00.000-07:002016-07-06T19:30:27.605-07:00Probate Estates Never Close. Or, Do They? Does The Five Year Rule Close Probate Estates Sub Silentio? <!--[if gte mso 9]><xml>
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<![endif]--><span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;">Probate Estates
Never Close. Or, Do They?<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Does The Five
Year Rule Close Probate Estates <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">Sub
Silentio</i>?<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span></span><br />
<br />
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">Hugh Wood, Esq., Atlanta, GA </span></span>
<br />
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<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEguAmsv0U_F39tOXo1CqNoPVYj1J8IlJWbxv5feY6JsnxdITvvoKeFSG29uiNI4AMU4qRSAzk5wZ8aCMiXxoEsD8kz6Me_8xLuYpNAdgmDJPsdiFrbP_D2v3Ty7KIzpsvk4FNMwkpHtm7Mp/s1600/Sorry+Estate+Closed.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" height="197" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEguAmsv0U_F39tOXo1CqNoPVYj1J8IlJWbxv5feY6JsnxdITvvoKeFSG29uiNI4AMU4qRSAzk5wZ8aCMiXxoEsD8kz6Me_8xLuYpNAdgmDJPsdiFrbP_D2v3Ty7KIzpsvk4FNMwkpHtm7Mp/s320/Sorry+Estate+Closed.jpg" width="320" /></a></div>
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<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;">Does the Five Year Automatic Dismissal Rule apply to the
closure of estates in Georgia. <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>OCGA §
9-2-60(b)? [1] <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>If your client is being
sued by an estate the executor or an administrator of the estate you might want
to check the probate court docket to see if any order has been entered in the
last five (5) years.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Granted the vast majority
of estate claims are received during the time that an estate is in active
litigation.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>However, this author has
been involved in a number of claims where the action brought by an
administrator or executor was pursued well beyond five (5) years beyond any
activity in the estate.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span></span></div>
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<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;">There appears to be no definitive answer to this question
in Georgia.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span></span></div>
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<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;">The pertinent part of the Five Year Rule states as
follows: “Any action or other proceeding filed in any of the courts of this
state in which no written order is taken for a period of five years shall
automatically stand dismissed.” [1]</span></div>
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<br /></div>
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<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;">It is clear that a probate filing is a “proceeding.”<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>However, what is unclear is whether the lack
of activity for more than five (5) years silently closes estates.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>While anecdotal, this author’s guess is that
if you polled “estate” experts they would dismiss this defense out of
hand.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>But should they? </span></div>
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<br /></div>
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<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;">There is at least one Georgia case where this issue was
raised as a serious defense.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The
settlement of that case on other grounds caused this defense to not be
reviewed. <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>However, it was considered a
serious defense within the context of the litigation. [2] </span></div>
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<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>Georgia probate, at least in
litigation, substantially follows the Georgia Superior Court Rules.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Georgia does have its own Uniform Probate Court
Rules. [3]<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>OCGA § 9-2-60 is a specific
Georgia code section and only the Georgia courts can definitively state how it
applies to litigation.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>However,
California has a five year rule and many decades ago California’s five year
rule was applied to bar litigation by an Estate.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>In the context of caveat litigation, the
California Court of Appeals dismissed the caveat based on California’s
application of its own five (5) year rule.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">In Re Morrison's Estate</i>,125
Cal.App. 504, 14 P.2d 102 (1932).<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>[4] </span></div>
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<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;">Georgia has 72 official probate forms.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Many Georgia Probate Forms allow for the
opening of probate estates, but strangely, none provide for the closure of estates.
<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>[5].<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>So how does one close and estate?<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>The best legal opinions in the Bar, is that you don’t close estates.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>In fairness, much of this article may not
apply to estates that are worth more than 5.4 million dollars or, like the
Estate of Elvis Aaron Presley, Memphis, Tennessee, have ongoing year to year
income.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>This analysis does not apply to
active estates.</span></div>
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<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The real “closure,”
if any, is based on when the largest threatened creditor, the IRS, officially
releases the estate with the Estate Tax Closing Letter.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>[6] In the Probate system, the filing of Form 33, if granted, allows for the discharge of the Personal Representative [Executor or Administrator] and in most probate courts leads to the administrative closure by the clerks (but not always). [5] [at Form 33]. The instructions for discharge, which may be relevant if you choose to discharge your personal representative, are listed below beside Form 33. <i>Id</i>. </span><br />
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;"></span><br />
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;"><br /></span></div>
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<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;">The Georgia Court of Appeals allowed an accounting
petition to go forward even though it was well beyond the ten (10) year applicable
statute of limitations claim for petitioning for an accounting. <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>[7] <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">In re Estate of John Malcolm Wade</i>, 331
Ga.App. 535, 771 S.E.2d 214 (Ga.App. 2015).<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>In fact, it was the “Wade,” case that caused this author to ponder
whether there were other defenses available to the Wade Executor to block the
Petition some 25 years after it could have been filed.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The alleged “final” distribution was filed
while Reagan was President in 1988, and yet the Georgia Court of Appeals
allowed the petition for an accounting to go forward in the 2<sup>nd</sup> term
of President Obama’s administration.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>That is long stretch of time, in this humble author’s opinion.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span></span></div>
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<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>The Court of Appeals has applied the
five (5) year rule, despite its unintended harsh consequences.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>[8] <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">Paul et al. v.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Smith, Gambrell & Russell</i>, 323 Ga.App.
447, 746 S.E.2d 739 (2013), the Georgia Court of Appeals allowed the
application of the five year rule to bar further trial court litigation – even
though the five years ran while the case was on appeal.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Recall that a filed Notice of Appeal acts as
supersedeas and no action may be taken in the trial court while a case is on
appeal.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The Court found that five (5)
years had run in the trial court, even though almost two years of the five years
was due to appeal supersedeas.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>How were the litigants to file anything in the
trial court to stop the draconian action of the five (5) year cutoff?<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>That was not answered in the opinion nor is
it answered in the statute.</span></div>
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<br /></div>
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<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;">This author believes that the five (5) year rule is not
nuanced, but rather is a blunt instrument.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>It is used to terminate old or stale litigation.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Whether correct policy or not, it just
is.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span></span></div>
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<br /></div>
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<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>The five (5) year rule may stop
zombie debt collection (and prosecution).<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>Granted that zombie debt is not common in the context of estate litigation,
but this author has seen it.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Aged chain
store debt and aged credit card debt sold to zombie collectors may fall to this
defense if they are pursued more than five (5) years after any estate action.</span></div>
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<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;">So what is the conclusion of this matter?<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>If your client is being pursued on a debt
that seems significantly aged and closed out of an estate there is no downside
not to raise the Five Year Rule.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>If you
are preparing to bring an action on behalf of an estate, its executor or
administrator, you might want to check the status of the probate estate to see
that some activity has occurred within the last five (5) years, if your claim
is aged.</span></div>
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<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;">Happy litigating.</span></div>
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<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
Hugh Wood, Esq.<br />
Wood & Meredith, LLP<br />
3756 LaVista Road<br />
Suite 250<br />
Atlanta (Tucker), GA 30084<br />
<br />
www.woodandmeredith.com<br />
hwood@woodandmeredith.com<br />
www.hughwood.blogspot.com<br />
Phone: 404-633-4100<br />
Fax: 404-633-0068<br />
<br />
<div style="text-align: center;">
& & &</div>
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<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;">Endnotes:</span></div>
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<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;">[1]</span></div>
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<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;">OCGA §
9-2-60. Dismissal for want of prosecution; costs; recommencement within six
months</span></div>
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<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;">(a) For the
purposes of this Code section, an order of continuance will be deemed an order
and the word "proceedings" shall be held to include, but shall not be
limited to, an appeal from an award of assessors or a special master in a
condemnation proceeding.</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;">(b) Any
action or other proceeding filed in any of the courts of this state in which no
written order is taken for a period of five years shall automatically stand
dismissed with costs to be taxed against the party plaintiff.</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;">(c) When an
action is dismissed under this Code section, if the plaintiff recommences the
action within six months following the dismissal then the renewed action shall
stand upon the same footing, as to limitation, with the original action.</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;">HISTORY: Ga.
L. 1953, Nov.-Dec. Sess., p. 342, 1, 2; Ga. L. 1967, p. 557, 1; Ga. L. 1984, p.
597, 1.</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;">[2]</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;">It is the Probate case that was associated with the following case; however, the citation is not available as of the date of this writing (mostly because the file is not available in an online searchable format). The Probate case filed in 2003 in the Probate Court of Fulton County is the underlying probate case associated with the RICO case that is shown by citation as follows: </span><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;">Rosario Diego Jimenez, Plaintiff vs.
Mari Luisa de Gregoriao, et al.,</span></i><span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;"> USDC for NDGa – ATL Div., Case No. 1:03-cv-1638-BBM.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Removed from Superior Court in a companion filing to In Re: The Estate of Natividad Jimenez
del Ray, Deceased, Probate Court of Fulton County, State of Georgia, Estate No.
185213.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> A probate matter in the county of Spain was in play with a companion probate filing in the United States. In the Fulton County Probate case a defense of the Five Year Rule was raised, but not reviewed. Unfortunately, without access to the litigants files, no copy is available for attachment to this article. </span>Interview with probate
litigation attorney, Walter Hamberg, III, June 30, 2016.</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;">[3]</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;">Uniform
Probate Court Rules</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;">[4]</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;">125 Cal.App.
504, 14 P.2d 102 (1932)</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;">District
Court of Appeal, First District, Division 1, California.</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;">In Re
Morrison's Estate.</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;">Goldborten Et
Al.v. Scott.</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;">Gryzolet Et
Al. v. Scott.</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;">Civ. 8322.</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;">Aug. 26,
1932.Rehearing Denied Sept. 24, 1932.Hearing Denied by Supreme Court Oct. 24,
1932.</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;">Appeals from
Superior Court, Alameda County; Lincoln S. Church, Judge.</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;">Petitions by
Zysla Brucha Goldborten and another and by Chaja Malta Gryzolet and others against
Maud Scott, also known as Marion Scott, to revoke the probate of the will of
Leon Morrison, deceased. From orders of dismissal, contestants appeal.</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;">Orders
reversed.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>[Copyright material removed]</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;">Attorneys and
Law Firms</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;">**103 *505
Livingston & Livingston, of San Francisco, for appellants.</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;">William J.
Cullinan and Stanley Burke, both of San Francisco, for respondent.</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;">Opinion</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;">JOHNSON,
Justice pro tem.</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;">In this
proceeding there are consolidated appeals from orders dismissing two petitions
to revoke probate of the will of Leon Morrison, deceased, one filed by persons
describing themselves as sisters of the deceased, the other by persons
declaring themselves to be nieces. The orders of dismissal were based on
section 583 of the Code of Civil Procedure, under which, in the absence of a
written stipulation for an extension of time, it is made the duty of the court
to dismiss an action not brought to trial within five years after the filing of
the answer.</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;">Leon Morrison
died on June 20, 1921; and, after a contest by the state of California, an
instrument dated January 12, 1921, purporting to be the will of the deceased,
was admitted to probate on August 14, 1923. An appeal from the order was taken
by the state, and on February 17, 1926, the remittitur from the Supreme Court
was filed showing affirmance of the order. Estate of Morrison, 198 Cal. 1, 242
P. 939.</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;">Meanwhile a
petition by the alleged sisters of the deceased to revoke probate of the will
was filed on October 23, 1923, and another petition by the alleged nieces on
July 18, 1924. Answers to these petitions were filed respectively on March 16
and March 23, 1926, by the respondent, Maud Scott, as the proponent of the
will. A date was then set for the trial of the contests; but, as the time drew
near, the contestants concluded that the evidence available to them would not
suffice to overcome testimony in favor of the will given at the time of its
admission by two witnesses, John W. McKenzie and Barney Hoffman. Accordingly a
settlement was *506 arranged whereby the contestants received $2,000, and
thereupon, on June 16, 1926, dismissed their contests. A minute order to like
effect was made by the court on the same day.</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;">Thereafter,
on July 8, 1926, McKenzie and Hoffman made a confession to the district
attorney of Alameda county that the testimony given by them in support of the
will had been false, and they stated that they had been procured to commit
perjury by said Maud Scott and others acting in her behalf. These men, on being
brought to trial on a charge of perjury, pleaded guilty, and were sentenced to
serve a term in the penitentiary.</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;">Upon learning
of these disclosures, the contestants on August 13, 1926, filed notice of
motion to vacate the dismissals of their contests, and by order signed December
2, 1926, in fulfillment of a minute order made November 18, 1926, that motion
was granted with authorization to the contestants to proceed in due course with
the prosecution of their contests. A period of six months, lacking fourteen
days, thus intervened between the dismissal of the contests on June 16 and
their reinstatement on December 2, 1926. An appeal from the order of
reinstatement was undertaken by Miss Scott, but was dismissed on July 1, 1929,
on the ground that the order was not appealable. While that appeal was pending,
efforts were made by the contestants to procure depositions of McKenzie and
Hoffman and also of witnesses in Chicago, but delays ensued, due largely to
continuances requested by attorneys for Miss Scott.</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;">On motion of
the contestants, the contests were finally set for trial for May 26, 1931; but
on May 1 Miss Scott filed notice of motion to dismiss both contests. By reason
of such motions, the trial of the contests was postponed by the court to August
5, 1931; and meanwhile, on July 23, the court made its orders granting the
motions on the sole ground that the contests had not been brought to trial
within five years after the answers were filed. The time which elapsed between
the earlier answer of Miss Scott and the date of the dismissals by the court
was five years, four months, and seven days.</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;">From the
orders of dismissal, the contestants prosecute these appeals.</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;">In addition
to the contests filed by the contestants as already mentioned, a petition to
revoke probate of the will *507 of said deceased was filed anew by the same
contestants on January 7, 1927. Certain questions affecting the status of that
petition are dealt with in the companion proceeding in prohibition of Maud
Scott v. Superior Court (Cal. App.) 14 P.(2d) 99, in which our opinion is this
day filed.</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;">Upon the
present appeal, there are two questions presented for consideration, one as to
the applicability of section 583 of the Code of Civil Procedure to a contest to
revoke probate of a will, the other as to the disallowance of credit in the
computation of time for the interval of approximately six months during which
the contests were suspended by virtue **104 of the dismissals effected by
concurrence of the parties. If this period of time is deductible, then the
contests cannot be treated as having been at issue for five years before the
dismissals in question.</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;">1 While
section 583 must necessarily have a limited application to probate proceedings
in general, we are of the opinion that it may properly be extended to include a
contest to revoke probate of a will.</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;">Such a
contest is an adversary proceeding, and in its essence is an action for
recovery of property claimed to be unlawfully taken, or about to be taken, from
the ownership of the contestant. He comes into court in the character of a
possessor of a chose in action, founded on the violation of a vested property
right by means of an instrument not truly testamentary; and, subject to certain
qualifications, he is entitled to have the merits of his cause determined by a
jury. Estate of Baker, 170 Cal. 578, 586–588, 150 P. 989; Estate of Clark, 94
Cal. App. 453, 460–461, 271 P. 542. The trial of a will contest has the
characteristics of a trial of an ordinary civil action involving title to
property; and, by section 1713 of the Code of Civil Procedure in force at the
time of the orders of dismissal, it was prescribed that, except as otherwise
specially provided, proceedings in probate should be governed by the rules of
practice in civil actions.</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;">In People v.
Central Pac. R. R. Co., 83 Cal. 393, 404, 23 P. 303, 307, the court, quoting
from a law lexicon, defined practice as “that which regulates the formal steps
in an action or other judicial proceeding. It therefore deals with writs,
summonses, pleadings, affidavits, notices, motions, *508 petitions, orders,
trials, judgments, appeals, costs, and executions.”</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;">Rules of
practice are designed to establish the manner of bringing parties into court,
and, when they are there, prescribe the course to be followed by the parties
and the court throughout the various stages of the litigation, in hearing,
dealing with, and disposing of the matters in dispute. 49 C. J. 1312. The
purpose is to harmonize and facilitate the conduct of litigation; and, since
such rules deal with all phases of a case from its inception to final judgment,
the time within which an action or proceeding shall either be brought to trial,
or dismissed as burdensome to an adversary and to the court as well, is a
proper subject for an administrative formula in aid of a definite and uniform
mode of procedure.</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;">It is the
policy of the law to expedite the administration of estates; and it would seem
that the reasons which influenced the adoption of section 583 justify an
interpretation of the word “action” sufficiently broad to include a proceeding
such as the contest of a will.</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;">The
appellants rely with much confidence, however, on the ruling of the court in
Estate of Simmons, 168 Cal. 390, 395, 143 P. 697, whereby section 581a, Code of
Civil Procedure, authorizing dismissal for failure to have summons issued in an
action within one year, was held to be inapplicable to a will contest, wherein
a year had been allowed to pass without issuance of a citation. The rationale
of that decision is that, as section 1328, Code of Civil Procedure, then in
force, prescribed the period of one year for issuance of a citation, without
annexing any penalty for the omission, the court was free to exercise its
discretion in relieving the contestant from default and authorizing the
issuance of a citation, notwithstanding the lapse of time. In other words, the
court took the view that there was a probate rule which forbade application of
the rule governing similar defaults in civil actions.</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;">Appellants
invoke also the decision in Estate of Joseph, 118 Cal. 660, 50 P. 768, rendered
in 1897, wherein insistence was laid upon the distinction between an action and
a special proceeding; and, by a strict interpretation of the word “action,” the
right to demand an undertaking from a nonresident plaintiff as security for
costs was limited to *509 the defendant in a civil action only. By an amendment
made in 1903, however, the benefit of the section was made available in special
proceedings also.</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;">While no sure
guide to the extension of the rules of civil practice to proceedings in probate
is furnished by the numerous decisions in this state on various points of
probate procedure, it may at any rate be said with certainty that the use of
the word “action” by itself in a Code section is not controlling. This is
illustrated in Estate of Knauft, 59 Cal. App. 536, 211 P. 29, where section
354, Code of Civil Procedure, was made to toll the statute of limitations in
behalf of an alien enemy who had instituted a will contest after expiration of
the ordinary statutory period; and in the course of its opinion, in reference
to a dismissal without prejudice, the court declared that it saw no reason why
section 581, Code of Civil Procedure, subdivision 4, was not applicable to a
proceeding in probate. A portion of that opinion is quoted with approval in
Estate of Cook, 205 Cal. 581, 588, 271 P. 1083, and is followed by the
statement of the Supreme Court that the pronouncement approved is authority
that the rule governing dismissal of actions generally under section 581 is
applicable to probate proceedings.</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;">Since the
orders under review were made, section 1713 of the Code of Civil Procedure has
been reframed in section 1233 of the Probate Code; and, with a view to
clarification, that section now provides that the rules of civil practice shall
be applicable to proceedings under the Probate Code “with regard to trials, new
trials, appeals, records on appeal, **105 and all other matters of procedure.”
In so far as trials are concerned, we do not interpret this section as
enlarging the scope of former section 1713, Code of Civil Procedure; and to our
minds section 583, depriving the court of jurisdiction to try an action when
there has been a delay of five years, is, and always has been, as much a
general rule, affecting actions and special proceedings alike, as a rule
declaring when an action or special proceeding is at issue and ready for trial.</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;">2 We are now
brought to the second question, the elimination of the period of suspension
intervening between the conventional dismissals on June 16, 1926, and the
reinstatement of the contests by the court on December 2, 1926.</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;">*510 The
respondent insists that the suspension had no effect whatever so far as section
583 is concerned, and relies on a statement of the court in Miller & Lux,
Inc., v. Superior Court, 192 Cal. 333, 338, 219 P. 1006, that nothing short of
a written stipulation expressly extending the time of trial beyond the
five–year period, or expressly waiving the right to a dismissal, will suffice
to toll the running of the statutory time. The court was there reiterating the
general rule in its relation to a stipulation in that particular case which was
found insufficient to meet the requirements of the law. Attention was not then
being centered upon a situation which temporarily deprived the trial court of
jurisdiction to proceed with the trial of the action. If such a situation had
been in the mind of the court, reference would doubtless have been made to
Kinard v. Jordan, 175 Cal. 13, 164 P. 894, 895, where it was held that, while
an appeal was pending, the case was removed from the jurisdiction of the trial
court, and necessarily exempt from the operation of section 583. Again, in
Allyne v. Superior Court, 200 Cal. 661, 664, 254 P. 564, in dealing with the
application of the section to the prosecution of an action after entry of an
order granting a new trial, the court declared that the plain and obvious
purpose of the section was to regulate the matter of compulsory dismissals only
under one set of circumstances, namely, where the action had not been brought
to trial within five years after filing of the answer, and that, so far as a
retrial was concerned, the section had no relevancy.</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;">In Kruly v.
Superior Court (Cal. App.) 10 P.(2d) 178, several years intervened between the
resting of the case after introduction of certain evidence and the resetting
for trial. The trial court having denied a motion to dismiss under section 583,
a writ of mandamus was applied for, but was denied upon the ground that suspension
of proceedings after commencement of the trial did not set the statute in
motion.</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;">Situations
are thus recognized which repel a strained construction of the statute.</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;">No logical
distinction can be made between a temporary suspension of proceedings in the
trial court, consequent upon a dismissal induced by fraud or mistake, and a
suspension of the power of the trial court to proceed by reason of the pendency
of an appeal. In either case, the action or proceeding *511 is withdrawn from
the cognizance of the court of first instance during the period of suspension.
And as in Kinard v. Jordan, supra, the case was taken out of the operation of
section 583 while an appeal was pending, so in like manner the period of
suspension here should be excluded in computing the quinquennium at the end of
which the jurisdiction of the court expires by operation of law. In Kinard v.
Jordan, begun in March, 1906, there was a motion to dismiss the action, made in
September, 1914, and based on that portion of section 583, which empowers the
court in its discretion to dismiss an action, if not brought to trial within
two years after filing of the answer. There had previously been a judgment for
the plaintiff on the merits, but on appeal that judgment had been reversed in
March, 1909. 10 Cal. App. 219, 101 P. 696. Thereupon certain proceedings were
had which resulted in another judgment in November, 1911, and another reversal
on appeal therefrom in March, 1914, 167 Cal. 333, 139 P. 797. Then came the
motion to dismiss, which was granted, but upon appeal the order was reversed.
In reversing the order, the Supreme Court, after referring to the judgment of
November, 1911, said: “That judgment, however erroneous it may be, purported to
determine the case. The aforesaid appeals taken therefrom suspended all power
of the court below to proceed, and necessarily took the case out of the
operation of section 583 while the appeals remained pending.”</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;">The
respondent, citing Wolters v. Rossi, 126 Cal. 644, 59 P. 143, and Page v.
Superior Court, 76 Cal. 372, 18 P. 385, contends that the dismissals in
question, being based upon a written request to the clerk by the attorneys of
the contestants, did not suspend proceedings at all, but left the contests at
all times pending.</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;">But the
dismissals in the cases cited were before the amendment made in 1897 to section
581 of the Code of Civil Procedure, authorizing dismissal by entry in the
clerk's register upon written consent of the attorney of the party requesting
dismissal. Consequently, those cases are no longer declaratory of the law on
that point. Hopkins v. Superior Court, 136 Cal. 552, 555, 69 P. 299. Moreover,
there does appear to have been a minute order of dismissal by the court.</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;">*512 It is
contended further on behalf of respondent that the order vacating the
dismissals had the effect of nullifying the intermission and placing the
contests in the same situation in all respects as if there had been no
dismissals at all. While the order **106 of restoration brought the contests
again under the jurisdiction of the court, it cannot be said that by its own
flat the court could create for itself a retroactive jurisdiction. When it is
stated that upon the vacation of an order or judgment the case is restored to
the previously existing status, that means that the parties are placed in their
original situation for the purpose of litigating the matters in controversy.
The restoration revives the right to enforce whatever claims or obligations
existed at the commencement of the action, and makes them subject to future
determination in due course. That is far from indulging a fiction that the case
was in court for purposes of trial when it was not.</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;">Thus the
question is merely whether the time when the contests were out of court shall
be counted. In Kinard v. Jordan, supra, the Supreme Court established the
precedent of disregarding the time during which the jurisdiction of the trial
court was suspended, thereby setting reality above artificiality; and in our
judgment it is our duty, under the circumstances shown in the record before us,
to follow that precedent.</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;">The orders
dismissing the petitions of said contestants to revoke probate of the will of
said deceased are each reversed.</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;">We concur:
KNIGHT, Acting P. J.; CASHIN, J.</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;">All Citations</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;">[5]</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;">Cumulative
Form Listing (name and GPCSF number)</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>General Instructions</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Form 2: Petition for Temporary Letters of
Administration</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Form 3: Petition for Letters of
Administration</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Form 4: Petition to Probate Will in Common
Form</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Form 5: Petition to Probate Will in Solemn
Form</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Form 6: Reserved See Supplement 6</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Form 7: Petition to Probate Will in Solemn
Form & for Letters of Administration w/ Will Annexed</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Form 8: Petition for Letters of
Administration with Will Annexed (Will Previously Probated)</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Form 9: Petition for Order Declaring No
Administration Necessary</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Form 10: Petition for Year's Support</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Form 11: Petition for the Appointment of an
Emergency Guardian and/or Conservator for a Proposed Ward</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Form 12: Petition for the Appointment of a
Guardian and/or Conservator for a Proposed Ward</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Form 13: Petition of Personal
Representative for Leave to Sell Property</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Form 14: Petition of Conservator for Leave
to Sell Property or Rent, Lease, or Otherwise Dispose of Property</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Form 15: Petition for Leave to Sell
Perishable Property by Conservator</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Form 16: Reserved See Supplement 1</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Form
17: Petition for Leave to Convey or Encumber Property Previously Set Aside as
Year's Support</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Form 18: Petition for Presumption of Death
of Missing Indvividual Believed to be Dead</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Form 19: Petition to Compromise Doubtful
Claim of Minor/Ward</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Form 20: Petition for Leave to Encroach on
Corpus</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Form 21: Bond of Administrators,
Conservators, & Executors, Etc.</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Form 22: Petition to Establish Custodial
Account for Minor or Incapacitated Adult</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Form 23: GPCSF 23 through 27 Reserved/Relocated</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Form 28: Petition for Temporary Letters of
Guardianship of Minor</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Form 29: Petition for Permanent Letters of
Guardianship of Minor</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Form 30: Petition for Letters of
Conservatorship of Minor</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Form 31: Application for Permit to Conduct
Public Fireworks Display</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Form 32: Petition by Personal
Representative for Waiver of Bond and/or Grant of Certain Powers</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Form 33: Petition for Discharge of Personal
Representative</span><br />
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;"> <span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;"><br /></span></span><i><span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;"><span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;">PETITION FOR DISCHARGE OF PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE </span></span><br /><span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;"><span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;">INSTRUCTIONS</span></span><br /><span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;"><span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;">I. Specific Instructions</span></span><br /><span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;"><span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;">1.
This form is to be used for a Petition for Discharge of a Personal
Representative pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 53-7-50 or Discharge of a
Temporary Administrator pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 53-7-52. A Personal
Representative may, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 53-7-50(e), petition the
court solely for discharge from office but not from all liability.</span></span><br /><span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;"><span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;">2.
If the Petition is filed by a Personal Representative, the notice to
debtors and creditors must have been published for four weeks, and three
months must have elapsed from the date of the last publication.
O.C.G.A. §§ 53-7-41, 53-11-4.</span></span><br /><span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;"><span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;">3. Signatures of heirs who acknowledge
service must be sworn to before a notary public or the Clerk of any
Probate Court of this State. It is not necessary that all
acknowledgments appear on the same page. An attorney at law may
acknowledge service on behalf of an heir; however, the attorney must
certify that he or she currently represents that heir with regard to the
pending matter and, in order to comply with O.C.G.A. § 53-11-6, the
attorney's signature must be sworn to as provided above. With regard to a
power of attorney, the attorney-in-fact may acknowledge service on
behalf of the grantor of the power, provided that the power of attorney
grants such authority, the signature of the attorney-in-fact is
attested, a copy of the power of attorney is attached, and the
attorney-in-fact certifies that the copy is a true copy and is still in
effect.</span></span><br /><span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;"><span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;">4. O.C.G.A. § 53-11-2 provides that a party to a probate
proceeding who is not sui juris must be represented by a guardian
provided that the Court may appoint a guardian ad litem or determine
that the natural guardian, guardian, conservator, or testamentary
guardian has no conflict and may serve. Should a guardian ad litem be
necessary because a party is not sui juris, use Supplement 1.</span></span><br /><span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;"><span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;">5. Use Supplement 2 if the Court determines it is appropriate to appoint a special process server.</span></span><br /><span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;"><span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;">6. Use Supplement 3 when an additional certificate of service is necessary.7.
In the event the Decedent died intestate, Paragraph 3 requires that a
definitive statement be made to show to the court that the persons named
in Paragraph 2 constitute all of the heirs of the Decedent and that
there are no heirs of the same or closer degree according to O.C.G.A. §
53-2-1. Provide the date of death for any deceased heirs. [NOTE: If you
are uncertain how to determine the heirs of a Decedent, please refer to
the “Heirs Determination Sheet” available from the probate court or at
www.gaprobate.gov.] Examples of such statement would be: (a) “Decedent
was or was not married at the time of his death and had no children
born, adopted, living or deceased, other than listed herein”; (b)
“Decedent had no other siblings half or whole other than those listed
herein”; (c) “the Decedent’s brother who died previously had no other
children born, adopted, living or deceased, other than listed herein.”</span></span></i><span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;"><i><span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;">8.
According to Probate Court Rule 5.6 (A), unless the Court specifically
assumes the responsibility, it is the responsibility of the moving party
to prepare the proper citation and deliver it properly so it can be
served according to law. All pages after the Notice regarding Uniform
Probate Court Rule 5.6 (A) are to be completed by the moving party,
unless otherwise directed by the Court.</span></i> </span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Form 34: Petition of Conservator for Final
Settlement of Accounts and Discharge from Office and Liability</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Form 35: Reserved See Supplement 4</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Form 36: Petition for the Appointment of a
Temporary Medical Consent Guardian for a Proposed Medical Consent Ward</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Form 37: 37 through 51 Reserved/Relocated</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Form 52: Default Certificate</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Form 53: Commission to Administer Oath</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Form 54: Service upon Minor or Adult Ward
through Service Upon Guardian</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Form 55: GPCSF 55 through 57
Reserved/Relocated</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Form 58: Adult Conservatorship Inventory
and Asset Management Plan</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Form 59: Minor Conservator Inventory and
Asset Management Program</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Form 60: GPCSF 60 Reserved</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Form 65: Petition for the Restoration of an
Individual Found to Be in Need of a Guardian and/or Conservator</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Form 70: Certificate in Accordance with
Uniform Probate Court Rule 5.9(D)</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Form 71: Petition for Leave to Sell
Perishable Property by Personal Representative</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Form 72: Petition for Determination of
Right of Disposition of Remains of a Decedent</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Supplement 1: Determination by Court that a
Person May Act as Guardian or Appointment of Guardian Ad Litem</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Supplement 2: Appointment of Special
Process Server</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Supplement 3: Certificate of Service</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Supplement 4: Guardian/Conservator/Personal
Representative Oath</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Supplement 5: Petition for Letters of
Testamentary Guardianship</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Supplement 6: Interrogatories to Witness to
Will</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;">See.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>www.gaprobate.gov<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>/ forms</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;">[6]</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;">When can I
expect the Estate Tax Closing Letter?</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;">For all
estate tax returns filed on or after June 1, 2015, estate tax closing letters
will be issued only upon request by the taxpayer. Please wait at least four
months after filing the return to make the closing letter request to allow time
for processing. To request a closing letter please call (866) 699-4083 and
provide the following information:</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Name of the decedent;</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Decedent’s social security number;</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Date of Death.</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;">The closing
letter will be prepared and issued to the executor at the address of record.
For any additional questions about estate tax closing letter requests or the
status of the return, call (866) 699-4083.</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;"><a href="https://www.irs.gov/businesses/small-businesses-self-employed/frequently-asked-questions-on-estate-taxes"><span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;">https://www.irs.gov/businesses/small-businesses-self-employed/frequently-asked-questions-on-estate-taxes</span></a></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;">See also, </span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;">Am I required
to file an estate tax return?</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;">If the
decedent is a U.S. citizen or resident and decedent's death occurred in 2016,
an estate tax return (Form 706) must be filed if the gross estate of the
decedent, increased by the decedent's adjusted taxable gifts and specific gift
tax exemption, is valued at more than the filing threshold for the year of the
decedent's death. The filing threshold for 2016 is $5,450,000, for 2015 is
$5,430,000, for 2014 is $5,340,000, for 2013 is $5,250,000, for 2012 is
$5,120,000, and for 2011 is $5,000,000. An estate tax return also must be filed
if the estate elects to transfer any deceased spousal unused exclusion (DSUE)
amount to a surviving spouse, regardless of the size of the gross estate or
amount of adjusted taxable gifts. The election to transfer a DSUE amount to a
surviving spouse is known as the portability election.</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;">An estate tax
return may need to be filed for a decedent who was a nonresident and not a U.S.
citizen if the decedent had U.S.-situated assets. Refer to Some Nonresidents
with U.S. Assets Must File Estate Tax Returns to learn more.</span><br />
<br />
<div style="text-align: center;">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;">&&&</span></div>
<div style="text-align: center;">
<br /></div>
<div style="text-align: left;">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;">See also, the discharge of personal liabiltiy by the personal represenative for the taxes owed the federal government by the testator/estate. 26 U.S. Code § 6905 - Discharge of executor from personal liability for decedent’s income and gift taxes: (a) Discharge of liability. In the case of liability of a decedent for taxes imposed by subtitle A or by chapter 12, if the executor makes written application (filed after the return with respect to such taxes is made and filed in such manner and such form as may be prescribed by regulations of the Secretary for release from personal liability for such taxes, the Secretary may notify the executor of the amount of such taxes. The executor, upon payment of the amount of which he is notified, after 9 months after receipt of the application if no notification is made by the Secretary before such date, shall be discharged from personal liability for any deficiency in such tax thereafter found to be due, and shall be entitled to a receipt or writing showing such discharge. (b) Definition of executor. For purposes of this section, the term “executor” means the executor or administrator of the decedent appointed, qualified, and acting within the United States. (c) Cross reference. For discharge of executor from personal liability for taxes imposed under chapter 11, see section 2204. (Added Pub. L. 91–614, title I, § 101(e)(1), Dec. 31, 1970, 84 Stat. 1837; amended Pub. L. 91–614, title I, § 101(f), Dec. 31, 1970, 84 Stat. 1838; Pub. L. 94–455, title XIX, § 1906(b)(13)(A), Oct. 4, 1976, 90 Stat. 1834.).</span></div>
</div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>[7]</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;">In re Estate
of John Malcolm Wade, 331 Ga.App. 535, 771 S.E.2d 214 (2015).</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;">A14A2013</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;">Court of
Appeals of Georgia</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;">March 25,
2015</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Estate. Charlton Superior Court.
Before Judge DeVane.</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Brown, Readdick, Bumgartner, Carter,
Strickland & Watkins, G. Todd Carter, Emily R. Hancock, for appellant.</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Gibson & Associates, Adrienne J.
Gibson, Douglas L. Gibson, Kenneth A. Taft, for appellee.</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>OPINION</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Branch, Judge.</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>In a 1982 will, John Malcolm Wade
named all five of his children as co-executors of his estate. Soon after Wade
died in 1987, the probate court issued letters testamentary to all five
children, thereby appointing them as</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;">Page 215</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;">co-executors.
Almost 25 years later, in August 2012, appellant Mary Virginia Wade petitioned
the probate court to obtain an accounting of her siblings' dealings on behalf
of the estate. After a trial, the probate court concluded that the siblings had
[331 Ga.App. 536] violated the terms of their father's will and ordered an
accounting of the estate. Three of the four siblings -- Bonnie Conner, Dorothy
Vuturo, and Malcolm Wade[1] -- appealed to the superior court, where they moved
for summary judgment on grounds including that Mary's action for an accounting
was time-barred. On this appeal from the superior court's grant of the
siblings' motion, Mary argues that her action is not time-barred because the
estate was still open and because there was no adverse possession by her
siblings that would have caused her cause of action to accrue and the statute
of limitation to have run. We agree and therefore reverse.</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>On appeal from the decision of a probate
court, the superior court conducts a de novo investigation of the probate
court's proceedings, and in doing so, will consider the records from the
probate court, as well as other competent evidence which may not have been
presented to the probate court.</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;">Garren v.
Garren, 316 Ga.App. 646, 647 (2) (730 S.E.2d 123) (2012), citing OCGA § 5-3-29.
" 'It is not the province of the superior court on such an appeal to
review and affirm, but to try the issue anew and pass original judgments on the
questions involved as if there had been no previous trial.' " Id. at 648
(3), quoting Knowles v. Knowles, 125 Ga.App. 642, 645 (1) (188 S.E.2d 800)
(1972). " To prevail at summary judgment under OCGA § 9-11-56, the moving
party must demonstrate that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that
the undisputed facts, viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving
party, warrant judgment as a matter of law." Lau's Corp. v. Haskins, 261
Ga. 491 (405 S.E.2d 474) (1991) (citations omitted). This Court reviews a trial
court's grant of summary judgment de novo, construing the record in the light
most favorable to the nonmovant. Ethridge v. Davis, 243 Ga.App. 11, 12 (530
S.E.2d 477) (2000).</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Thus viewed in favor of Mary, the
record, which is scant, shows that on December 29, 1987, all five of the Wade
children were sworn in as co-executors. At some point shortly after their
appointment, the siblings orally agreed that Mary would be the "
coordinating executor" charged with paying the estate's bills. At some
later point, however, the siblings agreed that any three of them could
authorize payments by the estate and that Bonnie should administer its assets
so as to wind up its affairs within six years. At an unspecified date, Mary
took [331 Ga.App. 537] a share of the estate's personal property according to a
system of apportionment also agreed upon by all five children. By another
unspecified date, Mary had packed up the estate's papers and shipped them to
Bonnie.</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>In March 1988, a bank sent all five
siblings checks and stock certificates representing what the bank called a
"final distribution" from the estate's account at that bank. Of the
five siblings, only Mary did not sign and return receipts for this attempted
distribution. In August 1988, Malcolm negotiated a $1 million loan from a
second bank to the estate in exchange for an interest in estate assets
including real property in North Carolina and Georgia as well as nearly 9,000
shares of stock in the privately held " N. G. Wade Investment Co." In
March 1989, Malcolm executed a power of attorney as to estate matters in favor
of Bonnie.</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>In February 1991, all five siblings
received a summary from a certified public accountant valuing the estate's
assets at approximately $1.2 million. By January 1993, Mary had received a
four-carat diamond and documents concerning the estate's assets from Dorothy.
In March 1993, Mary contacted the estate's accountant to ask for documents and
noted that " until I have adequate financial records to see that Estate
assets are distributed properly, I will not sign any papers to close the
Estate[.]" In the same document, Mary also asserted that estate funds
" ha[d] been spent without [her] knowledge or consent."</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;">Page 216</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;">In March
1994, Mary asked Bonnie for copies of documents relevant to the estate,
including transfers of a house and an automobile and a copy of a sale agreement
concerning timber on property located in North Carolina. In January 1999, Mary
paid $60,000 on her own behalf and Bonnie paid $60,000 on behalf of the four
remaining siblings to close out the 1988 loan to the estate. In the same year,
Carolyn demanded that Bonnie allow her to review the estate's financial
records.</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>In January 2009, Bonnie wrote to Mary
asking for her signature on an agreement between all the siblings to harvest
timber from the estate's land in Charlton County and share the proceeds
thereof, estimated at $27,700. The draft agreement noted that " a fire or
pine beetles among other disasters could dev[a]state this gain offered to [the
siblings] at any time." Bonnie also asked for Mary's signature on a second
document requesting the probate court to close the estate, " all the
business thereof being completed," and a recent bank statement showing an
estate account balance of $9,547.76. Bonnie later averred that the siblings also
sought to divide the Charlton County parcel at this time. Mary did not sign or
return either the draft agreement or the request to close the estate.</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>[331 Ga.App. 538] In August 2012,
Mary filed her petition for an accounting in probate court. As they had
previously, Dorothy and Malcolm filed notarized documents in the probate court
authorizing Bonnie to act on their behalf concerning the estate. Dorothy stated
that Bonnie had generated " remarkable amounts of money" for the
beneficiaries, had " found the highest prices to be paid for timber and
land sales," and " created and oversaw many positive outcomes for her
brother and sisters." After the November 2012 hearing, at which only Mary
and Bonnie appeared,[2] the probate court held that that in light of Bonnie's
admission that she or others had " intentionally destroyed" many
estate records, " any difficulty the co-executors have had in preparing an
accounting [would] be entirely self-inflicted." The probate court also
concluded that " decisions regarding the administration of the
estate" had been made " by a majority of the co-executors,"
rather than unanimously, in apparent violation of both OCGA § 53-7-5 (a)[3] and
the terms of John Malcolm Wade's will, which did not contain any provision for
majority rather than unanimous action. The probate court ordered an accounting
within 90 days.</span></div>
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<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>In January 2013, the siblings appealed
the probate court's ruling to the superior court. Both sides moved for summary
judgment -- the siblings on the grounds that Mary's petition was time-barred
and that she had refused to relinquish the diamond or otherwise agree to a
division of the estate's property, and Mary on the ground that the siblings
were required to render an accounting as a matter of law. In an August 2013
affidavit, Bonnie testified that the estate's only remaining undistributed
assets were the 29-acre Charlton County parcel of land and the diamond Mary had
received many years before. Also in August 2013, the siblings filed a
counterclaim against Mary for conversion of the family diamond. In April 2014,
the superior court granted the siblings' motion for summary judgment without
explanation and without ruling on the siblings' counterclaim. This appeal
followed.</span></div>
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<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>[331 Ga.App. 539] 1. As the parties
agree, the first question is whether Mary's petition for an accounting is
time-barred under OCGA § § 53-7-62 (a)</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;">Page 217</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;">and 9-3-27.
Mary argues that she may seek an accounting at any time while the estate
remains open, while the siblings argue that Mary was required to bring such an
action no later than ten years and six months after the appointment of the
co-executors. Both of these contentions miss the mark.</span></div>
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<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>OCGA § 53-7-62 (a) provides in
relevant part that " [a]ny person interested as an heir or beneficiary of
an estate or the probate court may, after the expiration of six months from the
granting of letters, cite the personal representative to appear before the
probate court for a settlement of accounts." OCGA § 9-3-27 provides that
" [a]ll actions against executors, administrators, or guardians, except on
their bonds, shall be brought within ten years after the right of action
accrues." The ten-year limitation period of OCGA § 9-3-27 applies to
petitions for an accounting. Rowland v. Rowland, 204 Ga. 603, 608 (5) (50
S.E.2d 343) (1948).</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The five original co-executors
received their letters testamentary in December 1987, with the result that Mary
could have brought an action for accounting as early as June 1988, or six
months after their appointment. OCGA § 53-7-62 (a). As co-executors, however,
each of the five siblings owes all the others, who are also co-beneficiaries,
the care required of a fiduciary. Bloodworth v. Bloodworth, 260 Ga.App. 466,
471 (1) (579 S.E.2d 858) (2003) (" [a]s fiduciaries," co-executors
" acquired a number of legal duties in relation to the
beneficiaries," including " full and fair disclosure in a timely
manner of all things adversely affecting" the beneficiaries' rights).
Because of the high standard of care imposed on executors, the Supreme Court of
Georgia has long refused to apply the ten-year statute of limitation to bar a
beneficiary's action for accounting by an executor in the absence of evidence
that the executor has held the estate's property adversely to the beneficiary:</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>[I]t is well settled in [Georgia] that not
only in express or implied trusts, but in other fiduciary relations, the
statute [of limitation] will not begin to run so long as the trust or duty with
regard to specific property continues, is acknowledged to be subsisting, and
there is no change of status to show an adverse holding of such property; that
as long as a person who is in possession of the property of another, using the
same for the owner's benefit, recognizes the latter's ownership, no lapse of
time will bar the owner from asserting his title as against the person in
possession ; that before any lapse of time will be a bar to the owner it must
appear that the [331 Ga.App. 540] person in possession has given notice, or
there must be circumstances shown which would be equivalent to notice to the
owner that the person in possession claims adversely to him ; that in such a
case the statute will begin to run from the date of such notice; and that until
the owner has such notice he has the right to treat the possession of the other
person as his own.</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;">Reynolds v.
Dorsey, 188 Ga. 218, 221 (2) (3 S.E.2d 564) (1939) (citations omitted; emphasis
supplied); Salter v. Salter, 209 Ga. 90, 95 (2) (70 S.E.2d 453) (1952); Manry
v. Manry, 196 Ga. 365, 369 (2) (26 S.E.2d 706) (1943) (" So long as the
executors h[o]ld the title and possession of [an] estate as such, it [is] a continuing
executory trust, and the bar of the statute of limitations does not run against
such a trust until its termination or repudiation." ) (citations omitted);
see also In re Estate of Holtzclaw, 293 Ga.App. 577 (667 S.E.2d 432) (2008)
(concerning fee awards arising from a petition for accounting brought in 2005
against an executor appointed in 1984, but not addressing the accrual of the
petitioner's cause of action).</span></div>
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<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>It is true that in her 1993 letter to
the estate's accountant, Mary both asked for information as to the estate and
accused at least one of her siblings of " spending" at least some of
the estate's assets without her " knowledge or consent." This letter
was sent to the estate's accountant, not to any of her co-executors, however,
and it sought to reserve Mary's own right as co-executor to review the
documents, and not to exercise her right as a beneficiary to obtain an
accounting. Compare Rowland, 204 Ga. at 604, 608 (5) (applying OCGA § 9-3-27 to
bar an action for accounting where the executor, " although requested to
do so," had " never made any accounting or settlement</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;">Page 218</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;">with the
[beneficiaries] for their interest in [an] estate" ). Further, we have
seen nothing in the record to suggest that the siblings ever denied Mary's
status as a co-beneficiary of any specific property owned by the estate. To the
contrary, the record also shows that whatever disagreements may have arisen
about the disposition of the estate, no sibling ever repudiated any other
sibling's right to a proportionate share in those contents, as when the
siblings presented Mary with a proposed settlement of the estate's assets in
1988, only four months after the appointment of the co-executors, and in 2009,
when they attempted to dispose of the Charlton County land parcel and to close
the estate.</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>A question of fact thus remains as to
whether any of the siblings' actions before the filing of Mary's petition put
Mary on notice that they had claimed any estate property adversely to her.
Because we cannot say as a matter of law that the siblings adversely held the
[331 Ga.App. 541] estate's assets or repudiated Mary's claim on them at any
time before Mary filed her petition, a jury must decide whether the ten-year
bar of OCGA § 9-3-27 began to run before that time. It follows that the trial
court erred when it granted summary judgment to the siblings on this basis.
Salter, 209 Ga. at 96-97 (affirming overruling of demurrer to petition for
accounting where nothing on the face of the petition showed that the trust at
issue " was not acknowledged to be subsisting or that there was any change
of status to show an adverse holding by the executors that would bring this
case within the statute of limitations" ); Manry, 196 Ga. at 369 (2)
(where a will did not direct when a division of an estate was to be made, a
beneficiary's action for accounting was not time-barred when the executors had
qualified 15 years before but had not disposed of the estate's assets until six
years before the filing of the action).</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>2. The record shows that the siblings also
moved for summary judgment on the ground that Mary had refused to agree to a
division of the estate's property. The trial court made no finding on this
question, and the parties have not briefed the matter on appeal. We therefore
leave it to further proceedings below. See City of Gainesville v. Dodd, 275 Ga.
834, 835-836 (573 S.E.2d 369) (2002) (appellate court may exercise its
discretion to determine whether a ground for summary judgment raised but not
ruled on below is properly affirmed). Our decision also moots Mary's assertion
that the trial court erred in failing to grant her summary judgment.</span></div>
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<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Judgment reversed.</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Barnes, P. J., and Boggs, J., concur.</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;">---------</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;">Notes:</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;">[1]The
fourth<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>sibling, Carolyn, did not appear
at the hearing before the probate court below and is not a party to this
appeal.</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;">[2]The record
does not include a transcript of the hearing before the probate court.</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;">[3]OCGA §
53-7-5 (a) of the Revised Probate Code of 1998 provides that</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>" [i]f more than one personal
representative is qualified and unless the will provides otherwise ... , [t]he
personal representatives must act by their unanimous action[.]" The same
subsection also specifies, however, that " [t]he personal representatives
may delegate in writing to one or more of them the authority to act for all of
them; provided, however, that all the personal representatives remain liable
for the actions<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>of the personal
representative who is authorized to act." Id. Mary has not asserted any
error as to the application of the Revised Probate Code to this dispute. See
OCGA § 53-1-1 (b) (Revised Probate Code of 1998 became effective on January 1
of that year, " provided, however, that no vested rights of title, year's
support, succession, or inheritance shall be impaired" ); McPherson v.
McPherson, 307 Ga.App. 548, 550-551 (1) (a) (705 S.E.2d 314) (applying Revised
Trust Code of 2010 to earlier trust instrument and transactions where that
application did not affect any " vested rights" ).</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;">[8]</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;">Paul et al. v.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Smith, Gambrell & Russell</span></i><span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;">, 323 Ga.App. 447, 746 S.E.2d 739 (2013)</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;">July 16, 2013</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Reconsideration denied July 29, 2013
-- Cert. applied for.</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;">Page 740</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Dismissal; five-year rule. Fulton
State Court. Before Judge Forsling.</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Frank J. Beltran, for appellants.</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Weinberg, Wheeler, Hudgins, Gunn
& Dial, Shawn D. Scott , Robert G. Tanner, for appellee.</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>MILLER, Judge. Barnes, P. J., and Ray,
J., concur in judgment only.</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>OPINION</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;">Page 741</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Miller, Judge.</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>This is the third appeal arising out
of a legal malpractice action that Appellants G. Douglas Paul, Sharon V. Paul,
Catspaw Productions, Inc. (" CPI" ), Catspaw, Inc., Atlanta Catco,
Inc., and Recording Studio, Inc. (" RSI" ) commenced against Smith,
Gambrell & Russell (" Smith Gambrell" ) in 2002. See Paul v.
Smith, Gambrell & Russell, 267 Ga.App. 107 (599 S.E.2d 206) (2004) ("
Paul I " ); Paul v. Smith, Gambrell & Russell, 283 Ga.App. 584 (642
S.E.2d 217) (2007) (" Paul II " ). In Paul II, the parties filed
cross-appeals from the trial court's April 11, 2005 order granting in part and
denying in part Smith Gambrell's second motion for summary judgment. 283
Ga.App. at 584-585. For the next five years after the April 11, 2005 order, no
written order was entered in the trial court. On July 12, 2011, the trial court
entered an order memorializing the automatic dismissal of the case pursuant to
OCGA § § 9-2-60 (b) and 9-11-41 (e), concluding that more than five years had
elapsed since the last order was entered in the case. On appeal, Appellants
argue, among other things, that the five-year period was tolled during the
pendency of the cross-appeals in Paul II. Finding this and Appellants' other
arguments unavailing, we affirm.</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>This appeal presents a question of
law subject to de novo review. See Jinks v. Eastman Enterprises, 317 Ga.App.
489, 489-490 (731 S.E.2d 378) (2012).</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>As recounted in greater detail in Paul
II, Appellants' action arises out of Smith Gambrell's representation of
Appellants prior to and during a lawsuit Ralph Destito, a shareholder of RSI
and a former employee of CPI, commenced against Appellants for fraud, breach of
fiduciary duty, and related claims (the " Destito action" ). 283
Ga.App. at 584-587. The Destito action resulted in a substantial verdict and
judgment against Appellants, and the judgment was affirmed on appeal.[1] Id. at
584.</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>In the first of two motions for
summary judgment in the present case, Smith Gambrell sought summary judgment on
the issue of [323 Ga.App. 448] punitive damages and its liability for failing
to call an accounting expert at trial in the Destito action, and the trial
court granted its motion on both issues. See Paul I, supra, 267 Ga.App. at
107-108. On appeal, this Court affirmed on the issue of punitive damages but
reversed as to the claim for failure to call an accounting expert. Id. at 108.
Prior to the decision in Paul I, Smith Gambrell filed its second motion for
summary judgment on the issues of its alleged malpractice in preparing
documents to merge RSI into CPI and subsequent Articles of Correction to
reverse the merger and its failure to prepare the Pauls to testify at trial in
the Destito action. Smith Gambrell's second motion did not address the claim
regarding the failure to call an accounting expert, as the trial court had
granted summary judgment in its favor on that claim.</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>In its April 11, 2005 order, the trial
court granted Smith Gambrell summary judgment on the issue of failing to
prepare the Pauls for trial but denied summary judgment on the issue of Smith
Gambrell's failure to exercise reasonable care in preparing the merger
documents. The parties filed cross-appeals, and this Court affirmed the April
11, 2005 order. Paul II, supra, 283 Ga.App. at 585.</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>No written order was entered in the
record following the April 11, 2005 order until an order was entered on
December 13, 2010 specially setting the matter for trial. After a jury was
empaneled on April 12, 2011, the trial court declared a mistrial, finding that</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;">Page 742</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;">Appellants
failed to identify one of its claims and supporting expert opinions during
discovery. Smith Gambrell subsequently moved to strike the action from the
docket under OCGA § § 9-2-60 (b) and 9-11-41 (e), and the trial court entered
an order memorializing the automatic dismissal of the case.</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>1. Appellants argue the trial court
erred in concluding that its action was dismissed by operation of law because
the five-year period under OCGA § § 9-2-60 (b) and 9-11-41 (e) was tolled
during the pendency of the cross-appeals in Paul II. We disagree.</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>" OCGA § § 9-2-60 (b) and 9-11-41
(e) are the statutory embodiment of the 'five-year rule.' Together, they
provide for the automatic dismissal of any action filed in a Georgia court of
record when 'no written order is taken for a period of five years[.]' "
Zepp v. Brannen, 283 Ga. 395, 396 (658 S.E.2d 567) (2008). The five-year rule
is " a reasonable procedural rule" that serves " the dual
purpose of preventing court records from becoming cluttered by unresolved and
inactive litigation and of protecting litigants from dilatory counsel."
(Citation and punctuation omitted.) Brown v. Kroger Co., 278 Ga. 65, 68 (597
S.E.2d 382) (2004). These Code sections are mandatory, and dismissal occurs by
operation of law. Republic Claims Svc. Co. v. Hoyal, 264 Ga. 127, 128 (441
S.E.2d 755) (1994); Roberts v. Eayrs, 297 Ga.App. 821, 822 (2) [323 Ga.App.
449] (678 S.E.2d 535) (2009). We apply a bright-line rule for determining
whether an order is sufficient to reset the five-year clock. Windsor v. City of
Atlanta, 287 Ga. 334, 336 (2) (695 S.E.2d 576) (2010). " [I]n order to
toll the running of the five-year period that results in automatic dismissal
for non-action, an order must be written, signed by the trial judge, and
properly entered in the records of the trial court by filing it with the clerk."
(Citation and punctuation omitted.) Id.</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Here, it is undisputed that more than
five years elapsed following the entry of the April 11, 2005 order before
another written order was entered in the record. Appellants attempted to avoid
the otherwise straightforward application of the fiveyear rule by arguing that
the five-year period was tolled for 22 months while the April 11, 2005 order
was on appeal in Paul II because a supersedeas was in effect pursuant to OCGA §
5-6-46 (a), depriving the trial court of jurisdiction. We have recognized that
the five-year period may be tolled under certain circumstances when a trial
court completely loses jurisdiction over a case. See, e.g., Jinks, supra, 317
Ga.App. at 491 (bankruptcy stay); Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Perry,
168 Ga.App. 387, 388 (308 S.E.2d 848) (1983) (removal to federal court). It is
well established, however, that " [t]he supersedeas that stems from the
filing of [a] ... notice of appeal is limited in that it supersedes only the
judgment appealed; it does not deprive the trial court of jurisdiction as to
other matters in the same case not affecting the judgment on appeal."
(Citation and punctuation omitted.) Avren v. Garten, 289 Ga. 186, 190 (6) (710
S.E.2d 130) (2011).</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Appellants argue that the trial court
was divested of all jurisdiction in the case during the Paul II cross-appeals
because Smith Gambrell's second motion for summary judgment stated that Smith
Gambrell was entitled to summary judgment on the " entire case." Once
this Court issued its decision in Paul I reinstating Appellants' claim
regarding the failure to call an accounting expert, however, it was apparent
that a portion of Appellants' case would remain pending even if Smith Gambrell
prevailed on its second motion for summary judgment. As such, the trial court
had jurisdiction to proceed with at least part of the case during the pendency
of the cross-appeals, see Craft's Ocean Court v. Coast House, Ltd., 255 Ga.
336, 337-338 (2) (338 S.E.2d 277) (1986), and we conclude that no tolling of
the five-year period occurred.[2]</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;">Page 743</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>[323 Ga.App. 450] Nelson v.
Haugabrook, 282 Ga.App. 399 (638 S.E.2d 840) (2006), upon which Appellants
rely, does not support a contrary result. In Nelson we held that the five-year
period was not tolled in between the time a certificate of immediate appellate
review of an interlocutory order was filed in the trial court and the
appellant's application for interlocutory review was denied. 282 Ga.App. at
401-402 (1) (b). Since the application was denied, the appellant in Nelson
never filed a notice of appeal effecting a supersedeas, and no loss of
jurisdiction occurred. Id. at 402 (1) (b). In Nelson, we did not address
whether a supersedeas would provide a basis for tolling the five-year period,
and indeed, we acknowledged that a supersedeas effects a loss of jurisdiction
only " as to matters contained within the appeal." (Footnote
omitted.) Id.</span></div>
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<br /></div>
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<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>2. Relying on Simmerson v. Blanks, 183
Ga.App. 863 (360 S.E.2d 422) (1987), Appellants contend that the Court should
reverse the trial court's dismissal order to avoid a " manifest
injustice." We disagree. In Simmerson, the trial court dismissed an action
under the five-year rule, concluding that a prior continuance order that would
have prevented dismissal was invalid because it was entered ex parte and
without a written motion. Id. This Court disagreed that the continuance order
was invalid and applied the rule that a trial judge may not revoke a granted
continuance where " manifest injustice would result." (Citation and
punctuation omitted.) Id. at 864. The Court concluded that revocation would
result in a manifest injustice because revocation occurred three years after
the continuance was granted and five years had passed from the last written
order prior to the continuance order. Id. No similar circumstances are present
here, and the trial court in this case did not enter any order at all for a
period in excess of five years after the April 11, 2005 order.</span></div>
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<br /></div>
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<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>3. Appellants also rely on Jefferson
v. Ross, 250 Ga. 817 (301 S.E.2d 268) (1983), to argue that dismissing their
case would not serve the purposes of the five-year rule. In Jefferson, the
Supreme Court of Georgia held that a trial court's authority to enter judgment
at any time after a jury verdict is not extinguished by the passage of five
years from the date of the verdict, finding that " the reasons behind the
Code sections ... no longer exist once the case has been prosecuted to
verdict." Id. at 818. Jefferson stands for the proposition that the [323
Ga.App. 451] five-year rule " applies to cases awaiting disposition, not
to cases already adjudicated by verdict or judgment." (Citations omitted.)
Lott v. Arrington & Hollowell, P.C., 258 Ga.App. 51, 55 (2) (b) (572 S.E.2d
664) (2002). Appellants' action never proceeded to verdict. Further, the issue
here is not the passage of five years following a disposition in the case.
Rather, five years passed without a written order before this case was set for
trial. Since the case was automatically dismissed as a matter of law, a trial
and verdict would have been a " mere nullity." (Citations omitted.)
Goodwyn v. Carter, 252 Ga.App. 114, 116 (555 S.E.2d 474) (2001). The holding in
Jefferson cannot save Appellants' action from automatic dismissal.</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>4. Finally, Appellants cite to news
stories reporting that the trial judge's case manager had engaged in misconduct
such as discarding original orders and pleadings and hiding files in a utility
closet. They argue that " [w]hile there is no evidence that any files
related to this case were discovered [in the closet], a reasonable probability
exists that [the] case manager hid or threw away orders in this case."
While the accounts that Appellants reference are disturbing, " [t]he mandatory
duty ... falls upon the plaintiff to obtain a written order and have it entered
upon the record to prevent an automatic dismissal." (Punctuation and
footnote omitted.) Roberts, supra, 297 Ga.App. at 822 (2). As it was
Appellants' responsibility to obtain and file an order, they cannot avoid
dismissal by speculating about</span></div>
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<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;">Page 744</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;">unspecified
orders that were possibly mishandled by a court employee.</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Judgment affirmed.</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Barnes, P. J., and Ray, J., concur in
judgment only.</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;">---------</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;">Notes:</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;">[1]See Paul
v. Destito, 250 Ga.App. 631 (550 S.E.2d 739) (2001).</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;">[2]In their
reply brief Appellants argue that due to statements in Smith Gambrell's
Appellant's Brief in Paul II, as to the scope of the merger-related issues on
appeal, Appellants reasonably believed the " entire case" was before
this Court, and, as a result, the five-year period was tolled, at a minimum,
for the eight months between the filing of Smith Gambrell's brief and the
remittitur from this Court. Given that the claim regarding the failure to call
an accounting expert was indisputably still pending in the trial court,
Appellants' alleged belief that the entire case was on appeal was not
reasonable. In any event, an alleged mistaken impression as to the issues on appeal
would not relieve Appellants of the duty to ensure that a written order signed
by the trial judge was entered in the record. See Willis v. Columbus Medical
Center, 306 Ga.App. 331, 333 (702 S.E.2d 673) (2010) (counsel's mistaken belief
that Office of Dispute Resolution filed mediation order with clerk, as was its
usual practice, could not prevent dismissal).</span></div>
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<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: center;">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;">END</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
Hugh Woodhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/01021049579391065763noreply@blogger.com1tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2321320695584069696.post-9306049268602489082016-06-04T12:32:00.000-07:002016-07-04T20:35:46.931-07:00How to Extend The Time to File a Caveat (Objection) to a Last Will and Testament<!--[if gte mso 9]><xml>
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<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;"></span><span style="color: black; font-size: large; mso-themecolor: text1;">How to Extend
The Time to File a Caveat (Objection) to a Last Will and Testament.</span></div>
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<span style="color: black; font-size: large; mso-themecolor: text1;"> </span><span style="font-size: large;">
</span></div>
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<span style="color: black; font-size: large; mso-themecolor: text1;"> Or: </span></div>
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<span style="font-size: large;"><br /></span></div>
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<span style="color: black; font-size: large; mso-themecolor: text1;"> How to
Save Your Bacon and Avoid calling your E&O Carrier.</span></div>
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<span style="font-size: large;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEieE9FhhlwPNd9LJ9eAWhuHwYjNiZJWcv_ZYOSXBFtXCEkcL8-g4XKayJINxWwfMQK57LRTYg5y2tutSR28uiXJn1Wow5phqOi20DHRP7JVxMKKSIe-_8DBB34e4DrrbTALG_9SkzTghjt3/s1600/Turn+Back+Time.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="clear: right; float: right; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-left: 1em;"><img border="0" height="224" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEieE9FhhlwPNd9LJ9eAWhuHwYjNiZJWcv_ZYOSXBFtXCEkcL8-g4XKayJINxWwfMQK57LRTYg5y2tutSR28uiXJn1Wow5phqOi20DHRP7JVxMKKSIe-_8DBB34e4DrrbTALG_9SkzTghjt3/s320/Turn+Back+Time.jpg" width="320" /></a></span></div>
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<span style="color: black; font-size: large; mso-themecolor: text1;">Your client calls and has been served with (Form 5) [1] <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>a Petition to Probate a Last Will and
Testament in Solemn Form (Petition).<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>That
call came in two (2) weeks ago.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Two (2)
weeks is not a very long time, but in Georgia probate it is an eternity.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Generally, your client only has 10 days (plus
three (3) days for mail) to file a Caveat or an Objection to the Last Will and
Testament or ---- you client is out of probate court.</span></div>
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<span style="color: black; font-size: large; mso-themecolor: text1;">Don’t panic.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>Unless, the Petition has been sitting on your desk for two (2) weeks
while you were binge drinking in Cancun, Mexico.</span></div>
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<span style="font-size: large;"><b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;">FIRST:</span></b></span></div>
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<span style="font-size: large;"><br /></span></div>
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<span style="color: black; font-size: large; mso-themecolor: text1;">Read the Petition carefully.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>We have had some success in spotting address
errors on the Petition.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Many times the
Petitioner or the Court will cooperate with timing issues, if the Petition
contains errors on its face (and many do).</span></div>
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<span style="font-size: large;"><br /></span></div>
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<span style="color: black; font-size: large; mso-themecolor: text1;">If you are beyond the time and there are no errors, then:</span></div>
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<span style="font-size: large;"><br /></span></div>
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<span style="font-size: large;"><b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;">SECOND:</span></b></span></div>
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<span style="color: black; font-size: large; mso-themecolor: text1;">Move to open default and pay the costs.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>You have the absolute statutory right to open
default for an additional fifteen (15) days.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>For some reason practitioners seem to know this exists for use in the
Superior Courts, but overlook the obvious and simplistic application in the
Probate Courts.</span></div>
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<span style="font-size: large;"><br /></span></div>
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<span style="color: black; font-size: large; mso-themecolor: text1;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>The Georgia Civil Practice Act (CPA) applies to proceedings
in probate court to "under OCGA § 9-11-1; the CPA applies ‘all courts
of record in this state and all actions of a civil nature whether cognizable as
cases at law or in equity, with exceptions as stated in Code § 9-11-81.’<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">Cochran
v. McCollum</i>, 233 Ga. 104, 210 S.E.2d 13 (1974) a probate court is a court
of record.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><i>Id</i>.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Thus, the provisions of the CPA apply in
probate court, except as provided in OCGA § 9-11-81."<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">Greene,
et al. v. Woodard</i>, 198 Ga. App. 427, 401 S.E.2d 617 (1991).<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>[2]</span></div>
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<span style="color: black; font-size: large; mso-themecolor: text1;">OCGA<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>§ 9-11-55 under the Civil Practice Act states as follows:</span></div>
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<span style="font-size: large;"><br /></span></div>
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<span style="font-size: large;"><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;">(a) <span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>When case in default; opening as matter
of right; judgment. If in any case an answer has not been filed within the time
required by this chapter, the case shall automatically become in default unless
the time for filing the answer has been extended as provided by law.</span></i></span></div>
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<span style="font-size: large;"><br /></span></div>
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<span style="font-size: large;"><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;">The default may be
opened as a matter of right by the filing of such defenses within 15 days of
the day of default, upon the payment of costs. If the case is still in default
after the expiration of the period of 15 days, the plaintiff at any time
thereafter shall be entitled to verdict and judgment by default, in open court
or in chambers, as if every item and paragraph of the complaint or other
original pleading were supported by proper evidence, without the intervention
of a jury, unless the action is one ex delicto or involves unliquidated
damages, in which event the plaintiff shall be required to introduce evidence
and establish the amount of damages before the court without a jury, with the
right of the defendant to introduce evidence as to damages and the right of either
to move for a new trial in respect of such damages; provided, however, in the
event a defendant, though in default, has placed damages in issue by filing a
pleading raising such issue, either party shall be entitled, upon demand, to a
jury trial of the issue as to damages.</span></i></span></div>
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<span style="font-size: large;"><br /></span></div>
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<span style="font-size: large;"><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;">An action based upon
open account shall not be considered one for unliquidated damages within the
meaning of this Code section.</span></i></span></div>
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<span style="font-size: large;"><br /></span></div>
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<span style="color: black; font-size: large; mso-themecolor: text1;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>Thus under the procedural aspects to be applied in
probate court, OCGA § 9-11-55 a defendant or respondent can open default as a
matter of right by filing its answer, affirmative defenses and the other
pleadings. Defendant has within 15 days of going into default to open default.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>This can be done as long as there is payment of costs.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>OCGA §
9-11-55(a).<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Costs MUST BE PAID or the opening of default is defective.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span></span></div>
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<span style="font-size: large;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhLNt_lVh7n_2ITWjqaHbdGcU-cQZntluzPWZ3A_QsQ6vhUvaiSOxjdV7SMPrFYZp4P3-bo8-L0zRGOOE-9DaylYjlUmc1nVJcj3a4i_NP5jaKMcGPumeMlhr4PkNwcfwzOhPEIH5GB9Nb8/s1600/Reset+the+Game+Clock+Umpire.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" height="320" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhLNt_lVh7n_2ITWjqaHbdGcU-cQZntluzPWZ3A_QsQ6vhUvaiSOxjdV7SMPrFYZp4P3-bo8-L0zRGOOE-9DaylYjlUmc1nVJcj3a4i_NP5jaKMcGPumeMlhr4PkNwcfwzOhPEIH5GB9Nb8/s320/Reset+the+Game+Clock+Umpire.jpg" width="193" /></a></span></div>
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<span style="font-size: large;"><b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;">THIRD:</span></b></span></div>
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<span style="font-size: large;"><br /></span></div>
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<span style="color: black; font-size: large; mso-themecolor: text1;">If you are beyond twenty five (25) days, it is bad.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>But, all is not lost.</span></div>
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<span style="font-size: large;"><br /></span></div>
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<span style="color: black; font-size: large; mso-themecolor: text1;">File a Motion to Open Default.</span></div>
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<span style="font-size: large;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin: 0in 0.5in;">
<span style="color: black; font-size: large; mso-themecolor: text1;">OCGA § 9-11-55</span></div>
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<span style="font-size: large;"><br /></span></div>
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<span style="font-size: large;"><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;">(b) <span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>Opening default. At any time before
final judgment, the court, in its discretion, upon payment of costs, may allow
the default to be opened for providential cause preventing the filing of
required pleadings or for excusable neglect or where the judge, from all the
facts, shall determine that a proper case has been made for the default to be
opened, on terms to be fixed by the court. In order to allow the default to be
thus opened, the showing shall be made under oath, shall set up a meritorious
defense, shall offer to plead instanter, and shall announce ready to proceed
with the trial.</span></i></span></div>
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<span style="font-size: large;"><br /></span></div>
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<span style="color: black; font-size: large; mso-themecolor: text1;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>Notice that OCGA § 9-11-55, though styled in a
similar fashion to the probate statute, is procedural whereas OCGA § 15-9-47 is
the substantive default statute in probate court.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Default judgments in probate court are governed
by OCGA § 15-9-47 “Default Judgments in Probate Court”.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>That statute states in its entirety: </span></div>
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<span style="font-size: large;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin: 0in 0.5in;">
<span style="font-size: large;"><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;">Notwithstanding any
provisions of Chapter 11 of Title 9, if in any case pending before the probate
court an answer, caveat, or other responsive pleading has not been filed within
the time required by law or by lawful order of the court, the case shall automatically
become in default unless the time for filing the answer, caveat, or other
responsive pleading has been extended as provided by law. The petitioner at any
time thereafter shall be entitled to verdict and judgment by default, in open
court or in chambers, as if every item and paragraph of the petition or other
pleadings filed in the matter were supported by proper evidence. At any time
before final judgment, the court, in its discretion, upon payment of costs, may
allow the default to open for providential cause preventing the filing of
required pleadings or for excusable neglect or where the judge, from all the
facts, shall determine that a proper case has been made for the default to
open, on terms to be fixed by the court. In order for the default to be thus
opened, the showing shall be made under oath, shall set up a meritorious
defense, shall offer to plead instanter, and shall announce ready to proceed
with the hearing in the matter.</span></i></span></div>
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<span style="font-size: large;"><br /></span></div>
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<span style="color: black; font-size: large; mso-themecolor: text1;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>OCGA § 15-9-47 contains the same language in the
Civil Practice Act for opening default for providential cause.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Thus, it is similar to OCGA § 9-11-55(b).<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Before judgment is entered, the probate
court under OCGA 15-9-47 may open default for the same three grounds as stated
in OCGA § 9-11-55(b).<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>They are:<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>(1), providential cause, (2) excusable
neglect – no willful disregard for the timing, and (3) where from a review of
all the facts that judge can determine that a proper case has been made for
opening default. </span></div>
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<span style="font-size: large;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in;">
<span style="color: black; font-size: large; mso-themecolor: text1;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>The defendant or respondent must prove one of the
three elements to open default.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>A proper
case for opening default under the third provision of OCGA § 15-9-47 is that
respondent must (1) show a proper reason that default should be opened (sworn
testimony), (2) the defendant or respondent must be able to make out an
immediate meritorious defense, (3) the respondent must be ready to stand and
defend him or herself instanter, and the respondent must be ready to proceed
immediately to trial.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>By analogy, see, <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">C.W. Matthews Contracting Company vs. Walker</i>,
197 Ga. App. 345, 398 S.W.2d 297 (1990).<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span></span></div>
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<span style="font-size: large;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in;">
<span style="color: black; font-size: large; mso-themecolor: text1;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>The probate court has broad discretion to open
default (assuming the underlying elements are presented to the court) and the
probate court will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">In Re
Estate of Loyd</i>, 328 Ga. App. 287, 761 S.E.2d 833 (2014), [3] citing <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">Simmons v. Harms</i>, 287 Ga. 176, 178, 695
S.E.2d 38 (2010). </span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in;">
<span style="font-size: large;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in;">
<span style="color: black; font-size: large; mso-themecolor: text1;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>It would appear that the court has the power to open
default up to either the entry of a judgment. In <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">In Re the Estate of Loyd</i> at 291, the court found that Ten (10) months
was excessive and there was no abuse of discretion by the probate court to
refuse to open default for the motion being untimely at Ten (10) months.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>By analogy in a non-probate case, the Court
of Appeals found that the 4 months was upheld as untimely.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>See, <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">Evers
v. Money Masters Inc.</i>, 203 Ga. App. 546, 417 S.E.2d 160 (1992).<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Thus, there seems to be some latitude and no
set bright line with regard to when a motion to open default may be considered
by the trial court [in this case, the probate court].<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in;">
<span style="font-size: large;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in;">
<span style="color: black; font-size: large; mso-themecolor: text1;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>So, if you find your client in a situation where the
client missed the 10-day or 13‑day time frame to file a caveat and the client
has missed the 25-day window to open default as a matter of right, don't lose
all hope.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>If you can make out, for your
client, the three opening default provisions as stated in OCGA § 15-9-47,
immediately file a motion to open default.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span></span></div>
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<span style="font-size: large;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in;">
<span style="color: black; font-size: large; mso-themecolor: text1;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>Happy Caveating.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span></span></div>
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<span style="font-size: large;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; font-size: large; mso-themecolor: text1;">Hugh Wood, Esq.<br />Wood & Meredith, LLP<br />3756 LaVista Road<br />Suite 250<br />Atlanta (Tucker), GA 30084<br /><br />www.woodandmeredith.com<br />hwood@woodandmeredith.com<br />www.hughwood.blogspot.com<br />Phone: 404-633-4100<br />Fax: 404-633-0068</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: center;">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;">& & & </span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; font-size: small; mso-themecolor: text1;">Endnotes:</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-size: small;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; font-size: small; mso-themecolor: text1;">[1]</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-size: small;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; font-size: small; mso-themecolor: text1;">Form 5.</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-size: small;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; font-size: small; mso-themecolor: text1;">https://www.scribd.com/doc/314288633/Petition-to-Probate-Will-in-Solemn-Form-Georgia-Probate-Form-5 </span></div>
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</div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; font-size: small; mso-themecolor: text1;">[2]</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-size: small;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in;">
<span style="font-size: small;"><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;">Greene, et al. v. Woodard</span></i><span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;">, 198 Ga. App. 427, 401 S.E.2d 617
(1991).<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span></span></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in;">
<span style="font-size: small;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; font-size: small; mso-themecolor: text1;">BEASLEY,
Judge.</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; font-size: small; mso-themecolor: text1;">Year's
support. Gwinnett Probate Court. Before Judge Meyer.</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; font-size: small; mso-themecolor: text1;">The question
is whether OCGA 9-11-55 (a), a section of the Civil Practice Act regarding the
opening of default judgments, governs an application for year's support and
caveat filed in probate court. We conclude that it does.</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; font-size: small; mso-themecolor: text1;">Virginia
Martin Woodard died testate on April 16, 1990, leaving as her heirs at law her
husband, who is the appellee, and four daughters by a prior marriage, who are
the appellants.</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; font-size: small; mso-themecolor: text1;">On May 4,
1990, the husband applied for year's support in the probate court. The
daughters were served by mail with a copy of the application and a citation ordering
them to show cause by "on or before 10:00 a.m. on the first Monday in June
4th 1990, next, why said application should not be granted."</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; font-size: small; mso-themecolor: text1;">During the
afternoon of June 4, the daughters sought to file a caveat to the application
and a demand for jury trial. The deputy clerk of the probate court informed
their counsel that the caveat was not timely filed. Later that day, counsel
attempted to pay costs and open the default as a matter of right under OCGA
9-11-55 (a). The deputy clerk refused to accept the check.</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; font-size: small; mso-themecolor: text1;">On June 18,
the daughters filed a "notice of opening default" and submitted a
check for costs. The clerk's office allowed this notice to be filed and cashed
the check. Later they filed a request for jury trial.</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; font-size: small; mso-themecolor: text1;">On July 9,
the probate court judge denied the caveat and dismissed the "notice of
opening default." He ruled that the provisions of the CPA relating to the
opening of default judgments under OCGA 9-11-55 (a) do not apply to proceedings
involving applications for year's support, which are governed by Chapter 5 of
OCGA Title 53.</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; font-size: small; mso-themecolor: text1;">Under OCGA
9-11-1, the CPA applies to "all courts of record of this state in all
actions of a civil nature whether cognizable as cases at law or in equity, with
the exceptions stated in Code Section 9-11-81." Cochran v. McCollum, 233
Ga. 104 (210 SE2d 13) (1974). A probate court is a court of record. Id. Thus,
the provisions of the CPA apply in probate court, except as provided in OCGA
9-11-81.</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; font-size: small; mso-themecolor: text1;">OCGA 9-11-81
states that the CPA "shall apply to all special statutory proceedings
except to the extent that specific rules of practice or procedure in conflict
herewith are expressly prescribed by law. . . ." 1 See Kipp v. Rawson, 193
Ga. App. 532, 534 (1) (388 SE2d 409) (1989). At least certain proceedings in
probate court are classifiable as "special statutory proceedings."
See Bragg v. Bragg, 225 Ga. 494 (170 SE2d 29) (1969); OCGA 15-9-122. Thus,
provisions of the CPA apply in probate court proceedings, unless there are
special rules of practice or procedure which are conflicting and which have
been expressly prescribed by law. See Howell v. Tidwell, 256 Ga. 647 (352 SE2d
372) (1987); Kipp v. Rawson, supra; Leathers v. Gilland, 141 Ga. App. 681, 683
(1, 2) (234 SE2d 336) (1977).</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; font-size: small; mso-themecolor: text1;">Rule 13 of
the Uniform Rules for the Probate Courts is expressly applicable to default
judgments and provides: "The party seeking entry of a default judgment in
any action shall certify to the court the date and type of service effected as
shown by court records and that there has been no defensive pleading from the
party against whom the judgment is sought. This certificate shall be in writing
and must be attached to the proposed default judgment when presented to the
judge for signature." 254 Ga. 811, 829 (1985). There is no conflict
between this rule and OCGA 9-11-55 (a).</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; font-size: small; mso-themecolor: text1;">Statutory
provisions concerning probate courts are contained in Chapter 9 of OCGA Title
15. By its terms, Article 6 of Chapter 9, OCGA 15-9-120 through 15-9-127,
applies to jury trials and appeals. Article 6 was amended by 6 of a 1986 Act generally
applicable to probate courts in counties having a population of more than
150,000 persons. Ga. L. 1986, pp. 982, 985-987. However, under a 1988 amendment
to OCGA 15-9-120 (2), Article 6 applies to probate courts in counties having a
population of more than 100,000 persons. OCGA 15-9-122 states: "Unless
provided to the contrary by Code Section 9-11-81, the general laws and rules of
practice, pleading, procedure, and evidence which are applicable to the
superior courts of this state shall be applicable to and govern civil cases in
the probate courts." Thus, OCGA 15-9-122 complements OCGA 9-11-81.</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; font-size: small; mso-themecolor: text1;">The statutory
provisions concerning year's support proceedings, which are contained in OCGA
53-5-1 through 53-5-21, do not address default judgments.</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; font-size: small; mso-themecolor: text1;">Consequently,
appellants were entitled to open their default as a matter of right under OCGA
9-11-55 (a) by filing defenses within 15 days of the day of default, upon
payment of costs.</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; font-size: small; mso-themecolor: text1;">Fred W.
Minter, for appellee.</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; font-size: small; mso-themecolor: text1;">Notes</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; font-size: small; mso-themecolor: text1;">1<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>It might be argued that the provisions of the
CPA relating to the opening of default judgments concern "relief from
judgments" and "the effect of judgments," and, therefore, OCGA
9-11-55, insofar as it governs the opening of default judgments, is expressly
made applicable to probate court proceedings by OCGA 9-11-81. This argument has
not been advanced here.</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; font-size: small; mso-themecolor: text1;">Schreeder,
Wheeler & Flint, David Flint, Timothy C. Batten, for appellants.</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; font-size: small; mso-themecolor: text1;">DECIDED
JANUARY 31, 1991.</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-size: small;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; font-size: small; mso-themecolor: text1;">[3]</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-size: small;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-size: small;"><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;">In Re Estate of Loyd</span></i><span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;">, 328 Ga. App. 287, 761 S.E.2d 833
(2014).</span></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; font-size: small; mso-themecolor: text1;">Opinion</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; font-size: small; mso-themecolor: text1;">MILLER,
Judge.</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; font-size: small; mso-themecolor: text1;">*287 In March
2012, Charles Bentley Childs, Sr., as executor, filed a petition to probate
Virginia Childs Loyd's last will and testament, as well as her codicil to the
will. Loyd's nephew, Jack Childs, filed an untimely caveat, objecting to the
petition on the ground of undue influence. Charles moved to dismiss the untimely
caveat, and Jack responded with a motion to open default pursuant to OCGA §§
15–9–47 and 9–11–55(b). The trial court granted Charles's motion to dismiss,
and Jack appeals, contending that the trial court erred in dismissing *288 his
caveat as untimely, failing to grant him an extension to file a caveat and
denying his motion to open default. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; font-size: small; mso-themecolor: text1;">1. Before
turning to the merits of Jack's appeal, we must first examine this Court's
jurisdiction over this appeal.</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; font-size: small; mso-themecolor: text1;">It is the
duty of this Court on its own motion to inquire into its jurisdiction. The
Constitution of the State of Georgia of 1983, Article VI, Section VI, Paragraph
III(3), confers upon the Supreme Court of Georgia jurisdiction in all cases
involving wills. The Supreme Court of Georgia has interpreted this language to
mean only those cases where the validity or construction of a will is the main
issue on appeal.</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; font-size: small; mso-themecolor: text1;">(Citations
and punctuation omitted.) In re Estate of Farkas, 325 Ga.App. 477, 478(1), 753
S.E.2d 137 (2013). Here, the issues on appeal concern the timeliness of the
caveat and whether Jack was entitled to open default. Since the issues do not
concern the validity or construction of the will or codicil, we have
jurisdiction over the appeal. Id.</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; font-size: small; mso-themecolor: text1;">2. Jack first
contends that the trial court erred in dismissing his caveat as untimely. We
disagree.</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; font-size: small; mso-themecolor: text1;">OCGA §
15–9–47 provides for automatic default in pending probate court proceedings if
an answer, caveat, or other responsive pleading has not been filed within the
time required by law or by lawful order of the court. Nevertheless, at any time
before final judgment, the probate court, in its discretion, and upon payment
of costs may allow the default to open for providential cause preventing the
filing of required pleadings or for excusable neglect or where the judge, from
all the facts, shall determine that a proper case has been made for the default
to open, on terms to be fixed by the court. In order for the default to be thus
opened, the showing shall be made under oath, shall set up a meritorious
defense, shall offer to plead instanter, and shall announce ready to proceed
with the hearing in the matter.</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; font-size: small; mso-themecolor: text1;">OCGA §
15–9–47. We will not disturb the probate court's ruling on a motion to open
default, absent an abuse of discretion. See Simmons v. Harms, 287 Ga. 176,
178(1), 695 S.E.2d 38 (2010) (probate court has discretion with regard to
motions to open default under OCGA § 15–9–47).</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; font-size: small; mso-themecolor: text1;">So viewed,
the record shows that Loyd executed her will in 1996, devising her property in
equal shares to her sisters, Doris Richwine *289 and Eugenia Pitts, her
brothers, Charles and Mobley Childs, and her nephew, Jack Childs. The will also
named Jack as Loyd's personal representative. In October 2004, Loyd executed a
codicil to her will, in which she appointed Charles as her personal
representative to administer the will. In the codicil, Loyd also specifically
provided that “it is my wish and desire that my nephew, Jack D. Childs, not
inherit under any paragraph or provision of my Will.”</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; font-size: small; mso-themecolor: text1;">Loyd died on
December 24, 2011. Thereafter, on March 30, 2012, Charles filed a petition to
probate the will and codicil. On April 3, 2012, the probate court entered an
**835 order requiring personal service on two of Virginia's nephews who resided
in Georgia—Dr. Samuel Richwine and Joseph Richwine. The order also required
service by registered or certified mail on Virginia's sister Eugenia Pitts, and
her nephews, Jack Childs and David Richwine, who all lived out of state. That
same day, the probate court also entered an order requiring Jack, David and
Eugenia to file any objections to the petition within 13 days or within 10 days
from the date of receipt as shown on the certified or registered mail return
receipt.</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; font-size: small; mso-themecolor: text1;">A copy of the
petition to probate was sent by certified mail to Jack at his residential
address in Carlsbad, California. On April 9, 2012, the copy was delivered to
Jack's residence and was signed for by his wife, Barbara. Thereafter, on April
23, 2012, Jack filed a caveat and objection to the petition to probate,
contending that the 2004 codicil was “fraudulently procured through undue
influence.”</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; font-size: small; mso-themecolor: text1;">On January
17, 2013, Charles filed a motion pursuant to OCGA § 53–11–10 to dismiss Jack's
caveat as untimely filed. On February 19, 2013, Jack responded to the motion to
dismiss, and filed a separate motion to open default for failing to file a
timely caveat.</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; font-size: small; mso-themecolor: text1;">Jack attached
an affidavit to his motion to open default, averring that he was away from his
residence on an overseas business trip from April 7 through April 18, 2012.
Jack further averred that he had no actual notice of the petition to probate
until he examined his mail on April 19, 2012, and he filed his caveat as soon
as he was able to on April 23, 2012.</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; font-size: small; mso-themecolor: text1;">The probate
court subsequently granted Charles's motion to dismiss Jack's caveat, finding
that the deadline for Jack to file an objection to the petition to probate was
April 19, 2012 (ten days from the April 9 date shown on the certified mail
return receipt), and Jack did not move to open default during the 15 days in
which he could have opened default as a matter of right. The probate court
further found that Jack was aware of the timeliness issue because Charles
included language in his responses to Jack's discovery requests about not waiving
the right to raise and challenge the timeliness of the caveat. Finally, the
probate court found that Jack failed to explain *290 why he waited more than
ten months before filing his motion to open default, and he failed to show
excusable neglect, providential cause or a proper case to open default.</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; font-size: small; mso-themecolor: text1;">Contrary to
Jack's contention, the trial court did not err in dismissing his caveat as
untimely.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The nature of the probate
court's discretion regarding the timing of responses to petitions to probate
... is statutory. OCGA § 53–11–5 provides, in relevant part: The probate judge
may extend the time to respond with respect to any proceedings covered by this
chapter as the judge may determine to be proper in the interests of due process
and reasonable opportunity for any party or interest to be heard. OCGA §
53–11–10(a) further states: Except as otherwise prescribed by law or directed
by the judge pursuant to Code Section 53–11–5 with respect to any particular
proceeding, the date on or before which any objection is required to be filed
shall be not less than ten days after the date the person is personally served.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>(Punctuation omitted.) English v. Ricart, 280
Ga. 215, 216(1), 626 S.E.2d 475 (2006). Here, in accordance with OCGA §
53–11–10(a), the probate court's order required Jack to file his objection to
the petition to probate no more than 13 days from the April 3, 2012 date of
mailing of the notice or within 10 days from the April 9, 2012 date of receipt
of notice as shown on the certified mail return receipt.</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; font-size: small; mso-themecolor: text1;">Jack admits
that he was a resident of the State of California when the notice of the
probate court's order was received at his residence by certified mail on April
9, 2012. Jack nevertheless argues that the trial court should have allowed him
30 days to file his caveat because he was temporarily out of the country on a
business trip.</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; font-size: small; mso-themecolor: text1;">Although OCGA
§ 53–11–10(a) provides for a 30–day objection period for persons who are
outside the continental United States, the only reasonable interpretation of that
statute is one in which the extended 30– **836 day objection period applies to
persons residing outside the continental United States. There is no dispute
that Jack was served within the continental United States. Moreover, this Court
has previously upheld service on a defendant at his residence by handing a copy
to the defendant's wife, even though the defendant was temporarily working
outside the country. See Goldberg v. Painter, 128 Ga.App. 214, 196 S.E.2d 157
(1973). Jack cites to no authority, and we have found none, providing that his
temporary absence from his California residence entitled him to additional time
to file his caveat. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in dismissing
Jack's caveat as untimely filed.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>*291 3.
Jack also contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to open
default. We discern no error.</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; font-size: small; mso-themecolor: text1;">Pursuant to
OCGA § 15–9–47, the probate court had discretion to open default for
providential cause or excusable neglect prior to admitting the will and codicil
to probate. In reviewing the probate court's decision on a motion to open
default, “we must determine whether all the conditions set forth in OCGA §
[15–9–47] have been met and, if so, whether the [probate court] abused its
discretion based on the facts peculiar to [this] case.” (Citation and
punctuation omitted.) Vibratech, Inc. v. Frost, 291 Ga.App. 133, 144(2), 661
S.E.2d 185 (2008).</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; font-size: small; mso-themecolor: text1;">[T]his Court
has recognized a number of factors for determining whether opening default
would be appropriate in a particular case, including: whether and how the
opposing party will be prejudiced by opening the default; whether the opposing
party elected not to raise the default issue until after the time under OCGA §
9–11–55(a) had expired for the defaulting party to open default as a matter of
right; and whether the defaulting party acted promptly to open the default[.]
... Further, any additional delay occasioned by a failure to file promptly for
opening default upon its discovery can be considered in determining whether [the
defaulting party's] neglect was excusable.</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; font-size: small; mso-themecolor: text1;">(Citation
omitted.) Vibratech, supra, 291 Ga.App. at 145(2), 661 S.E.2d 185.</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; font-size: small; mso-themecolor: text1;">Here, it is
undisputed that Jack did not move to open the automatic default as a matter of
right within the 15 days provided under OCGA § 9–11–55. Moreover, the record
shows that Jack waited more than ten months, until February 19, 2013, to move
to open the default, even though he had notice at least as early as November
2012 that Charles had reserved the right to raise and challenge the timeliness
of Jack's caveat.1 Finally, as the trial court found in its order denying
Jack's motion to open default, Jack failed to provide a reasonable excuse for
the delay in filing his motion to open default, particularly after he had
notice that Charles might challenge the timeliness of the caveat. Accordingly,
Jack cannot show that the probate court abused its discretion in denying his
motion to open default. See Vibratech, supra, 291 Ga.App. at 146(2), 661 S.E.2d
185.</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; font-size: small; mso-themecolor: text1;">*292 4. In
light of our holding in Divisions 2 and 3 above, we need not address Jack's
additional enumeration of error.</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; font-size: small; mso-themecolor: text1;">Judgment
affirmed.</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; font-size: small; mso-themecolor: text1;">DOYLE, P.J.,
and DILLARD, J., concur.</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; font-size: small; mso-themecolor: text1;">All Citations</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; font-size: small; mso-themecolor: text1;">328 Ga.App.
287, 761 S.E.2d 833</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="color: black; font-size: small; mso-themecolor: text1;">Footnotes</span></div>
<div class="MsoListParagraph" style="mso-list: l0 level1 lfo1; text-indent: -.25in;">
<span style="color: black; font-size: small; mso-bidi-font-family: Calibri; mso-bidi-theme-font: minor-latin; mso-themecolor: text1;"><span style="mso-list: Ignore;">1.<span style="font-family: "times new roman"; font-stretch: normal; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span></span><span style="color: black; font-size: small; mso-themecolor: text1;">Jack
argues that Charles buried the statement regarding the reservation of his right
to raise and challenge the timeliness of the caveat in prefatory language to
his discovery responses. Our review of these discovery responses, however,
shows that the reservation of rights was clearly and expressly set out on the
first page of each responsive pleading.</span></div>
<div class="MsoListParagraph" style="mso-list: l0 level1 lfo1; text-indent: -.25in;">
<span style="font-size: small;"><br /></span></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: center;">
<span style="color: black; font-size: small; mso-themecolor: text1;">END</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
Hugh Woodhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/01021049579391065763noreply@blogger.com1tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2321320695584069696.post-690805058089059332016-05-30T13:42:00.000-07:002016-05-30T13:42:39.034-07:00How to File a Caveat (Objection) to a Last Will and TestamentHow to File a Caveat (Objection) to a Last Will and Testament.<br />
<br />
You spent the last four (4) years of your life taking care of your dear father. He passed away and the funeral is over. Now you are putting your life in order without your dad. Your mom passed away some years ago and everything in your mom's estate passed to your father. <br />
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Your father was a wonderful man. He always told you everything in his estate would be yours when he passed away. <br />
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Well, not so fast. <br />
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You just got served with a Last Will and Testament [1] that leaves everything to your father's mistress. <br />
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<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEizzBX-DeSEDjQfXA9hJjxZ1oIp60osNR9Do6ZvffJQiiP4EpBN15HnYbcc9kCHv3BNPyCd_o5Tpf3won9DAjPIpEUDabT79VBYn26gHqMjyrZTl4wy3kMzhdg_yx3jyIfHqN9aup1JGKht/s1600/Fathers+Mistress+1.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" height="231" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEizzBX-DeSEDjQfXA9hJjxZ1oIp60osNR9Do6ZvffJQiiP4EpBN15HnYbcc9kCHv3BNPyCd_o5Tpf3won9DAjPIpEUDabT79VBYn26gHqMjyrZTl4wy3kMzhdg_yx3jyIfHqN9aup1JGKht/s320/Fathers+Mistress+1.jpg" width="320" /></a></div>
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You thought the mistress was history and he had grown out of that phase of life. Well like all estate secrets, we guess not.<br />
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What can you do?<br />
<br />
You can file a formal caveat or objection to the Last Will and Testament offered by the mistress for Probate. <br />
<br />
So how do you do it? The caveat is a pleading that is filed in opposition and response to a Petition to Probate in Solemn Form. [3] <br />
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You can write your own, or copy portions from a Form we have prepared. [4] <br />
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In Georgia, you must move with speed. You only have ten (10) days to file a caveat (an objection). [5] However, there are certain methods by which you can extend the ten (10) days to caveat, but they are beyond the scope of this blog post.<br />
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The types of objections that you can assert in your caveat (other than dad must have been out of his mind leaving it to the mistress) are:<br />
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<div style="text-align: center;">
& & & </div>
<br />
<div style="text-align: left;">
The Will was not attested correctly according to law; that is, one of the required witnesses is missing or that witness was not qualified to witness the will in question; <br />The formalities of the Will were not followed;<br />The document propounded is not a Last Will and Testament (is may be missing necessary language);<br />One or more of the witnesses was incompetent at the time the Will was witnessed (this may also disqualify the self-proving affidavit, if one is presented for Probate);<br />The Testator was unduly influenced to make the Will propounded;<br />The Testator was unduly influenced to insert certain bequest and/or legacies in the Will, which were not the intent of the Testator;<br />The Testator was incompetent to make a Will at the time it was attested;<br />The Testator was insane or incompetent at the time he or she signed it;<br />The Testator was so weak and infirm that the Testator could not have known what was in the Will at the time he or she signed it;<br />The Testator was an accomplished physician/or CEO/or skilled musician (or whatever) and the shaky and illegible signature shows that the Testator did not know what he or she was signing at the time it was attested;<br />The will was revoked by tearing or burning or was revoked by a will that was executed AFTER the date of the propounded Will and thus the propounded Will is not the final Last Will and Testament of the Testator.</div>
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<div style="text-align: center;">
& & &</div>
<div style="text-align: center;">
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<div style="text-align: left;">
Happy Caveating.</div>
<div style="text-align: left;">
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<div style="text-align: left;">
If we can help you with the assembly of a Caveat or other probate document, please give us a call.</div>
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<br /></div>
<div style="text-align: left;">
Hugh C. Wood, Esq.<br />Wood & Meredith, LLP<br />3756 LaVista Road<br />Suite 250<br />Atlanta (Tucker), GA 30084<br /><br />hwood@woodandmeredith.com<br />www.hughwood.blogspot.com<br />Phone: 404-633-4100<br />Cell: 678-516-8289<br />Fax: 404-633-0068</div>
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<br />
<br />
&&&&&<br />
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<br />
<br />
[1]<br />
<br />
You were served with a Petition to Probate in Solemn Form. That Form can be found at the Probate Judges' Official site or here:<br />
<br />
<a href="https://www.scribd.com/doc/314288633/Petition-to-Probate-Will-in-Solemn-Form-Georgia-Probate-Form-5">https://www.scribd.com/doc/314288633/Petition-to-Probate-Will-in-Solemn-Form-Georgia-Probate-Form-5</a><br />
<br />
[2]<br />
<br />
Story and photo from British ITV.<br />
Jeremy Kyle exploded with rage at three women after they discovered on TV that they were half-sisters. Hazel, 18, found out Danielle and Katie's late father Ronald was also her dad for the first time in 18 years when Jeremy read out DNA results on The Jeremy Kyle Show.<br />After hearing that Hazel was definitely her half-sister, Danielle reacted with fury and shouted at her half-sibling: "Jump off a cliff." Watch Jeremy Kyle explode with rage and give chase backstage as guests run off: ''It's all BS'' 4 Aug 2015 By James Leyfield.<br />
<br />
[3]<br />
<br />
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Filing a Caveat to a Will</div>
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<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
Hinkel, Daniel F. , Ga. Probate & Administration § 4:1
(4th ed.)(2015)</div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
Georgia Probate and Administration with Forms</div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
Chapter 4. Caveat to Probate</div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
§ 4:1. Definition</div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
A caveat is a written objection to the probate of a will
filed with the probate court citing the grounds for objection.1 The only issue
is devisavit vel non (will or no will) — whether the propounded paper is or is
not the last will and testament of the deceased. There are only three questions
for consideration: (1) Was the document properly executed? (2) Did the testator
have mental capacity to execute the document? (3) Was there undue influence,
fraud, or mistake in the execution of the document? It is not a ground for
caveat to the probate of a will that a devise to a particular person may be
void or uncertain.2</div>
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To have standing to caveat a will, a person must have a
sufficient interest in the estate so that he or she will be injured by the
probate of the will or will benefit if the will is not being probated.3 For
example, beneficiaries in a first will, though not heirs-at-law, would have
standing to caveat a later will.</div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
1</div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
O.C.G.A. § 15-9-88.</div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
It is not necessary that an executor be appointed prior to
the court's consideration of the merits of a caveat. See In re Estate of
Farquharson, 244 Ga. App. 632, 535 S.E.2d 774 (2000). Evidence showed that
medical guardianship form was not intended as a will. Candies v. Hulsey, 277
Ga. 630, 593 S.E.2d 353 (2004). See O.C.G.A. § 53-4-68 regarding in terrorem
clauses that disinherit a will contestant. Cox v. Fowler, 279 Ga. 501, 614
S.E.2d 59 (2005). A caveat may be amended up to the time evidence is taken at
trial where there is no pre-trial order. Henderson v. Henderson, 281 Ga. 553,
640 S.E.2d 254 (2007).</div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
A caveator of a will who signed a letter of assent
consenting to the probate of the will in solemn form is precluded from
asserting that the will was invalid due to the testatrix's mental capacity. In
re Estate of Brice, 288 Ga. App. 449, 654 S.E.2d 420 (2007).</div>
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It was proper for a probate court to dismiss a will caveat
without a hearing. The pleadings affirmatively established that the caveat was
fatally defective. In re Estate of Brice, 288 Ga. App. 449, 654 S.E.2d 420
(2007).</div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
The Court of Appeals affirmed a probate court's holding the
caveators' attorney's fees are to be paid by the estate when it was alleged the
estate benefited from his services. In re Estate of Boss, 293 Ga. App. 769, 668
S.E.2d 283 (2008). The court in its decision, does not actually rule the
caveators' attorney's fees should be paid from the estate but instead allowed
the probate order to stand because the appellant failed to preserve the
argument in a properly filed cross-appeal.</div>
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An estate cannot recover attorney's fees, incurred in a
prior appeal of litigation regarding a will contest, in a second action against
the executor for malfeasance. Only attorney fees and expenses incurred in
prosecuting the second action could be recovered. In re Estate of Tapley, 312
Ga. App. 234, 718 S.E.2d 92 (2011).</div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
Caveators of a will are not collaterally estopped to assert
incapacity and undue influence because the Court of Appeals had already decided
such issues adversely to them in an action involving a guardianship of the
testator (Copelan I). Establishing a guardianship requires clear and convincing
proof. The burden in the case presently brought by the caveators to prove lack
of testamentary capacity and undue influence is only a preponderance of the
evidence, a less demanding burden than the one considered by the Court of
Appeals in Copelan I. The failure to prove something by a higher standard will
not work as collateral estoppel in a subsequent case in which the same thing
need only be proven by a lower standard. Copelan v. Copelan, 294 Ga. 840, 755
S.E.2d 739 (2014).</div>
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O.C.G.A. § 53-11-10(a) provides for a 30-day objection
period to file a caveat for persons who are outside the continental United States.
The only reasonable interpretation of this statute is one in which the extended
30-day objection period applies to persons residing outside the continental
United States, not a person who resides within the continental United States
but was traveling out of the country on business at the time service was made
on him at his residence by handing a copy of the probate court's order to the
defendant's wife. In re Estate of Loyd, 328 Ga. App. 287, 761 S.E.2d 833
(2014).</div>
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2</div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
In re Estate of Corbitt, 265 Ga. 110, 454 S.E.2d 129 (1995);
Reid v. Wilson, 208 Ga. 235, 65 S.E.2d 913 (1951); Shaw v. Fehn, 196 Ga. 661,
27 S.E.2d 406 (1943). See also Garrett v. Morton, 265 Ga. 394, 458 S.E.2d 618
(1995).</div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
3</div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
Lavender v. Wilkins, 237 Ga. 510, 512, 228 S.E.2d 888, 92
A.L.R.3d 1236 (1976).</div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
Appellant was estopped from asserting that a will was not
properly witnessed inasmuch as he acknowledged service and consented to the
immediate probate of the will with full knowledge of its contents and the
circumstances surrounding its execution. Clark v. Clark, 265 Ga. 434, 457
S.E.2d 564 (1995). See also Morgan v. Johns, 276 Ga. App. 366, 623 S.E.2d 219
(2005), judgment rev'd, 281 Ga. 51, 635 S.E.2d 753 (2006) and judgment vacated,
282 Ga. App. 724, 639 S.E.2d 419 (2006); Morgan v. Johns, 282 Ga. App. 724, 639
S.E.2d 419 (2006); In re Estate of Brice, 288 Ga. App. 449, 654 S.E.2d 420
(2007); Smith v. Wyatt, 282 Ga. 902, 655 S.E.2d 581 (2008).</div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
An executor of a will who is also the trustee of a
testamentary trust created under the will has standing in his capacity as
trustee of the testamentary marital trust to file a caveat to a codicil of the
will which alters the allocation of property without increasing the share
devised to the trust. Melican v. Parker, 283 Ga. 253, 657 S.E.2d 234 (2008).</div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
A caveator who benefited by the probate of a will and was
not harmed by its probate lacks standing to allege the decedent lacked
testamentary capacity and that the will was a product of undue influence.
Norman v. Gober, 288 Ga. 754, 707 S.E.2d 98 (2011).</div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
A caveat contesting the validity of a will brought by a
person who lacked standing is an initiation of a legal proceeding that may
trigger the in terrorem clause in the will and might, under some circumstances,
be attributed to a party other than the caveator. Norman v. Gober, 292 Ga. 351,
737 S.E.2d 309 (2013).</div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
A grantee of a deed from the testator, which might have been
cancelled in the event the testator's will was upheld as valid, has sufficient
interest in the proceeding to have standing to caveat the probate of the will.
Odom v. Hughes, 293 Ga. 447, 748 S.E.2d 839 (2013).</div>
<br /><br />
[4]<br />
<br />
Caveat Form <br />
<br />
<a href="https://www.scribd.com/doc/314290989/Caveat-to-a-Last-Will-and-Testament-Georgia">https://www.scribd.com/doc/314290989/Caveat-to-a-Last-Will-and-Testament-Georgia</a><br />
<br />
[5]<br />
<br />
<i>In re Estate of Loyd</i>, 328 Ga.App. 287, 761 S.E.2d 833, 835 (2014).<br />
<br />
<br />Hugh Woodhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/01021049579391065763noreply@blogger.com1tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2321320695584069696.post-15921253964704882662016-05-18T21:43:00.000-07:002016-05-18T21:43:20.393-07:00Georgia :: Sheriff's Sale Price Found to be FMV for Ad Valorem County Price - overruling County BOEMay 18, 2016<br />
<br />
In a physical precedent only case [1] , Georgia Court of Appeals Rule 33, the Court of Appeals allowed the reduction in value from $137,700.00 to $25,000.00. That is almost an 82% reduction in value and companion reduction in the taxes due the County on the property. The Court of Appeals cut through OCGA § 48-5-2 [2] and found that a Sheriff's Sale that only returned $25,000.00 on the courthouse steps in cash constitued an "arm's length, bona fide" [sale] transaction. <br />
<br />
Our firm has never evaluated such a sale as Fair Market Value (FMV) price and this opinion provides a new weapon against counties in the ongoing (never ending actually) [3] battle against rising real estate property taxes. <br />
<br />
Hugh Wood, Esq.<br />Wood & Meredith, LLP<br />3756 LaVista Road<br />Suite 250<br />Atlanta (Tucker), GA 30084<br />www.woodandmeredith.com<br />hwood@woodandmeredith.com<br />www.hughwood.blogspot.com<br />Phone: 404-633-4100<br />Cell: 404-449-9041<br />Fax: 404-633-0068<br />
<br />[1]<br />
<br />
783 S.E.2d 453<br />Court of Appeals of Georgia.<br />PARK SOLUTIONS, LLC<br />v.<br />DEKALB COUNTY BOARD OF TAX ASSESSORS.<br />No. A15A2136.<br />March 23, 2016.Reconsideration Denied April 14, 2016.<br />Synopsis<br />Background:
Judicial foreclosure sale purchaser appealed decision of county board
of equalization (BOE) that upheld assessor's valuation of real property.
The Superior Court, DeKalb County affirmed. Purchaser appealed.<br />Holding:
The Court of Appeals, McFadden, J., held that judicial foreclosure sale
qualified as an “arm's length, bona fide sale” for purposes of statute
providing one-year freeze of ad valorem tax value of property.<br />Reversed.<br />Dillard, J., concurred in judgment only and filed statement.<br /><br />Attorneys and Law Firms<br />*453 C. Terry Blanton, for Appellant.<br />Jermaine Anthony Walker, Decatur, Laura Karen Johnson, Mark A. Thompson, Shaheem Malik Williams, for Appellee.<br />Opinion<br />McFADDEN, Judge.<br />The
issue in this appeal is whether a sheriff's sale of certain real
property was an “arm's length, bona fide” sale under OCGA § 48–5–2(3) so
that the sale price constituted the property's maximum allowable fair
market value for the next taxable year. Because *454 we find that the
sheriff's sale was such an arm's length, bona fide sale, the superior
court's ruling to the contrary was erroneous and must be reversed.<br />On
June 4, 2013, Park Solutions, LLC bought a tract of land for $25,000 at
a sheriff's sale in DeKalb County. The sheriff's deed provided that
Mollye Devault and Robert Christopher Taylor were the owners of the
property; that the owners made the deed by and through the DeKalb County
sheriff, acting in his official capacity; that the sheriff conducted
the sale to satisfy a default judgment of $37,796 obtained by DRST
Holdings LTD; that the sale was held “at the usual place for conducting
[s]heriff's sales in DeKalb [C]ounty before the [c]ourthouse door;” and
that Park Solutions was the highest bidder at the “public outcry.”<br />After
the sale, the county appraised the value of the property as $146,900
for the 2014 tax year, and Park Solutions appealed that valuation to the
DeKalb County Board of Tax Assessors. The board of tax assessors issued
a decision finding that the fair market value of the property was
$137,700. Park Solutions appealed that decision to the DeKalb County
Board of Equalization, which upheld the county tax assessor's fair
market value finding of the property as $137,700. Park Solutions then
appealed to the superior court, asserting that pursuant to OCGA §
48–5–2(3), the maximum allowable fair market value of the property for
the 2014 tax year was the $25,000 price that it had paid at the
sheriff's sale. The trial court rejected the argument, finding that the
sheriff's sale was not an arm's length, bona fide sale under that
statute because such “judicial foreclosure sales are not mentioned in
the statute and also the parties to the sale are related and
affiliated.” The trial court concluded that the county had accurately
determined the fair market value of the property as of January 1, 2014,
to be $137,700. Park Solutions appeals from the superior court's final
order.<br />1. Sheriff's sale.<br />1<br />Park Solutions asserts that the
trial court erred in finding that the sheriff's sale in this case was
not governed by OCGA § 48–5–2(3) because such judicial foreclosure sales
are not mentioned in the statute. We agree with the assertion.<br />OCGA § 48–5–2(3), which is part of the code governing ad valorem taxation of property, provides, in pertinent part:<br /><br />
“Fair market value of property” means the amount a knowledgeable buyer
would pay for the property and a willing seller would accept for the
property at an arm's length, bona fide sale.... Notwithstanding any
other provision of this chapter to the contrary, the transaction amount
of the most recent arm's length, bona fide sale in any year shall be the
maximum allowable fair market value for the next taxable year.<br /><br />The
term “arm's length, bona fide” sale as used in this code section is
defined as “mean[ing] a transaction which has occurred in good faith
without fraud or deceit carried out by unrelated or unaffiliated
parties, as by a willing buyer and a willing seller, each acting in his
or her own self-interest, including but not limited to a distress sale,
short sale, bank sale, or sale at public auction.” OCGA § 48–5–2(.1)
(emphasis supplied).<br />Thus, OCGA § 48–5–2(3) “provides the method for
assessing [fair market] value as of [January 1 of the applicable tax
year] ..., with its focus on the actual market-determined value of
property on the actual date the property was acquired, rather than its
value as much as a year later[.]” Columbus Bd. of Tax Assessors v.
Yeoman, 293 Ga. 107, 109(2), 744 S.E.2d 18 (2013). “This amounts to a
freeze on the ad valorem tax value of property for one year. [Cit.]”
Ballard v. Newton County Bd. of Tax Assessors, 332 Ga.App. 521, 522, 773
S.E.2d 780 (2015).<br />In finding that this freeze on the value of the
property did not apply to the sheriff's sale in this case, the trial
court relied on OCGA § 48–5–1, which provides that “[t]he intent and
purpose of the tax laws of this state are to have all property and
subjects of taxation returned at the value which would be realized from
the cash sale, but not the forced sale, of the property and subjects as
such property and subjects are usually sold except as otherwise provided
in this chapter.” (Emphasis supplied.) The trial court *455 then
reasoned that foreclosure sales are considered to be forced sales and
therefore “[r]eading [OCGA] § 48–5–2(.1) to include judicial foreclosure
sales would be contrary to the expressed intent of Title 48 to exclude
values realized as a result of the forced sale of a property.”<br />2<br />However,
the trial court overlooked the plain language in OCGA § 48–5–1
providing that it applies “except as otherwise provided in this
chapter.” Likewise, the controlling portion of OCGA § 48–5–2(3) itself
expressly provides that it applies “[n]otwithstanding any other
provision of this chapter to the contrary[.]” We must construe these
statutes together and harmonize them to ascertain the legislative
intent. Aimwell, Inc. v. McLendon Enterprises, 318 Ga.App. 394, 397(1),
734 S.E.2d 84 (2012). In so doing, even if we assume, without deciding,
that there is some inconsistency between them, it is apparent from the
plain language of both code sections that, notwithstanding anything to
the contrary, the legislative intent was to allow the specific provision
of a one-year freeze on ad valorem tax value set forth in OCGA §
48–5–2(3) to control over the general expression of purpose set forth in
OCGA § 48–5–1. See Hubert Properties, LLP v. Cobb County, 318 Ga.App.
321, 323(1), 733 S.E.2d 373 (2012) (specific statute will prevail over a
general statute to resolve any inconsistency between them).<br />Moreover,
the trial court also erred in concluding that the absence of the term
“foreclosure sale” from OCGA § 48–5–2(.1) indicates that such sales were
excluded by the legislature from that code section's definition of an
arm's length, bona fide sale. As recited above, OCGA § 48–5–2(.1)
defines an arm's length, bona fide sale as “including but not limited to
a distress sale, short sale, bank sale, or sale at public auction.”
(Emphasis supplied.) Contrary to the trial court's interpretation of
this code section, the legislature's use of the phrase “including but
not limited to” is not restrictive or exclusive, and instead “reflects
broad language of illustration or enlargement. [Cit.]” Hendry v. Hendry,
292 Ga. 1, 2(1), n. 2, 734 S.E.2d 46 (2012).<br />Indeed, two of the
examples of the types of sales expressly included in the definition of
an arm's length, bona fide sale set forth in OCGA § 48–5–2(.1)—distress
sales and public auctions—clearly include the foreclosure sale executed
by the sheriff in this case. “The statute does not define the ... terms
[‘distress sale’ or ‘public auction,’] and we therefore look to their
plain and ordinary meanings as defined by dictionaries.” Skelhorn v.
State, 332 Ga.App. 782, 787(3)(b), 773 S.E.2d 45 (2015) (citation and
punctuation omitted). Black's Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014), defines
the term “distress sale” as “[a] form of liquidation in which the seller
receives less for the goods than what would be received under normal
sales conditions,” and as a “foreclosure ... sale.” Under this ordinary
meaning of the phrase, the sheriff's foreclosure sale in this case was a
distress sale as contemplated by the statute.<br />Furthermore, Black's
Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014) defines the word “auction” as being “[a]
public sale of property to the highest bidder,” and it defines the term
“public sale” as meaning “[a] sale made after public notice, as in an
auction or sheriff's sale.” Consistent with this dictionary definition,
another statute in our official code provides that “the term ‘public
sale’ means any sale, the notice of which must by law in any manner be
given to the public.” OCGA § 9–13–160(a). Thus, under these definitions,
the sheriff's sale in this case was a public auction at which Park
Solutions was the high bidder.<br />“OCGA § 48–5–2(.1) expressly defines
an arm's length, bona fide sale to include those types of transactions
where the seller might suffer a financial loss[,] including distress
sales ... or sales at public auction[ ].” CPF Investments v. Fulton
County Bd. of Assessors, 330 Ga.App. 744, 749, 769 S.E.2d 159 (2015)
(punctuation omitted). Here, because the sheriff's sale of the subject
property was a distress sale and public auction, it was an arm's length,
bona fide sale under the plain terms of OCGA § 48–5–2(.1).
Consequently, the board of tax assessors could not “assess the property
at a higher value in the year following the sale, regardless of whether
the [b]oard believe[d] the sale price reflect[ed] the actual fair market
value of the property.” CPF Investments, supra at 747 *456 , n. 4, 769
S.E.2d 159. The trial court's findings to the contrary with regard to
the sheriff's sale in this case were erroneous and must be reversed.
Compare Ballard, supra at 525, 773 S.E.2d 780 (holding that a tax sale
purchaser receives only a defeasible fee interest and since fair market
value “is not defined as the amount a buyer would pay to purchase, and a
willing seller accept, for a defeasible interest in property, a tax
sale does not qualify as an arm's length, bona fide sale such that the
one-year freeze of OCGA § 48–5–2(3) would apply.”) (emphasis in
original).<br />2. Parties to the sale.<br />The trial court also found that
the sheriff's sale was not an arm's length transaction under OCGA §
48–5–2(.1) because the parties to the 2013 sheriff's sale were DRST and
Park Solutions and those parties were related in that the president of
DRST and the manager of Park Solutions were, respectively, father and
son. However, regardless of the relationship between the father and son
and the respective corporate entities, the factual premise of the trial
court's ruling is flawed because DRST was not a party to the sale.<br />As
the sheriff's deed plainly shows, the parties to the sale were the
sheriff as the grantor, acting in his official capacity on behalf of the
property owners, and Park Solutions as the grantee after being the
highest bidder for the property at the public auction. See Associates
Financial Svcs. Co. v. Johnson, 128 Ga.App. 712, 713, 197 S.E.2d 764
(1973) (sheriffs who are legally authorized to make sales at a public
outcry represent the sellers of the property). Thus, contrary to the
trial court's finding, DRST simply was not a party to the sheriff's
sale, which instead was an arm's length sale between the unrelated and
unaffiliated parties of the grantor sheriff and the grantee Park
Solutions. Accordingly, the trial court's finding that the transaction
was not an arm's length sale was erroneous. “In light of the foregoing
[errors], the [final] order of the trial court ... is reversed.” CPF
Investments, supra at 750, 769 S.E.2d 159.<br />Judgment reversed.<br />ELLINGTON, P.J., concurs and DILLARD, J., concurs in the judgment only.<br />DILLARD, Judge, concurring in judgment only.<br />I
concur in judgment only because I do not agree with all that is said in
the majority opinion. As a result, the majority's opinion decides only
the issues presented in the case sub judice and may not be cited as
binding precedent. See Court of Appeals Rule 33(a).<br />All Citations<br />783 S.E.2d 453 <br />
<br />[2] <br />
<br />
Effective: July 1, 2014<br />Ga. Code Ann., § 48-5-2<br />OCGA § 48-5-2. Definitions<br />Currentness<br />As used in this chapter, the term:<br />(.1) “Arm's length, bona fide sale” means a transaction which has occurred in good faith without fraud or deceit carried out by unrelated or unaffiliated parties, as by a willing buyer and a willing seller, each acting in his or her own self-interest, including but not limited to a distress sale, short sale, bank sale, or sale at public auction.<br />(1) “Current use value” of bona fide conservation use property means the amount a knowledgeable buyer would pay for the property with the intention of continuing the property in its existing use and in an arm's length, bona fide sale and shall be determined in accordance with the specifications and criteria provided for in subsection (b) of Code Section 48-5-269.<br />(2) “Current use value” of bona fide residential transitional property means the amount a knowledgeable buyer would pay for the property with the intention of continuing the property in its existing use and in an arm's length, bona fide sale. The tax assessor shall consider the following criteria, as applicable, in determining the current use value of bona fide residential transitional property:<br />(A) The current use of such property;<br />(B) Annual productivity; and<br />(C) Sales data of comparable real property with and for the same existing use.<br />(3) “Fair market value of property” means the amount a knowledgeable buyer would pay for the property and a willing seller would accept for the property at an arm's length, bona fide sale. The income approach, if data is available, shall be considered in determining the fair market value of income-producing property. Notwithstanding any other provision of this chapter to the contrary, the transaction amount of the most recent arm's length, bona fide sale in any year shall be the maximum allowable fair market value for the next taxable year. With respect to the valuation of equipment, machinery, and fixtures when no ready market exists for the sale of the equipment, machinery, and fixtures, fair market value may be determined by resorting to any reasonable, relevant, and useful information available, including, but not limited to, the original cost of the property, any depreciation or obsolescence, and any increase in value by reason of inflation. Each tax assessor shall have access to any public records of the taxpayer for the purpose of discovering such information.<br />(A) In determining the fair market value of a going business where its continued operation is reasonably anticipated, the tax assessor may value the equipment, machinery, and fixtures which are the property of the business as a whole where appropriate to reflect the accurate fair market value.<br />(B) The tax assessor shall apply the following criteria in determining the fair market value of real property:<br />(i) Existing zoning of property;<br />(ii) Existing use of property, including any restrictions or limitations on the use of property resulting from state or federal law or rules or regulations adopted pursuant to the authority of state or federal law;<br />(iii) Existing covenants or restrictions in deed dedicating the property to a particular use;<br />(iv) Bank sales, other financial institution owned sales, or distressed sales, or any combination thereof, of comparable real property;<br />(v) Decreased value of the property based on limitations and restrictions resulting from the property being in a conservation easement;<br />(vi) Rent limitations, operational requirements, and any other restrictions imposed upon the property in connection with the property being eligible for any income tax credits described in subparagraph (B.1) of this paragraph or receiving any other state or federal subsidies provided with respect to the use of the property as residential rental property; provided, however, that such properties described in subparagraph (B.1) of this paragraph shall not be considered comparable real property for assessment or appeal of assessment of other properties; and<br />(vii) Any other existing factors provided by law or by rule and regulation of the commissioner deemed pertinent in arriving at fair market value.<br />(B.1) The tax assessor shall not consider any income tax credits with respect to real property which are claimed and granted pursuant to either Section 42 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended, or Chapter 7 of this title in determining the fair market value of real property.<br />(B.2) In determining the fair market value of real property, the tax assessor shall not include the value of any intangible assets used by a business, wherever located, including patents, trademarks, trade names, customer agreements, and merchandising agreements.<br />(C) Fair market value of “historic property” as such term is defined in subsection (a) of Code Section 48-5-7.2 means:<br />(i) For the first eight years in which the property is classified as “rehabilitated historic property,” the value equal to the greater of the acquisition cost of the property or the appraised fair market value of the property as recorded in the county tax digest at the time preliminary certification on such property was received by the county board of tax assessors pursuant to subsection (c) of Code Section 48-5-7.2;<br />(ii) For the ninth year in which the property is classified as “rehabilitated historic property,” the value of the property as determined by division (i) of this subparagraph plus one-half of the difference between such value and the current fair market value exclusive of the provisions of this subparagraph; and<br />(iii) For the tenth and following years, the fair market value of such property as determined by the provisions of this paragraph, excluding the provisions of this subparagraph.<br />(D) Fair market value of “landmark historic property” as such term is defined in subsection (a) of Code Section 48-5-7.3 means:<br />(i) For the first eight years in which the property is classified as “landmark historic property,” the value equal to the greater of the acquisition cost of the property or the appraised fair market value of the property as recorded in the county tax digest at the time certification on such property was received by the county board of tax assessors pursuant to subsection (c) of Code Section 48-5-7.3;<br />(ii) For the ninth year in which the property is classified as “landmark historic property,” the value of the property as determined by division (i) of this subparagraph plus one-half of the difference between such value and the current fair market value exclusive of the provisions of this subparagraph; and<br />(iii) For the tenth and following years, the fair market value of such property as determined by the provisions of this paragraph, excluding the provisions of this subparagraph.<br />(E) Timber shall be valued at its fair market value at the time of its harvest or sale in the manner specified in Code Section 48-5-7.5.<br />(F) Fair market value of “brownfield property” as such term is defined in subsection (a) of Code Section 48-5-7.6 means:<br />(i) Unless sooner disqualified pursuant to subsection (e) of Code Section 48-5-7.6, for the first ten years in which the property is classified as “brownfield property,” or as this period of preferential assessment may be extended pursuant to subsection (o) of Code Section 48-5-7. 6, the value equal to the lesser of the acquisition cost of the property or the appraised fair market value of the property as recorded in the county tax digest at the time application was made to the Environmental Protection Division of the Department of Natural Resources for participation under Article 9 of Chapter 8 of Title 12, the “Georgia Hazardous Site Reuse and Redevelopment Act,” as amended; and<br />(ii) Unless sooner disqualified pursuant to subsection (e) of Code Section 48-5-7.6, for the eleventh and following years, or at the end of any extension of this period of preferential assessment pursuant to subsection (o) of Code Section 48-5-7.6, the fair market value of such property as determined by the provisions of this paragraph, excluding the provisions of this subparagraph.<br />(4) “Foreign merchandise in transit” means personal property of any description which has been or will be moved by waterborne commerce through any port located in this state and:<br />(A) Which has entered the export stream, although temporarily stored or warehoused in the county where the port of export is located; or<br />(B) Which was shipped from a point of origin located outside the customs territory of the United States and on which United States customs duties are paid at or through any customs district or port located in this state, although stored or warehoused in the county where the port of entry is located while in transit to a final destination.<br />(5) “Forest land conservation value” of forest land conservation use property means the amount determined in accordance with the specifications and criteria provided for in Code Section 48-5-271 and Article VII, Section I, Paragraph III(f) of the Constitution.<br />(6) “Forest land fair market value” means the 2008 fair market value of the forest land; provided, however, that when the 2008 fair market value of the forest land has been appealed by a property owner and the ultimate fair market value of the forest land is changed in the appeal process by either the board of assessors, the board of equalization, a hearing officer, an arbitrator, or a superior court judge, then the final fair market value of the forest land shall replace the 2008 fair market value of the forest land. This final fair market value of the forest land shall be used in the calculation of local assistance grants. If local assistance grants have been granted to either a county, a county board of education, or a municipality based on the 2008 fair market value of forest land and subsequently the fair market value of such forest land is reduced on an appeal, then the county or the municipality shall reimburse the state, within 12 months unless otherwise agreed to by the parties, the difference between local assistance grants paid to the county or municipality and the amount which would have been due based on the final fair market value of the forest land. Such 2008 valuation may increase from one taxable year to the next by a rate equal to the percentage change in the price index for gross output of state and local government from the prior year to the current year as defined by the National Income and Product Accounts and determined by the United States Bureau of Economic Analysis and indicated by the Price Index for Government Consumption Expenditures and General Government Gross Output (Table 3.10.4).<br />
<br />
[3]<br />
<br />
One of the first known taxes: Egyptian Pharaohs levied a tax on household cooking oil. Taxes have been an ongoing event since then.<br />
<br />
END<br />
<br />
<br />
<div id="stcpDiv" style="left: -1988px; position: absolute; top: -1999px;">
Egyptian Pharaohs</div>
<br />
<br />Hugh Woodhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/01021049579391065763noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2321320695584069696.post-9984224391272671182013-01-03T23:46:00.002-08:002013-01-03T23:49:15.334-08:00<div style="text-align: center;">
<span style="font-size: large;"><span style="font-family: Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;"><span style="background-color: black;"><span style="font-size: x-large;"><span style="background-color: white;">Important
Information from the ABA Regarding Lawyers Who Accept Credit Card
Payments</span></span><span style="background-color: black;"><span><span style="background-color: #eeeeee;"></span></span></span></span></span></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">New IRS requirements regarding the reporting of
credit card transactions have the potential to negatively impact IOLTA accounts
and lead to ethical violations by lawyers. Here are the key points about
which you may wish to alert members who accept credit card payments:</span></div>
<span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"></span><br />
<ul><span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">
</span>
<li><span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">Pursuant to the Housing Assistance Tax Act of 2008, credit card processing
companies are required to verify and match each merchant’s federal tax
identification number and her legal name with those found on file with the IRS.
An EXACT match is required.<br />
</span>
</li>
<li><span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">For the purposes of this requirement, lawyers who accept credit card
payments are considered “merchants.”<br />
</span>
</li>
<li><span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">If there is NOT an exact match between the information provided to the
credit card processing company and the information on file with the IRS, there
are serious consequences:</span><span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"> </span></li>
<span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">
</span>
</ul>
<span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"></span><br />
<div style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt 1in; text-indent: -0.25in;">
<span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">o Beginning January 2013, the IRS will impose a
28% withholding penalty on all credit card transactions, including those that
the lawyer directs to her IOLTA account.</span></div>
<span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"></span><br />
<div style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt 1in; text-indent: -0.25in;">
<span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">o If client funds that should be in the IOLTA
account are withheld due to the lawyer’s failure to act and thus are not
available to the client on demand, ethical issues are raised.</span></div>
<span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"></span><br />
<ul><span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">
</span>
<li><span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">The credit card processing company should have received information from the
IRS if a mismatch occurred and already notified the lawyer of the problem.
However, it is not known if all processing companies have provided such
notice.<br />
</span>
</li>
<li><span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">Steps lawyers can take now to avoid an ethical violation in 2013: </span></li>
<span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">
</span>
</ul>
<span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"></span><br />
<div style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt 1in; text-indent: -0.25in;">
<span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">o<span style="font-size: 7pt;"> </span>Contact the credit card processor to determine
that a match occurred</span></div>
<span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"></span><br />
<div style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt 1in; text-indent: -0.25in;">
<span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">o<span style="font-size: 7pt;"> </span>Correct mismatches if informed of one</span></div>
<span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"></span><br />
<div style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-indent: -4.5pt;">
<span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">For more information on
this issue, see </span><a href="https://www.lawpay.com/news/irs60502.pdf"><span style="text-decoration: underline;"><span style="color: blue; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">https://www.lawpay.com/news/irs60502.pdf</span></span></a></div>
<span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"></span><br />
<div style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-indent: -4.5pt;">
<span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">This information was
provided to us by the ABA Commission on IOLTA. If you have questions, please
direct them to Beverly Groudine, staff counsel to the Commission, </span><a href="mailto:Beverly.Groudine@americanbar.org"><span style="text-decoration: underline;"><span style="color: blue; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">Beverly.Groudine@americanbar.org</span></span></a><span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; text-decoration: underline;">.</span></div>
Hugh Woodhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/01021049579391065763noreply@blogger.com3tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2321320695584069696.post-33202570563906120512012-09-28T21:57:00.001-07:002012-09-28T22:01:24.760-07:00<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjVXHZ1330pyZKmb4CElKzZy40zQtgrYQLiy2em6oIt3FObN3IBsQPjr3C_Nabv1F2Qa_fx_Z5-3xd2RO8PyIgnTqhglbWLCI-u0-aje-2UaYjRDDP_9nFLIfJRj_UrFLzxApkIBVEicHsB/s1600/Taxpayer.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="clear: right; float: right; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-left: 1em;"><img border="0" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjVXHZ1330pyZKmb4CElKzZy40zQtgrYQLiy2em6oIt3FObN3IBsQPjr3C_Nabv1F2Qa_fx_Z5-3xd2RO8PyIgnTqhglbWLCI-u0-aje-2UaYjRDDP_9nFLIfJRj_UrFLzxApkIBVEicHsB/s1600/Taxpayer.jpg" /></a></div>
<span style="font-family: Calibri; font-size: large;"><strong>THE TAXMAN COMETH</strong></span><br />
<span style="font-family: Calibri;">Hugh
Wood, Atlanta, GA</span><br />
<br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;">
<span style="font-family: Calibri;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>The Era
of USA low taxes is in sunset.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The tax
hammer is upon us.</span></div>
<span style="font-family: Calibri;">Why
editorialize it.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span></span><br />
<br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;">
<span style="font-family: Calibri;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span><strong>2013%
INCREASES IN FEDERAL TAX BRACKETS</strong></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;">
<span style="font-family: Calibri;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>For
those of us who actually pay taxes, federal taxes in 2012, are, to wit:<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>“Marginal federal income-tax rates (for the
four brackets)<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>[are]<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>25%<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>28%<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>33%<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>35.”<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>[1]</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;">
<span style="font-family: Calibri;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>After
January 1, 2013, they will rise to:</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;">
<span style="font-family: Calibri;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>The “marginal
federal income-tax rates (for the four brackets) [will jump to] …28%<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>31%<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>36%<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>39.6%. The child tax credit
[will] fall to $500 from $1,000.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">Id</i>.</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;">
<span style="font-family: Calibri;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span><strong>A
MEDICAL TAX ON CAPITAL GAINS AND DIVIDEND INCOME</strong></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;">
<span style="font-family: Calibri;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>After
January 1, 2013, individuals will see a new tax for medical care imposed on
capital gains and dividend income.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>“[T]he new 3.8% MedicalCare tax, and those rates on capital gains and
dividends [will jump] to 23.8% and (in the top bracket) 43.4%.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">Id</i>.</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;">
<span style="font-family: Calibri;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>From
other sources, additional relevant tax hammers are:</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;">
<span style="font-family: Calibri;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span><strong>A NEW SURTAX
ON INVESTMENT INCOME</strong></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;">
<span style="font-family: Calibri;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>The
2013 a new Surtax on Investment Income – will bring a $123 billion tax increase:
This is a new, 3.8% point surtax on investment income earned will impact
households making at least $250,000 ($200,000 single). This will result in the
following top tax rates on investment income:</span></div>
<br />
<table border="0" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="MsoNormalTable" style="border-collapse: collapse; margin: auto auto auto 7.75pt; mso-padding-alt: 0in 0in 0in 0in; mso-table-layout-alt: fixed;">
<tbody>
<tr style="height: 19.45pt; mso-height-rule: exactly; mso-yfti-firstrow: yes; mso-yfti-irow: 0;">
<td style="background-color: transparent; border-color: windowtext; border-style: solid double double solid; border-width: 1pt 2.25pt 2.25pt 1pt; height: 19.45pt; mso-border-bottom-alt: double 2.25pt; mso-border-color-alt: windowtext; mso-border-left-alt: solid .5pt; mso-border-right-alt: double 2.25pt; mso-border-top-alt: solid .5pt; mso-height-rule: exactly; padding: 0in; width: 116.9pt;" valign="top" width="156"><div class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt; mso-line-break-override: restrictions; punctuation-wrap: simple; vertical-align: baseline;">
<span style="font-family: "Tahoma","sans-serif"; font-size: 12pt; line-height: 115%;"><o:p> </o:p></span></div>
</td>
<td style="background-color: transparent; border-color: windowtext windowtext windowtext rgb(0, 0, 0); border-style: solid double double none; border-width: 1pt 2.25pt 2.25pt 0px; height: 19.45pt; mso-border-alt: double windowtext 2.25pt; mso-border-left-alt: double windowtext 2.25pt; mso-border-top-alt: solid windowtext .5pt; mso-height-rule: exactly; padding: 0in; width: 78.2pt;" width="104"><div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 12.6pt; margin: 4.2pt 0in 2.4pt 2.15pt; mso-line-break-override: restrictions; mso-line-height-rule: exactly; punctuation-wrap: simple; vertical-align: baseline;">
<span style="font-size: 12.5pt; letter-spacing: -0.2pt; mso-ascii-font-family: Calibri; mso-bidi-font-family: Calibri; mso-hansi-font-family: Calibri;"><span style="font-family: Calibri;">Capital Gains<o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
</td>
<td style="background-color: transparent; border-color: windowtext windowtext windowtext rgb(0, 0, 0); border-style: solid solid double none; border-width: 1pt 1pt 2.25pt 0px; height: 19.45pt; mso-border-bottom-alt: double 2.25pt; mso-border-color-alt: windowtext; mso-border-left-alt: double 2.25pt; mso-border-right-alt: solid .5pt; mso-border-top-alt: solid .5pt; mso-height-rule: exactly; padding: 0in; width: 60.25pt;" width="80"><div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 12.45pt; margin: 4.2pt 0in 2.55pt 2.2pt; mso-line-break-override: restrictions; mso-line-height-rule: exactly; punctuation-wrap: simple; vertical-align: baseline;">
<span style="font-size: 12.5pt; letter-spacing: -0.25pt; mso-ascii-font-family: Calibri; mso-bidi-font-family: Calibri; mso-hansi-font-family: Calibri;"><span style="font-family: Calibri;">Dividends<o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
</td>
<td style="background-color: transparent; border-color: windowtext windowtext windowtext rgb(0, 0, 0); border-style: solid solid solid none; border-width: 1pt 1pt 1pt 0px; height: 19.45pt; mso-border-alt: solid windowtext .5pt; mso-border-left-alt: solid windowtext .5pt; mso-height-rule: exactly; padding: 0in; width: 44.9pt;" width="60"><div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 12.45pt; margin: 4.2pt 0in 2.55pt 2.15pt; mso-line-break-override: restrictions; mso-line-height-rule: exactly; punctuation-wrap: simple; vertical-align: baseline;">
<span style="font-size: 12.5pt; letter-spacing: -0.35pt; mso-ascii-font-family: Calibri; mso-bidi-font-family: Calibri; mso-hansi-font-family: Calibri;"><span style="font-family: Calibri;">Other*<o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="height: 18.25pt; mso-height-rule: exactly; mso-yfti-irow: 1;">
<td style="background-color: transparent; border-color: rgb(0, 0, 0) windowtext windowtext; border-style: none double double solid; border-width: 0px 2.25pt 2.25pt 1pt; height: 18.25pt; mso-border-alt: double windowtext 2.25pt; mso-border-left-alt: solid windowtext .5pt; mso-border-top-alt: double windowtext 2.25pt; mso-height-rule: exactly; padding: 0in; width: 116.9pt;" width="156"><div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 12.5pt; margin: 3.35pt 0in 1.9pt 2.4pt; mso-line-break-override: restrictions; mso-line-height-rule: exactly; punctuation-wrap: simple; vertical-align: baseline;">
<i><span style="font-size: 12pt; mso-ascii-font-family: Calibri; mso-bidi-font-family: Calibri; mso-hansi-font-family: Calibri;"><span style="font-family: Calibri;">2012<o:p></o:p></span></span></i></div>
</td>
<td style="background-color: transparent; border-color: rgb(0, 0, 0) windowtext windowtext rgb(0, 0, 0); border-style: none double double none; border-width: 0px 2.25pt 2.25pt 0px; height: 18.25pt; mso-border-left-alt: double windowtext 2.25pt; mso-border-top-alt: double windowtext 2.25pt; mso-height-rule: exactly; padding: 0in; width: 78.2pt;" width="104"><div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 12.45pt; margin: 3.25pt 0in 2.05pt 2.15pt; mso-line-break-override: restrictions; mso-line-height-rule: exactly; punctuation-wrap: simple; vertical-align: baseline;">
<span style="font-size: 12.5pt; letter-spacing: -0.5pt; mso-ascii-font-family: Calibri; mso-bidi-font-family: Calibri; mso-hansi-font-family: Calibri;"><span style="font-family: Calibri;">15%<o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
</td>
<td style="background-color: transparent; border-color: rgb(0, 0, 0) windowtext windowtext rgb(0, 0, 0); border-style: none solid double none; border-width: 0px 1pt 2.25pt 0px; height: 18.25pt; mso-border-alt: double windowtext 2.25pt; mso-border-left-alt: double windowtext 2.25pt; mso-border-right-alt: solid windowtext .5pt; mso-border-top-alt: double windowtext 2.25pt; mso-height-rule: exactly; padding: 0in; width: 60.25pt;" width="80"><div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 12.45pt; margin: 3.25pt 0in 2.05pt 2.2pt; mso-line-break-override: restrictions; mso-line-height-rule: exactly; punctuation-wrap: simple; vertical-align: baseline;">
<span style="font-size: 12.5pt; letter-spacing: -0.5pt; mso-ascii-font-family: Calibri; mso-bidi-font-family: Calibri; mso-hansi-font-family: Calibri;"><span style="font-family: Calibri;">15%<o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
</td>
<td style="background-color: transparent; border-color: rgb(0, 0, 0) windowtext windowtext rgb(0, 0, 0); border-style: none solid solid none; border-width: 0px 1pt 1pt 0px; height: 18.25pt; mso-border-alt: solid windowtext .5pt; mso-border-left-alt: solid windowtext .5pt; mso-border-top-alt: solid windowtext .5pt; mso-height-rule: exactly; padding: 0in; width: 44.9pt;" width="60"><div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 12.45pt; margin: 3.25pt 0in 2.05pt 2.15pt; mso-line-break-override: restrictions; mso-line-height-rule: exactly; punctuation-wrap: simple; vertical-align: baseline;">
<span style="font-size: 12.5pt; letter-spacing: -0.35pt; mso-ascii-font-family: Calibri; mso-bidi-font-family: Calibri; mso-hansi-font-family: Calibri;"><span style="font-family: Calibri;">35%<o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="height: 19.65pt; mso-height-rule: exactly; mso-yfti-irow: 2; mso-yfti-lastrow: yes;">
<td style="background-color: transparent; border-color: rgb(0, 0, 0) windowtext windowtext; border-style: none double solid solid; border-width: 0px 2.25pt 1pt 1pt; height: 19.65pt; mso-border-bottom-alt: solid .5pt; mso-border-color-alt: windowtext; mso-border-left-alt: solid .5pt; mso-border-right-alt: double 2.25pt; mso-border-top-alt: double 2.25pt; mso-height-rule: exactly; padding: 0in; width: 116.9pt;" width="156"><div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 12.5pt; margin: 3.35pt 0in 3.1pt 2.4pt; mso-line-break-override: restrictions; mso-line-height-rule: exactly; punctuation-wrap: simple; vertical-align: baseline;">
<i><span style="font-size: 12pt; mso-ascii-font-family: Calibri; mso-bidi-font-family: Calibri; mso-hansi-font-family: Calibri;"><span style="font-family: Calibri;">2013+ (current
law)<o:p></o:p></span></span></i></div>
</td>
<td style="background-color: transparent; border-color: rgb(0, 0, 0) windowtext windowtext rgb(0, 0, 0); border-style: none double solid none; border-width: 0px 2.25pt 1pt 0px; height: 19.65pt; mso-border-alt: double windowtext 2.25pt; mso-border-bottom-alt: solid windowtext .5pt; mso-border-left-alt: double windowtext 2.25pt; mso-border-top-alt: double windowtext 2.25pt; mso-height-rule: exactly; padding: 0in; width: 78.2pt;" width="104"><div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 12.45pt; margin: 3.25pt 0in 3.25pt 2.15pt; mso-line-break-override: restrictions; mso-line-height-rule: exactly; punctuation-wrap: simple; vertical-align: baseline;">
<span style="font-size: 12.5pt; letter-spacing: -0.3pt; mso-ascii-font-family: Calibri; mso-bidi-font-family: Calibri; mso-hansi-font-family: Calibri;"><span style="font-family: Calibri;">23.8%<o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
</td>
<td style="background-color: transparent; border-color: rgb(0, 0, 0) windowtext windowtext rgb(0, 0, 0); border-style: none solid solid none; border-width: 0px 1pt 1pt 0px; height: 19.65pt; mso-border-bottom-alt: solid .5pt; mso-border-color-alt: windowtext; mso-border-left-alt: double 2.25pt; mso-border-right-alt: solid .5pt; mso-border-top-alt: double 2.25pt; mso-height-rule: exactly; padding: 0in; width: 60.25pt;" width="80"><div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 12.45pt; margin: 3.25pt 0in 3.25pt 2.2pt; mso-line-break-override: restrictions; mso-line-height-rule: exactly; punctuation-wrap: simple; vertical-align: baseline;">
<span style="font-size: 12.5pt; letter-spacing: -0.25pt; mso-ascii-font-family: Calibri; mso-bidi-font-family: Calibri; mso-hansi-font-family: Calibri;"><span style="font-family: Calibri;">43.4%<o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
</td>
<td style="background-color: transparent; border-color: rgb(0, 0, 0) windowtext windowtext rgb(0, 0, 0); border-style: none solid solid none; border-width: 0px 1pt 1pt 0px; height: 19.65pt; mso-border-alt: solid windowtext .5pt; mso-border-left-alt: solid windowtext .5pt; mso-border-top-alt: solid windowtext .5pt; mso-height-rule: exactly; padding: 0in; width: 44.9pt;" width="60"><div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 12.45pt; margin: 3.25pt 0in 3.25pt 2.15pt; mso-line-break-override: restrictions; mso-line-height-rule: exactly; punctuation-wrap: simple; vertical-align: baseline;">
<span style="font-size: 12.5pt; letter-spacing: -0.25pt; mso-ascii-font-family: Calibri; mso-bidi-font-family: Calibri; mso-hansi-font-family: Calibri;"><span style="font-family: Calibri;">43.4%<o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
</td>
</tr>
</tbody></table>
<br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;">
<span style="font-family: Calibri;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>The
table above also incorporates the scheduled hike in the capital gains rate from
15% to 20%, and the scheduled hike in dividends rate from 15% to 39.6%.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>[2]</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;">
<span style="font-family: Calibri;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span><strong>MEDICARE
PAYROLL TAX:<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>3.8% UP TO $250,000</strong></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;">
<span style="font-family: Calibri;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>The new
2013 Medicare Payroll Tax Hike – will bring an $86.8 billion tax increase: The
Medicare payroll tax is currently 2.9% on all wages and self-employment
profits. Under this tax hike, wages and profits exceeding $200,000 ($250,000 in
the case of married couples) will face a 3.8% rate instead. This is a direct
marginal income tax hike on small business owners, who are liable for
self-employment tax in most cases. The table below compares current law vs. the
2013 Medicare Payroll Tax Hike:</span></div>
<table border="0" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="MsoNormalTable" style="border-collapse: collapse; margin: auto auto auto 40.5pt; mso-padding-alt: 0in 0in 0in 0in; mso-table-layout-alt: fixed;">
<tbody>
<tr style="height: 85.35pt; mso-height-rule: exactly; mso-yfti-firstrow: yes; mso-yfti-irow: 0;">
<td style="background-color: transparent; border-color: windowtext; border-style: solid double double solid; border-width: 1pt 2.25pt 2.25pt 1pt; height: 85.35pt; mso-border-bottom-alt: double 2.25pt; mso-border-color-alt: windowtext; mso-border-left-alt: solid .75pt; mso-border-right-alt: double 2.25pt; mso-border-top-alt: solid .75pt; mso-height-rule: exactly; padding: 0in; width: 76.9pt;" valign="top" width="103"><div class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt; mso-line-break-override: restrictions; punctuation-wrap: simple; vertical-align: baseline;">
<span style="font-size: 12pt; line-height: 115%;"><o:p><span style="font-family: Calibri;"> </span></o:p></span></div>
</td>
<td style="background-color: transparent; border-color: windowtext windowtext windowtext rgb(0, 0, 0); border-style: solid double double none; border-width: 1pt 2.25pt 2.25pt 0px; height: 85.35pt; mso-border-alt: double windowtext 2.25pt; mso-border-left-alt: double windowtext 2.25pt; mso-border-top-alt: solid windowtext .75pt; mso-height-rule: exactly; padding: 0in; width: 121.5pt;" valign="top" width="162"><div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 14.05pt; margin: 0in 0in 1.2pt 1.8pt; mso-line-break-override: restrictions; mso-line-height-rule: exactly; punctuation-wrap: simple; vertical-align: baseline;">
<span style="font-size: 11.5pt; letter-spacing: -0.05pt; mso-ascii-font-family: Calibri; mso-bidi-font-family: Calibri; mso-hansi-font-family: Calibri;"><span style="font-family: Calibri;">First $200,000 ($250,000 Married) Employer/Employee<o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
</td>
<td style="background-color: transparent; border-color: windowtext windowtext windowtext rgb(0, 0, 0); border-style: solid solid double none; border-width: 1pt 1pt 2.25pt 0px; height: 85.35pt; mso-border-bottom-alt: double 2.25pt; mso-border-color-alt: windowtext; mso-border-left-alt: double 2.25pt; mso-border-right-alt: solid .75pt; mso-border-top-alt: solid .75pt; mso-height-rule: exactly; padding: 0in; width: 121.5pt;" valign="top" width="162"><div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 14.05pt; margin: 0in 0.45in 10pt 0in; mso-line-break-override: restrictions; mso-line-height-rule: exactly; punctuation-wrap: simple; vertical-align: baseline;">
<span style="font-size: 11.5pt; mso-ascii-font-family: Calibri; mso-bidi-font-family: Calibri; mso-hansi-font-family: Calibri;"><span style="font-family: Calibri;">All
Remaining Wages<o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 11.9pt; margin: 2pt 0in 1.2pt; mso-line-break-override: restrictions; mso-line-height-rule: exactly; punctuation-wrap: simple; vertical-align: baseline;">
<span style="font-size: 11.5pt; letter-spacing: -0.15pt; mso-ascii-font-family: Calibri; mso-bidi-font-family: Calibri; mso-hansi-font-family: Calibri;"><span style="font-family: Calibri;">Employer/Employee<o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="height: 60.6pt; mso-height-rule: exactly; mso-yfti-irow: 1;">
<td style="background-color: transparent; border-color: rgb(0, 0, 0) windowtext windowtext; border-style: none double double solid; border-width: 0px 2.25pt 2.25pt 1pt; height: 60.6pt; mso-border-alt: double windowtext 2.25pt; mso-border-left-alt: solid windowtext .75pt; mso-border-top-alt: double windowtext 2.25pt; mso-height-rule: exactly; padding: 0in; width: 76.9pt;" valign="top" width="103"><div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 14.05pt; margin: 0in 19.8pt 2pt 1.8pt; mso-line-break-override: restrictions; mso-line-height-rule: exactly; punctuation-wrap: simple; vertical-align: baseline;">
<span style="font-size: 11.5pt; letter-spacing: -0.1pt; mso-ascii-font-family: Calibri; mso-bidi-font-family: Calibri; mso-hansi-font-family: Calibri;"><span style="font-family: Calibri;">Current Law<o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
</td>
<td style="background-color: transparent; border-color: rgb(0, 0, 0) windowtext windowtext rgb(0, 0, 0); border-style: none double double none; border-width: 0px 2.25pt 2.25pt 0px; height: 60.6pt; mso-border-left-alt: double windowtext 2.25pt; mso-border-top-alt: double windowtext 2.25pt; mso-height-rule: exactly; padding: 0in; width: 121.5pt;" valign="top" width="162"><div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 11.8pt; margin: 2.25pt 0in 10pt; mso-line-break-override: restrictions; mso-line-height-rule: exactly; punctuation-wrap: simple; vertical-align: baseline;">
<span style="font-size: 11.5pt; letter-spacing: -0.05pt; mso-ascii-font-family: Calibri; mso-bidi-font-family: Calibri; mso-hansi-font-family: Calibri;"><span style="font-family: Calibri;">1.45%/1.45%<o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 11.9pt; margin: 2.4pt 0in 1.9pt; mso-line-break-override: restrictions; mso-line-height-rule: exactly; punctuation-wrap: simple; vertical-align: baseline;">
<span style="font-size: 11.5pt; mso-ascii-font-family: Calibri; mso-bidi-font-family: Calibri; mso-hansi-font-family: Calibri;"><span style="font-family: Calibri;">2.9%
self-employed<o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
</td>
<td style="background-color: transparent; border-color: rgb(0, 0, 0) windowtext windowtext rgb(0, 0, 0); border-style: none solid double none; border-width: 0px 1pt 2.25pt 0px; height: 60.6pt; mso-border-alt: double windowtext 2.25pt; mso-border-left-alt: double windowtext 2.25pt; mso-border-right-alt: solid windowtext .75pt; mso-border-top-alt: double windowtext 2.25pt; mso-height-rule: exactly; padding: 0in; width: 121.5pt;" valign="top" width="162"><div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 11.8pt; margin: 2.25pt 0in 10pt; mso-line-break-override: restrictions; mso-line-height-rule: exactly; punctuation-wrap: simple; vertical-align: baseline;">
<span style="font-size: 11.5pt; letter-spacing: -0.05pt; mso-ascii-font-family: Calibri; mso-bidi-font-family: Calibri; mso-hansi-font-family: Calibri;"><span style="font-family: Calibri;">1.45%/1.45%<o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 11.9pt; margin: 2.4pt 0in 1.9pt; mso-line-break-override: restrictions; mso-line-height-rule: exactly; punctuation-wrap: simple; vertical-align: baseline;">
<span style="font-size: 11.5pt; mso-ascii-font-family: Calibri; mso-bidi-font-family: Calibri; mso-hansi-font-family: Calibri;"><span style="font-family: Calibri;">2.9%
self-employed<o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="height: 67.8pt; mso-height-rule: exactly; mso-yfti-irow: 2; mso-yfti-lastrow: yes;">
<td style="background-color: transparent; border-color: rgb(0, 0, 0) windowtext windowtext; border-style: none double solid solid; border-width: 0px 2.25pt 1pt 1pt; height: 67.8pt; mso-border-bottom-alt: solid .75pt; mso-border-color-alt: windowtext; mso-border-left-alt: solid .75pt; mso-border-right-alt: double 2.25pt; mso-border-top-alt: double 2.25pt; mso-height-rule: exactly; padding: 0in; width: 76.9pt;" valign="top" width="103"><div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 13.95pt; margin: 0in 0in 2.05pt 1.8pt; mso-line-break-override: restrictions; mso-line-height-rule: exactly; punctuation-wrap: simple; vertical-align: baseline;">
<span style="font-size: 11.5pt; mso-ascii-font-family: Calibri; mso-bidi-font-family: Calibri; mso-hansi-font-family: Calibri;"><span style="font-family: Calibri;">2013 Tax Hike<o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
</td>
<td style="background-color: transparent; border-color: rgb(0, 0, 0) windowtext windowtext rgb(0, 0, 0); border-style: none double solid none; border-width: 0px 2.25pt 1pt 0px; height: 67.8pt; mso-border-alt: double windowtext 2.25pt; mso-border-bottom-alt: solid windowtext .75pt; mso-border-left-alt: double windowtext 2.25pt; mso-border-top-alt: double windowtext 2.25pt; mso-height-rule: exactly; padding: 0in; width: 121.5pt;" valign="top" width="162"><div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 11.8pt; margin: 2.25pt 0in 10pt; mso-line-break-override: restrictions; mso-line-height-rule: exactly; punctuation-wrap: simple; vertical-align: baseline;">
<span style="font-size: 11.5pt; letter-spacing: -0.05pt; mso-ascii-font-family: Calibri; mso-bidi-font-family: Calibri; mso-hansi-font-family: Calibri;"><span style="font-family: Calibri;">1.45%/1.45%<o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 12.15pt; margin: 2.1pt 0in 1.7pt; mso-line-break-override: restrictions; mso-line-height-rule: exactly; punctuation-wrap: simple; vertical-align: baseline;">
<span style="font-size: 11.5pt; mso-ascii-font-family: Calibri; mso-bidi-font-family: Calibri; mso-hansi-font-family: Calibri;"><span style="font-family: Calibri;">2.9%
self-employed<o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
</td>
<td style="background-color: transparent; border-color: rgb(0, 0, 0) windowtext windowtext rgb(0, 0, 0); border-style: none solid solid none; border-width: 0px 1pt 1pt 0px; height: 67.8pt; mso-border-bottom-alt: solid .75pt; mso-border-color-alt: windowtext; mso-border-left-alt: double 2.25pt; mso-border-right-alt: solid .75pt; mso-border-top-alt: double 2.25pt; mso-height-rule: exactly; padding: 0in; width: 121.5pt;" valign="top" width="162"><div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 11.8pt; margin: 2.25pt 0in 10pt; mso-line-break-override: restrictions; mso-line-height-rule: exactly; punctuation-wrap: simple; vertical-align: baseline;">
<span style="font-size: 11.5pt; letter-spacing: -0.05pt; mso-ascii-font-family: Calibri; mso-bidi-font-family: Calibri; mso-hansi-font-family: Calibri;"><span style="font-family: Calibri;">1.45%/2.35%<o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 12.15pt; margin: 2.1pt 0in 1.7pt; mso-line-break-override: restrictions; mso-line-height-rule: exactly; punctuation-wrap: simple; vertical-align: baseline;">
<span style="font-size: 11.5pt; mso-ascii-font-family: Calibri; mso-bidi-font-family: Calibri; mso-hansi-font-family: Calibri;"><span style="font-family: Calibri;">3.8%
self-employed<o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
</td>
</tr>
</tbody></table>
<br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;">
<span style="font-family: Calibri;"><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">Id</i>.</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;">
<span style="font-family: Calibri;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span><strong>THE
DEATH TAX RETURNS WITH A VENGEANCE (55%)</strong></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;">
<span style="font-family: Calibri;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>Under
federal estate tax law for 2011 and 2012, most of the wealthiest 1% of American
households are not subject to estate tax liability. The large estate tax
exemption is presently at $5.12 million per spouse. This means that with
nominal planning households worth less than $10.24 million can avoid the estate
tax. <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;">
<span style="font-family: Calibri;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>Under
the new January 1, 2013 Estate Tax scheme, taxable estates over $1 million will
be subject to estate tax.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The maximum
marginal tax rate of 55% will begin at $3 million.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>[3]<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>So,
put that <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>55% tax in your tax hat and
smoke it.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>[4]</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;">
<span style="font-family: Calibri;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>Why
editorialize this.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The tax hammer is
upon us.</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;">
<span style="font-family: Calibri;">Hugh Wood,
Esq.</span></div>
<span style="font-family: Calibri;">Wood &
Meredith, LLP</span><br />
<span style="font-family: Calibri;">3756 LaVista
Road</span><br />
<span style="font-family: Calibri;">Suite 250</span><br />
<span style="font-family: Calibri;">Atlanta
(Tucker), GA 30084</span><br />
<span style="font-family: Calibri;"><a href="http://www.woodandmeredith.com/">www.woodandmeredith.com</a></span><br />
<br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;">
<span style="font-family: Calibri;">hwood@woodandmeredith.com</span></div>
<span style="font-family: Calibri;"><a href="http://www.hughwood.blogspot.com/">www.hughwood.blogspot.com</a></span><a href="http://www.hughwood.blogspot.com/"><span style="font-family: Calibri;"></span></a><br />
<span style="font-family: Calibri;">twitter:
USALawyer_</span><br />
<span style="font-family: Calibri;">Phone:
404-633-4100</span><br />
<span style="font-family: Calibri;">Fax:
404-633-0068</span><br />
<br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;">
<o:p><span style="font-family: Calibri;"> </span></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;">
<span style="font-family: Calibri; font-size: xx-small;">[1]</span></div>
<span style="font-size: xx-small;">
<span style="font-family: Calibri;">Pethokoukis, James, <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">The
American Enterprise Institute</i>, August 1, 2012.</span></span><br />
<span style="font-size: xx-small;">
</span><br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;">
<span style="font-family: Calibri; font-size: xx-small;">[2]</span></div>
<span style="font-size: xx-small;">
<span style="font-family: Calibri;"><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">Americans for Tax
Reform</i>, September 2012</span></span><br />
<span style="font-size: xx-small;">
</span><br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;">
<span style="font-family: Calibri; font-size: xx-small;">[3]</span></div>
<span style="font-size: xx-small;">
<span style="font-family: Calibri;"><em>Forbes</em> June 2012<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>See
also, “Top Estate Tax Rates Set To Rise To 55 Percent In 2013.”<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Gladstone, Beth, <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">ReutersMoney</i>.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Reuters.</span></span><br />
<span style="font-size: xx-small;">
</span><br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;">
<span style="font-family: Calibri; font-size: xx-small;">[4]</span></div>
<span style="font-size: xx-small;">
<span style="font-family: Calibri;">While perhaps a bit extreme, consider the George Steinbrenner’s
(owner of the NY Yankees at death) estate.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>(1930-2010).<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Steinbrenner’s
estate was considered to be worth $1,100,000.000.00.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Dying in 2010 his estate paid zero (0%)
estate taxes.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>However, if Steinbrenner
had died in 2013 his estate would pay $605,000.000.00 in estate taxes (less, an
exemption of 10.5M which I did not bother to calculate).</span></span><br />
<span style="font-size: xx-small;">
</span><br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;">
<span style="font-family: Calibri; font-size: xx-small;">So, under 2010 law his heirs divide:<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>$1,100,000.000.00.</span></div>
<span style="font-size: xx-small;">
</span><br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;">
<span style="font-family: Calibri; font-size: xx-small;">But,</span></div>
<span style="font-size: xx-small;">
</span><br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;">
<span style="font-family: Calibri; font-size: xx-small;">Under 2013 law, his heirs would divide only:<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>$495,000.000.00.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>And, the US Treasury has to be paid IN
CASH.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Thus, the Treasury gets all the
cash and the estate (mostly) gets left with all the non-liquid assets.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>In many cases, this is the non-liquid real
estate.</span></div>
<span style="font-size: x-small;">
</span><br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;">
<o:p><span style="font-family: Calibri; font-size: x-small;"> </span></o:p></div>
<br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;">
<o:p><span style="font-family: Calibri;"> </span></o:p></div>
<br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;">
<o:p><span style="font-family: Calibri;"> </span></o:p></div>
<br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;">
<o:p><span style="font-family: Calibri;"> </span></o:p></div>
<br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;">
<o:p><span style="font-family: Calibri;"> </span></o:p></div>
<br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;">
<o:p><span style="font-family: Calibri;"> </span></o:p></div>
<br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;">
<o:p><span style="font-family: Calibri;"> </span></o:p></div>
Hugh Woodhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/01021049579391065763noreply@blogger.com2tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2321320695584069696.post-34192973953595756892012-04-09T22:57:00.007-07:002012-04-09T23:31:52.574-07:00Notes Concerning The Legal Aspects of Death and Dying :: A College Lecture<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhtofQ7vEdwq2kIus9Hl5qjdK6_3AKEetFKo0TBgXDcpOsEb2DxgwIcq36J2XY1g5Yl4Qdan76Ctd8ZkUhntMqxAfjMEl8Iv0IxpgnoEsIA6SXNox57OVyhqnCT31XRnXqJtL8OCR4JAvxv/s1600/Hugh+Wood.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="clear: right; float: right; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-left: 1em;"><img border="0" height="320" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhtofQ7vEdwq2kIus9Hl5qjdK6_3AKEetFKo0TBgXDcpOsEb2DxgwIcq36J2XY1g5Yl4Qdan76Ctd8ZkUhntMqxAfjMEl8Iv0IxpgnoEsIA6SXNox57OVyhqnCT31XRnXqJtL8OCR4JAvxv/s320/Hugh+Wood.jpg" width="208" /></a><span style="font-size: large;"><span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;"><strong><span style="font-size: x-large;">Notes Concerning the Legal Aspects of Death and Dying: Presented at Perimeter College on April 11, 2012</span></strong><span style="font-size: small;"> </span></span></span></div><span style="font-size: large;"></span><br />
<span style="font-size: large;"></span><br />
<span style="font-size: large;"></span><br />
<span style="font-size: large;"><div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><br />
</div><div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="color: #333333; font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 13.5pt; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman";"><span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;">Hugh Wood, Esq.</span></span><span style="color: #333333; font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12pt; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman";"><br />
<span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;"> </span></span><span style="color: #333333; font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 13.5pt; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman";"><span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;">Wood & Meredith, LLP</span></span><span style="color: #333333; font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12pt; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman";"><br />
<span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;"> </span></span><span style="color: #333333; font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 13.5pt; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman";"><span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;">3756 LaVista Road</span></span><span style="color: #333333; font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12pt; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman";"><br />
<span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;"> </span></span><span style="color: #333333; font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 13.5pt; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman";"><span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;">Suite 250</span></span><span style="color: #333333; font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12pt; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman";"><br />
<span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;"> </span></span><span style="color: #333333; font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 13.5pt; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman";"><span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;">Atlanta (Tucker), GA 30084</span></span></div><div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="color: #333333; font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 13.5pt; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman";"></span><span style="color: #333333; font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12pt; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman";"><a href="http://www.woodandmeredith.com/"><span style="color: #336688; font-size: 13.5pt; mso-bidi-font-size: 11.0pt; text-decoration: none; text-underline: none;"><span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;">www.woodandmeredith.com</span></span></a><br />
<span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;"> </span><a href="mailto:hwood@woodandmeredith.com"><span style="color: #336688; font-size: 13.5pt; mso-bidi-font-size: 11.0pt; text-decoration: none; text-underline: none;"><span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;">hwood@woodandmeredith.com</span></span></a><br />
<span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;"> </span><a href="http://www.hughwood.blogspot.com/"><span style="color: #336688; font-size: 13.5pt; mso-bidi-font-size: 11.0pt; text-decoration: none; text-underline: none;"><span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;">www.hughwood.blogspot.com</span></span></a><br />
<span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;"> </span></span><span style="color: #333333; font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 13.5pt; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman";"><span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;">Phone: 404-633-4100</span></span><span style="color: #333333; font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12pt; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman";"><br />
<span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;"> </span></span><span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;"><span style="color: #333333; font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 13.5pt; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman";">Fax: 404-633-0068</span><span style="color: #333333; font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12pt; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman";"><o:p></o:p></span></span></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;"></span></div></span><br />
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: small;"> </span></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><br />
</div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: left;"><br />
</div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: left;"><br />
</div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: x-large;"><strong>I. A Death Certificate is Required at Death in Georgia</strong></span></div><br />
<br />
<b><span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;">CODE OF GEORGIA</span></b><br />
<div id="nllheader"><nlltitle><span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;"> </span><b><span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;">Title 31. HEALTH</span></b></nlltitle><nllchapter><span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;"> </span><b><span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;">Chapter 10. VITAL RECORDS</span></b></nllchapter><span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;"> </span><i><span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;"> </span></i><br />
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<div class="currency"></div></div><b><span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;"><nllcodesect>OCGA § 31-10-15. </nllcodesect><nllcatch>Death Certificate; Filing; Medical Certification; Forwarding Death Certificate To Decedent's County Of Residence; Purging Voter Registration List </nllcatch></span></b><br />
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<span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;">(a) A certificate of death for each death which occurs in this state shall be filed with the local registrar of the county in which the death occurred or the body was found within ten days after the death as follows: </span><br />
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<span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;">(1) If the place of death is unknown but the dead body is found in this state, the certificate of death shall be completed and filed in accordance with this Code section. The place where the body is found shall be shown as the place of death. If the date of death is unknown, it shall be the date the body was found and the certificate marked as such; or </span><br />
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<span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;">(2) When death occurs in a moving conveyance in the United States and the body is first removed from the conveyance in this state, the death shall be registered in this state and the place where it is first removed shall be considered the place of death. When a death occurs on a moving conveyance while in international waters or airspace or in a foreign country or its airspace and the body is first removed from the conveyance in this state, the death shall be registered in this state but the certificate shall show the actual place of death insofar as can be determined.</span><br />
<span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;"> </span><br />
<span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;">(b) The funeral director or person acting as such who first assumes custody of the dead body shall file the certificate of death. Such director or person shall obtain the personal data from the next of kin or the best qualified person or source available and shall obtain the medical certification from the person responsible therefor.</span><br />
<span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;"> </span><br />
<span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;">(c) The medical certification as to the cause and circumstances of death shall be completed, signed, and returned to the funeral director or person acting as such within 72 hours after death by the physician in charge of the patient's care for the illness or condition which resulted in death, except when inquiry is required by Article 2 of Chapter 16 of Title 45, the "Georgia Death Investigation Act." In the absence of said physician or with that physician's approval the certificate may be completed and signed by an associate physician, the chief medical officer of the institution in which death occurred, or the physician who performed an autopsy upon the decedent, provided that such individual has access to the medical history of the case, views the deceased at or after death, and death is due to natural causes.</span><br />
<span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;"> </span><br />
<span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;">(d) When death occurs without medical attendance as set forth in subsection (c) of this Code section or when inquiry is required by Article 2 of Chapter 16 of Title 45, the "Georgia Death Investigation Act," the proper person shall investigate the cause of death and shall complete and sign the medical certification portion of the death certificate within 30 days after being notified of the death.</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;">(e) If the cause of death cannot be determined within 48 hours after death, the medical certification shall be completed as provided by regulation. The attending physician or coroner shall give the funeral director or person acting as such notice of the reason for the delay, and final disposition of the body shall not be made until authorized by the attending physician, coroner, or medical examiner.</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;">(f) When death occurs on or after July 1, 1985, in a county other than the county of the residence of the deceased person, a copy of such person's death certificate shall be forwarded as soon as practicable by the department to the custodian of records of the county of the residence of such deceased person. The custodian of records shall file such death certificate as a part of the permanent records of such office.</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;">(g) By the twentieth day of each month, the state registrar shall furnish to the Secretary of State's office, in a format prescribed by the Secretary's office, a list of those persons for whom death certificates have been filed during the preceding month. Such list shall be used by the Secretary of State to notify local registration officers for the purpose of purging the voter registration list of each county.</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: x-large;"><strong>II. Illegal to Abandon a Dead Body. (Felony)</strong></span><br />
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<div id="nllheader"><span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;"> </span><b><span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;">CODE OF GEORGIA</span></b><br />
<nlltitle><span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;"> </span><b><span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;">Title 31. HEALTH</span></b></nlltitle><nllchapter><span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;"> </span><b><span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;">Chapter 21. DEAD BODIES</span></b></nllchapter><nllarticle><span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;"> </span><b><span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;">Article 3. OFFENSES</span></b></nllarticle><span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;"> </span><i><span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;"> </span></i><br />
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<i><div class="currency"><span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;">Current through Chapter 419 of the 2012 Legislative Session</span></div></i><span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;"> </span></div><b><span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;"><nllcodesect>OCGA § 31-21-44.2. </nllcodesect><nllcatch>Abandonment of a Dead Body </nllcatch></span></b><br />
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<span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;">(a)(1) Any person who throws away or abandons any dead human body or portion of such dead body shall commit the offense of abandonment of a dead body. </span><br />
<span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;"> </span><br />
<span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;">(2) It shall not be an offense under this subsection to make final disposition of a dead human body or portion of such dead body under a death certificate issued under Chapter 10 of this title or the law of another jurisdiction by interment, entombment, inurnment, scattering of cremated remains, burial at sea, or any means otherwise authorized by law; nor shall it be an offense under this subsection for any law enforcement personnel, medical or medical laboratory personnel, hospital personnel, coroner or medical examiner, funeral director, embalmer, crematory operator, or cemetery operator to perform those duties or acts relating to possession or disposition of a dead human body or portion of such dead body which are otherwise imposed or authorized by law or lawful contract; nor shall use of a dead human body or portion of such dead body at or by an accredited medical school, dental school, college, or university for education, research, or advancement of medical or dental science or therapy be an offense under this subsection.</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;">(b) Any person who commits an offense of abandonment of a dead body as provided by subsection (a) of this Code section shall be guilty of a felony and shall be punished by imprisonment for not less than one nor more than three years.</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: x-large;"><strong>III. The Georgia Directive for Health Care Decisions</strong></span><br />
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<span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: x-large;"><strong></strong></span><span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: medium;">The new Georgia Advance Directive for Healthcare replaces Living Wills and Durable Power of Attorney</span><br />
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<div class="MsoNormal" style="background: white; margin: 0in 3.75pt 10pt 0in;"><em><span style="color: black; font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 9pt; line-height: 115%;">October 16, 2007</span></em></div><div class="MsoNormal" style="background: white; margin: 0in 3.75pt 10pt 0in;"><span style="color: black; font-size: 9pt; line-height: 115%;"><span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;">ATLANTA (GA) – The Department of Human Resources Division of Aging Services (DAS) informs Georgians that as of July 1, 2007, the new Georgia Advance Directive for Healthcare has replaced the Georgia laws on the Living Will and the Durable Power of Attorney for Healthcare. This document combines the characteristics of both the living will and the durable power of attorney for healthcare and still allows people to choose for themselves the medical care they want when they are no longer able to communicate with doctors or family. Those persons who already had living wills and/or durable powers of attorney for healthcare are allowed to keep the forms that they have and they are still legally binding until they are revoked. The Durable Power of Attorney for H ealthcare was repealed or removed from the law and the Living Will law was completely rewritten and replaced. For a copy of the Georgia Advance Directive for Healthcare, go online at </span><a href="http://www.aging.dhr.georgia.gov/"><span style="color: blue; font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;">www.aging.dhr.georgia.gov</span></a><span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;"> and click on Publications on the left.</span></span></div><div class="MsoNormal" style="background: white; margin: 0in 3.75pt 10pt 0in;"><span style="color: black; font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 9pt; line-height: 115%;">"Having one document to fill out will simplify the process for people choosing to decide for themselves the medical care they want when they are unable to communicate with others," said Maria Greene, Director of DAS. "We encourage individuals to go to our website to obtain a copy of the new Georgia Advance Directive for Healthcare."</span></div><div class="MsoNormal" style="background: white; margin: 0in 3.75pt 10pt 0in;"><span style="color: black; font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 9pt; line-height: 115%;">Like the living will, the Georgia Advance Directive for Healthcare allows for withholding or withdrawing treatment and authorizes a person’s doctor to withhold or withdraw certain medical procedures such as a respirator or ventilator in certain conditions. It also permits one to choose to accept or refuse artificial nutrition or hydration-feeding tubes. And like the former durable power of attorney for healthcare, the Georgia Advance Directive for Healthcare allows one to appoint an agent to carry out many more medical treatment decisions and choose the kinds of medical treatment they do or do not want.</span></div><div class="MsoNormal" style="background: white; margin: 0in 3.75pt 10pt 0in;"><span style="color: black; font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 9pt; line-height: 115%;">The changes by the 2007 Georgia General Assembly were made to reduce confusion, inconsistency, out-of-date terminology and confusing and inconsistent requirements for execution as well as to follow trends set by other states to combine the concepts of the living will and healthcare agency into a single legal document.</span></div><div class="MsoNormal" style="background: white; margin: 0in 3.75pt 10pt 0in;"><span style="color: black; font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 9pt; line-height: 115%;">Once the Georgia Advance Directive for Healthcare is signed, the person should have several copies made. The originals should be kept with your other important papers, such as your Last Will and Testament. These papers should be kept in a place where someone can find them. Copies should be given to your family members and your doctors. These documents can be revoked at any time.</span></div><div class="MsoNormal" style="background: white; margin: 0in 3.75pt 10pt 0in;"><span style="color: black; font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 9pt; line-height: 115%;">A Georgia Advance Directive for Healthcare allows people to retain control over their medical care, even if they are no longer able to communicate. Making decisions about this document should help individuals and their families rest easier, knowing that their wishes about their care are known. The law does not require a person to consult an attorney or a physician when executing these documents, but if someone has questions about them, it is a good idea.</span></div><div class="MsoNormal" style="background: white; margin: 0in 3.75pt 10pt 0in;"><span style="color: black; font-size: 9pt; line-height: 115%;"><span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;">The Division of Aging Services provides free information forms on the Georgia Advance Directive for Healthcare. For more information, contact the Division of Aging Services at 404-657-5319 or go to the Division’s website at </span><a href="http://www.aging.dhr.georgia.gov/"><span style="color: blue; font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;">www.aging.dhr.georgia.gov</span></a><span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;"> and click on Publications on the left.<o:p></o:p></span></span></div><br />
<span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;">You can download the Advance Directive here or get it off the DHR . GEORGIA . GOV website.</span><br />
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<a href="http://www.docstoc.com/docs/118231651/advance-directive"><span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;">http://www.docstoc.com/docs/118231651/advance-directive</span></a><br />
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<span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;">A General Power of Attorney (Georgia) may be downloaded at:</span><br />
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<a href="http://www.docstoc.com/docs/118237101/Georgia-General-Power-of-Attorney-Form"><span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;">http://www.docstoc.com/docs/118237101/Georgia-General-Power-of-Attorney-Form</span></a><br />
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<span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: x-large;"><strong>IV. The Five (5) Year Look Back Rule for Medicaid / Nursing Home Care :: Disposing of Assets for Nursing Care</strong></span><br />
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[This overview refers to New York. The Georgia Asset limitations are listed below]<br />
<span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;">Q. IF MY SPOUSE IS GOING INTO A NURSING HOME, CAN HE OR SHE TRANSFER ALL OF HIS OR HER ASSETS TO ME AND QUALIFY FOR MEDICAID? </span><br />
<div align="justify"><span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;"><b>A.</b> No. To determine the eligibility of the spouse who is going into the nursing home to receive Medicaid, all of the non-exempt assets held by the husband or wife are added together and then the total divided equally between the spouses. To the extent the healthy spouse's half exceeds $74,820, in New York State, the Community Spouse Resource Allowance, (CSRA), the excess is attributed to the spouse going into the nursing home, thereby disqualifying the spouse going into the nursing home from receiving Medicaid. </span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;">The spouse outside of the nursing home can retain $74,820 in New York State, the CSRA, in otherwise non-exclude able assets, plus homestead, plus personal property, plus a burial reserve, plus an automobile and set up certain burial space agreements for children, their spouses. brothers, sisters and their spouses, etc. pursuant to strict rules set forth in an Administrative Directive issued in July, 2011, which must be carefully followed. You can protect a substantial amount of your assets if burial space agreements for family members are used correctly. Interest on burial accounts is also exempt for Medicaid purposes.<br />
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While the Community Spouse Resource Allowance (CSRA) can be as high as $109,560 for seniors with a large amount of assets, this higher CSRA results in the payment of more of your assets for nursing home costs. <br />
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It is important to understand that under New York law: <br />
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1. A spouse is charged with legal responsibility for the other spouse's nursing home costs. This means that the income and resources of the healthy spouse are considered as available to the Medicaid applicant spouse who is going into a nursing home and will be considered in determining if that spouse qualifies for Medicaid, and <br />
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2. If the healthy spouse has assets in excess of $74,820, those excess assets must be spent on medical care until the healthy spouse's assets are down to $74,820, and <br />
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3. If the healthy spouse's monthly income is more than $2,739 per month, the local Social Services Department will normally require 25% of the excess income to be spent on the nursing home costs of the spouse in the nursing home.<br />
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4. If the total income of both spouses does not exceed $2,739 per month, all of the total income can go to the healthy spouse, even if their spouse is in a nursing home. <br />
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5. The healthy spouse can refuse to support the spouse in the nursing home, but then the Department of Social Services has the right to sue the healthy spouse to recover money it pays for the nursing home costs of the spouse in the nursing home. Doing what is called a "spousal refusal" may make sense in certain situations because the Medicaid rate is less than the private pay rate. <br />
</span><span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;"><strong>5. Q. HOW MUCH INCOME CAN I MAKE AND QUALIFY FOR MEDICAID<br />
</strong> A. Any person over 64 whose net income is less than $767 per month, plus an unearned income credit of $20 ($1,117 for a couple) per month, plus an unearned income credit of $20 for some couples) has satisfied the income means test for SSI related Medicaid. A single individual residing in a nursing home is permitted only $50 per month as a personal needs allowance, plus assets of $13,800 ($20,100 for a couple) plus a burial reserve. (Caution: under New York's new Estate Recovery law, passed April 1, 2011, if the person on Medicaid has this $13,800 exempt amount or any lesser amount of money in a joint account at the time of death, Medicaid can get a lien on those funds at the time of the Medicaid recipients death. Therefore planning needs to be done after the Medicaid recipient is on Medicaid and before the Medicaid recipient passes away to protect even the $13,800 exempt amount from Medicaid's lien under the new law.) You can set up a trust with a funeral director to prepay funeral expenses and the money in the trust will not be counted as a resource for Medicaid as long as any money not spent on the funeral is turned over to the Medicaid upon the senior's death. Caution, at the current time, only the cost of the vault, burial container, opening and closing of the grave, plot, stone and casket are treated as exempt for the community spouse, as opposed to the Medicaid applicant. (Car and personal residence may be exempt.) The law provides that the spouse of an individual who has established his or her eligibility for Medicaid is entitled to a monthly income not to exceed $2,739 per month. <br />
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6.Q. CAN I TRANSFER MY ASSETS TO MY CHILDREN OR OTHER FAMILY MEMBERS JUST BEFORE I GO INTO A NURSING HOME?<br />
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A. LAW IN EFFECT AFTER FEBRUARY 8, 2006<strong>.</strong> There is a new law in effect after February 8th, 2006 that will change previous law drastically. The bottom line is that under the new law there is a five year look back period and any assets transferred within 5 years of you going into a nursing home and making a Medicaid application will disqualify you from receiving Medicaid until that penalty period has run. <strong><u>Under the old law before February 8th, 2006</u></strong>, there was a Thirty Six Month Rule (applicable to outright transfers) and a Sixty Month Rule (applicable to certain transfers in trust). Eligibility for medical benefits is denied for a period of time if the person going into the nursing home transferred assets for less than fair market value within thirty six or sixty months before his or her application for Medicaid benefits. Under the old law which applies to transfers made before February 8, 2006, the period of ineligibility begins the first day of the month following the month in which the resources were transferred and lasts for a number of months equal to the total value of the transferred property divided by the average cost of nursing home care to a private patient in that region of the state. (Currently $7,688 per month in central New York State and higher in other areas of New York). <strong><u>Under the new law</u></strong>, the penalty period doesn't start to run the first day of the month after the month of the transfer, it starts to run much later, in essence, the penalty period starts to run on the date you are both: 1. in the nursing home <strong><u>and</u></strong> 2. would otherwise qualify for Medicaid, if you hadn't made the transfers. So any transfers within 5 years of applying for Medicaid result in a penalty period preventing you from qualifying for Medicaid, calculated by taking the amount you transferred within 5 years and dividing it by $8,015 (in central NY). Source: </span><span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;"><span style="font-size: medium;">Law Offices of D. Victor Pellegrino</span>Attorney at Law, 2627 Genesee Street, Utica, New York 13501, Phone (315) 733-0417, Fax (315) 792-8075.</span></div><div align="justify"><br />
</div></div><span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;">More complete information on the Five Year Lookback may be found at:</span><br />
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<a href="http://estateandelderlaw.com/ep_pg2.htm"><span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;">http://estateandelderlaw.com/ep_pg2.htm</span></a><br />
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<span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;">Additional information on the Asset Limitation is specific to <strong><u>Georgia</u></strong> is:</span><br />
<h1><span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: small;">Key Medicaid Information for Georgia for 2012</span></h1><h2><span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: small;">Protections for the Community Spouse</span></h2><table border="0" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0"><tbody>
<tr><td><span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;">Community Spouse Resource Allowance (CSRA):</span></td><td><span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;">Minimum: $113,640<br />
Maximum: $113,640</span></td></tr>
<tr><td><span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;">Increased CSRA:</span></td><td><span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;">Permitted, with fair hearing.</span></td></tr>
<tr><td><span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;">Annuities:</span></td><td><span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;">Actuarially sound annuities are permitted.</span></td></tr>
<tr><td><span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;">Monthly Maintenance Needs Allowance:</span></td><td><span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;">Minimum: $2,841<br />
Maximum: $2,841</span></td></tr>
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</tbody></table><h2><span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: small;">Transfers</span></h2><table border="0" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0"><tbody>
<tr><td><span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;">Average monthly cost of nursing home care according to state:</span></td><td><span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;">$4,916.55</span></td></tr>
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<tr><td><span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;">Has a Long-Term Care Partnership program been implemented?</span></td><td><span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;">Yes</span></td></tr>
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</tbody></table><h2><span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: small;">Income</span></h2><table border="0" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0"><tbody>
<tr><td><span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;">Is the state an income cap state?</span></td><td><span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;">Yes. </span></td></tr>
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</tbody></table><h2><span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: small;">Estate Recovery</span></h2><table border="0" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0"><tbody>
<tr><td><span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;">Has the state expanded the definition of estate beyond the probate estate?</span></td><td><span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;">Yes</span></td></tr>
<tr><td><span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;">Has the state included a hardship provision in its estate recovery plan?</span></td><td><span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;">Yes</span></td></tr>
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</tbody></table><h2><span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: small;">Home Equity Limit</span></h2><table border="0" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0"><tbody>
<tr><td><span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;">The state Medicaid program will not cover long-term care services for those with home equity above this limit, with certain exceptions.</span></td><td><span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;">$525,000</span></td></tr>
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</tbody></table><span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;"></span><br />
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<span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;"><hr width="100%" /></span><span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;"><em>This information was kindly provided by Ruthann P. Lacey quali</em><em>fied elder law attorney in Tucker, GA.</em></span><br />
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<em><span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;">Contact Ruthann at:</span></em><br />
<span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;">Ms. Ruthann P. Lacey <br />
Company: Ruthann P. Lacey, P.C. <br />
Address: 3541-E Habersham At Northlake<br />
Tucker, GA 30084 <br />
Phone: (770) 939-4616 <br />
Fax: (770) 939-1758 <br />
Email: </span><a href="mailto:rlacey@elderlaw-lacey.com"><span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;">rlacey@elderlaw-lacey.com</span></a><span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;"> <br />
Admit Date: 01/27/1993<br />
Law School: Emory University </span><br />
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<span style="font-size: x-large;"><strong>V. The Testate Estate ( Dying With A Will )</strong></span></span><br />
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<span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;">Last Will and Testament Law</span><br />
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<div id="nllheader"><span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;"> </span><b><span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;">CODE OF GEORGIA</span></b><br />
<nlltitle><span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;"> </span><b><span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;">Title 53. WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ADMINISTRATION OF ESTATES</span></b></nlltitle><nllchapter><span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;"> </span><b><span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;">Chapter 4. WILLS</span></b></nllchapter><nllarticle><span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;"> </span><b><span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;">Article 1. GENERAL PROVISIONS</span></b></nllarticle><span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;"> </span><i><span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;"> </span></i><br />
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<i><div class="currency"><span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;">Current through Chapter 54 of the 2011 Special Session</span></div></i><span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;"> </span><br />
<span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;">Definitions are at [1]</span></div><span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;"> </span><br />
<b><span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;"><nllcodesect>OCGA § 53-4-1. </nllcodesect><nllcatch>Power Of Testator </nllcatch></span></b><br />
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<span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;">A testator, by will, may make any disposition of property that is not inconsistent with the laws or contrary to the public policy of the state and may give all the property to strangers, to the exclusion of the testator's spouse and descendants.</span><br />
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<b><span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;"><nllcodesect>OCGA § 53-4-2. </nllcodesect><nllcatch>When Will Takes Effect </nllcatch></span></b><br />
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<span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;">A will shall take effect instantly upon the death of the testator however long probate may be postponed.</span><br />
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<b><span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;"><nllcodesect>OCGA § 53-4-3. </nllcodesect><nllcatch>Determination Whether Instrument Is Will </nllcatch></span></b><br />
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<span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;">No particular form is necessary to constitute a will. To determine whether an instrument is a will, the test is the intention of the maker to be gathered from the whole instrument, read in light of the surrounding circumstances. If the intention is to convey a present interest, though the possession is postponed until after death, the instrument is not a will. If the intention is to convey an interest accruing and having effect only at death, the instrument is a will.</span><br />
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<div id="nllheader"><span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;"> </span><b><span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;">CODE OF GEORGIA</span></b><br />
<nlltitle><span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;"> </span><b><span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;">Title 53. WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ADMINISTRATION OF ESTATES</span></b></nlltitle><nllchapter><span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;"> </span><b><span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;">Chapter 4. WILLS</span></b></nllchapter><nllarticle><span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;"> </span><b><span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;">Article 2. TESTAMENTARY CAPACITY</span></b></nllarticle><span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;"> </span><i><span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;"> </span></i><br />
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<i><div class="currency"><span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;">Current through Chapter 54 of the 2011 Special Session</span></div></i><span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;"> </span></div><span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;"> </span><br />
<b><span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;"><nllcodesect>OCGA § 53-4-10. </nllcodesect><nllcatch>Minimum Age; Conviction Of Crime </nllcatch></span></b><br />
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<span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;">(a) Every individual 14 years of age or older may make a will, unless laboring under some legal disability arising either from a want of capacity or a want of perfect liberty of action.</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;">(b) An individual who has been convicted of a crime shall not be deprived of the power to make a will.</span><br />
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<b><span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;"><nllcodesect>OCGA § 53-4-11. </nllcodesect><nllcatch>Decided And Rational Desire; Incapacity To Contract; Insanity; Advanced Age Or Eccentricity </nllcatch></span></b><br />
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<span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;">(a) Testamentary capacity exists when the testator has a decided and rational desire as to the disposition of property.</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;">(b) An incapacity to contract may coexist with the capacity to make a will.</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;">(c) An insane individual generally may not make a will except during a lucid interval. A monomaniac may make a will if the will is in no way connected with the monomania. In all such cases, it must appear that the will expresses the wishes of the testator unbiased by the insanity or monomania with which the testator is affected.</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;">(d) Neither advancing age nor weakness of intellect nor eccentricity of habit or thought is inconsistent with the capacity to make a will.</span><br />
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<b><span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;"><nllcodesect>OCGA § 53-4-12. </nllcodesect><nllcatch>Freedom Of Volition </nllcatch></span></b><br />
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<span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;">A will must be freely and voluntarily executed. A will is not valid if anything destroys the testator's freedom of volition, such as fraudulent practices upon the testator's fears, affections, or sympathies; misrepresentation; duress; or undue influence whereby the will of another is substituted for the wishes of the testator.</span><br />
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<div id="nllheader"><span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;"> </span><b><span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;">CODE OF GEORGIA</span></b><br />
<nlltitle><span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;"> </span><b><span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;">Title 53. WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ADMINISTRATION OF ESTATES</span></b></nlltitle><nllchapter><span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;"> </span><b><span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;">Chapter 4. WILLS</span></b></nllchapter><nllarticle><span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;"> </span><b><span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;">Article 3. EXECUTION AND ATTESTATION</span></b></nllarticle><span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;"> </span><i><span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;"> </span></i><br />
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<i><div class="currency"><span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;">Current through Chapter 54 of the 2011 Special Session</span></div></i><span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;"> </span></div><span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;"> </span><br />
<b><span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;"><nllcodesect>OCGA § 53-4-20. </nllcodesect><nllcatch>Required Writing; Signing; Witnesses; Codicil </nllcatch></span></b><br />
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<span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;">(a) A will shall be in writing and shall be signed by the testator or by some other individual in the testator's presence and at the testator's express direction. A testator may sign by mark or by any name that is intended to authenticate the instrument as the testator's will.</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;">(b) A will shall be attested and subscribed in the presence of the testator by two or more competent witnesses. A witness to a will may attest by mark. Another individual may not subscribe the name of a witness, even in that witness's presence and at that witness's direction.</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;">(c) A codicil shall be executed by the testator and attested and subscribed by witnesses with the same formality as a will.</span><br />
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<b><span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;"><nllcodesect>OCGA § 53-4-21. </nllcodesect><nllcatch>Knowledge Of Contents Of Will By Testator </nllcatch></span></b><br />
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<span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;">Knowledge of the contents of a will by the testator is necessary to the validity of a will. If the testator can read, the testator's signature or acknowledgment of that signature is presumed to show such knowledge.</span><br />
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<b><span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;"><nllcodesect>OCGA § 53-4-22. </nllcodesect><nllcatch>Competency Of Witness </nllcatch></span></b><br />
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<span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;">(a) Any individual who is competent to be a witness and age 14 or over may witness a will.</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;">(b) If a witness is competent at the time of attesting the will, the subsequent incompetence of the witness shall not prevent the probate of the will.</span><br />
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<b><span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;"><nllcodesect>OCGA § 53-4-23. </nllcodesect><nllcatch>Testamentary Gift To Witness Or Witness's Spouse </nllcatch></span></b><br />
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<span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;">(a) If a subscribing witness is also a beneficiary under the will, the witness shall be competent; but the testamentary gift to the witness shall be void unless there are at least two other subscribing witnesses to the will who are not beneficiaries under the will.</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;">(b) An individual may be a witness to a will by which a testamentary gift is given to that individual's spouse, the fact going only to the credibility of the witness.</span><br />
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<b><span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;"><nllcodesect>OCGA § 53-4-24. </nllcodesect><nllcatch>Self-proved Will Or Codicil </nllcatch></span></b><br />
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<span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;">(a) At the time of its execution or at any subsequent date during the lifetime of the testator and the witnesses, a will or codicil may be made self-proved and the testimony of the witnesses in the probate regarding such will may be made unnecessary by the affidavits of the testator and the attesting witnesses made before a notary public. The affidavit and certificate provided in subsection (b) of this Code section shall be the only prerequisites of a self-proved will or codicil.</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;">(b) The affidavit shall be evidenced by a certificate, affixed with the official seal of the notary public, that is attached or annexed to the will or codicil, in form and content substantially as follows: </span><br />
<pre style="font-family: "Courier New"; font-weight: bold; white-space: pre;"><span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;"> STATE OF GEORGIA
COUNTY of ___________
Before me, the undersigned authority, on this day personally
appeared _______________________, ______________________, and
_______________________, known to me to be the testator and the
witnesses, respectively, whose names are subscribed to the annexed
or foregoing instrument in their respective capacities, and all of
said individuals being by me duly sworn, _______________________,
testator, declared to me and to the witnesses in my presence that
said instrument is the last will and testament or a codicil to the
last will and testament of the testator and that the testator had
willingly made and executed it as a free act and deed for the
purposes expressed therein. The witnesses, each on oath, stated
to me in the presence and hearing of the testator that the
testator had declared to them that the instrument is the
testator's last will and testament or a codicil to the testator's
last will and testament and that the testator executed the
instrument as such and wished each of them to sign it as a
witness; and under oath each witness stated further that the
witness had signed the same as witness in the presence of the
testator and at the testator's request; that the testator was 14
years of age or over and of sound mind; and that each of the
witnesses was then at least 14 years of age.
_______________________
Testator
_______________________
Witness
_______________________
Witness
Sworn to and subscribed before me by _______________________,
testator, and sworn to and subscribed before me by
_______________________ and _______________________, witnesses,
this ______ day of ______________, ____.
(SEAL)
(Signed)______________________________
(Official Capacity of Officer)
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<span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;">(c) A self-proved will or codicil may be admitted to probate without the testimony of any subscribing witness, but otherwise it shall be treated no differently from a will or codicil that is not self-proved. In particular, without limiting the generality of the foregoing sentence, a self-proved will or codicil may be contested, revoked, or amended in exactly the same fashion as a will or codicil that is not self-proved.</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;"> </span></div><span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: x-large;"><strong>VI. The Intestate Testate Estate ( Dying Without a Will )</strong></span><br />
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<div id="nllheader"><span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;"> </span><b><span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;">CODE OF GEORGIA</span></b><br />
<nlltitle><span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;"> </span><b><span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;">Title 53. WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ADMINISTRATION OF ESTATES</span></b></nlltitle><nllchapter><span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;"> </span><b><span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;">Chapter 2. DESCENT AND DISTRIBUTION</span></b></nllchapter><nllarticle><span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;"> </span><b><span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;">Article 1. GENERAL PROVISIONS</span></b></nllarticle><span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;"> </span><i><span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;"> </span></i><br />
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<b><span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;"><nllcodesect>OCGA § 53-2-1. </nllcodesect><nllcatch>Rules of Inheritance when Decedent Dies without Will </nllcatch></span></b><br />
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<span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;">(a) As used in this Code section, the term:</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;">(1) "Abandon" means that a parent of a minor child, without justifiable cause, fails to communicate with the minor child, care for the minor child, and provide for the minor child's support as required by law or judicial decree for a period of at least one year immediately prior to the date of the death of the minor.</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;">(2) "Abandonment" means the act of abandoning.</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;">(3) "Minor child" means a person who is less than 18 years of age.</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;">(b) For purposes of this Code section:</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;">(1) Children of the decedent who are born after the decedent's death are considered children in being at the decedent's death, provided they were conceived prior to the decedent's death, were born within ten months of the decedent's death, and survived 120 hours or more after birth; and</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;">(2) The half-blood, whether on the maternal or paternal side, are considered equally with the whole-blood, so that the children of any common parent are treated as brothers and sisters to each other.</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;">(c) Except as provided in subsection (d) of this Code section, when a decedent died without a will, the following rules shall determine such decedent's heirs:</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;">(1) Upon the death of an individual who is survived by a spouse but not by any child or other descendant, the spouse is the sole heir. If the decedent is also survived by any child or other descendant, the spouse shall share equally with the children, with the descendants of any deceased child taking that child's share, per stirpes; provided, however, that the spouse's portion shall not be less than a one-third share;</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;">(2) If the decedent is not survived by a spouse, the heirs shall be those relatives, as provided in this Code section, who are in the nearest degree to the decedent in which there is any survivor;</span><br />
<span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;"> </span><br />
<span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;">(3) Children of the decedent are in the first degree, and those who survive the decedent shall share the estate equally, with the descendants of any deceased child taking, per stirpes, the share that child would have taken if in life;</span><br />
<span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;"> </span><br />
<span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;">(4) Parents of the decedent are in the second degree, and those who survive the decedent shall share the estate equally;</span><br />
<span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;"> </span><br />
<span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;">(5) Siblings of the decedent are in the third degree, and those who survive the decedent shall share the estate equally, with the descendants of any deceased sibling taking, per stirpes, the share that sibling would have taken if in life; provided, however, that, subject to the provisions of paragraph (1) of subsection (f) of Code Section </span><a class="CodeLink" href="http://www.itislaw.com/NLLXML/getcode.asp?userid=PRODSG&interface=&statecd=GA&codesec=53-1-20&sessionyr=2011&Title=53&datatype=S&noheader=1&nojumpmsg=0"><span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;">53-1-20</span></a><span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;">, if no sibling survives the decedent, the nieces and nephews who survive the decedent shall take the estate in equal shares, with the descendants of any deceased niece or nephew taking, per stirpes, the share that niece or nephew would have taken if in life;</span><br />
<span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;"> </span><br />
<span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;">(6) Grandparents of the decedent are in the fourth degree, and those who survive the decedent shall share the estate equally;</span><br />
<span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;"> </span><br />
<span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;">(7) Uncles and aunts of the decedent are in the fifth degree, and those who survive the decedent shall share the estate equally, with the children of any deceased uncle or aunt taking, per stirpes, the share that uncle or aunt would have taken if in life; provided, however, that, subject to the provisions of paragraph (1) of subsection (f) of Code Section </span><a class="CodeLink" href="http://www.itislaw.com/NLLXML/getcode.asp?userid=PRODSG&interface=&statecd=GA&codesec=53-1-20&sessionyr=2011&Title=53&datatype=S&noheader=1&nojumpmsg=0"><span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;">53-1-20</span></a><span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;">, if no uncle or aunt of the decedent survives the decedent, the first cousins who survive the decedent shall share the estate equally; and</span><br />
<span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;"> </span><br />
<span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;">(8) The more remote degrees of kinship shall be determined by counting the number of steps in the chain from the relative to the closest common ancestor of the relative and decedent and the number of steps in the chain from the common ancestor to the decedent. The sum of the steps in the two chains shall be the degree of kinship, and the surviving relatives with the lowest sum shall be in the nearest degree and shall share the estate equally.</span><br />
<span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;"> </span><br />
<span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;">(d) Except as provided in Code Sections </span><a class="CodeLink" href="http://www.itislaw.com/NLLXML/getcode.asp?userid=PRODSG&interface=&statecd=GA&codesec=19-7-1&sessionyr=2011&Title=19&datatype=S&noheader=1&nojumpmsg=0"><span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;">19-7-1</span></a><span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;"> and </span><a class="CodeLink" href="http://www.itislaw.com/NLLXML/getcode.asp?userid=PRODSG&interface=&statecd=GA&codesec=51-4-4&sessionyr=2011&Title=51&datatype=S&noheader=1&nojumpmsg=0"><span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;">51-4-4</span></a><span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;"> for the right of recovery for the wrongful death of a child, when a minor child dies without a will, a parent who willfully abandoned his or her minor child and has maintained such abandonment shall lose all right to intestate succession to the minor child's estate and shall not have the right to administer the minor child's estate. A parent who has been deprived of the custody of his or her minor child under an order of a court of competent jurisdiction and who has substantially complied with the support requirements of the order shall not be barred from inheriting from the minor child's estate.</span><br />
<span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;"> </span><br />
<span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;">(e) For cases in which abandonment is alleged, the moving party shall file a motion with the probate court requesting the judge to determine the issue of abandonment and shall serve all parties as set forth in subsection (f) of this Code section. A hearing shall be conducted and all parties shall have the opportunity to present evidence regarding the party's relationship with the decedent. The burden of proof to show an abandonment is on the person asserting the abandonment by clear and convincing evidence.</span><br />
<span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;"> </span><br />
<span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;">(f) All parties to a motion filed pursuant to subsection (e) of this Code section shall be served in accordance with Chapter 11 of this title. If a party cannot be personally served and the party's interest in an estate is subject to forfeiture pursuant to subsection (d) of this Code section, the judge shall appoint a guardian ad litem for the party. If a party cannot be personally served, the citation shall also be published in the newspaper in which sheriff's advertisements are published in the county where the party was last known to reside.</span><br />
<span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;"> </span><br />
<span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;">(g) In the event that a parent is disqualified from taking a distributive share in the estate of a decedent under subsection (d) of this Code section, the estate of such decedent shall be distributed in accordance with subsection (c) of this Code section as though the parent had predeceased the decedent.</span><br />
<span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;"> </span><br />
<span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;"><b>Cite as O.C.G.A. § 53-2-1</b></span><br />
<nllhl><span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;"> </span></nllhl><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;"></span><br />
<span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;"></span><br />
<span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;"></span><br />
<span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;"><hr /></span><span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;"> </span><br />
<b><span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;"><nllcodesect>OCGA § 53-2-3. </nllcodesect><nllcatch>Inheritance By Children Born Out Of Wedlock </nllcatch></span></b><br />
<span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;"> </span><br />
<span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;"> </span><br />
<span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;">The rights of inheritance of a child born out of wedlock shall be as follows: </span><br />
<span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;"> </span><br />
<span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;">(1) A child born out of wedlock may inherit in the same manner as though legitimate from or through the child's mother, the other children of the mother, and any other maternal kin; </span><br />
<span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;"> </span><br />
<span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;">(2)(A) A child born out of wedlock may not inherit from or through the child's father, the other children of the father, or any paternal kin by reason of the paternal kinship, unless: </span><br />
<span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;"> </span><br />
<span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;">(i) A court of competent jurisdiction has entered an order declaring the child to be legitimate, under the authority of Code Section </span><a class="CodeLink" href="http://www.itislaw.com/NLLXML/getcode.asp?userid=PRODSG&interface=&statecd=GA&codesec=19-7-22&sessionyr=2011&Title=19&datatype=S&noheader=1&nojumpmsg=0"><span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;">19-7-22</span></a><span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;"> or such other authority as may be provided by law; </span><br />
<span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;"> </span><br />
<span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;">(ii) A court of competent jurisdiction has otherwise entered a court order establishing paternity; </span><br />
<span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;"> </span><br />
<span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;">(iii) The father has executed a sworn statement signed by him attesting to the parent-child relationship; </span><br />
<span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;"> </span><br />
<span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;">(iv) The father has signed the birth certificate of the child; or </span><br />
<span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;"> </span><br />
<span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;">(v) There is other clear and convincing evidence that the child is the child of the father.</span><br />
<span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;"> </span><br />
<span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;">(B)(i) Subparagraph (A) of this paragraph notwithstanding, a child born out of wedlock may inherit from or through the father, other children of the father, or any paternal kin by reason of the paternal kinship if evidence of the rebuttable presumption of paternity described in this subparagraph is filed with the court before which proceedings on the estate are pending and the presumption is not overcome to the satisfaction of the trier of fact by clear and convincing evidence.</span><br />
<span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;"> </span><br />
<span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;">(ii) There shall exist a rebuttable presumption of paternity of a child born out of wedlock if parentage-determination genetic testing establishes at least a 97 percent probability of paternity. Parentage-determination genetic testing shall include, but not be limited to, red cell antigen, human leucocyte antigen (HLA), red cell enzyme, and serum protein electrophoresis tests or testing by deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) probes.</span><br />
<span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;"> </span><br />
<span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;">(C) If any one of the requirements of divisions (i) through (v) of subparagraph (A) of this paragraph is fulfilled, or if the presumption of paternity set forth in subparagraph (B) of this paragraph shall have been established and shall not have been rebutted by clear and convincing evidence, a child born out of wedlock may inherit in the same manner as though legitimate from and through the child's father, the other children of his or her father, and any other paternal kin; </span><br />
<span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;"> </span><br />
<span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;">(3) In distributions under this Code section, the children of a deceased child born out of wedlock shall represent that deceased child.</span><br />
<span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;"> </span><br />
<span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;"></span><br />
<span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;"></span><br />
<span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;"></span><br />
<span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;"><hr /></span><span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;"> </span><br />
<b><span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;"><nllcodesect>OCGA § 53-2-4. </nllcodesect><nllcatch>Inheritance From Children Born Out Of Wedlock </nllcatch></span></b><br />
<span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;"> </span><br />
<span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;"> </span><br />
<span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;">(a) The mother of a child born out of wedlock, the other children of the mother, and other maternal kin may inherit from and through the child born out of wedlock in the same manner as though the child were legitimate.</span><br />
<span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;"> </span><br />
<span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;">(b) The father of a child born out of wedlock, the other children of the father, and other paternal kin may inherit from and through the child born out of wedlock in the same manner as if the child were legitimate if: </span><br />
<span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;"> </span><br />
<span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;">(1) A court of competent jurisdiction has entered an order declaring the child to be legitimate under the authority of Code Section </span><a class="CodeLink" href="http://www.itislaw.com/NLLXML/getcode.asp?userid=PRODSG&interface=&statecd=GA&codesec=19-7-22&sessionyr=2011&Title=19&datatype=S&noheader=1&nojumpmsg=0"><span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;">19-7-22</span></a><span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;"> or such other authority as may be provided by law; </span><br />
<span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;"> </span><br />
<span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;">(2) A court of competent jurisdiction has otherwise entered a court order establishing paternity; </span><br />
<span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;"> </span><br />
<span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;">(3) The father has, during the lifetime of the child, executed a sworn statement signed by the father attesting to the parent-child relationship; </span><br />
<span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;"> </span><br />
<span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;">(4) The father has, during the lifetime of the child, signed the birth certificate of the child; or </span><br />
<span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;"> </span><br />
<span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;">(5) The presumption of paternity described in division (2)(B)(ii) of Code Section </span><a class="CodeLink" href="http://www.itislaw.com/NLLXML/getcode.asp?userid=PRODSG&interface=&statecd=GA&codesec=53-2-3&sessionyr=2011&Title=53&datatype=S&noheader=1&nojumpmsg=0"><span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;">53-2-3</span></a><span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;"> has been established and has not been rebutted by clear and convincing evidence.</span><br />
<span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;"> </span><br />
<span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;"></span><br />
<span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;"> </span><br />
<span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;"></span><br />
<span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;"></span><br />
<span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;"></span><br />
<span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;"><hr /></span><span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;"> </span><br />
<b><span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;"><nllcodesect>OCGA § 53-2-5. </nllcodesect><nllcatch>Children Conceived By Artificial Insemination </nllcatch></span></b><br />
<span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;"> </span><br />
<span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;"> </span><br />
<span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;">An individual conceived by artificial insemination and presumed legitimate in accordance with Code Section </span><a class="CodeLink" href="http://www.itislaw.com/NLLXML/getcode.asp?userid=PRODSG&interface=&statecd=GA&codesec=19-7-21&sessionyr=2011&Title=19&datatype=S&noheader=1&nojumpmsg=0"><span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;">19-7-21</span></a><span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;"> shall be considered a child of the parents and entitled to inherit under the laws of intestacy from the parents and from relatives of the parents, and the parents and relatives of the parents shall likewise be entitled to inherit as heirs from and through such individual.</span><br />
<span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;"> </span><br />
<span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;"> </span><br />
<span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;"></span><br />
<span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;"></span><br />
<span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;"></span><br />
<span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;"><hr /></span><span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;"> </span><br />
<b><span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;"><nllcodesect>OCGA § 53-2-6. </nllcodesect><nllcatch>Individual Related To Decedent Through Two Or More Lines Of Relationship </nllcatch></span></b><br />
<span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;"> </span><br />
<span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;"> </span><br />
<span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;">An individual who is related to the decedent through two or more lines of relationship is entitled to only a single share based on the relationship entitling that individual to the largest share under the laws of intestacy.</span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;"></span><br />
<span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;"> </span><br />
<span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;"></span><br />
<span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;"></span><br />
<span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;"></span><br />
<span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;"><hr /></span><span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;"> </span><br />
<b><span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;"><nllcodesect>OCGA § 53-2-7. </nllcodesect><nllcatch>Vesting Of Title To Property; Right To Possession </nllcatch></span></b><br />
<span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;"> </span><br />
<span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;"> </span><br />
<span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;">(a) Upon the death of an intestate decedent who is the owner of any interest in real property, the title to any such interest which survives the intestate decedent shall vest immediately in the decedent's heirs at law, subject to divestment by the appointment of an administrator of the estate.</span><br />
<span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;"> </span><br />
<span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;">(b) The title to all other property owned by an intestate decedent shall vest in the administrator of the estate for the benefit of the decedent's heirs and creditors.</span><br />
<span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;"> </span><br />
<span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;">(c) Upon the appointment of an administrator, the title to any interest in real property which survives the intestate decedent shall vest in the administrator for the benefit of the heirs and creditors of the decedent, and title to such property shall not revest in the heirs until the administrator assents to such revesting. For purposes of this Code section, the assent of the administrator shall be proved in the manner set out in Code Section </span><a class="CodeLink" href="http://www.itislaw.com/NLLXML/getcode.asp?userid=PRODSG&interface=&statecd=GA&codesec=53-8-15&sessionyr=2011&Title=53&datatype=S&noheader=1&nojumpmsg=0"><span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;">53-8-15</span></a><span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;">.</span><br />
<span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;"> </span><br />
<span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;">(d) Upon the appointment of an administrator, the right to the possession of the whole estate is in the administrator, and, as long as administration continues, the right to recover possession of the estate from all other persons is solely in the administrator. The administrator may recover possession of any part of the estate from the heirs at law or purchasers from them; but, in order to recover real property, it is necessary for the administrator to show, upon the trial, either that the property which is the subject of the action has been in the administrator's possession and without the administrator's consent is held by the defendant at the time of bringing the action or that it is necessary for the administrator to have possession for the purpose of paying the debts, making a proper distribution, or for other purposes provided for by law. An order for sale or distribution, granted by the judge of the probate court after notice to the defendant, shall be conclusive evidence of either fact.</span><br />
<span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;"> </span><br />
<span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;">(e) If an order has been entered under Code Section </span><a class="CodeLink" href="http://www.itislaw.com/NLLXML/getcode.asp?userid=PRODSG&interface=&statecd=GA&codesec=53-2-41&sessionyr=2011&Title=53&datatype=S&noheader=1&nojumpmsg=0"><span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;">53-2-41</span></a><span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;"> that no administration is necessary, or if the administrator has assented to the vesting of title in the heirs, the heirs may take possession of the property or may sue for possession of the property in their own right.</span><br />
<span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;"> </span><br />
<span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;"></span><br />
<span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;"></span><br />
<span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;"></span><br />
<span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;"><hr /></span><span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;"> </span><br />
<b><span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;"><nllcodesect>OCGA § 53-2-8. </nllcodesect><nllcatch>Death Intestate, And Without Ascertainable Heirs, Of Spouse Of Intestate Decedent </nllcatch></span></b><br />
<span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;"> </span><br />
<span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;"> </span><br />
<span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;">(a) When the spouse of an intestate decedent dies intestate and without ascertainable heirs within six months of the decedent's death, any undistributed property of the decedent to which the spouse had been entitled prior to the spouse's death shall not escheat but shall be distributed to the heirs of the decedent who would have inherited the property under the intestacy laws if the spouse had predeceased the decedent.</span><br />
<span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;"> </span><br />
<span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;">(b) The nonexistence of heirs of the spouse may be determined by publication as provided in Code Section </span><a class="CodeLink" href="http://www.itislaw.com/NLLXML/getcode.asp?userid=PRODSG&interface=&statecd=GA&codesec=53-2-51&sessionyr=2011&Title=53&datatype=S&noheader=1&nojumpmsg=0"><span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;">53-2-51</span></a><span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;">. If no heir of the spouse appears, the property, less the expenses of the proceedings to determine the nonexistence of heirs, shall be paid over as provided in subsection (a) of this Code section.</span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-size: x-large;"><strong>VII. TAX CONSIDERATIONS: THE STEP-UP BASIS RULE</strong></span><br />
<br />
<h4>What is the “step-up in basis” rule?</h4>In general, when you sell an asset that has risen in value, you pay taxes on the gain. For assets like stocks, the “capital gain” is generally calculated as the difference between the purchase and sale price.<br />
For example, if you buy shares in a company for $100 and sell them for $300, you have $200 in capital gain. The original purchase price, $100, is called your “basis” in the shares.<br />
But there is a special rule for inherited property. Here’s how it works: If you inherit a stock from your late aunt and later sell it, you are taxed on the difference between what you sold it for and what the stock was worth when Auntie died.<br />
Let’s say Auntie bought the stock a long time ago for $1,000 and its value climbed to $50,000 during her lifetime. When you inherit the stock, your “basis” is the stock’s fair-market value upon Auntie’s death, or $50,000, rather than the $1,000 she paid for it.<br />
That step-up in basis means that when you sell the stock now, you’ll only pay taxes on any gain above $50,000 that occurred while you held the stock.<br />
Since Auntie held the stock until she passed away, she never “realized” the $49,000 in gain, and therefore never paid taxes on it either. So the step-up in basis rule means that $49,000 goes permanently untaxed. Source: Seth Hanlon. Center for American Progress. February 16, 2011.<br />
<br />
See, 28 USC Sec. 1014 Basis of Property Acquired from a Decedent<br />
<br />
<span class="enumbell">(a)</span> In general <br />
<div class="ptext-11">Except as otherwise provided in this section, the basis of property in the hands of a person acquiring the property from a decedent or to whom the property passed from a decedent shall, if not sold, exchanged, or otherwise disposed of before the decedent’s death by such person, be—</div><div class="psection-2"><a href="http://www.blogger.com/" name="a_1"></a><span class="enumbell">(1)</span><span class="ptext-">the fair market value of the property at the date of the decedent’s death,</span></div><div class="psection-2"><a href="http://www.blogger.com/" name="a_2"></a><span class="enumbell">(2)</span><span class="ptext-">in the case of an election under either section 2032 orsection 811(j) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939 where the decedent died after October 21, 1942, its value at the applicable valuation date prescribed by those sections,</span></div><div class="psection-2"><a href="http://www.blogger.com/" name="a_3"></a><span class="enumbell">(3)</span><span class="ptext-">in the case of an election under section 2032A<a alt="§ 2032A - Valuation of certain farm, etc., real property" href="http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/26/usc_sec_26_00002032---A000-" title="§ 2032A - Valuation of certain farm, etc., real property"></a>, its value determined under such section, or</span></div><div class="psection-2"><a href="http://www.blogger.com/" name="a_4"></a><span class="enumbell">(4)</span><span class="ptext-">to the extent of the applicability of the exclusion described in section 2031(c)<a alt="§ 2031 - Definition of gross estate" href="http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/26/usc_sec_26_00002031----000-" title="§ 2031 - Definition of gross estate"></a><a alt="(c)" href="http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/26/usc_sec_26_00002031----000-#c" title="(c)"></a>, the basis in the hands of the decedent.</span><br />
<br />
<br />
</div><span style="font-family: Times; font-size: x-large;"><strong>VIII. CONCLUSION</strong></span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;"> </span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;">&&&&&&&&&&&&&</span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;">ENDNOTES</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;">[1]</span><br />
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<b><span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;">OCGA § 53-1-2. Definitions [Associated with Wills Trusts and Estates ]</span></b><br />
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<span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;">As used in this chapter and Chapters 2 through 11 of this title, the term: </span><br />
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<span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;">(1) "Administrator" means any person appointed and qualified to administer an intestate estate, including an intestate estate already partially administered by an administrator and from any cause unrepresented.</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;">(2) "Administrator with the will annexed" means any person, other than an executor, appointed and qualified to administer a testate estate, including a testate estate already partially administered and from any cause unrepresented.</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;">(3) "Beneficiary" means a person, including a trust, who is designated in a will to take an interest in real or personal property.</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;">(4) "Codicil" means an amendment to or republication of a will.</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;">(5) "County administrator" means any individual or individuals appointed by the probate court of the county and qualified to represent an estate that is unrepresented and unlikely to be represented.</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;">(6) "Descendants" means the lineal descendants of an individual including those individuals who are treated as lineal descendants by virtue of adoption.</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;">(7) "Executor" means any person nominated in a will who has qualified to administer a testate estate, including a person nominated as alternative or successor executor.</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;">(8) "Guardian" means the guardian ad litem or representative described in Code Section </span><a href="http://www.itislaw.com/NLLXML/getcode.asp?userid=PRODSG&interface=&statecd=GA&codesec=53-11-2&sessionyr=2011&Title=53&datatype=S&noheader=1&nojumpmsg=0"><span style="color: blue; font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;">53-11-2</span></a><span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;"> who represents one or more parties to a probate court proceeding who are not sui juris, are unborn, or are unknown.</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;">(9) "Heirs" means those one or more individuals who survive the decedent and are determined under the rules of inheritance to take the property of the decedent that is not disposed of by will.</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;">(10) "Nominated executor" means any person nominated in the will to serve as executor who has not yet qualified to serve as executor.</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;">(11) "Person" means an individual, corporation, partnership, association, joint-stock company, business trust, unincorporated organization, limited liability company, or two or more persons having a joint or common interest, including an individual or a business entity acting as a personal representative or in any other fiduciary capacity.</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;">(12) "Personal representative" means any administrator, administrator with the will annexed, county administrator, or executor.</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;">(13) "Qualified" means that a personal representative has taken the oath, posted any required bond, and been issued letters of administration or letters testamentary, as provided in this title.</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;">(14) "Sui juris" means an individual is age 18 or over and not suffering from any legal disability.</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;">(15) "Temporary administrator" means any person granted temporary letters of administration upon an unrepresented estate.</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;">(16) "Testamentary gift" means the interest in real or personal property which a beneficiary is designated to take in a will.</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;"> </span><br />
<span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;">(17) "Will" means the legal declaration of an individual's testamentary intention regarding that individual's property or other matters. Will includes the will and all codicils to the will.</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: large;"><strong>Miscellaneous:</strong></span><br />
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<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjWdL_J7E6ugyTvqJXtOdwQyfbboUuw67irJzQPnmcC9mVZqDHw1DVsoo0O9xTKWy2YxHtx0aVsmyYhHQwc3fIRP7VzUT0u7sLwyA-P0PjBqRwHMETIeX2lylvBS8owYsUx_ZJ-Va47Lb7m/s1600/Neaves.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;"><img border="0" height="320" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjWdL_J7E6ugyTvqJXtOdwQyfbboUuw67irJzQPnmcC9mVZqDHw1DVsoo0O9xTKWy2YxHtx0aVsmyYhHQwc3fIRP7VzUT0u7sLwyA-P0PjBqRwHMETIeX2lylvBS8owYsUx_ZJ-Va47Lb7m/s320/Neaves.jpg" width="224" /></span></a></div><div align="center"><span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;"></span></div><span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;">Lord Neaves 1800 - 1876. High Court of Scotland (Court of Session or The Supreme Court of Scotland) </span><br />
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<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin: 0in 0in 10pt; mso-margin-bottom-alt: auto; mso-margin-top-alt: auto;"><span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 10pt; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman";">Ye lawyers who live upon litigants' fees, <br />
And who need a good many to live at your ease, <br />
Grave or gay, wise or witty, whate'er your degree, <br />
Plain stuff or Queen's Counsel, take counsel of me: <br />
When a festive occasion your spirit unbends, <br />
You should never forget the profession's best friends; <br />
So we'll send round the wine, and a light bumper fill <br />
To the jolly testator who makes his own will. </span></div><div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin: 0in 0in 10pt; mso-margin-bottom-alt: auto; mso-margin-top-alt: auto;"><span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 10pt; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman";">He premises his wish and his purpose to save <br />
All dispute among friends when he's laid in the grave; <br />
Then he straightway proceeds more disputes to create <br />
Than a long summer's day would give time to relate. <br />
He writes and erases, he blunders and blots, <br />
He produces such puzzles and Gordian knots, <br />
That a lawyer, intending to frame the thing ill, <br />
Couldn't match the testator who makes his own will. </span></div><div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin: 0in 0in 10pt; mso-margin-bottom-alt: auto; mso-margin-top-alt: auto;"><span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 10pt; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman";">Testators are good, but a feeling more tender <br />
Springs up when I think of the feminine gender! <br />
The testatrix for me, who, like Telemaque's mother, <br />
Unweaves at one time what she wove at another; <br />
She bequeaths, she repeats, she recalls a donation, <br />
And ends by revoking her own revocation; <br />
Still scribbling or scratching some new codicil, <br />
Oh! success to the woman who makes her own will. </span></div><div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin: 0in 0in 10pt; mso-margin-bottom-alt: auto; mso-margin-top-alt: auto;"><span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 10pt; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman";">'Tisn't easy to say, 'mid her varying vapors, <br />
What scraps should be deemed testamentary papers. <br />
'Tisn't easy from these her intention to find, <br />
When perhaps she herself never knew her own mind. <br />
Every step that we take, there arises fresh trouble: <br />
Is the legacy lapsed? Is it single or double? <br />
No customer brings so much grist to the mill <br />
As the wealthy old woman who makes her own will. <br />
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The law decides questions of meum and tuum, <br />
By kindly consenting to make the thing suum; <br />
The Aesopian fable instructively tells <br />
What becomes of the oysters, and who gets the shells; <br />
The legatees starve, but the lawyers are fed; <br />
The Seniors have riches, the Juniors have bread; <br />
The available surplus of course will be nil, <br />
From the worthy testators who make their own will. </span></div><div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin: 0in 0in 10pt; mso-margin-bottom-alt: auto; mso-margin-top-alt: auto;"><span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 10pt; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman";">You had better pay toll when you take to the road, <br />
Than attempt by a by-way to reach your abode; <br />
You had better employ a conveyancer's hand <br />
Than encounter the risk that your will shouldn't stand. <br />
From the broad beaten track when the traveler strays, <br />
He may land in a bog or be lost in a maze; <br />
And the law, when defied, will avenge itself still <br />
On the man and the woman who make their own will.</span></div><div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin: 0in 0in 10pt; mso-margin-bottom-alt: auto; mso-margin-top-alt: auto;"><span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;"><br />
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</span></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhjUYaNTaxga-bPXCRV9hjFt0PhcrGP_LmpMSDKxQ287hdBtilxraXns2m-mYcyIQtGp608sJ_OHeHDPCVjUv8OJvaKT2pck8cAgNc-cF2zpNI8x37pmmgLGz6ldHa9TG5XIVyEMZ6YiJHr/s1600/bleakhouse.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;"><img border="0" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhjUYaNTaxga-bPXCRV9hjFt0PhcrGP_LmpMSDKxQ287hdBtilxraXns2m-mYcyIQtGp608sJ_OHeHDPCVjUv8OJvaKT2pck8cAgNc-cF2zpNI8x37pmmgLGz6ldHa9TG5XIVyEMZ6YiJHr/s1600/bleakhouse.jpg" /></span></a></div><span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;"><br />
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<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;">“Jarndyce and Jarndyce drones on. This scarecrow of a suit has, in course of time, become so complicated that no man alive knows what it means. The parties to it understand it least, but it has been observed that no two Chancery lawyers can talk about it for five minutes without coming to a total disagreement as to all the premises. Innumerable children have been born into the cause; innumerable old people have died out of it. Scores of persons have deliriously found themselves made parties in Jarndyce and Jarndyce without knowing how or why; whole families have inherited legendary hatreds with the suit. The little plaintiff or defendant who was promised a new rocking-horse when Jarndyce and Jarndyce should be settled has grown up, possessed himself of a real horse, and trotted away into the other world.” </span><br />
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<span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;"> Dickens, Charles, BLEAK HOUSE, Bradbury & Evans, London (1853).</span></div><div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><br />
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</div>Hugh Woodhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/01021049579391065763noreply@blogger.com4tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2321320695584069696.post-19121091708696398132012-03-02T15:15:00.000-08:002012-03-02T15:15:08.334-08:00Federal Judge Amy Totenberg Cautiously Finds Against Bank On Foreclosure Advertisement<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiEVRU3389jnrLkCfZ8yZ0XMVgR_XriHpSWJMmvno5d3cLdIksuVk2-OLOkpzuKa5q8fzXYO0E2jSRZJmWdsFYDzlnhYp3PdvNJHcCzKCPwOMFMukQwGbWA54riCCEevRUkCdwTp0BB7hcD/s1600/AmyTotenbergFederalJudge.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="clear: right; float: right; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-left: 1em;"><img border="0" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiEVRU3389jnrLkCfZ8yZ0XMVgR_XriHpSWJMmvno5d3cLdIksuVk2-OLOkpzuKa5q8fzXYO0E2jSRZJmWdsFYDzlnhYp3PdvNJHcCzKCPwOMFMukQwGbWA54riCCEevRUkCdwTp0BB7hcD/s1600/AmyTotenbergFederalJudge.jpg" /></a></div><div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Courier New";"><span style="font-family: Georgia, "Times New Roman", serif;"><span style="font-size: large;">In the never ending cycle of allegations of “produce the note,” and “who owns the Note,” in wrongful foreclosure cases, Federal Judge Amy Totenberg has cautiously sided (initially) with a Plaintiff in a wrongful foreclosure case.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Stubbs v Bank of America, United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia, Case No. 1:11–CV–1367–AT.<o:p></o:p></span></span></span></div><span style="font-family: Georgia, "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: large;"> </span><br />
<span style="font-size: large;"><span style="font-family: Georgia, "Times New Roman", serif;"> </span><span style="font-family: "Courier New";"><span style="font-family: Georgia, "Times New Roman", serif;">While a denial of a Motion to Dismiss is an early stage Order that carries little weight in the life the case, Totenberg’s finding that a Bank/Servicer’s Notice and Advertisement (Bank of America/BAC) may be defective, since the actual debt and Note were owned by another entity(Fannie Mae).</span><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><o:p></o:p></span></span><br />
<span style="font-size: large;"> </span><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Courier New";"><span style="font-family: Georgia, "Times New Roman", serif;"><span style="font-size: large;">While this author thinks wrongful foreclosure has turned the corner and we will see fewer claims in the future, this Order (if ever affirmed in the 11<sup>th</sup> Circuit) stands as problematic to any advertisement run in the name of only the mortgage servicer.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>[Totenberg acknowledges that few other Federal Judges in Georgia agree with her on this legal reasoning associated with OCGA § 44–14–162.2.]<o:p></o:p></span></span></span></div><span style="font-family: Georgia, "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: large;"> </span><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Courier New";"><span style="font-family: Georgia, "Times New Roman", serif;"><span style="font-size: large;">Until the Georgia Supreme Court (which seems to avoid this issue like the plague) or the 11<sup>th</sup> Circuit predicting the meaning of Georgia Substantive law provide us with a definitive ruling on this issue, Totenberg’s Order may stand as lone sentinel in Georgia on this particular issue.<o:p></o:p></span></span></span></div><span style="font-family: Georgia, "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: large;"> </span><br />
<span style="font-family: Georgia, "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: large;"> </span><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Courier New";"><span style="font-family: Georgia, "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: large;">Hugh Wood</span></span></div><div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Courier New";"><span style="font-family: Georgia, "Times New Roman", serif;"><span style="font-size: large;">Atlanta, GA<o:p></o:p></span></span></span></div><span style="font-family: Georgia, "Times New Roman", serif;"> </span><br />
<span style="font-family: Georgia, "Times New Roman", serif;"> </span><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Courier New";"><o:p><span style="font-family: Georgia, "Times New Roman", serif;"><span style="font-size: large;"><span>Wood & Meredith, LLP</span><br />
<span>3756 LaVista Road</span><br />
<span>Suite 250</span><br />
<span>Atlanta (Tucker), GA 30084</span></span></span><a href="http://www.woodandmeredith.com/"><span><span style="color: #336688; font-family: Georgia, "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: large;">www.woodandmeredith.com</span></span></a><br />
<a href="mailto:hwood@woodandmeredith.com"><span><span style="color: #336688; font-family: Georgia, "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: large;">hwood@woodandmeredith.com</span></span></a><br />
<a href="http://www.hughwood.blogspot.com/"><span><span style="color: #336688; font-family: Georgia, "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: large;">www.hughwood.blogspot.com</span></span></a><br />
<span style="font-family: Georgia, "Times New Roman", serif;"><span style="font-size: large;"><span>twitter: USALawyer_</span><br />
<span>Phone: 404-633-4100</span><br />
<span>Fax: 404-633-0068</span></span></span></o:p></span></div><span style="font-family: Georgia, "Times New Roman", serif;"> </span><br />
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<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Courier New";"><span style="font-family: "Trebuchet MS", sans-serif;">Stubbs v. Bank of America, --- F.Supp.2d ---- (2012)<o:p></o:p></span></span></div><span style="font-family: "Trebuchet MS", sans-serif;"> </span><br />
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<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Courier New";"><span style="font-family: "Trebuchet MS", sans-serif;">2012 WL 516972<o:p></o:p></span></span></div><span style="font-family: "Trebuchet MS", sans-serif;"> </span><br />
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<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Courier New";"><span style="font-family: "Trebuchet MS", sans-serif;">United States District Court,<o:p></o:p></span></span></div><span style="font-family: "Trebuchet MS", sans-serif;"> </span><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Courier New";"><span style="font-family: "Trebuchet MS", sans-serif;">N.D. Georgia,<o:p></o:p></span></span></div><span style="font-family: "Trebuchet MS", sans-serif;"> </span><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Courier New";"><span style="font-family: "Trebuchet MS", sans-serif;">Atlanta Division.<o:p></o:p></span></span></div><span style="font-family: "Trebuchet MS", sans-serif;"> </span><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Courier New";"><span style="font-family: "Trebuchet MS", sans-serif;">Gary STUBBS, Plaintiff,<o:p></o:p></span></span></div><span style="font-family: "Trebuchet MS", sans-serif;"> </span><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Courier New";"><span style="font-family: "Trebuchet MS", sans-serif;">v.<o:p></o:p></span></span></div><span style="font-family: "Trebuchet MS", sans-serif;"> </span><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Courier New";"><span style="font-family: "Trebuchet MS", sans-serif;">BANK OF AMERICA, BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP, and Federal National Mortgage Association, Defendants.<o:p></o:p></span></span></div><span style="font-family: "Trebuchet MS", sans-serif;"> </span><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Courier New";"><span style="font-family: "Trebuchet MS", sans-serif;">No. 1:11–CV–1367–AT. | Feb. 16, 2012.<o:p></o:p></span></span></div><span style="font-family: "Trebuchet MS", sans-serif;"> </span><br />
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<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Courier New";"><span style="font-family: "Trebuchet MS", sans-serif;">Attorneys and Law Firms<o:p></o:p></span></span></div><span style="font-family: "Trebuchet MS", sans-serif;"> </span><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Courier New";"><span style="font-family: "Trebuchet MS", sans-serif;">Jamie Scaringi–Cherry, Law Office of Jamie Scaringi–Cherry, for Plaintiffs.<o:p></o:p></span></span></div><span style="font-family: "Trebuchet MS", sans-serif;"> </span><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Courier New";"><span style="font-family: "Trebuchet MS", sans-serif;">Andrew G. Phillips, McGuire Woods LLP–GA, for Defendant.<o:p></o:p></span></span></div><span style="font-family: "Trebuchet MS", sans-serif;"> </span><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Courier New";"><span style="font-family: "Trebuchet MS", sans-serif;">Opinion<o:p></o:p></span></span></div><span style="font-family: "Trebuchet MS", sans-serif;"> </span><br />
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<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Courier New";"><span style="font-family: "Trebuchet MS", sans-serif;">ORDER<o:p></o:p></span></span></div><span style="font-family: "Trebuchet MS", sans-serif;"> </span><br />
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<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Courier New";"><span style="font-family: "Trebuchet MS", sans-serif;">AMY TOTENBER, District Judge.<o:p></o:p></span></span></div><span style="font-family: "Trebuchet MS", sans-serif;"> </span><br />
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<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Courier New";"><span style="font-family: "Trebuchet MS", sans-serif;">*1 This matter is before the Court on Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint [Doc. 9].<o:p></o:p></span></span></div><span style="font-family: "Trebuchet MS", sans-serif;"> </span><br />
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<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt 0.75in; mso-list: l0 level1 lfo1; text-indent: -0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Trebuchet MS", sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "Courier New"; mso-fareast-font-family: "Courier New";"><span style="mso-list: Ignore;">I.<span style="font-size-adjust: none; font-stretch: normal; font: 7pt/normal "Times New Roman";"> </span></span></span><span style="font-family: "Courier New";">Procedural Background<o:p></o:p></span></span></div><span style="font-family: "Trebuchet MS", sans-serif;"> </span><br />
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<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Courier New";"><span style="font-family: "Trebuchet MS", sans-serif;">On March 21, 2011, Plaintiff Gary Stubbs filed his complaint in the Superior Court of Fulton County, Georgia, seeking cancellation of a foreclosure sale and damages based on his wrongful foreclosure claim. Defendants Bank of America, BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP (“BAC”), and Federal National Mortgage Association (“Fannie Mae”) removed the action to the Northern District of Georgia based on diversity jurisdiction on April 27, 2011.<o:p></o:p></span></span></div><span style="font-family: "Trebuchet MS", sans-serif;"> </span><br />
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<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Courier New";"><span style="font-family: "Trebuchet MS", sans-serif;">Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on May 3, 2011. Plaintiff filed a motion for leave to file amended complaint on May 6, 2011. Recognizing that Plaintiff could amend his complaint as of right under Rule 15(a)(1), Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the amended complaint on May 19, 2011. The Court granted Plaintiff leave to file the amended complaint, and the parties have now briefed the motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s amended complaint.<o:p></o:p></span></span></div><span style="font-family: "Trebuchet MS", sans-serif;"> </span><br />
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<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Courier New";"><span style="font-family: "Trebuchet MS", sans-serif;">Plaintiff filed his response to the motion to dismiss amended complaint outside of time. Under this Court’s Local Rules, “[a]ny party opposing a motion shall serve the party’s response ... not later than fourteen (14) days after service of the motion,” and “[f]ailure to file a response shall indicate that there is no opposition to the motion.” LR 7.1(B), NDGa; see Welch v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 978 F.Supp. 1133, 1148 (N.D.Ga.1997). The Eleventh Circuit has noted that a district court may dismiss a case when a party, represented by counsel (as in the instant case), fails to file a response to a motion to dismiss. See Magluta v. Samples, 162 F.3d 662, 664–65 (11th Cir.1998) (citing LR 7.1(B), NDGa). Such a dismissal is, however, within the discretion of the district court. Id.; Edwards v. Shalala, 846 F.Supp. 997, 998 n. 2 (N.D.Ga.1994) (“[T]he court, in its discretion, may waive a Local Rule.”); see also Sampson v. Fulton County Jail, 157 F. App’x 242, 243 (11th Cir.2005). In the Eleventh Circuit, “there is a strong policy of determining cases on their merits.” In re Worldwide Web Sys., Inc., 328 F.3d 1291, 1295 (11th Cir.2003). Therefore, because this Court’s Order of May 26, 2011, might have caused confusion regarding Plaintiff’s deadline to respond, and because of the strong policy in favor of deciding cases on their merits, the Court proceeds to evaluate Defendants’ motion on the merits rather than granting it as unopposed. However, the Court CAUTIONS Plaintiff to be more attentive to deadlines imposed by the federal and local rules, as failing to comply with these rules may materially impact his rights.<o:p></o:p></span></span></div><span style="font-family: "Trebuchet MS", sans-serif;"> </span><br />
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<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt 0.75in; mso-list: l0 level1 lfo1; text-indent: -0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Trebuchet MS", sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "Courier New"; mso-fareast-font-family: "Courier New";"><span style="mso-list: Ignore;">II.<span style="font-size-adjust: none; font-stretch: normal; font: 7pt/normal "Times New Roman";"> </span></span></span><span style="font-family: "Courier New";">Motion to Dismiss Standard<o:p></o:p></span></span></div><span style="font-family: "Trebuchet MS", sans-serif;"> </span><br />
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<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Courier New";"><span style="font-family: "Trebuchet MS", sans-serif;">In determining whether a complaint states a claim upon which relief can be granted, courts accept the factual allegations in the complaint as true and construe them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Hill v. White, 321 F.3d 1334, 1335 (11th Cir.2003). To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must allege facts that, if true, “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (quotation marks omitted). A claim is plausible where the plaintiff alleges factual content that “allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. The plausibility standard requires that a plaintiff allege sufficient facts “to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence” that supports the plaintiff’s claim. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007).<o:p></o:p></span></span></div><span style="font-family: "Trebuchet MS", sans-serif;"> </span><br />
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<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt 0.75in; mso-list: l0 level1 lfo1; text-indent: -0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Trebuchet MS", sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "Courier New"; mso-fareast-font-family: "Courier New";"><span style="mso-list: Ignore;">III.<span style="font-size-adjust: none; font-stretch: normal; font: 7pt/normal "Times New Roman";"> </span></span></span><span style="font-family: "Courier New";">Factual Background<o:p></o:p></span></span></div><span style="font-family: "Trebuchet MS", sans-serif;"> </span><br />
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<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Courier New";"><span style="font-family: "Trebuchet MS", sans-serif;">*2 Plaintiff Stubbs brings this action to set aside an alleged wrongful foreclosure. He alleges that on or about December 2009, a representative of Bank of America informed Plaintiff that the bank would not consider modifying his mortgage loan unless he was in default on the loan payments. (Am.Compl.¶ 6.) After he fell behind on his payments, he was “immediately denied a loan modification” in March 2010. (Id.)<o:p></o:p></span></span></div><span style="font-family: "Trebuchet MS", sans-serif;"> </span><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Courier New";"><span style="font-family: "Trebuchet MS", sans-serif;">In a letter dated July 20, 2010, McCurdy & Candler, L.L.C., informed Plaintiff that the property was scheduled for public foreclosure sale on September 7, 2010, before the courthouse door in Fulton County, Georgia. (Id. at Ex. B.) The letter identified BAC Home Loans Servicing as the creditor and stated that the entity with the full authority to discuss, negotiate, or change all terms of the mortgage was Bank of America. (Id.) The foreclosure occurred, and Fannie Mae is now representing to Plaintiff that it owns his home pursuant to the foreclosure sale and demanding that he vacate the property. (Id. ¶ 8.)<o:p></o:p></span></span></div><span style="font-family: "Trebuchet MS", sans-serif;"> </span><br />
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<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Courier New";"><span style="font-family: "Trebuchet MS", sans-serif;">In his amended complaint Plaintiff specifically asserts that Fannie Mae owned his loan at the time of the foreclosure and BAC was merely the servicer. (Id. at ¶ 11.) He attaches to the complaint letters from Bank of America and its counsel, dated June 28 and October 13, 2010, which state that Fannie Mae (or in the second letter “FNMA AA MST/SUB CW Bank REO”) is the owner of his mortgage loan and Bank of America/BAC is the servicer. (Id. at Exs. D and E.) These letters identifying Fannie Mae as the secured creditor considered alongside the foreclosure notice letter identifying BAC as the secured creditor created confusion about the identity of the holder of the loan. Plaintiff alleges that no assignment to Fannie Mae was recorded in the county deed records prior to the foreclosure sale. (Id. at 12.)<o:p></o:p></span></span></div><span style="font-family: "Trebuchet MS", sans-serif;"> </span><br />
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<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt 0.75in; mso-list: l0 level1 lfo1; text-indent: -0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Trebuchet MS", sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "Courier New"; mso-fareast-font-family: "Courier New";"><span style="mso-list: Ignore;">IV.<span style="font-size-adjust: none; font-stretch: normal; font: 7pt/normal "Times New Roman";"> </span></span></span><span style="font-family: "Courier New";">Analysis<o:p></o:p></span></span></div><span style="font-family: "Trebuchet MS", sans-serif;"> </span><br />
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<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt 36.75pt; mso-list: l1 level1 lfo2; text-indent: -18.75pt;"><span style="font-family: "Trebuchet MS", sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "Courier New"; mso-fareast-font-family: "Courier New";"><span style="mso-list: Ignore;">A.<span style="font-size-adjust: none; font-stretch: normal; font: 7pt/normal "Times New Roman";"> </span></span></span><span style="font-family: "Courier New";">Wrongful Foreclosure<o:p></o:p></span></span></div><span style="font-family: "Trebuchet MS", sans-serif;"> </span><br />
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<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Courier New";"><span style="font-family: "Trebuchet MS", sans-serif;">Traditional real property principles and the careful consideration required in cases involving title to land guide the Court’s analysis. Georgia courts have long recognized that harm to an interest in land is irreparable due to the “unique character of the property interest.” Focus Entm’t Int’l v. Partridge Green, 558 S.E.2d 440, 446 (Ga.Ct.App.2001). The real property interest holds a special place in our legal system as in our society, especially in cases involving the potential loss of that most important, tangible piece of emotional and physical stability—the home.<o:p></o:p></span></span></div><span style="font-family: "Trebuchet MS", sans-serif;"> </span><br />
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<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Courier New";"><span style="font-family: "Trebuchet MS", sans-serif;">Georgia law allows for a number of different means of foreclosing on a debt secured by real property, including nonjudicial foreclosure by power of sale. See Frank S. Alexander, GEORGIA REAL ESTATE FINANCE AND FORECLOSURE LAW, § 1:5 (2011–12 ed.). In authorizing this manner of foreclosure, the state provides creditors with the flexibility and efficiency of a nonjudicial procedure upon a debtor’s default. However, given the significant power that such a procedure vests in the foreclosing party, the law requires that powers of sale “shall be strictly construed and shall be fairly exercised.” O.C.G.A. § 23–2–114.1 Moreover, for loans secured by residential property, O.C.G.A. § 44–14–162.2 specifies the required elements of the notice letter that a creditor must send prior to the nonjudicial foreclosure sale. This statutory section requires that the creditor advise the homeowner of the “individual or entity who shall have full authority to negotiate, amend, and modify all terms of the mortgage with the debtor.” O.C.G.A. § 44–14–162.2. The creditor must send the statutory notice by “registered or certified mail or statutory overnight delivery, return receipt requested.” Id. The statute expressly requires a higher level of notice for residential loans than nonresidential loans.<o:p></o:p></span></span></div><span style="font-family: "Trebuchet MS", sans-serif;"> </span><br />
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<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Courier New";"><span style="font-family: "Trebuchet MS", sans-serif;">Whether or not all sections of the foreclosure statute are in derogation of the common law (as Defendants question, see Reply at 5), this independent statute requires powers of sale to be strictly construed and fairly exercised.<o:p></o:p></span></span></div><span style="font-family: "Trebuchet MS", sans-serif;"> </span><br />
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<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Courier New";"><span style="font-family: "Trebuchet MS", sans-serif;">*3 Georgia’s nonjudicial foreclosure statute authorizes the secured creditor to foreclose in conformity with O.C.G.A. §§ 44–14–162 et seq.2 “Secured creditor” is not defined in the statute and is therefore to be given its ordinary meaning. See O’Neal v. State, 288 Ga. 219, 220–21 (Ga.2010) (“we apply the fundamental rules of statutory construction that require us to construe the statute according to its terms, to give words their plain and ordinary meaning, and to avoid a construction that makes some language mere surplusage”). Merriam–Webster’s Dictionary defines creditor as “one to whom a debt is owed; a person to whom money or goods are due.” Black’s Law Dictionary (9th ed.) defines creditor as “one to whom a debt is owed; one who gives credit for money or goods,” and secured creditor as “a creditor who has the right, on the debtor’s default, to proceed against collateral and apply it to the payment of the debt.” Thus, according to the plain language of the statute, the secured creditor—the entity to whom the debt is owed—is authorized to foreclose pursuant to Georgia’s nonjudicial foreclosure statute.<o:p></o:p></span></span></div><span style="font-family: "Trebuchet MS", sans-serif;"> </span><br />
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<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Courier New";"><span style="font-family: "Trebuchet MS", sans-serif;">“Notice of the initiation of proceedings to exercise a power of sale in a mortgage, security deed, or other lien contract shall be given to the debtor by the secured creditor no later than 30 days before the date of the proposed foreclosure.” O.C.G.A. § 44–14–162.2(a) (emphasis added).<o:p></o:p></span></span></div><span style="font-family: "Trebuchet MS", sans-serif;"> </span><br />
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<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Courier New";"><span style="font-family: "Trebuchet MS", sans-serif;">The sequence of legislative enactments, specifically the recent amendment of the statute in 2008, bolsters this understanding of the language of O.C.G.A. § 44–14–162 et seq. At that time, the Georgia General Assembly added the following clause to section 162: “The security instrument or assignment thereof vesting the secured creditor with title to the security instrument shall be filed prior to the time of sale in the office of the clerk of the superior court in the county in which the real property is located.” O.C.G.A. § 44–14–162(b). This addition to the statute clearly demonstrates the legislature’s intent to require the identity of the secured creditor to be of public record prior to the foreclosure sale. At the same time, the legislature amended section 162.2(a) to require the secured creditor to send the pre-foreclosure notice 30 days prior to sale (rather than 15) and to require that this notice “shall include the name, address, and telephone number of the individual or entity who shall have full authority to negotiate, amend, and modify all terms of the mortgage with the debtor.” O.C.G.A. § 162.2(a).<o:p></o:p></span></span></div><span style="font-family: "Trebuchet MS", sans-serif;"> </span><br />
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<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Courier New";"><span style="font-family: "Trebuchet MS", sans-serif;">The legislature enacted the 2008 amendments of the foreclosure statute with the goal of making transparent both the identity of the secured creditor with authority to foreclose and the identity (and contact information) of the party with authority to agree to a loan modification. Often, the secured creditor and the entity with full authority to modify the loan will be one and the same. At times a servicing agent may have full authority to modify the loan, but the fact that it is merely a servicer acting on behalf of a loan holder, and the identity of that holder, is relevant to that factual question. In any event, these two sections were amended simultaneously with a clear purpose—to increase transparency and clarity in what can otherwise be a quite bewildering process, both in order to avert any avoidable foreclosures through loan modifications and to protect the integrity of Georgia’s real property records. This is evidenced by the title of the 2008 bill amending the statute, which describes its purpose as follows:<o:p></o:p></span></span></div><span style="font-family: "Trebuchet MS", sans-serif;"> </span><br />
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<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Courier New";"><span style="font-family: "Trebuchet MS", sans-serif;">*4 AN ACT to amend Article 7 of Chapter 14 of Title 44 of the Official Code of Georgia Annotated, relating to foreclosure on mortgages, conveyances to secure debt, and liens, so as to require a foreclosure to be conducted by the current owner or holder of the mortgage, as reflected by public records; to provide for the identity of the secured creditor to be included in the advertisement and in court records; to change the requirement for mailing or delivery of notice to debtor for sales made under the power of sale in a mortgage, security deed, or other lien contract; to provide for the content of such notice; to provide for related matters; to provide an effective date; to repeal conflicting laws; and for other purposes.<o:p></o:p></span></span></div><span style="font-family: "Trebuchet MS", sans-serif;"> </span><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Courier New";"><span style="font-family: "Trebuchet MS", sans-serif;">2008 Georgia Laws Act 576 (S.B.531).<o:p></o:p></span></span></div><span style="font-family: "Trebuchet MS", sans-serif;"> </span><br />
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<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Courier New";"><span style="font-family: "Trebuchet MS", sans-serif;">The goal of the amendment is bolstered by other related sections of the Georgia Code. Section 162.3 states that the borrower cannot waive the statutory notice at the time the security interest is created. See O.C.G.A. § 44–(“[n]o waiver or release of the notice requirement of Code Section 44–14–162.2 shall be valid when made in or contemporaneously with the security instrument containing the power of nonjudicial foreclosure sale”). The fact that the notice requirement is nonwaivable demonstrates the consumer protection purpose of these interrelated sections. Moreover, section 162.4 provides:<o:p></o:p></span></span></div><span style="font-family: "Trebuchet MS", sans-serif;"> </span><br />
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<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Courier New";"><span style="font-family: "Trebuchet MS", sans-serif;">All deeds under power shall contain recitals setting forth the giving of notice in compliance with Code Section 44–14–162.2 or a statement of the facts which render the same inapplicable thereto, which facts may include, without limitation, the nonresidential character of the property. The effect of such recitals shall be to protect the validity of the title of any subsequent purchaser in good faith other than the lender.<o:p></o:p></span></span></div><span style="font-family: "Trebuchet MS", sans-serif;"> </span><br />
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<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Courier New";"><span style="font-family: "Trebuchet MS", sans-serif;">O.C.G.A. § 44–14–162.4. Requiring the recitals of actions taken in compliance with the statute to be incorporated into the foreclosure deed (the “deed under power” of sale) emphasizes the legislative purpose of protecting the integrity of Georgia’s real property title records. All of these interrelated code sections show that the statute requires clear disclosure of the secured creditor and the entity with authority to modify the loan and does not permit obfuscation and subterfuge on these material points.<o:p></o:p></span></span></div><span style="font-family: "Trebuchet MS", sans-serif;"> </span><br />
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<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Courier New";"><span style="font-family: "Trebuchet MS", sans-serif;">Under the facts alleged here, if presumed true, the actual “secured creditor” did not provide notice of the foreclosure sale as required by O.C.G.A. § 44–14–162.2. Nor did the servicer, acting as agent for the secured creditor, send a foreclosure notice that properly identified the secured creditor. Rather, the loan servicer sent a notice of foreclosure identifying itself as the secured creditor when it was not. (Am.Compl.Exs.B, D, E.)<o:p></o:p></span></span></div><span style="font-family: "Trebuchet MS", sans-serif;"> </span><br />
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<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Courier New";"><span style="font-family: "Trebuchet MS", sans-serif;">Other judges of this district have grappled with the issue of whether a servicer can send the notice required under O.C.G.A. § 44–14–162.2. See, e.g., LaCosta v. McCalla Raymer, No. 1:10–CV–1171–RWS, 2011 WL 166902 (N.D.Ga. Jan. 18, 2011). In LaCosta, Judge Story explained that under agency law, “a principal has the power to appoint someone to act on his behalf,” and therefore a secured creditor should be able to direct its servicer to send the statutory notice. Id. at *4. Judge Story further explained, “The goal of Section 162 is to give the debtor notice of the foreclosure sale. Whether that notice is provided by the secured creditor directly, or by its agent, is of no consequence .” Id.<o:p></o:p></span></span></div><span style="font-family: "Trebuchet MS", sans-serif;"> </span><br />
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<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Courier New";"><span style="font-family: "Trebuchet MS", sans-serif;">*5 While it may be of no consequence who actually sends the notice, and that task may properly be delegated to a servicing agent (or, as is often the case, an attorney), the amendments of sections 162 and 162.2 in 2008 make clear that the identity of the secured creditor conducting the sale is a material element of that notice. The identity of the secured creditor is material because of its bearing on the entity with authority to modify the loan. Misidentifying the secured creditor creates confusion and doubt regarding the identification of the entity with authority to modify. Moreover, disclosing that Bank of America has full authority to modify and is the creditor for the loan is materially different from disclosing that Bank of America has full authority to modify on behalf of a creditor, Fannie Mae, within whatever guidelines that creditor may have imposed. See Adam Ashcraft and Til Schuermann, Understanding the Securitization of Subprime Mortgage Credit, 318 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF NEW YORK STAFF REPORT at 9 (2008) (investors “can put hard rules into the pooling and servicing agreement limiting loan modifications”); Loan Workout Hierarchy for Fannie Mae Conventional Loans (2012), available at www.efanniemae.com/sf/servicing/pdf/ loanworkoutfactsheet.pdf; Pasillas v. HSBC Bank, 255 P.3d 1281, 1283 (Nev.2011) (servicer violated Nevada mediation program rules by failing to bring to the mediation a person with authority to modify the loan, as it “needed additional authority from investors to agree to a loan modification”).<o:p></o:p></span></span></div><span style="font-family: "Trebuchet MS", sans-serif;"> </span><br />
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<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Courier New";"><span style="font-family: "Trebuchet MS", sans-serif;">This reasoning is not inconsistent with the Eleventh Circuit’s recent approval of a grant of summary judgment for the defendants in a wrongful foreclosure suit where the servicer sent the foreclosure notice, but the notice identified the true secured creditor. See Smith v. Saxon Mortgage, No. 11–11762, 2011 WL 5375063 (11th Cir.2011), summarily aff’g No. 1:09–CV–3375, at 6–7 (N.D.Ga. March 16, 2011) (granting summary judgment for defendants where foreclosure notice was sent by the servicer but “clearly identified the creditor and the loan servicer and was in no way misleading”). Sending a foreclosure notice that misidentifies the secured creditor violates the spirit and intent of O.C.G.A. § 44–14–162.2.<o:p></o:p></span></span></div><span style="font-family: "Trebuchet MS", sans-serif;"> </span><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Courier New";"><span style="font-family: "Trebuchet MS", sans-serif;">Defendants concede in their reply brief that Fannie Mae was the secured creditor, and simply argue that Bank of America could send the foreclosure notice as Fannie Mae’s agent. (Reply at 4–5.) While troubling for the reasons set forth above, this concession bolsters Plaintiff’s other basis for his wrongful foreclosure claim—that the assignment of the security deed to the secured creditor, Fannie Mae, was not filed prior to the time of sale. Defendants argued in their original brief that there was no need to record an assignment to Fannie Mae because the assignment to Bank of America was sufficient to comply with section 162(b). That argument assumes a definition of “secured creditor” that is equivalent to “beneficiary or assignee of the security deed.” However, such a definition would render the 2008 amendment of section 162 meaningless, for whatever entity is the grantee of record of the security deed would have authority to foreclose, just as it did prior to the amendment. Secured creditor must have a fixed definition in order for the amendment to have meaning, and this Court is bound to apply the presumption that the legislature did not intend to “enact meaningless language.” Osborne Bonding & Surety Co. v. Georgia, 481 S.E.2d 578, 579 (Ga.1997).<o:p></o:p></span></span></div><span style="font-family: "Trebuchet MS", sans-serif;"> </span><br />
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<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Courier New";"><span style="font-family: "Trebuchet MS", sans-serif;">*6 Plaintiff has alleged facts making it plausible that Fannie Mae was in fact the secured creditor at the time of the foreclosure and has alleged that no assignment to Fannie Mae was filed prior to the time of sale as required by O.C.G.A. § 44–14–162(b). Therefore, based on the allegations in the amended complaint, BAC evaded the most substantive requirements of Georgia’s foreclosure statute in that (1) it was not the secured creditor entitled to foreclose despite providing a notice letter affirmatively representing it was the creditor; and (2) it failed to file the assignment of the security deed to the secured creditor in the county deed records prior to the foreclosure. See O.C.G.A. § 162(b); Weems v. Coker, 70 Ga. 746, 749 (Ga.1883); Cummings v. Anderson, 173 B.R. 959, 963 (Bankr.N.D.Ga.1994).3 The Court accordingly DENIES the motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s claim for wrongful foreclosure based on failure to comply with Georgia foreclosure law.<o:p></o:p></span></span></div><span style="font-family: "Trebuchet MS", sans-serif;"> </span><br />
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<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Courier New";"><span style="font-family: "Trebuchet MS", sans-serif;">3<o:p></o:p></span></span></div><span style="font-family: "Trebuchet MS", sans-serif;"> </span><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Courier New";"><span style="font-family: "Trebuchet MS", sans-serif;">While other respected members of this court have declined to hold that Georgia law requires an entity to possess both the security deed and promissory note in order to foreclose, they have done so in the context of counsel’s apparent failure to draw the court’s attention to relevant precedent. See LaCosta, 2011 WL 166902, at *5; Nicholson v. OneWest Bank, 1: 10–CV–795–JECAJB, 2010 WL 2732325, at *4 (N.D. Ga. April 20, 2010). Based on this Court’s review of applicable Georgia law, as discussed previously in Morgan v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC, 795 F.Supp.2d 1370, 1376 (N.D.Ga.2011), the Court concludes that Georgia statutes and case law require the holder of the loan to carry out the foreclosure and to identify itself as the secured creditor of public record prior to the foreclosure sale.<o:p></o:p></span></span></div><span style="font-family: "Trebuchet MS", sans-serif;"> </span><br />
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<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt 36.75pt; mso-list: l1 level1 lfo2; text-indent: -18.75pt;"><span style="font-family: "Trebuchet MS", sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "Courier New"; mso-fareast-font-family: "Courier New";"><span style="mso-list: Ignore;">B.<span style="font-size-adjust: none; font-stretch: normal; font: 7pt/normal "Times New Roman";"> </span></span></span><span style="font-family: "Courier New";">BAC Not Registered to Do Business in Georgia<o:p></o:p></span></span></div><span style="font-family: "Trebuchet MS", sans-serif;"> </span><br />
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<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Courier New";"><span style="font-family: "Trebuchet MS", sans-serif;">Plaintiff also seeks to set aside the foreclosure of his home based on the fact that BAC is a foreign limited partnership and failed to register to do business in Georgia prior to carrying out the foreclosure. (Am.Compl.¶¶ 3–5.) This allegation does not state a claim for relief, as the statute requiring foreign limited partnerships to register with the Secretary of State prior to transacting business in Georgia specifically exempts “making loans or creating or acquiring evidences of debt” and “securing or collecting debts or enforcing any rights in property securing the same” from the definition of “transacting business.” See O.C .G.A. § 14–9–902. Therefore, Plaintiff’s claim for wrongful foreclosure on the basis of BAC not having registered to do business in Georgia is DISMISSED.<o:p></o:p></span></span></div><span style="font-family: "Trebuchet MS", sans-serif;"> </span><br />
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<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt 36.75pt; mso-list: l1 level1 lfo2; text-indent: -18.75pt;"><span style="font-family: "Trebuchet MS", sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "Courier New"; mso-fareast-font-family: "Courier New";"><span style="mso-list: Ignore;">C.<span style="font-size-adjust: none; font-stretch: normal; font: 7pt/normal "Times New Roman";"> </span></span></span><span style="font-family: "Courier New";">Fraud Claim<o:p></o:p></span></span></div><span style="font-family: "Trebuchet MS", sans-serif;"> </span><br />
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<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Courier New";"><span style="font-family: "Trebuchet MS", sans-serif;">Plaintiff Stubbs asserts a fraud claim, alleging that the foreclosure resulted from Bank of America’s fraudulent misrepresentations that it would evaluate him for a loan modification. (Am.Compl.¶¶ 5–6.) However, Plaintiff alleges that Bank of America said he could be “considered” for a loan modification only if he was in default on his payments; he does not allege that Bank of America guaranteed that he would be approved for a modification if he defaulted.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>(Id. ¶ 6.) His allegation that Bank of America later denied his request for a loan modification is not equivalent to an allegation that Bank of America did not consider him for a modification. Therefore, Plaintiff has not alleged a misrepresentation of fact. See American Dental Ass’n v. Cigna Corp., 605 F.2d 1283, 1291 (11th Cir.2010) (under the heightened pleading standard for fraud imposed by Fed.R.Civ.P. 9(b), a plaintiff must allege the precise statements or misrepresentations made and the manner in which these statements misled the plaintiff). Plaintiff has failed to properly plead a misrepresentation of fact despite the Court’s prior Order addressing this issue. (Order, Doc. 6, May 5, 2011.) Therefore, the Court DISMISSES Plaintiff Stubbs’ fraud claim.<o:p></o:p></span></span></div><span style="font-family: "Trebuchet MS", sans-serif;"> </span><br />
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<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt 0.75in; mso-list: l0 level1 lfo1; text-indent: -0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Trebuchet MS", sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "Courier New"; mso-fareast-font-family: "Courier New";"><span style="mso-list: Ignore;">V.<span style="font-size-adjust: none; font-stretch: normal; font: 7pt/normal "Times New Roman";"> </span></span></span><span style="font-family: "Courier New";">Conclusion<o:p></o:p></span></span></div><span style="font-family: "Trebuchet MS", sans-serif;"> </span><br />
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<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Courier New";"><span style="font-family: "Trebuchet MS", sans-serif;">*7 For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART Defendants’ motion to dismiss the amended complaint [Doc. 9]. The Court DISMISSES Plaintiff’s fraud claim and his claim based on BAC’s failure to register to do business in Georgia. The motion to dismiss is DENIED as to Plaintiff’s wrongful foreclosure claim. The Court will hold a telephone status conference with the parties on February 23, 2012, at 11:30 a.m.<o:p></o:p></span></span></div><span style="font-family: "Trebuchet MS", sans-serif;"> </span><br />
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<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Courier New";"><span style="font-family: "Trebuchet MS", sans-serif;">IT IS SO ORDERED.<o:p></o:p></span></span></div><span style="font-family: "Trebuchet MS", sans-serif;"> </span><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Courier New";"><o:p><span style="font-family: "Trebuchet MS", sans-serif;"> <span style="font-size: medium;">Hugh Wood, Esq.</span><br />
<span style="font-size: medium;">Wood & Meredith, LLP</span><br />
<span style="font-size: medium;">3756 LaVista Road</span><br />
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<a href="mailto:hwood@woodandmeredith.com"><span style="font-size: medium;"><span style="color: #336688; font-family: "Trebuchet MS", sans-serif;">hwood@woodandmeredith.com</span></span></a><br />
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<span style="font-size: medium;">Phone: 404-633-4100</span><br />
<span style="font-size: medium;">Fax: 404-633-0068</span></span></o:p></span></div>Hugh Woodhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/01021049579391065763noreply@blogger.com3tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2321320695584069696.post-85609245848151532732012-02-07T23:26:00.000-08:002012-02-07T23:26:28.159-08:00GPS Tracking Illegal Without a Search WarrantFinally, a small win by the People against the Police State. <br />
Restrictive 4th Amendment Search and Seizure cases favorable to<br />
the People are quite rare. <br />
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhRoZ6XyES0-Nd44fO4ZTufvTCm93C590zH8pr7Fiuz9V5tBcYXEalyGGBeZP_6wDzc0sAPYYsbVSFFdvgPX0tjrWDXNPxFmpeTjWo7pAYYPiJoANCSkmjWvYjH8w350ValVQgg0CXvKrC5/s1600/policestate-11.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="clear: right; float: right; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-left: 1em;"><img border="0" height="262" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhRoZ6XyES0-Nd44fO4ZTufvTCm93C590zH8pr7Fiuz9V5tBcYXEalyGGBeZP_6wDzc0sAPYYsbVSFFdvgPX0tjrWDXNPxFmpeTjWo7pAYYPiJoANCSkmjWvYjH8w350ValVQgg0CXvKrC5/s320/policestate-11.jpg" width="320" /></a></div><br />
UNITED STATES, PETITIONER<br />
v.<br />
ANTOINE JONES<br />
No. 10-1259.<br />
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES<br />
OCTOBER TERM, 2011<br />
Argued November 8, 2011<br />
Decided January 23, 2012<br />
<br />
Summaries:<br />
Source: Justia<br />
<br />
Respondent was convicted of drug trafficking and conspiracy charges. <br />
The District Court suppressed GPS data from a vehicle parked outside <br />
of respondent's residence, but held the remaining data admissible <br />
because respondent had no reasonable expectation of privacy when the <br />
vehicle was on a public street. The D.C. Circuit reversed, concluding <br />
that admission of the evidence obtained by warrantless use of the GPS <br />
device violated the Fourth Amendment. The Court held that the <br />
Government's installation of a GPS device on a target's vehicle, and <br />
its use of that device to monitor the vehicle's movements, constituted <br />
a search under the Fourth Amendment. Accordingly, the judgment of the <br />
Court of Appeals was affirmed.<br />
Syllabus<br />
NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be <br />
released, as is being done in connection with this case, at the time <br />
the opinion is issued. The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion <br />
of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for <br />
the convenience of the reader. See United States v. Detroit Timber & <br />
Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.<br />
Syllabus<br />
<br />
UNITED STATES v. JONES<br />
<br />
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR<br />
THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT<br />
The Government obtained a search warrant permitting it to <br />
install a Global-Positioning-System (GPS) tracking device on a vehicle <br />
registered to respondent Jones's wife. The warrant authorized <br />
installation in the District of Columbia and within 10 days, but <br />
agents installed the device on the 11th day and in Maryland. The <br />
Government then tracked the vehicle's movements for 28 days. It <br />
subsequently secured an indictment of Jones and others on drug <br />
trafficking conspiracy charges. The District Court suppressed the GPS <br />
data obtained while the vehicle was parked at Jones's residence, but <br />
held the remaining data admissible because Jones had no reasonable <br />
expectation of privacy when the vehicle was on public streets. Jones <br />
was convicted. The D. C. Circuit reversed, concluding that admission <br />
of the evidence obtained by warrantless use of the GPS device violated <br />
the Fourth Amendment.<br />
Held: The Government's attachment of the GPS device to the <br />
vehicle, and its use of that device to monitor the vehicle's <br />
movements, constitutes a search under the Fourth Amendment. Pp. 3-12.<br />
(a) The Fourth Amendment protects the "right of the people to be <br />
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against <br />
unreasonable searches and seizures." Here, the Government's physical <br />
intrusion on an "effect" for the purpose of obtaining information <br />
constitutes a "search." This type of encroachment on an area <br />
enumerated in the Amendment would have been considered a search within <br />
the meaning of the Amendment at the time it was adopted. Pp. 3-4.<br />
(b) This conclusion is consistent with this Court's Fourth Amendment <br />
jurisprudence, which until the latter half of the 20th century was <br />
tied to common-law trespass. Later cases, which have deviated from <br />
that exclusively property-based approach, have applied the<br />
<br />
Page 2<br />
analysis of Justice Harlan's concurrence in Katz v. United States, 389 <br />
U. S. 347, which said that the Fourth Amendment protects a person's <br />
"reasonable expectation of privacy," id., at 360. Here, the Court need <br />
not address the Government's contention that Jones had no "reasonable <br />
expectation of privacy," because Jones's Fourth Amendment rights do <br />
not rise or fall with the Katz formulation. At bottom, the Court must <br />
"assur[e] preservation of that degree of privacy against government <br />
that existed when the Fourth Amendment was adopted." Kyllo v. United <br />
States, 533 U. S. 27, 34. Katz did not repudiate the understanding <br />
that the Fourth Amendment embodies a particular concern for government <br />
trespass upon the areas it enumerates. The Katz reasonable-<br />
expectation-of-privacy test has been added to, but not substituted <br />
for, the common-law trespassory test. See Alderman v. United States, <br />
394 U. S. 165, 176; Soldal v. Cook County, 506 U. S. 56, 64. United <br />
States v. Knotts, 460 U. S. 276, and United States v. Karo, 468 U. S. <br />
705—post-Katz cases rejecting Fourth Amendment challenges to <br />
"beepers," electronic tracking devices representing another form of <br />
electronic monitoring—do not foreclose the conclusion that a search <br />
occurred here. New York v. Class, 475 U. S. 106, and Oliver v. United <br />
States, 466 U. S. 170, also do not support the Government's position. <br />
Pp. 4-12.<br />
(c) The Government's alternative argument—that if the attachment and <br />
use of the device was a search, it was a reasonable one—is forfeited <br />
because it was not raised below. P. 12.<br />
<br />
615 F. 3d 544, affirmed.<br />
SCALIA, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which <br />
ROBERTS, C. J., and KENNEDY, THOMAS, and SOTOMAYOR, JJ., joined. <br />
SOTOMAYOR, J., filed a concurring opinion. ALITO, J., filed an opinion <br />
concurring in the judgment, in which GINSBURG, BREYER, and KAGAN, JJ., <br />
joined.<br />
Page 3<br />
Opinion of the Court<br />
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before <br />
publication in the preliminary print of the United States Reports. <br />
Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme <br />
Court of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543, of any <br />
typographical or other formal errors, in order that corrections may be <br />
made before the preliminary print goes to press.<br />
No.10-1259<br />
<br />
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF<br />
APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT<br />
JUSTICE SCALIA delivered the opinion of the Court.<br />
We decide whether the attachment of a Global-Positioning-<br />
System (GPS) tracking device to an individual's vehicle, and <br />
subsequent use of that device to monitor the vehicle's movements on <br />
public streets, constitutes a search or seizure within the meaning of <br />
the Fourth Amendment.<br />
I<br />
In 2004 respondent Antoine Jones, owner and operator of a <br />
nightclub in the District of Columbia, came under suspicion of <br />
trafficking in narcotics and was made the target of an investigation <br />
by a joint FBI and Metropolitan Police Department task force. Officers <br />
employed various investigative techniques, including visual <br />
surveillance of the nightclub, installation of a camera focused on the <br />
front door of the club, and a pen register and wiretap covering <br />
Jones's cellular phone.<br />
Based in part on information gathered from these sources, in <br />
2005 the Government applied to the United States District Court for <br />
the District of Columbia for a warrant authorizing the use of an <br />
electronic tracking device on the Jeep Grand Cherokee registered to <br />
Jones's<br />
Page 4<br />
wife. A warrant issued, authorizing installation of the device in the <br />
District of Columbia and within 10 days.<br />
On the 11th day, and not in the District of Columbia but in <br />
Maryland,1 agents installed a GPS tracking device on the undercarriage <br />
of the Jeep while it was parked in a public parking lot. Over the next <br />
28 days, the Government used the device to track the vehicle's <br />
movements, and once had to replace the device's battery when the <br />
vehicle was parked in a different public lot in Maryland. By means of <br />
signals from multiple satellites, the device established the vehicle's <br />
location within 50 to 100 feet, and communicated that location by <br />
cellular phone to a Government computer. It relayed more than 2,000 <br />
pages of data over the 4-week period.<br />
The Government ultimately obtained a multiple-count indictment <br />
charging Jones and several alleged co-conspirators with, as relevant <br />
here, conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute <br />
five kilograms or more of cocaine and 50 grams or more of cocaine <br />
base, in violation of 21 U. S. C. §§841 and 846. Before trial, Jones <br />
filed a motion to suppress evidence obtained through the GPS device. <br />
The District Court granted the motion only in part, suppressing the <br />
data obtained while the vehicle was parked in the garage adjoining <br />
Jones's residence. 451 F. Supp. 2d 71, 88 (2006). It held the <br />
remaining data admissible, because "'[a] person traveling in an <br />
automobile on public thoroughfares has no reasonable expectation of <br />
privacy in his movements from one place to another.'" Ibid. (quoting <br />
United States v. Knotts, 460 U. S. 276, 281 (1983)). Jones's trial in <br />
October 2006 produced a hung jury on the conspiracy count.<br />
In March 2007, a grand jury returned another indict-<br />
Page 5<br />
ment, charging Jones and others with the same conspiracy. The <br />
Government introduced at trial the same GPS-derived locational data <br />
admitted in the first trial, which connected Jones to the alleged <br />
conspirators' stash house that contained $850,000 in cash, 97 <br />
kilograms of cocaine, and 1 kilogram of cocaine base. The jury <br />
returned a guilty verdict, and the District Court sentenced Jones to <br />
life imprisonment.<br />
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of <br />
Columbia Circuit reversed the conviction because of admission of the <br />
evidence obtained by warrantless use of the GPS device which, it said, <br />
violated the Fourth Amendment. United States v. Maynard, 615 F. 3d 544 <br />
(2010). The D. C. Circuit denied the Government's petition for <br />
rehearing en banc, with four judges dissenting. 625 F. 3d 766 (2010). <br />
We granted certiorari, 564 U. S. _ (2011).<br />
II<br />
<br />
A<br />
The Fourth Amendment provides in relevant part that "[t]he <br />
right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and <br />
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be <br />
violated." It is beyond dispute that a vehicle is an "effect" as that <br />
term is used in the Amendment. United States v. Chadwick, 433 U. S. 1, <br />
12 (1977). We hold that the Government's installation of a GPS device <br />
on a target's vehicle,2 and its use of that device to monitor the <br />
vehicle's movements, constitutes a "search."<br />
Page 6<br />
It is important to be clear about what occurred in this case: <br />
The Government physically occupied private property for the purpose of <br />
obtaining information. We have no doubt that such a physical intrusion <br />
would have been considered a "search" within the meaning of the Fourth <br />
Amendment when it was adopted. Entick v. Carrington, 95 Eng. Rep. 807 <br />
(C. P. 1765), is a "case we have described as a 'monument of English <br />
freedom' 'undoubtedly familiar' to 'every American statesman' at the <br />
time the Constitution was adopted, and considered to be 'the true and <br />
ultimate expression of constitutional law'" with regard to search and <br />
seizure. Brower v. County of Inyo, 489 U. S. 593, 596 (1989) (quoting <br />
Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S. 616, 626 (1886)). In that case, Lord <br />
Camden expressed in plain terms the significance of property rights in <br />
search-and-seizure analysis:<br />
"[O]ur law holds the property of every man so sacred, that no man can <br />
set his foot upon his neighbour's close without his leave; if he does <br />
he is a trespasser, though he does no damage at all; if he will tread <br />
upon his neighbour's ground, he must justify it by law." Entick, <br />
supra, at 817.<br />
<br />
The text of the Fourth Amendment reflects its close connection to <br />
property, since otherwise it would have referred simply to "the right <br />
of the people to be secure against unreasonable searches and <br />
seizures"; the phrase "in their persons, houses, papers, and effects" <br />
would have been superfluous.<br />
Consistent with this understanding, our Fourth Amendment <br />
jurisprudence was tied to common-law trespass, at least until the <br />
latter half of the 20th century. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U. S. 27, <br />
31 (2001); Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies: <br />
Constitutional Myths and the Case for Caution, 102 Mich. L. Rev. 801, <br />
816 (2004). Thus, in Olmstead v. United States, 277 U. S.<br />
Page 7<br />
438 (1928), we held that wiretaps attached to telephone wires on the <br />
public streets did not constitute a Fourth Amendment search because <br />
"[t]here was no entry of the houses or offices of the defendants," <br />
id., at 464.<br />
Our later cases, of course, have deviated from that <br />
exclusively property-based approach. In Katz v. United States, 389 U. <br />
S. 347, 351 (1967), we said that "the Fourth Amendment protects <br />
people, not places," and found a violation in attachment of an <br />
eavesdropping device to a public telephone booth. Our later cases have <br />
applied the analysis of Justice Harlan's concurrence in that case, <br />
which said that a violation occurs when government officers violate a <br />
person's "reasonable expectation of privacy," id., at 360. See, e.g., <br />
Bond v. United States, 529 U. S. 334 (2000); California v. Ciraolo, <br />
476 U. S. 207 (1986); Smith v. Maryland, 442 U. S. 735 (1979).<br />
The Government contends that the Harlan standard shows that no <br />
search occurred here, since Jones had no "reasonable expectation of <br />
privacy" in the area of the Jeep accessed by Government agents (its <br />
underbody) and in the locations of the Jeep on the public roads, which <br />
were visible to all. But we need not address the Government's <br />
contentions, because Jones's Fourth Amendment rights do not rise or <br />
fall with the Katz formulation. At bottom, we must "assur[e] <br />
preservation of that degree of privacy against government that existed <br />
when the Fourth Amendment was adopted." Kyllo, supra, at 34. As <br />
explained, for most of our history the Fourth Amendment was understood <br />
to embody a particular concern for government trespass upon the areas <br />
("persons, houses, papers, and effects") it enumerates.3 Katz did not <br />
repudiate<br />
Page 8<br />
that understanding. Less than two years later the Court upheld <br />
defendants' contention that the Government could not introduce against <br />
them conversations between other people obtained by warrantless <br />
placement of electronic surveillance devices in their homes. The <br />
opinion rejected the dissent's contention that there was no Fourth <br />
Amendment violation "unless the conversational privacy of the <br />
homeowner himself is invaded."4 Alderman v. United States, 394 U. S. <br />
165, 176 (1969). "[W]e [do not] believe that Katz, by holding that the <br />
Fourth Amendment protects persons and their private conversations, was <br />
intended to withdraw any of the protection which the Amendment extends <br />
to the home . . . ." Id., at 180.<br />
More recently, in Soldal v. Cook County, 506 U. S. 56 (1992), <br />
the Court unanimously rejected the argument that although a "seizure" <br />
had occurred "in a 'technical' sense" when a trailer home was forcibly <br />
removed, id., at 62, no Fourth Amendment violation occurred because <br />
law enforcement had not "invade[d] the [individuals'] privacy," id., <br />
at 60. Katz, the Court explained, established that "property rights <br />
are not the sole measure of Fourth<br />
Page 9<br />
Amendment violations," but did not "snuf[f] out the previously <br />
recognized protection for property." 506 U. S., at 64. As Justice <br />
Brennan explained in his concurrence in Knotts, Katz did not erode the <br />
principle "that, when the Government does engage in physical intrusion <br />
of a constitutionally protected area in order to obtain information, <br />
that intrusion may constitute a violation of the Fourth Amendment." <br />
460 U. S., at 286 (opinion concurring in judgment). We have embodied <br />
that preservation of past rights in our very definition of "reasonable <br />
expectation of privacy" which we have said to be an expectation "that <br />
has a source outside of the Fourth Amendment, either by reference to <br />
concepts of real or personal property law or to understandings that <br />
are recognized and permitted by society." Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U. <br />
S. 83, 88 (1998) (internal quotation marks omitted). Katz did not <br />
narrow the Fourth Amendment's scope.5 <br />
The Government contends that several of our post-Katz cases <br />
foreclose the conclusion that what occurred here constituted a search. <br />
It relies principally on two cases in<br />
Page 10<br />
which we rejected Fourth Amendment challenges to "beepers," electronic <br />
tracking devices that represent another form of electronic monitoring. <br />
The first case, Knotts, upheld against Fourth Amendment challenge the <br />
use of a "beeper" that had been placed in a container of chloroform, <br />
allowing law enforcement to monitor the location of the container. 460 <br />
U. S., at 278. We said that there had been no infringement of Knotts' <br />
reasonable expectation of privacy since the information obtained—the <br />
location of the automobile carrying the container on public roads, and <br />
the location of the off-loaded container in open fields near Knotts' <br />
cabin—had been voluntarily conveyed to the pub-lic.6 Id., at 281-282. <br />
But as we have discussed, the Katz reasonable-expectation-of-privacy <br />
test has been added to, not substituted for, the common-law <br />
trespassory test. The holding in Knotts addressed only the former, <br />
since the latter was not at issue. The beeper had been placed in the <br />
container before it came into Knotts' possession, with the consent of <br />
the then-owner. 460 U. S., at 278. Knotts did not challenge that <br />
installation, and we specifically declined to consider its effect on <br />
the Fourth Amendment analysis. Id., at 279, n. Knotts would be <br />
relevant, perhaps, if the Government were making the argument that <br />
what would otherwise be an unconstitutional search is not such where <br />
it produces only public information. The Government does not make that <br />
argument, and we know of no case that would support it.<br />
The second "beeper" case, United States v. Karo, 468 U. S. 705 <br />
(1984), does not suggest a different conclusion. There we addressed <br />
the question left open by Knotts, whether the installation of a beeper <br />
in a container<br />
Page 11<br />
amounted to a search or seizure. 468 U. S., at 713. As in Knotts, at <br />
the time the beeper was installed the container belonged to a third <br />
party, and it did not come into possession of the defendant until <br />
later. 468 U. S., at 708. Thus, the specific question we considered <br />
was whether the installation "with the consent of the original owner <br />
consti-tute[d] a search or seizure . . . when the container is <br />
delivered to a buyer having no knowledge of the presence of the <br />
beeper." Id., at 707 (emphasis added). We held not. The Government, we <br />
said, came into physical contact with the container only before it <br />
belonged to the defendant Karo; and the transfer of the container with <br />
the unmonitored beeper inside did not convey any information and thus <br />
did not invade Karo's privacy. See id., at 712. That conclusion is <br />
perfectly consistent with the one we reach here. Karo accepted the <br />
container as it came to him, beeper and all, and was therefore not <br />
entitled to object to the beeper's presence, even though it was used <br />
to monitor the container's location. Cf. On Lee v. United States, 343 <br />
U. S. 747, 751-752 (1952) (no search or seizure where an informant, <br />
who was wearing a concealed microphone, was invited into the <br />
defendant's business). Jones, who possessed the Jeep at the time the <br />
Government trespassorily inserted the information-gathering device, is <br />
on much different footing.<br />
The Government also points to our exposition in New York v. <br />
Class, 475 U. S. 106 (1986), that "[t]he exterior of a car . . . is <br />
thrust into the public eye, and thus to examine it does not constitute <br />
a 'search.'" Id., at 114. That statement is of marginal relevance here <br />
since, as the Government acknowledges, "the officers in this case did <br />
more than conduct a visual inspection of respondent's vehicle," Brief <br />
for United States 41 (emphasis added). By attaching the device to the <br />
Jeep, officers encroached on a protected area. In Class itself we <br />
suggested that this would make a difference, for we concluded that an <br />
officer's momentary reaching into the interior of a vehicle did <br />
constitute a<br />
Page 12<br />
search.7 475 U. S., at 114-115.<br />
Finally, the Government's position gains little support from <br />
our conclusion in Oliver v. United States, 466 U. S. 170 (1984), that <br />
officers' information-gathering intrusion on an "open field" did not <br />
constitute a Fourth Amendment search even though it was a trespass at <br />
common law, id., at 183. Quite simply, an open field, unlike the <br />
curtilage of a home, see United States v. Dunn, 480 U. S. 294, 300 <br />
(1987), is not one of those protected areas enumerated in the Fourth <br />
Amendment. Oliver, supra, at 176-177. See also Hester v. United <br />
States, 265 U. S. 57, 59 (1924). The Government's physical intrusion <br />
on such an area—unlike its intrusion on the "effect" at issue here—is <br />
of no Fourth Amendment significance.8 <br />
B<br />
The concurrence begins by accusing us of applying "18th-<br />
century tort law." Post, at 1. That is a distortion. What we apply is <br />
an 18th-century guarantee against unreasonable searches, which we <br />
believe must provide at<br />
Page 13<br />
a minimum the degree of protection it afforded when it was adopted. <br />
The concurrence does not share that belief. It would apply exclusively <br />
Katz's reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test, even when that <br />
eliminates rights that previously existed.<br />
The concurrence faults our approach for "present[ing] <br />
particularly vexing problems" in cases that do not involve physical <br />
contact, such as those that involve the transmission of electronic <br />
signals. Post, at 9. We entirely fail to understand that point. For <br />
unlike the concurrence, which would make Katz the exclusive test, we <br />
do not make trespass the exclusive test. Situations involving merely <br />
the transmission of electronic signals without trespass would remain <br />
subject to Katz analysis.<br />
In fact, it is the concurrence's insistence on the exclusivity <br />
of the Katz test that needlessly leads us into "particularly vexing <br />
problems" in the present case. This Court has to date not deviated <br />
from the understanding that mere visual observation does not <br />
constitute a search. See Kyllo, 533 U. S., at 31-32. We accordingly <br />
held in Knotts that "[a] person traveling in an automobile on public <br />
thoroughfares has no reasonable expectation of privacy in his <br />
movements from one place to another." 460 U. S., at 281. Thus, even <br />
assuming that the concurrence is correct to say that "[t]raditional <br />
surveillance" of Jones for a 4-week period "would have required a <br />
large team of agents, multiple vehicles, and perhaps aerial <br />
assistance," post, at 12, our cases suggest that such visual <br />
observation is constitutionally permissible. It may be that achieving <br />
the same result through electronic means, without an accompanying <br />
trespass, is an unconstitutional invasion of privacy, but the present <br />
case does not require us to answer that question.<br />
And answering it affirmatively leads us needlessly into <br />
additional thorny problems. The concurrence posits that "relatively <br />
short-term monitoring of a person's movements<br />
Page 14<br />
on public streets" is okay, but that "the use of longer term GPS <br />
monitoring in investigations of most offenses" is no good. Post, at 13 <br />
(emphasis added). That introduces yet another novelty into our <br />
jurisprudence. There is no precedent for the proposition that whether <br />
a search has occurred depends on the nature of the crime being <br />
investigated. And even accepting that novelty, it remains unexplained <br />
why a 4-week investigation is "surely" too long and why a drug-<br />
trafficking conspiracy involving substantial amounts of cash and <br />
narcotics is not an "extraordinary offens[e]" which may permit longer <br />
observation. See post, at 13-14. What of a 2-day monitoring of a <br />
suspected purveyor of stolen electronics? Or of a 6-month monitoring <br />
of a suspected terrorist? We may have to grapple with these "vexing <br />
problems" in some future case where a classic trespassory search is <br />
not involved and resort must be had to Katz analysis; but there is no <br />
reason for rushing forward to resolve them here.<br />
III<br />
The Government argues in the alternative that even if the <br />
attachment and use of the device was a search, it was reasonable—and <br />
thus lawful—under the Fourth Amendment because "officers had <br />
reasonable suspicion, and indeed probable cause, to believe that <br />
[Jones] was a leader in a large-scale cocaine distribution <br />
conspiracy." Brief for United States 50-51. We have no occasion to <br />
consider this argument. The Government did not raise it below, and the <br />
D. C. Circuit therefore did not address it. See 625 F. 3d, at 767 <br />
(Ginsburg, Tatel, and Griffith, JJ., concurring in denial of rehearing <br />
en banc). We consider the argument forfeited. See Sprietsma v. Mercury <br />
Marine, 537 U. S. 51, 56, n. 4 (2002).<br />
* * *<br />
The judgment of the Court of Appeals for the D. C. Circuit is <br />
affirmed.<br />
It is so ordered.<br />
Page 15<br />
SOTOMAYOR, J., concurring<br />
<br />
No.10-1259<br />
UNITED STATES, PETITIONER<br />
v.<br />
ANTOINE JONES<br />
<br />
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF<br />
APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT<br />
JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR, concurring.<br />
I join the Court's opinion because I agree that a search <br />
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment occurs, at a minimum, "[w]<br />
here, as here, the Government obtains information by physically <br />
intruding on a constitutionally protected area." Ante, at 6, n. 3. In <br />
this case, the Government installed a Global Positioning System (GPS) <br />
tracking device on respondent Antoine Jones' Jeep without a valid <br />
warrant and without Jones' consent, then used that device to monitor <br />
the Jeep's movements over the course of four weeks. The Government <br />
usurped Jones' property for the purpose of conducting surveillance on <br />
him, thereby invading privacy interests long afforded, and undoubtedly <br />
entitled to, Fourth Amendment protection. See, e.g., Silverman v. <br />
United States, 365 U. S. 505, 511-512 (1961).<br />
Of course, the Fourth Amendment is not concerned only with <br />
trespassory intrusions on property. See, e.g., Kyllo v. United States, <br />
533 U. S. 27, 31-33 (2001). Rather, even in the absence of a trespass, <br />
"a Fourth Amendment search occurs when the government violates a <br />
subjective expectation of privacy that society recognizes as <br />
reasonable." Id., at 33; see also Smith v. Maryland, 442 U. S. 735, <br />
740-741 (1979); Katz v. United States, 389 U. S. 347, 361 (1967) <br />
(Harlan, J., concurring). In Katz, this Court enlarged its then-<br />
prevailing focus on property rights by announcing<br />
Page 16<br />
that the reach of the Fourth Amendment does not "turn upon the <br />
presence or absence of a physical intrusion." Id., at 353. As the <br />
majority's opinion makes clear, however, Katz's reasonable-<br />
expectation-of-privacy test augmented, but did not displace or <br />
diminish, the common-law trespassory test that preceded it. Ante, at <br />
8. Thus, "when the Government does engage in physical intrusion of a <br />
constitutionally protected area in order to obtain information, that <br />
intrusion may constitute a violation of the Fourth Amendment." United <br />
States v. Knotts, 460 U. S. 276, 286 (1983) (Brennan, J., concurring <br />
in judgment); see also, e.g., Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U. S. 128, 144, <br />
n. 12 (1978). JUSTICE ALITO's approach, which discounts altogether the <br />
constitutional relevance of the Government's physical intrusion on <br />
Jones' Jeep, erodes that longstanding protection for privacy <br />
expectations inherent in items of property that people possess or <br />
control. See post, at 5—7 (opinion concurring in judgment). By <br />
contrast, the trespassory test applied in the majority's opinion <br />
reflects an irreducible constitutional minimum: When the Government <br />
physically invades personal property to gather information, a search <br />
occurs. The reaffirmation of that principle suffices to decide this <br />
case.<br />
Nonetheless, as JUSTICE ALITO notes, physical intrusion is now <br />
unnecessary to many forms of surveillance. Post, at 9—12. With <br />
increasing regularity, the Government will be capable of duplicating <br />
the monitoring undertaken in this case by enlisting factory- or <br />
owner-installed vehicle tracking devices or GPS-enabled smartphones. <br />
See United States v. Pineda-Moreno, 617 F. 3d 1120, 1125 (CA9 2010) <br />
(Kozinski, C. J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc). In <br />
cases of electronic or other novel modes of surveillance that do not <br />
depend upon a physical invasion on property, the majority opinion's <br />
trespassory test may provide little guidance. But "[s]ituations <br />
involving merely the transmission of electronic signals without <br />
trespass<br />
Page 17<br />
would remain subject to Katz analysis." Ante, at 11. As JUSTICE ALITO <br />
incisively observes, the same technological advances that have made <br />
possible nontrespassory surveillance techniques will also affect the <br />
Katz test by shaping the evolution of societal privacy expectations. <br />
Post, at 10—11. Under that rubric, I agree with JUSTICE ALITO that, at <br />
the very least, "longer term GPS monitoring in investigations of most <br />
offenses impinges on expectations of privacy." Post, at 13.<br />
In cases involving even short-term monitoring, some unique <br />
attributes of GPS surveillance relevant to the Katz analysis will <br />
require particular attention. GPS monitoring generates a precise, <br />
comprehensive record of a person's public movements that reflects a <br />
wealth of detail about her familial, political, professional, <br />
religious, and sexual associations. See, e.g., People v. Weaver, 12 N. <br />
Y. 3d 433, 441—442, 909 N. E. 2d 1195, 1199 (2009) ("Disclosed in <br />
[GPS] data . . . will be trips the indisputably private nature of <br />
which takes little imagination to conjure: trips to the psychiatrist, <br />
the plastic surgeon, the abortion clinic, the AIDS treatment center, <br />
the strip club, the criminal defense attorney, the by-the-hour motel, <br />
the union meeting, the mosque, synagogue or church, the gay bar and on <br />
and on"). The Government can store such records and efficiently mine <br />
them for information years into the future. Pineda-Moreno, 617 F. 3d, <br />
at 1124 (opinion of Kozinski, C. J.). And because GPS monitoring is <br />
cheap in comparison to conventional surveillance techniques and, by <br />
design, proceeds surreptitiously, it evades the ordinary checks that <br />
constrain abusive law enforcement practices: "limited police resources <br />
and community hostility." Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U. S. 419, 426 <br />
(2004).<br />
Awareness that the Government may be watching chills <br />
associational and expressive freedoms. And the Government's <br />
unrestrained power to assemble data that reveal private aspects of <br />
identity is susceptible to abuse. The net<br />
Page 18<br />
result is that GPS monitoring—by making available at a relatively low <br />
cost such a substantial quantum of intimate information about any <br />
person whom the Government, in its unfettered discretion, chooses to <br />
track—may "alter the relationship between citizen and government in a <br />
way that is inimical to democratic society." United States v. Cuevas-<br />
Perez, 640 F. 3d 272, 285 (CA7 2011) (Flaum, J., concurring).<br />
I would take these attributes of GPS monitoring into account <br />
when considering the existence of a reasonable societal expectation of <br />
privacy in the sum of one's public movements. I would ask whether <br />
people reasonably expect that their movements will be recorded and <br />
aggregated in a manner that enables the Government to ascertain, more <br />
or less at will, their political and religious beliefs, sexual habits, <br />
and so on. I do not regard as dispositive the fact that the Government <br />
might obtain the fruits of GPS monitoring through lawful conventional <br />
surveillance techniques. See Kyllo, 533 U. S., at 35, n. 2; ante, at <br />
11 (leaving open the possibility that duplicating traditional <br />
surveillance "through electronic means, without an accompanying <br />
trespass, is an unconstitutional invasion of privacy"). I would also <br />
consider the appropriateness of entrusting to the Executive, in the <br />
absence of any oversight from a coordinate branch, a tool so amenable <br />
to misuse, especially in light of the Fourth Amendment's goal to curb <br />
arbitrary exercises of police power to and prevent "a too permeating <br />
police surveillance," United States v. Di Re, 332 U. S. 581, 595 <br />
(1948).* <br />
Page 19<br />
More fundamentally, it may be necessary to reconsider the <br />
premise that an individual has no reasonable expectation of privacy in <br />
information voluntarily disclosed to third parties. E.g., Smith, 442 <br />
U. S., at 742; United States v. Miller, 425 U. S. 435, 443 (1976). <br />
This approach is ill suited to the digital age, in which people reveal <br />
a great deal of information about themselves to third parties in the <br />
course of carrying out mundane tasks. People disclose the phone <br />
numbers that they dial or text to their cellular providers; the URLs <br />
that they visit and the e-mail addresses with which they correspond to <br />
their Internet service providers; and the books, groceries, and <br />
medications they purchase to online retailers. Perhaps, as JUSTICE <br />
ALITO notes, some people may find the "tradeoff" of privacy for <br />
convenience "worthwhile," or come to accept this "diminution of <br />
privacy" as "inevitable," post, at 10, and perhaps not. I for one <br />
doubt that people would accept without complaint the warrantless <br />
disclosure to the Government of a list of every Web site they had <br />
visited in the last week, or month, or year. But whatever the societal <br />
expectations, they can attain constitutionally protected status only <br />
if our Fourth Amendment jurisprudence ceases<br />
Page 20<br />
to treat secrecy as a prerequisite for privacy. I would not assume <br />
that all information voluntarily disclosed to some member of the <br />
public for a limited purpose is, for that reason alone, disentitled to <br />
Fourth Amendment protection. See Smith, 442 U. S., at 749 (Marshall, <br />
J., dissenting) ("Privacy is not a discrete commodity, possessed <br />
absolutely or not at all. Those who disclose certain facts to a bank <br />
or phone company for a limited business purpose need not assume that <br />
this information will be released to other persons for other <br />
purposes"); see also Katz, 389 U. S., at 351-352 ("[W]hat [a person] <br />
seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the <br />
public, may be constitutionally protected").<br />
Resolution of these difficult questions in this case is <br />
unnecessary, however, because the Government's physical intrusion on <br />
Jones' Jeep supplies a narrower basis for decision. I therefore join <br />
the majority's opinion.<br />
Page 21<br />
ALITO, J., concurring in judgment<br />
<br />
No.10-1259<br />
UNITED STATES, PETITIONER<br />
v.<br />
ANTOINE JONES<br />
<br />
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF<br />
APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT<br />
JUSTICE ALITO, with whom JUSTICE GINSBURG, JUSTICE BREYER, and <br />
JUSTICE KAGAN join, concurring in the judgment.<br />
This case requires us to apply the Fourth Amendment's <br />
prohibition of unreasonable searches and seizures to a 21st-century <br />
surveillance technique, the use of a Global Positioning System (GPS) <br />
device to monitor a vehicle's movements for an extended period of <br />
time. Ironically, the Court has chosen to decide this case based on <br />
18th-century tort law. By attaching a small GPS device9 to the <br />
underside of the vehicle that respondent drove, the law enforcement <br />
officers in this case engaged in conduct that might have provided <br />
grounds in 1791 for a suit for trespass to chattels.10 And for this <br />
reason, the Court concludes, the installation and use of the GPS <br />
device constituted a search. Ante, at 3-4.<br />
Page 22<br />
This holding, in my judgment, is unwise. It strains the <br />
language of the Fourth Amendment; it has little if any support in <br />
current Fourth Amendment case law; and it is highly artificial.<br />
I would analyze the question presented in this case by asking <br />
whether respondent's reasonable expectations of privacy were violated <br />
by the long-term monitoring of the movements of the vehicle he drove.<br />
I<br />
<br />
A<br />
The Fourth Amendment prohibits "unreasonable searches and <br />
seizures," and the Court makes very little effort to explain how the <br />
attachment or use of the GPS device fits within these terms. The Court <br />
does not contend that there was a seizure. A seizure of property <br />
occurs when there is "some meaningful interference with an <br />
individual's possessory interests in that property," United States v. <br />
Jacobsen, 466 U. S. 109, 113 (1984), and here there was none. Indeed, <br />
the success of the surveillance technique that the officers employed <br />
was dependent on the fact that the GPS did not interfere in any way <br />
with the operation of the vehicle, for if any such interference had <br />
been detected, the device might have been discovered.<br />
The Court does claim that the installation and use of the GPS <br />
constituted a search, see ante, at 3-4, but this conclusion is <br />
dependent on the questionable proposition that these two procedures <br />
cannot be separated for purposes of Fourth Amendment analysis. If <br />
these two procedures are analyzed separately, it is not at all clear <br />
from the Court's opinion why either should be regarded as a search. It <br />
is clear that the attachment of the GPS device was not itself a <br />
search; if the device had not functioned or if the officers had not <br />
used it, no information would have been obtained. And the Court does <br />
not contend that the use of the device constituted a search either. On <br />
the contrary, the Court<br />
Page 23<br />
accepts the holding in United States v. Knotts, 460 U. S. 276 (1983), <br />
that the use of a surreptitiously planted electronic device to monitor <br />
a vehicle's movements on public roads did not amount to a search. See <br />
ante, at 7.<br />
The Court argues—and I agree—that "we must 'assur[e] <br />
preservation of that degree of privacy against government that existed <br />
when the Fourth Amendment was adopted.'" Ante, at 5 (quoting Kyllo v. <br />
United States, 533 U. S. 27, 34 (2001)). But it is almost impossible <br />
to think of late-18th-century situations that are analogous to what <br />
took place in this case. (Is it possible to imagine a case in which a <br />
constable secreted himself somewhere in a coach and remained there for <br />
a period of time in order to monitor the movements of the coach's <br />
owner?11 ) The Court's theory seems to be that the concept of a <br />
search, as originally understood, comprehended any technical trespass <br />
that led to the gathering of evidence, but we know that this is <br />
incorrect. At common law, any unauthorized intrusion on private <br />
property was actionable, see Prosser & Keeton 75, but a trespass on <br />
open fields, as opposed to the "curtilage" of a home, does not fall <br />
within the scope of the Fourth Amendment because private property <br />
outside the curtilage is not part of a "hous[e]" within the meaning of <br />
the Fourth Amendment. See Oliver v. United States, 466 U. S. 170 <br />
(1984); Hester v. United States, 265 U. S. 57 (1924).<br />
B<br />
The Court's reasoning in this case is very similar to that in <br />
the Court's early decisions involving wiretapping and electronic <br />
eavesdropping, namely, that a technical trespass followed by the <br />
gathering of evidence constitutes a<br />
Page 24<br />
search. In the early electronic surveillance cases, the Court <br />
concluded that a Fourth Amendment search occurred when private <br />
conversations were monitored as a result of an "unauthorized physical <br />
penetration into the premises occupied" by the defendant. Silverman v. <br />
United States, 365 U. S. 505, 509 (1961). In Silverman, police <br />
officers listened to conversations in an attached home by inserting a <br />
"spike mike" through the wall that this house shared with the vacant <br />
house next door. Id., at 506. This procedure was held to be a search <br />
because the mike made contact with a heating duct on the other side of <br />
the wall and thus "usurp[ed] . . . an integral part of the premises." <br />
Id., at 511.<br />
By contrast, in cases in which there was no trespass, it was <br />
held that there was no search. Thus, in Olmstead v. United States, 277 <br />
U. S. 438 (1928), the Court found that the Fourth Amendment did not <br />
apply because "[t]he taps from house lines were made in the streets <br />
near the houses." Id., at 457. Similarly, the Court concluded that no <br />
search occurred in Goldman v. United States, 316 U. S. 129, 135 <br />
(1942), where a "detectaphone" was placed on the outer wall of <br />
defendant's office for the purpose of overhearing conversations held <br />
within the room.<br />
This trespass-based rule was repeatedly criticized. In <br />
Olmstead, Justice Brandeis wrote that it was "immaterial where the <br />
physical connection with the telephone wires was made." 277 U. S., at <br />
479 (dissenting opinion). Although a private conversation transmitted <br />
by wire did not fall within the literal words of the Fourth Amendment, <br />
he argued, the Amendment should be understood as prohibiting "every <br />
unjustifiable intrusion by the government upon the privacy of the <br />
individual." Id., at 478. See also, e.g., Silverman, supra, at 513 <br />
(Douglas, J., concurring) ("The concept of 'an unauthorized physical <br />
penetration into the premises,' on which the present decision rests <br />
seems to me beside the point. Was not the wrong . . . done when the<br />
Page 25<br />
intimacies of the home were tapped, recorded, or revealed? The depth <br />
of the penetration of the electronic device—even the degree of its <br />
remoteness from the inside of the house— is not the measure of the <br />
injury"); Goldman, supra, at 139 (Murphy, J., dissenting) ("[T]he <br />
search of one's home or office no longer requires physical entry, for <br />
science has brought forth far more effective devices for the invasion <br />
of a person's privacy than the direct and obvious methods of <br />
oppression which were detested by our forebears and which inspired the <br />
Fourth Amendment").<br />
Katz v. United States, 389 U. S. 347 (1967), finally did away <br />
with the old approach, holding that a trespass was not required for a <br />
Fourth Amendment violation. Katz involved the use of a listening <br />
device that was attached to the outside of a public telephone booth <br />
and that allowed police officers to eavesdrop on one end of the <br />
target's phone conversation. This procedure did not physically intrude <br />
on the area occupied by the target, but the Katz Court, "repudiate<br />
[ed]" the old doctrine, Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U. S. 128, 143 (1978), <br />
and held that "[t]he fact that the electronic device employed . . . <br />
did not happen to penetrate the wall of the booth can have no <br />
constitutional significance," 389 U. S., at 353 ("[T]he reach of th[e] <br />
[Fourth] Amendment cannot turn upon the presence or absence of a <br />
physical intrusion into any given enclosure"); see Rakas, supra, at <br />
143 (describing Katz as holding that the "capacity to claim the <br />
protection for the Fourth Amendment depends not upon a property right <br />
in the invaded place but upon whether the person who claims the <br />
protection of the Amendment has a legitimate expectation of privacy in <br />
the invaded place"); Kyllo, supra, at 32 ("We have since decoupled <br />
violation of a person's Fourth Amendment rights from trespassory <br />
violation of his property"). What mattered, the Court now held, was <br />
whether the conduct at issue "violated the privacy upon which [the <br />
defendant] justifiably relied while using the telephone booth." Katz, <br />
supra,<br />
Page 26<br />
at 353.<br />
Under this approach, as the Court later put it when addressing <br />
the relevance of a technical trespass, "an actual trespass is neither <br />
necessary nor sufficient to establish a constitutional violation." <br />
United States v. Karo, 468 U. S. 705, 713 (1984) (emphasis added). <br />
Ibid. ("Compar[ing] Katz v. United States, 389 U. S. 347 (1967) (no <br />
trespass, but Fourth Amendment violation), with Oliver v. United <br />
States, 466 U. S. 170 (1984) (trespass, but no Fourth Amendment <br />
violation)"). In Oliver, the Court wrote:<br />
"The existence of a property right is but one element in determining <br />
whether expectations of privacy are legitimate. 'The premise that <br />
property interests control the right of the Government to search and <br />
seize has been discredited.' Katz, 389 U. S., at 353, (quoting Warden <br />
v. Hayden, 387 U. S. 294, 304 (1967); some internal quotation marks <br />
omitted)." 466 U. S., at 183.<br />
<br />
II<br />
The majority suggests that two post-Katz decisions— Soldal v. <br />
Cook County, 506 U. S. 56 (1992), and Alderman v. United States, 394 <br />
U. S. 165 (1969)—show that a technical trespass is sufficient to <br />
establish the existence of a search, but they provide little support.<br />
In Soldal, the Court held that towing away a trailer home <br />
without the owner's consent constituted a seizure even if this did not <br />
invade the occupants' personal privacy. But in the present case, the <br />
Court does not find that there was a seizure, and it is clear that <br />
none occurred.<br />
In Alderman, the Court held that the Fourth Amendment rights <br />
of homeowners were implicated by the use of a surreptitiously planted <br />
listening device to monitor third-party conversations that occurred <br />
within their home. See 394 U. S., at 176-180. Alderman is best <br />
understood to<br />
Page 27<br />
mean that the homeowners had a legitimate expectation of privacy in <br />
all conversations that took place under their roof. See Rakas, 439 U. <br />
S., at 144, n. 12 (citing Alderman for the proposition that "the Court <br />
has not altogether abandoned use of property concepts in determining <br />
the presence or absence of the privacy interests protected by that <br />
Amendment"); 439 U. S., at 153 (Powell, J., concurring) (citing <br />
Alderman for the proposition that "property rights reflect society's <br />
explicit recognition of a person's authority to act as he wishes in <br />
certain areas, and therefore should be considered in determining <br />
whether an individual's expectations of privacy are reasonable); Karo, <br />
supra, at 732 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) <br />
(citing Alderman in support of the proposition that "a homeowner has a <br />
reasonable expectation of privacy in the contents of his home, <br />
including items owned by others").<br />
In sum, the majority is hard pressed to find support in post-<br />
Katz cases for its trespass-based theory.<br />
III<br />
Disharmony with a substantial body of existing case law is <br />
only one of the problems with the Court's approach in this case.<br />
I will briefly note four others. First, the Court's reasoning <br />
largely disregards what is really important (the use of a GPS for the <br />
purpose of long-term tracking) and instead attaches great significance <br />
to something that most would view as relatively minor (attaching to <br />
the bottom of a car a small, light object that does not interfere in <br />
any way with the car's operation). Attaching such an object is <br />
generally regarded as so trivial that it does not provide a basis for <br />
recovery under modern tort law. See Prosser & Keeton §14, at 87 <br />
(harmless or trivial contact with personal property not actionable); <br />
D. Dobbs, Law of Torts 124 (2000) (same). But under the Court's <br />
reasoning, this conduct<br />
Page 28<br />
may violate the Fourth Amendment. By contrast, if long-term monitoring <br />
can be accomplished without committing a technical trespass—suppose, <br />
for example, that the Federal Government required or persuaded auto <br />
manufacturers to include a GPS tracking device in every car—the <br />
Court's theory would provide no protection.<br />
Second, the Court's approach leads to incongruous results. If <br />
the police attach a GPS device to a car and use the device to follow <br />
the car for even a brief time, under the Court's theory, the Fourth <br />
Amendment applies. But if the police follow the same car for a much <br />
longer period using unmarked cars and aerial assistance, this tracking <br />
is not subject to any Fourth Amendment constraints.<br />
In the present case, the Fourth Amendment applies, the Court <br />
concludes, because the officers installed the GPS device after <br />
respondent's wife, to whom the car was registered, turned it over to <br />
respondent for his exclusive use. See ante, at 8. But if the GPS had <br />
been attached prior to that time, the Court's theory would lead to a <br />
different result. The Court proceeds on the assumption that respondent <br />
"had at least the property rights of a bailee," ante, at 3, n. 2, but <br />
a bailee may sue for a trespass to chattel only if the injury occurs <br />
during the term of the bailment. See 8A Am. Jur. 2d, Bailment §166, <br />
pp. 685686 (2009). So if the GPS device had been installed before <br />
respondent's wife gave him the keys, respondent would have no claim <br />
for trespass—and, presumably, no Fourth Amendment claim either.<br />
Third, under the Court's theory, the coverage of the Fourth <br />
Amendment may vary from State to State. If the events at issue here <br />
had occurred in a community property State12 or a State that has <br />
adopted the Uniform Marital<br />
Page 29<br />
Property Act,13 respondent would likely be an owner of the vehicle, <br />
and it would not matter whether the GPS was installed before or after <br />
his wife turned over the keys. In non-community-property States, on <br />
the other hand, the registration of the vehicle in the name of <br />
respondent's wife would generally be regarded as presumptive evidence <br />
that she was the sole owner. See 60 C. J. S., Motor Vehicles §231, pp. <br />
398-399 (2002); 8 Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles §1208, pp. 859-860 (2007).<br />
Fourth, the Court's reliance on the law of trespass will <br />
present particularly vexing problems in cases involving surveillance <br />
that is carried out by making electronic, as opposed to physical, <br />
contact with the item to be tracked. For example, suppose that the <br />
officers in the present case had followed respondent by <br />
surreptitiously activating a stolen vehicle detection system that came <br />
with the car when it was purchased. Would the sending of a radio <br />
signal to activate this system constitute a trespass to chattels? <br />
Trespass to chattels has traditionally required a physical touching of <br />
the property. See Restatement (Second) of Torts §217 and Comment e <br />
(1963 and 1964); Dobbs, supra, at 123. In recent years, courts have <br />
wrestled with the application of this old tort in cases involving <br />
unwanted electronic contact with computer systems, and some have held <br />
that even the transmission of electrons that occurs when a <br />
communication is sent from one computer to another is enough. See, <br />
e.g., CompuServe, Inc. v. Cyber Promotions, Inc.,962 F. Supp. 1015 (SD <br />
Ohio 1997); Thrifty-Tel, Inc. v. Bezenek, 46 Cal. App. 4th 1559, 1566, <br />
n. 6 (1996). But may such decisions be followed in applying the <br />
Court's trespass theory? Assuming that what matters under the Court's <br />
theory is the law of trespass as it existed at the time of the <br />
adoption of the Fourth<br />
Page 30<br />
Amendment, do these recent decisions represent a change in the law or <br />
simply the application of the old tort to new situations?<br />
IV<br />
<br />
A<br />
The Katz expectation-of-privacy test avoids the problems and <br />
complications noted above, but it is not without its own difficulties. <br />
It involves a degree of circularity, see Kyllo, 533 U. S., at 34, and <br />
judges are apt to confuse their own expectations of privacy with those <br />
of the hypothetical reasonable person to which the Katz test looks. <br />
See Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U. S. 83, 97 (1998) (SCALIA, J., <br />
concurring). In addition, the Katz test rests on the assumption that <br />
this hypothetical reasonable person has a well-developed and stable <br />
set of privacy expectations. But technology can change those <br />
expectations. Dramatic technological change may lead to periods in <br />
which popular expectations are in flux and may ultimately produce <br />
significant changes in popular attitudes. New technology may provide <br />
increased convenience or security at the expense of privacy, and many <br />
people may find the tradeoff worthwhile. And even if the public does <br />
not welcome the diminution of privacy that new technology entails, <br />
they may eventually reconcile themselves to this development as <br />
inevitable.14 <br />
On the other hand, concern about new intrusions on privacy may <br />
spur the enactment of legislation to protect against these intrusions. <br />
This is what ultimately happened with respect to wiretapping. After <br />
Katz, Congress<br />
Page 31<br />
did not leave it to the courts to develop a body of Fourth Amendment <br />
case law governing that complex subject. Instead, Congress promptly <br />
enacted a comprehensive statute, see 18 U. S. C. §§2510-2522 (2006 ed. <br />
and Supp. IV), and since that time, the regulation of wiretapping has <br />
been governed primarily by statute and not by case law.15 In an ironic <br />
sense, although Katz overruled Olmstead, Chief Justice Taft's <br />
suggestion in the latter case that the regulation of wiretapping was a <br />
matter better left for Congress, see 277 U. S., at 465-466, has been <br />
borne out.<br />
B<br />
Recent years have seen the emergence of many new devices that <br />
permit the monitoring of a person's movements. In some locales, <br />
closed-circuit television video monitoring is becoming ubiquitous. On <br />
toll roads, automatic toll collection systems create a precise record <br />
of the movements of motorists who choose to make use of that <br />
convenience. Many motorists purchase cars that are equipped with <br />
devices that permit a central station to ascertain the car's location <br />
at any time so that roadside assistance may be provided if needed and <br />
the car may be found if it is stolen.<br />
Perhaps most significant, cell phones and other wireless <br />
devices now permit wireless carriers to track and record the location <br />
of users—and as of June 2011, it has been reported, there were more <br />
than 322 million wireless devices in use in the United States.16 For <br />
older phones, the accuracy of the location information depends on the <br />
density of the tower network, but new "smart phones," which<br />
Page 32<br />
are equipped with a GPS device, permit more precise tracking. For <br />
example, when a user activates the GPS on such a phone, a provider is <br />
able to monitor the phone's location and speed of movement and can <br />
then report back real-time traffic conditions after combining <br />
("crowdsourcing") the speed of all such phones on any particular <br />
road.17 Similarly, phone-location-tracking services are offered as <br />
"social" tools, allowing consumers to find (or to avoid) others who <br />
enroll in these services. The availability and use of these and other <br />
new devices will continue to shape the average person's expectations <br />
about the privacy of his or her daily movements.<br />
V<br />
In the pre-computer age, the greatest protections of privacy <br />
were neither constitutional nor statutory, but practical. Traditional <br />
surveillance for any extended period of time was difficult and costly <br />
and therefore rarely undertaken. The surveillance at issue in this <br />
case—constant monitoring of the location of a vehicle for four weeks— <br />
would have required a large team of agents, multiple vehicles, and <br />
perhaps aerial assistance.18 Only an investigation of unusual <br />
importance could have justified such an<br />
Page 33<br />
expenditure of law enforcement resources. Devices like the one used in <br />
the present case, however, make long-term monitoring relatively easy <br />
and cheap. In circumstances involving dramatic technological change, <br />
the best solution to privacy concerns may be legislative. See, e.g., <br />
Kerr, 102 Mich. L. Rev., at 805-806. A legislative body is well <br />
situated to gauge changing public attitudes, to draw detailed lines, <br />
and to balance privacy and public safety in a comprehensive way.<br />
To date, however, Congress and most States have not enacted <br />
statutes regulating the use of GPS tracking technology for law <br />
enforcement purposes. The best that we can do in this case is to apply <br />
existing Fourth Amendment doctrine and to ask whether the use of GPS <br />
tracking in a particular case involved a degree of intrusion that a <br />
reasonable person would not have anticipated.<br />
Under this approach, relatively short-term monitoring of a <br />
person's movements on public streets accords with expectations of <br />
privacy that our society has recognized as reasonable. See Knotts, 460 <br />
U. S., at 281-282. But the use of longer term GPS monitoring in <br />
investigations of most offenses impinges on expectations of privacy. <br />
For such offenses, society's expectation has been that law enforcement <br />
agents and others would not—and indeed, in the main, simply could not<br />
—secretly monitor and catalogue every single movement of an <br />
individual's car for a very long period. In this case, for four weeks, <br />
law enforcement agents tracked every movement that respondent made in <br />
the vehicle he was driving. We need not identify with precision the <br />
point at which the tracking of this vehicle became a search, for the <br />
line was surely crossed before the 4-week mark. Other cases may <br />
present more difficult questions. But where uncertainty exists with <br />
respect to whether a certain period of GPS surveil<br />
Page 34<br />
lance is long enough to constitute a Fourth Amendment search, the <br />
police may always seek a warrant.19 We also need not consider whether <br />
prolonged GPS monitoring in the context of investigations involving <br />
extraordinary offenses would similarly intrude on a constitutionally <br />
protected sphere of privacy. In such cases, long-term tracking might <br />
have been mounted using previously available techniques.<br />
* * *<br />
For these reasons, I conclude that the lengthy monitoring that <br />
occurred in this case constituted a search under the Fourth Amendment. <br />
I therefore agree with the majority that the decision of the Court of <br />
Appeals must be affirmed.<br />
<br />
--------<br />
Notes:<br />
1. In this litigation, the Government has conceded <br />
noncompliance with the warrant and has argued only that a warrant was <br />
not required. United States v. Maynard, 615 F. 3d 544, 566, n. (CADC <br />
2010).<br />
2.As we have noted, the Jeep was registered to Jones's wife. <br />
The Government acknowledged, however, that Jones was "the exclusive <br />
driver." Id., at 555, n. (internal quotation marks omitted). If Jones <br />
was not the owner he had at least the property rights of a bailee. The <br />
Court of Appeals concluded that the vehicle's registration did not <br />
affect his ability to make a Fourth Amendment objection, ibid., and <br />
the Government has not challenged that determination here. We <br />
therefore do not consider the Fourth Amendment significance of Jones's <br />
status.<br />
3. JUSTICE ALITO's concurrence (hereinafter concurrence) <br />
doubts the wisdom of our approach because "it is almost impossible to <br />
think of late-18th-century situations that are analogous to what took <br />
place in this case." Post, at 3 (opinion concurring in judgment). But <br />
in fact it posits a situation that is not far afield—a constable's <br />
concealing himself in the target's coach in order to track its <br />
movements. Ibid. There is no doubt that the information gained by that <br />
trespassory activity would be the product of an unlawful search—<br />
whether that information consisted of the conversations occurring in <br />
the coach, or of the destinations to which the coach traveled.<br />
In any case, it is quite irrelevant whether there was an <br />
18th-century analog. Whatever new methods of investigation may be <br />
devised, our task, at a minimum, is to decide whether the action in <br />
question would have constituted a "search" within the original meaning <br />
of the Fourth Amendment. Where, as here, the Government obtains <br />
information by physically intruding on a constitutionally protected <br />
area, such a search has undoubtedly occurred.<br />
4. Thus, the concurrence's attempt to recast Alderman as <br />
meaning that individuals have a "legitimate expectation of privacy in <br />
all conversations that [take] place under their roof," post, at 6-7, <br />
is foreclosed by the Court's opinion. The Court took as a given that <br />
the homeowner's "conversational privacy" had not been violated.<br />
5.The concurrence notes that post-Katz we have explained that <br />
" 'an actual trespass is neither necessary nor sufficient to establish <br />
a constitutional violation.' " Post, at 6 (quoting United States v. <br />
Karo, 468 U. S. 705, 713 (1984)). That is undoubtedly true, and <br />
undoubtedly irrelevant. Karo was considering whether a seizure <br />
occurred, and as the concurrence explains, a seizure of property <br />
occurs, not when there is a trespass, but "when there is some <br />
meaningful interference with an individual's possessory interests in <br />
that property." Post, at 2 (internal quotation marks omitted). <br />
Likewise with a search. Trespass alone does not qualify, but there <br />
must be conjoined with that what was present here: an attempt to find <br />
something or to obtain information.<br />
Related to this, and similarly irrelevant, is the <br />
concurrence's point that, if analyzed separately, neither the <br />
installation of the device nor its use would constitute a Fourth <br />
Amendment search. See ibid. Of course not. A trespass on "houses" or <br />
"effects," or a Katz invasion of privacy, is not alone a search unless <br />
it is done to obtain information; and the obtaining of information is <br />
not alone a search unless it is achieved by such a trespass or <br />
invasion of privacy.<br />
6. Knotts noted the "limited use which the government made of <br />
the signals from this particular beeper," 460 U. S., at 284; and <br />
reserved the question whether "different constitutional principles may <br />
be applicable" to "dragnet-type law enforcement practices" of the type <br />
that GPS tracking made possible here, ibid.<br />
7. The Government also points to Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U. S. <br />
583 (1974), in which the Court rejected the claim that the inspection <br />
of an impounded vehicle's tire tread and the collection of paint <br />
scrapings from its exterior violated the Fourth Amendment. Whether the <br />
plurality said so because no search occurred or because the search was <br />
reasonable is unclear. Compare id., at 591 (opinion of Blackmun, J.) <br />
("[W]e fail to comprehend what expectation of privacy was infringed"), <br />
with id., at 592 ("Under circumstances such as these, where probable <br />
cause exists, a warrantless examination of the exterior of a car is <br />
not unreasonable . . . ").<br />
8. Thus, our theory is not that the Fourth Amendment is <br />
concerned with "any technical trespass that led to the gathering of <br />
evidence." Post, at 3 (ALITO, J., concurring in judgment) (emphasis <br />
added). The Fourth Amendment protects against trespassory searches <br />
only with regard to those items ("persons, houses, papers, and <br />
effects") that it enumerates. The trespass that occurred in Oliver may <br />
properly be understood as a "search," but not one "in the <br />
constitutional sense." 466 U. S., at 170, 183.<br />
*. United States v. Knotts, 460 U. S. 276 (1983), does not <br />
foreclose the conclusion that GPS monitoring, in the absence of a <br />
physical intrusion, is a Fourth Amendment search. As the majority's <br />
opinion notes, Knotts reserved the question whether " 'different <br />
constitutional principles may be applicable' " to invasive law <br />
enforcement practices such as GPS tracking. See ante, at 8, n. 6 <br />
(quoting 460 U. S., at 284).<br />
United States v. Karo, 468 U. S. 705 (1984), addressed the <br />
Fourth Amendment implications of the installation of a beeper in a <br />
container with the consent of the container's original owner, who was <br />
aware that the beeper would be used for surveillance purposes. Id., at <br />
707. Owners of GPS-equipped cars and smartphones do not contemplate <br />
that these devices will be used to enable covert surveillance of their <br />
movements. To the contrary, subscribers of one such service greeted a <br />
similar suggestion with anger. Quain, Changes to OnStar's Privacy <br />
Terms Rile Some Users, N. Y. Times (Sept. 22, 2011), online at <br />
<a href="http://wheels.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/09/22/changes-to-onstars">http://wheels.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/09/22/changes-to-onstars</a>-<br />
privacy-terms-rile-some-users (as visited Jan. 19, 2012, and available <br />
in Clerk of Court's case file). In addition, the bugged container in <br />
Karo lacked the close relationship with the target that a car shares <br />
with its owner. The bugged container in Karo was stationary for much <br />
of the Government's surveillance. See 468 U. S., at 708—710. A car's <br />
movements, by contrast, are its owner's movements.<br />
91Although the record does not reveal the size or weight of <br />
the device used in this case, there is now a device in use that weighs <br />
two ounces and is the size of a credit card. Tr. of Oral Arg. 27.<br />
10. At common law, a suit for trespass to chattels could be <br />
maintained if there was a violation of "the dignitary interest in the <br />
inviolability of chattels," but today there must be "some actual <br />
damage to the chattel before the action can be maintained." W. Keeton, <br />
D. Dobbs, R. Keeton, & D. Owen, Prosser & Keeton on Law of Torts 87 <br />
(5th ed. 1984) (hereinafter Prosser & Keeton). Here, there was no <br />
actual damage to the vehicle to which the GPS device was attached.<br />
11. The Court suggests that something like this might have <br />
occurred in 1791, but this would have required either a gigantic <br />
coach, a very tiny constable, or both—not to mention a constable with <br />
incredible fortitude and patience.<br />
12.See, e.g., Cal. Family Code Ann. §760 (West 2004).<br />
13.See Uniform Marital Property Act §4, 9A U. L. A. 116 <br />
(1998).<br />
14.See, e.g., NPR, The End of Privacy <br />
<a href="http://www.npr.org/series/">http://www.npr.org/series/</a> 114250076/the-end-of-privacy (all Internet <br />
materials as visited Jan. 20, 2012, and available in Clerk of Court's <br />
case file); Time Magazine, Everything About You Is Being Tracked—Get <br />
Over It, Joel Stein, Mar. 21, 2011, Vol. 177, No. 11.<br />
15. See Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies: <br />
Constitutional Myths and the Case for Caution, 102 Mich. L. Rev. 801, <br />
850-851 (2004) (hereinafter Kerr).<br />
16.See CTIA Consumer Info, 50 Wireless Quick Facts, <br />
<a href="http://www/">http://www</a>. ctia.org/consumer_info/index.cfm/AID/10323.<br />
17.See, e.g., The bright side of sitting in traffic: <br />
Crowdsourcing road congestion data, Google Blog, <br />
<a href="http://googleblog.blogspot.com/2009/08/">http://googleblog.blogspot.com/2009/08/</a> bright-side-of-sitting-in-<br />
traffic.html.<br />
18.Even with a radio transmitter like those used in United <br />
States v. Knotts, 460 U. S. 276 (1983), or United States v. Karo, 468 <br />
U. S. 705 (1984), such long-term surveillance would have been <br />
exceptionally demanding. The beepers used in those cases merely "emit<br />
[ted] periodic signals that [could] be picked up by a radio receiver." <br />
Knotts, 460 U.S., at 277. The signal had a limited range and could be <br />
lost if the police did not stay close enough. Indeed, in Knotts <br />
itself, officers lost the signal from the beeper, and only "with the <br />
assistance of a monitoring device located in a helicopter [was] the <br />
approximate location of the signal . . . picked up again about one <br />
hour later." Id., at 278.<br />
19.In this case, the agents obtained a warrant, but they did <br />
not comply with two of the warrant's restrictions: They did not <br />
install the GPS device within the 10-day period required by the terms <br />
of the warrant and by Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 41(e)(2)(B)(i), and they <br />
did not install the GPS device within the District of Columbia, as <br />
required by the terms of the warrant and by 18 U. S. C. §3117(a) and <br />
Rule 41(b)(4). In the courts below the Government did not argue, and <br />
has not argued here, that the Fourth Amendment does not impose these <br />
precise restrictions and that the violation of these restrictions does <br />
not demand the suppression of evidence obtained using the tracking <br />
device. See, e.g., United States v. Gerber, 994 F. 2d 1556, 1559-1560 <br />
(CA11 1993); United States v. Burke, 517 F. 2d 377, 386-387 (CA2 <br />
1975). Because it was not raised, that question is not before us.Hugh Woodhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/01021049579391065763noreply@blogger.com5tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2321320695584069696.post-70403858198391659102012-02-07T19:29:00.000-08:002012-02-07T19:29:46.695-08:00Fee Shifting Under the Georgia Rules of Civil Procedure :: 2012 Review of OCGA § 9-11-68<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjyhLtO1xIUOFPr1ndMJxz9DDKjbMi6JU2vRnc3p4KslRQ3fKeasFJgxcyHvjxbwqm_weF35huQHzRFBb3ZAbAeVl1LQC_QT3Lw0VGq9g99nO4L4c1Iw2g5uuUA6JzLkbeyQoF10gk6PSH-/s1600/AbusiveLitigation02032012D.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="clear: right; float: right; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-left: 1em;"><img border="0" height="240" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjyhLtO1xIUOFPr1ndMJxz9DDKjbMi6JU2vRnc3p4KslRQ3fKeasFJgxcyHvjxbwqm_weF35huQHzRFBb3ZAbAeVl1LQC_QT3Lw0VGq9g99nO4L4c1Iw2g5uuUA6JzLkbeyQoF10gk6PSH-/s320/AbusiveLitigation02032012D.jpg" width="320" /></a></div><div class="MsoPlainText" style="line-height: 200%; margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 200%;">This paper will: 1) review the mechanics of OCGA § 9‑11‑68, 2) it will review the subparts of the statute, 3) it will review the “good faith” portion of the statute and the jury driven homologue to OCGA § 9-15-14, and 4) it will review recent Georgia cases decided under OCGA § 9‑11‑68.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="line-height: 200%; margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 200%;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>This paper will then review some creative moves counsel may use to avoid or mitigate the impact of OCGA § 9‑11‑68; and,<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="line-height: 200%; margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 200%;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>Then this paper will review separately Rule 68 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: 1) it will review The Rule, 2) it will review that the underlying federal statute must authorize fees, 3) it will review recent Federal (Georgia District) cases, 4) it will review the necessary terms that must be inserted in a federal Offer of Judgment and 5) it will review how OCGA § 9‑11‑68 will be applied in Federal Court.<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt 1in; text-indent: -0.5in;"><b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14pt;">I.<span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>OCGA § 9‑11‑68, GEORGIA'S OFFER OF SETTLEMENT STATUTE<o:p></o:p></span></b></div><br />
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<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14pt;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 2;"> </span>A.<span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span><u>The Offer of Settlement Statute:<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>OCGA § 9‑11‑68</u><o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
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<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14pt;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>OCGA § 9-11-68. Offer of Settlement <o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
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<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 29.85pt 0pt 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14pt;">(a) At any time more than 30 days after the service of a summons and complaint on a party but not less than 30 days (or 20 days if it is a counteroffer) before trial, either party may serve upon the other party, but shall not file with the Court, a written offer, denominated as an offer under this Code section, to settle a tort claim for the money specified in the offer and to enter into an agreement dismissing the claim or to allow judgment to be entered accordingly. Any offer under this Code section must:<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 29.85pt 0pt 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14pt;">(1) Be in writing and state that it is being made pursuant to this Code section;<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 29.85pt 0pt 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14pt;">(2) Identify the party or parties making the proposal and the party or parties to whom the proposal is being made;<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 29.85pt 0pt 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14pt;">(3) identify generally the claim or claims the proposal is attempting to resolve;<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 29.85pt 0pt 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14pt;">(4) State with particularity any relevant conditions;<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 29.85pt 0pt 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14pt;">(5) State the total amount of the proposal;<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 29.85pt 0pt 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14pt;">(6) State with particularity the amount proposed to settle a claim for punitive damages, if any;<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 29.85pt 0pt 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14pt;">(7) State whether the proposal includes attorney´s fees or other expenses and whether attorney´s fees or other expenses are part of the legal claim; and<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 29.85pt 0pt 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14pt;">(8) Include a certificate of service and be served by certified mail or statutory overnight delivery in the form required by Code Section 9-11-5.<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
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<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 29.85pt 0pt 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14pt;">(b)(1) If a defendant makes an Offer of Settlement which is rejected by the plaintiff, the defendant shall be entitled to recover reasonable attorney ´s fees and expenses of litigation incurred by the defendant or on the defendant ´s behalf from the date of the rejection of the Offer of Settlement through the entry of judgment if the final judgment is one of no liability or the final judgment obtained by the plaintiff is less than 75 percent of such Offer of Settlement.<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 29.85pt 0pt 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14pt;">(2) If a plaintiff makes an Offer of Settlement which is rejected by the defendant and the plaintiff recovers a final judgment in an amount greater than 125 percent of such Offer of Settlement, the plaintiff shall be entitled to recover reasonable attorney ´s fees and expenses of litigation incurred by the plaintiff or on the plaintiff ´s behalf from the date of the rejection of the Offer of Settlement through the entry of judgment.<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
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<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 29.85pt 0pt 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14pt;">(c) Any offer made under this Code section shall remain open for 30 days unless sooner withdrawn by a writing served on the offeree prior to acceptance by the offeree, but an offeror shall not be entitled to attorney´s fees and costs under subsection (b) of this Code section to the extent an offer is not open for at least 30 days (unless it is rejected during that 30 day period). A counteroffer shall be deemed a rejection but may serve as an offer under this Code section if it is specifically denominated as an offer under this Code section. Acceptance or rejection of the offer by the offeree must be in writing and served upon the offeror. An offer that is neither withdrawn nor accepted within 30 days shall be deemed rejected. The fact that an offer is made but not accepted does not preclude a subsequent offer. Evidence of an offer is not admissible except in proceedings to enforce a settlement or to determine reasonable attorney´s fees and costs under this Code section.<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
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<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 29.85pt 0pt 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14pt;">(d)(1) The Court shall order the payment of attorney ´s fees and expenses of litigation upon receipt of proof that the judgment is one to which the provisions of either paragraph (1) or paragraph (2) of subsection (b) of this Code section apply; provided, however, that if an appeal is taken from such judgment, the Court shall order payment of such attorney ´s fees and expenses of litigation only upon remittitur affirming such judgment.<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 29.85pt 0pt 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14pt;">(2) If a party is entitled to costs and fees pursuant to the provisions of this Code section, the Court may determine that an offer was not made in good faith in an order setting forth the basis for such a determination. In such case, the Court may disallow an award of attorney´s fees and costs.<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
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<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 29.85pt 0pt 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14pt;">(e) Upon motion by the prevailing party at the time that the verdict or judgment is rendered, the moving party may request that the finder of fact determine whether the opposing party presented a frivolous claim or defense. In such event, the Court shall hold a separate bifurcated hearing at which the finder of fact shall make a determination of whether such frivolous claims or defenses were asserted and to award damages, if any, against the party presenting such frivolous claims or defenses. Under this subsection:<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 29.85pt 0pt 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14pt;">(1) Frivolous claims shall include, but are not limited to, the following:<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 29.85pt 0pt 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14pt;">(A) A claim, defense, or other position that lacks substantial justification or that is not made in good faith or that is made with malice or a wrongful purpose, as those terms are defined in Code Section 51-7-80;<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 29.85pt 0pt 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14pt;">(B) A claim, defense, or other position with respect to which there existed such a complete absence of any justiciable issue of law or fact that it could not be reasonably believed that a Court would accept the asserted claim, defense, or other position; and<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 29.85pt 0pt 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14pt;">(C) A claim, defense, or other position that was interposed for delay or harassment;<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 29.85pt 0pt 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14pt;">(2) Damages awarded may include reasonable and necessary attorney´s fees and expenses of litigation; and<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 29.85pt 0pt 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14pt;">(3) A party may elect to pursue either the procedure specified in this subsection or the procedure specified in Code Section 9-15-14, but not both.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>History. Amended by 2006 Ga. Laws 589, §1, eff. 4/27/2006.<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 29.85pt 0pt 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14pt;">Added by 2005 Ga. Laws 1, §5, eff. 2/16/2005.<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
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<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt 0.5in; text-indent: 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14pt;">B. <span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span><u>The Mechanics of the Statute</u><o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14pt;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="line-height: 200%; margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-indent: 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 200%;">OCGA § 9-11-68(a): <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;">The statute applies only to tort cases</b>.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>While this author is certain that some creative practitioners will attempt to expand the scope of this charming statute to probate, hybrid-contract actions and other actions, it by its language, presently only applies to “tort” actions.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Thus, your case must have the prerequisite of a tort claim to be able to make an Offer of Settlement.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>[1]<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="line-height: 200%; margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 200%;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>With regard to timing, the offer may only be made thirty (30) days after the service of the summons and complaint (Note: it does not refer to the Answer, but only service) and not less than thirty (30) days before trial.<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="line-height: 200%; margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 200%;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>Assuming that your case has a tort claim and the offer is made within the proper timing parameters (thirty (30) days after service or thirty (30) days before trial) then it must contain the following elements:<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="line-height: 200%; margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 200%;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>OCGA § 9-11-68(a)(1):<span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>It must be in writing and it must specifically state that it is made under the Offer of Settlement statute 9-11-68;<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="line-height: 200%; margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 200%;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>OCGA § 9-11-68(a)(2):<span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>It must particularly identify which parties are making the offer [assuming that there are multiple parties in addition to a simply plaintiff and defendant]; it must also identify the target of the offer;<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="line-height: 200%; margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 200%;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>OCGA § 9-11-68(a)(3): <span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>It must identify, generally, the claim or claims concerning which the Offer desired to settle;<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>[2]<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="line-height: 200%; margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 200%;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>OCGA § 9-11-68(a)(4):<span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>The offer must “state with particularity any relevant conditions.”<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>What is the legal meaning of “relevant conditions?”<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>This definition escapes this author.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="line-height: 200%; margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 200%;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>OCGA § 9-11-68(a)(5):<span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>The offer must state the total dollar ($) amount of the proposal.<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="line-height: 200%; margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 200%;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>OCGA § 9-11-68(a)(6):<span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>The offer must state with particularity the amount that offeror proposes to settle any punitive damage claim;<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="line-height: 200%; margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 200%;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>OCGA § 9-11-68(a)(7):<span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>The offer must state specifically whether it includes “attorney’s fees” and/or other expenses and whether attorney’s fees or other expenses are part of the underlying legal claim;<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="line-height: 200%; margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 200%;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>OCGA § 9-11-68(a)(8):<span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>The offer must include a certificate of service and be served by certified or statutory overnight delivery (read that UPS or FedEx) in the form required by OCGA § 9-11-5.<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="line-height: 200%; margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-indent: 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 200%;">Under Section OCGA § 9-11-68 (c) any offer made must remain open for Thirty 30 days unless withdrawn in writing served on the Offeree prior to acceptance. <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>[3]<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="line-height: 200%; margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 200%;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>OCGA § 9-11-68(b).<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Liability for a Rejected Offer.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>It is somewhat difficult to state the liability for a rejected offer, however:<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="line-height: 200%; margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 200%;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>If defendant makes an Offer and it is rejected, plaintiff must beat the offer at trial by, at least, 75% of the rejected offer or pay defendant’s attorney’s fees.<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="line-height: 200%; margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 200%;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>If plaintiff makes an Offer and it is rejected, defendant is not liable for plaintiff’s attorney’s fees unless plaintiff beats the rejected offer by 125% of the amount of the offer.<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="line-height: 200%; margin: 0in 0in 0pt 0.5in; text-indent: 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 200%;">C.<span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span><u>The Good Faith Defense</u><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span><o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="line-height: 200%; margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-indent: 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 200%;">The statute appears to allow the trial Court, upon motion of the non‑prevailing party under an Offer of Settlement, to request that the Court find that Offeror knew that Offer of Settlement was not made “in good faith”.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>OCGA § 9-11-68(d)(2).<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>If the Court finds the offer was not made in good faith, then the Offer of Settlement is just considered either void or null.<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt 0.5in; text-indent: 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14pt;">D. <span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span><u>The Jury Version Homologue of OCGA § 9-15-14</u><o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
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<div class="MsoPlainText" style="line-height: 200%; margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-indent: 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 200%;">OCGA § 9-11-68(e).<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The 1987 enactment of OCGA § 9-15-14 motion for attorney’s fees for frivolous litigation and claims was supposed to be the remedy enacted by the legislature which merged all common law claims of malicious abuse and malicious use of prosecution into one statute.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>However, since the enactment of OCGA § 9-15-14, we have seen the enactment of OCGA § 51-7-80 through 85 and now a jury-driven version of OCGA § 9-15-14.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Under subparagraph (e) of OCGA § 9-11-68 a prevailing party at the end of a jury trial may move the Court to allow the jury (then impaneled) to hear a bifurcated discussion of whether the claims advanced by the non‑prevailing party were frivolous, lacked substantial justification or were not made in good faith.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="line-height: 200%; margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-indent: 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 200%;">If the jury finds that those claims were made during trial were frivolous then and in that event the jury may proceed to award damages against the non-prevailing party pursuant to OCGA § 9-11-68(e).<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>It is possible that a motion under subparagraph (e) may be made to the judge; however, it is clear that the General Assembly wanted to give the prevailing party the opportunity to present frivolous claims to the jury then impaneled.<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="line-height: 200%; margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 200%;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>A prevailing party may not use both OCGA § 9-15-14 and OCGA § 9-11-68(e) for the same factual conduct by the non-prevailing party.<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14pt;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span><b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;">II.<span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>RECENT GEORGIA CASES <o:p></o:p></b></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt 0.5in; text-indent: 0.5in;"><b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14pt;">INTERPRETING OCGA § 9-11-68<o:p></o:p></span></b></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14pt;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span><o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt 1.5in; mso-list: l3 level1 lfo1; text-indent: -0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14pt; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman";"><span style="mso-list: Ignore;">A.<span style="font-size-adjust: none; font-stretch: normal; font: 7pt/normal "Times New Roman";"> </span></span></span><u><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14pt;">Small Jury Verdict for Plaintiff <o:p></o:p></span></u></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt 1.25in; text-indent: 0.25in;"><u><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14pt;">Equals Judgment for the Defendant<o:p></o:p></span></u></div><br />
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<div class="MsoPlainText" style="line-height: 200%; margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 200%;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">Abraham v. Hannah</i>, 306 Ga.App. 735, 702 S.E.2d 904 (2010) is a case that has a shocking outcome under OCGA Code § 9‑11‑68.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>While <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">Abraham</i> was reversed on appeal because the plaintiff did not have notice of the OCGA § 9‑11‑68 hearing, it shows how a plaintiff may win and then lose under OCGA § 9‑11‑68.<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="line-height: 200%; margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 200%;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>Abraham (Plaintiff) recovered $850.00 in a jury verdict (this author admits that it's in a tiny sum); however, prior to the jury verdict Hannah (defendant) had offered $2,500.00 to Abraham to settle the case.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>After the jury verdict in Abraham's favor of $850.00, the trial Court held a hearing and granted attorney's fees, pursuant to OCGA § 9‑11‑68, to Hannah in the amount of $2,425.00.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Once the jury verdict of $850.00 was subtracted from that amount the defendant (though the defendant lost at trial) had a judgment in its favor against the successful plaintiff, Abraham, of $1,575.00.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="line-height: 200%; margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 200%;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>While this case was reversed for lack of notice, it displays in stark contrast the painful reality of an unaccepted offer in the face of a small jury verdict.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt 1.5in; mso-list: l3 level1 lfo1; text-indent: -0.25in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14pt; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman";"><span style="mso-list: Ignore;">B.<span style="font-size-adjust: none; font-stretch: normal; font: 7pt/normal "Times New Roman";"> </span></span></span><u><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14pt;">Defense Insurance Rejection of Small <o:p></o:p></span></u></div><br />
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<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt 1.5in;"><u><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14pt;">Payment of All Plaintiff’s Attorney’s Fees<o:p></o:p></span></u></div><br />
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<div class="MsoPlainText" style="line-height: 200%; margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 200%;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>The rejection of a low offer of settlement offered by a Plaintiff but rejected by the Insurance Company has resulted in the Defendant (Insurance Company) bearing all the fees associated with the case.<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%; margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 200%;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>Apparently, Georgia has at least one Order supporting my prediction of September 26, 2010.<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%; margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-indent: 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 200%;">In my article "Georgia's Offer of Settlement Statute, OCGA § 9‑11‑68.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The Curious Anomaly of a Low Plaintiff's Offer," I predicted these types of outcomes could happen to Defendants who refuse settle.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>http://hughwood.blogspot.com/2010/09/georgias-offer-of-settlement-statute.html<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%; margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 200%;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>Judge Alvin T. Wong, State Court of DeKalb County, chided the Defendant and its insurance company for proceeding to a jury trial in the face of a $12,000.00 Plaintiff’s offer.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>It got hit by the jury for a $48,081.30 verdict.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>In the face of Defendant's rejection of Plaintiff's offer to settle of $12,000.00, Judge Wong noted that the Plaintiff’s exceeded the Defendant's offer by more than 125 percent (as now required by the new Offer of Settlement Statute in Georgia OCGA § 9‑11‑68) and obtained a judgment almost four times that of Defendant's offer.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%; margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-indent: 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 200%;">Referencing the famous words of David Glasgow Farragut at the Battle of Mobile Bay [4] Judge Wong reminded the Defendant that there was a price to pay for a legal strategy he referred to as "damn the torpedoes, full speed ahead."<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0.5in 0pt;"><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14pt;">The purpose of O.C.G.A. §9-11-68 is to provide a hammer against a litigant who insists on going forward when everything before him or her, or her counsel, or her insurance carrier says settle it, resolve it. During the morning of the motion hearing, in response to the Court's question, counsel for Plaintiff stated in open court that he would waive the 9-11-68 attorney's fees if the Defendant would simply pay the judgment. Defendant's counsel made phone calls but nothing was offered except to proceed ahead.<o:p></o:p></span></i></div><br />
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<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%; margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-indent: 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 200%;">Defendant proceeded and lost on a $48,081.30 verdict.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Given the mandatory nature of the award of attorney’s fees, Judge Wong granted the Plaintiff $19,232,52 in attorney’s fees, based on Defendants risk and Defendant’s loss at trial.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Order in <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">Johnson v. Turner</i>, State Court of DeKalb County, State of Georgia Civil Action File No. 08A98178-1, November 22, 2011 at Page 3.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>[5]<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt 1.5in; mso-list: l3 level1 lfo1; text-indent: -0.25in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14pt; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman";"><span style="mso-list: Ignore;">C.<span style="font-size-adjust: none; font-stretch: normal; font: 7pt/normal "Times New Roman";"> </span></span></span><u><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14pt;">Plaintiff’s Rejection of $40,000.00 Offer<o:p></o:p></span></u></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt 1.5in;"><u><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14pt;">Results in $60,291.52 of Defendant’s<o:p></o:p></span></u></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt 1.5in;"><u><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14pt;">Attorney’s Fees<o:p></o:p></span></u></div><br />
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<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%; margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 200%;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>In <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">O'Leary, et al, v. Whitehall Construction, et al</i>, 288 Ga. 790, 708 SE2d 353 (2011), plaintiffs were saddled with $60,291.52 of defendant's attorney's fees after unsuccessfully trying the case to a defense verdict.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Plaintiffs, homeowners, O'Leary brought a trespass and nuisance action against Whitehall Construction Company alleging that the home Whitehall built next to the O'Leary's home caused excessive storm water runoff.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Apparently, Whitehall corrected the storm water runoff and stopped any form of continuing nuisance.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>While the case appears to have been heavily litigated, Whitehall made a $40,000.00 offer pursuant to OCGA § 9-11-68(a) prior to trial.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%; margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 200%;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>The O'Learys rejected the settlement offer and tried the case to a defense verdict.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>After the verdict, Whitehall moved for attorney's fees both under OCGA § 9-15-14(a) and (b) and OCGA § 9-11-68.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The Court, finding that Whitehall had made an appropriate pretrial offer of $40,000.00 and plaintiffs recovered nothing at the trial of the case, awarded defendants its attorney's fees of $60,291.52.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The opinion does not state whether this amount is post-in-time to the rejection of the offer.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Under the terms of the statute, it must be.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Thus, we can assume that there were substantial attorney's fees incurred by the defendant (that were not compensated under OCGA § 9-11-68) from the filing of the Answer to the entry of the Pretrial Order or trial.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%; margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 200%;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>This case also contains the wicked reminder that the Notice of Appeal must be timely filed.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>In the strange world of attorney's fees, the O'Learys filed their Notice of Appeal after the denial of the notice of new trial but it was, unfortunately, too late.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>According to the dates in the opinion, defendant obtained a final verdict on October 4, 2007 and the O'Learys moved for a new trial on October 29, 2007.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Then, (apparently within 45 days) Whitehall moved for attorney's fees under OCGA § 9-15-14 and additionally moved for fees under OCGA § 9-11-68.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The court denied the O'Leary's motion for a new trial on March 9, 2009 but did not rule on the attorney's fees issue at that time.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>It was not until nine months later that the court issued a ruling on the OCGA 9-15-14 motion and the request for attorney's fees under OCGA § 9‑11‑68.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>O'Learys, untimely, filed a Notice of Appeal from the court's ruling on December 31, 2009.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>While the court simply referred to the fact that it did not have jurisdiction to review the underlying merits of the case because the Notice of Appeal was untimely pursuant to OCGA § 5-6-38(a), this denial of jurisdiction in an OCGA § 9-11-68 review should remind us all that the filing of post-verdict motions for attorney's fees do not toll the requirement to file a timely Notice of Appeal.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Perhaps, we, as practitioners, are lulled into believing that we need the final order in a case from which to take an appeal.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">O'Leary</i>, not only stands for the fact that risking a defense verdict may buy your client $60,000.00 of attorney's fees but also for the wicked reminder that failure to timely file a Notice of Appeal may leave your client with no appellate review.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt 1.25in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14pt;">D.<span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span><u>Courts Struggle With Definition of <o:p></o:p></u></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt 1.5in;"><u><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14pt;">Offers Not Made in Good Faith</span></u><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14pt;"><o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
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<div class="MsoPlainText" style="line-height: 200%; margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 200%;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>The trial courts and Georgia Court of Appeals have struggled with the defining what constitutes and Offer not made in “good faith.”<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>It is, somewhat, like trying to put a subjective concept into an objective box.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>However, given that the General Assembly has foisted this Code Section upon us, we must do it.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>It is possible that the Georgia Supreme Court will weigh in on this matter in the not too distant future.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="line-height: 200%; margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 200%;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>The most prominent case on point, <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">Great West Cas. Co. v. Bloomfield</i>, ___ S.E.2d ___, No. A11A1454, 2011 WL 6004571 (Ga. Ct. App. , Dec. 1, 2011), is currently pending a determination on a Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Cert. Appeal No. S12C0624.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>If the Supreme Court accepts the case, then expect some guidelines for “in good faith,” and “not in good faith.”<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>If it declines Certiorari, then expect the morass of confusion to continue in this area.<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="line-height: 200%; margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 200%;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>I dictated my own version of the <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">Bloomfield, supra</i>, case.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Then I found, Chuck Clay and Michael Paupeck’s version.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>While it has a bit of a defense bend, it is quite a masterful overview of the background of how <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">Bloomfield, supra</i>, arrived at the Petition for a Writ of Certiorari.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Thus, I reproduce most of it (not indented) below, as follows:<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="line-height: 200%; margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 200%;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>“On December 1, 2011 the Georgia Court of Appeals issued an opinion that complicates efforts by defendants and their insurers to obtain fees and costs, particularly in large damages cases. See <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">Great West Cas. Co. v. Bloomfield</i>, ___ S.E.2d ___, No. A11A1454, 2011 WL 6004571 (Ga. Ct. App. Dec. 1, 2011). This appeal was taken from a trial court’s denial of a motion for fees and costs pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 9-11-68, Georgia’s offer of settlement statute. This statute is quite specific regarding the procedure and essential terms of the written offer. If complied with, the statute states that a defendant shall be entitled to recover reasonable attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation incurred from the date an offer was rejected through entry of judgment, if the final judgment is one of no liability or less than 75 percent of such offer of settlement. That is, unless the trial judge determines that the offer was not made in “good faith.” <o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="line-height: 200%; margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 200%;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>In <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">Bloomfield</i>, Judge Patsy Porter of the Fulton County State Court ruled that the Great West Defendants’ $25,000.00 offer of settlement did not constitute a “good faith” offer in a wrongful death trucking case, and, thus, she disallowed an award of $69,000.00 in fees and costs to which these defendants were otherwise entitled under the statute. The trial judge’s ruling and the ultimate decision on appeal were somewhat surprising because these defendants won at trial and their written offer, in all technical aspects, complied with the requisites of O.C.G.A. § 9-11-68. Moreover, in June of 2011, the Court of Appeals held that a $750 offer was not made in bad faith in a slander case and, therefore, upheld a $84,000.00 <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>award of fees and expenses. The <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">Bloomfield</i> decision makes clear that winning at trial does not guarantee a recovery of attorneys’ fees and costs. <span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>Unfortunately, it provides limited explanation as to exactly why the particular offer was deficient and creates ambiguous precedent. <o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="line-height: 200%; margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 200%;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>The underlying case in <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">Bloomfield</i> involved two separate collisions. In the first collision, the tractor-trailer driver insured by Great West struck another vehicle while changing lanes, causing an accident. Subsequently, the vehicle in which Mrs. Bloomfield was a passenger slowed while approaching the original wreck and was struck from behind by a second tractor-trailer, the driver of which admitted fault and was ultimately assessed 100% liability. A Fulton County jury awarded $10.4M compensatory damages and $44M in punitive damages (which were capped at $250,000.00 by statute) against the defendants associated with the second tractor-trailer. <o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="line-height: 200%; margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 200%;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>The specific issue on appeal was whether the trial court had abused its discretion pursuant to subsection (d)(2) of O.C.G.A. § 9-11-68 in disallowing the fees and costs to which the Great West Defendants were otherwise entitled. Subsection (d)(2) reads, “If a party is entitled to costs and fees pursuant to the provisions of this Code section, the court may determine that an offer was not made in good faith in an order setting forth the basis for such a determination.” (emphasis added). The trial court initially denied the motion for fees without providing the statutorily required basis, so the Court of Appeals first vacated that order and remanded the case back with instructions to explain the basis for finding bad faith. See <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">Great West Cas. Co. v. Bloomfield</i>, 303 Ga. App. 26, 693 S.E.2d 99 (2010); cf <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">Cohen v. Alfred and Adele Academy, Inc</i>., 310 Ga. App. 761, 714 S.E.2d 350 (2011) (trial courts are not required to make written findings of fact or conclusions of law should they find that an offer was made in good faith). On remand, the Bloomfield trial court supported its denial by stating: 1) $25,000.00 was not a reasonable offer or realistic assessment of liability in a wrongful death case; 2) the subject truck driver paid a traffic ticket fine for improper lane change; 3) defense counsel made the offer without having even deposed a police officer on the scene who later testified at trial; and 4) that the Great West Defendants eventually made a $1M offer during trial, which Plaintiff rejected. <o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="line-height: 200%; margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 200%;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>The case then went to the Court of Appeals a second time. Initially, it was assigned to a three-judge panel which included Judges Anne Elizabeth Barnes, Harris Adams and Keith Blackwell. They split 2-1 in favor of reversing the trial court on the grounds that it had failed to justify the finding of bad faith. Because there was a split, an expanded seven-judge panel was employed to resolve the split. Judge Barnes apparently convinced the additional panel members to side with her, and in a 5-2 decision focusing heavily upon the abuse of discretion standard of review, the majority upheld the trial court’s denial of fees and costs.<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="line-height: 200%; margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 200%;">While upholding the trial court’s ruling, the Court of Appeals’ majority opinion offered almost no analysis of the trial court’s four-part rationale for finding a lack of good faith. The dissent raised frustration with that approach and then proceeded to delve into a more detailed analysis in which they challenged each of Judge Porter’s four reasons. Instead, the majority broadly stated that the trial court’s determination of the reasonableness of an offer “is a factual determination, based on the trial court’s assessment of the case, the parties, the lawyers, and all of the other factors that go into such determination, which the trial court has gathered during of the case.” They did not address: 1) whether the $25,000 offer was per se unreasonable in a wrongful death case; 2) whether the fact that the subject truck driver paid a traffic ticket fine for improper lane change properly supported a finding of bad faith; or 3) whether defense counsel’s failure to depose a police officer on the scene who later testified at trial was indicative of bad faith. The Court of Appeals did analyze the trial court’s fourth factor and held that the trial court properly considered the fact that Great West made a $1M settlement offer during trial.” [6]<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt 1.5in; mso-list: l6 level1 lfo6; text-indent: -0.25in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14pt; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman";"><span style="mso-list: Ignore;">E.<span style="font-size-adjust: none; font-stretch: normal; font: 7pt/normal "Times New Roman";"> </span></span></span><u><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14pt;">Punitive Damages Count Toward the 75% - 125%<o:p></o:p></span></u></div><br />
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<div class="MsoPlainText" style="line-height: 200%; margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 200%;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>In <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">Wildcat Cliffs Builders, LLC v. Hagwood</i>, 229 Ga. App. 244, 663 S.E.2d 818 (2008), (This case was decided under prior law), plaintiff in the underlying action, Hagwood, recovered a $90,000.00 compensatory award, $100,000.00 punitive damage award and $14,688.56 in OCGA § 9-11-68 attorney’s fees. <o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="line-height: 200%; margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 200%;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>The facts most favorable to Hagwood showed that Wild Cliffs Builders knowingly encroached upon Hagwood’s property, built a retaining wall, refused to remove it and then offered Hagwood only $10,000.00 in an effort to purchase an easement and a complete release of liability.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>A jury awarded to Hagwood the amounts stated above.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Though decided under prior law, an interesting nuance out of the Wildwood Builders case is that defendant/appellant’s took the position on appeal that punitive damages should not be counted in calculating the 9-11-68 award.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Although it is unclear whether the Georgia Court of Appeals simply said that they would or would not consider the inclusion of punitive damages, they held that it was “moot” once they affirmed the punitive damage award.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">Wildcat Cliffs</i>, at 822.<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="line-height: 200%; margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 200%;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>In sum, the evidence showed that Wildcat had no interest in remedying or lessening the run-off problem or compensating Hagwood for the property damage he had sustained. <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Rather, it was amenable only to paying Hagwood for an easement and a release from all liability arising from the retaining walls it had constructed on Hagwood's property. The foregoing evidence was sufficient to authorize the jury's conclusion that, after it learned of its trespass onto Hagwood's property and its creation of a continuing nuisance thereon, Wildcat acted with a conscious indifference to the consequences of its conduct.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>See, <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">Tyler v. Lincoln</i>, 272 Ga. 118, 120-121(1), 527 S.E.2d 180 (2000); <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">Sumitomo Corp. of America v. Deal</i>, 256 Ga.App. 703, 706-707(2), 569 S.E.2d 608 (2002); <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">Baumann v. Snider</i>, 243 Ga.App. 526, 530-531, 532 S.E.2d 468 (2000).<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="line-height: 200%; margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 200%;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>Hagwood requested and received attorney fees and expenses pursuant to OCGA § 9-11-68(b)(2).<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Prior to trial, Hagwood offered to settle the case for $110,000.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>After the jury awarded him a total of $190,000 in damages, he was, therefore, statutorily entitled to recover his attorney fees and expenses.<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="line-height: 200%; margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 200%;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>On appeal, Wildcat argued that this award must be overturned, because, in the absence of the punitive damages award, Hagwood did not recover greater than 125% percent of his Offer of Settlement. <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The Court of Appeals held that since it sustained the award of punitive damages, that argument is moot.<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="line-height: 200%; margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 200%;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>It affirmed the entry of judgment against Wildcat in favor of Hagwood, including the award of $100,000 in punitive damages and $14,688.56 in attorney fees and expenses.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt 1.5in; mso-list: l6 level1 lfo6; text-indent: -0.25in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14pt; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman";"><span style="mso-list: Ignore;">F.<span style="font-size-adjust: none; font-stretch: normal; font: 7pt/normal "Times New Roman";"> </span></span></span><u><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14pt;">A Dismissal Without Prejudice <o:p></o:p></span></u></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt 1.25in; text-indent: 0.25in;"><u><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14pt;">Does Not Trigger the Award<o:p></o:p></span></u></div><br />
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<div class="MsoPlainText" style="line-height: 200%; margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 200%;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>In <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">McKesson Corporation, et al. v. Green, et al</i>., 286 Ga. App. 110, 648 S.E.2d 457 (2007), (decided under prior law), the Court of Appeals declined to award OCGA § 9-11-68 attorney’s fees where a demand had been made but plaintiff took a dismissal without prejudice (OCGA § 9-11-41) prior to proceeding to trial.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>While the <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">McKesson</i> case turned on complex issues associated with stockholdings, RICO allegations concerning stockholdings and plaintiff’s apparent lack of an expert immediately prior to trial, the OCGA § 9‑11-68 issue was resolved by the Court of Appeals in that a voluntary dismissal does not constitute the type of judgment or final judgment which will invoke liability under the OCGA § 9-11-68 statute.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The Court of Appeals wrote in that regard as follows:<o:p></o:p></span></div><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 200%; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-fareast-font-family: Calibri; mso-fareast-language: EN-US;"><br clear="all" style="mso-special-character: line-break; page-break-before: always;" /> </span> <br />
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<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 29.85pt 0pt 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14pt;">McKesson contends that the trial Court erred in denying its motion for attorney’s fees under OCGA § 9-11-68(b)(1).<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>That code section provides that a defendant whose settlement offer is rejected shall recover attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation “if the final judgment is one of no liability or the final judgment obtained by the plaintiff is less than 75 percent of such Offer of Settlement.”<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The trial Court in this case entered no final judgment within the meaning of the statute, and therefore did not err in denying this motion.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;">A right to dismiss voluntarily without prejudice would be meaningless if doing so would trigger the payment of defendant’s attorney’s fees</b>.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Without explicit language establishing that the legislature intended to excise a plaintiff’s right to dismiss in this manner, this Court will not engraft such an intention into the statute.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">McKesson,</i> at 462.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>(Emphasis Supplied).<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
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<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt 1.5in; mso-list: l6 level1 lfo6; text-indent: -0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14pt; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman";"><span style="mso-list: Ignore;">G.<span style="font-size-adjust: none; font-stretch: normal; font: 7pt/normal "Times New Roman";"> </span></span></span><u><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14pt;">OCGA § 9-11-68 found Constitutional<o:p></o:p></span></u></div><br />
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<div class="MsoPlainText" style="line-height: 200%; margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 200%;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">Smith et al. v. Baptiste, et al</i>., 287 Ga. 23, 694 S.E.2d 83 (2010), stands for the proposition that the Supreme Court of Georgia found OCGA § 9-11-68 to be constitutional.<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="line-height: 200%; margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 200%;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>The Baptistes filed a complaint for damages against Chuck Smith and the radio station WQXI 790 AM after WQXI broadcast defamatory statements about the Baptistes.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>While the case was pending and pursuant to OCGA § 9-11-68(a), Smith and WQXI offered to settle the case for $5,000.00.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The Baptistes did not respond to the offer which was deemed a rejection under OCGA § 9-11-68(c).<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The Court granted summary judgment.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="line-height: 200%; margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 200%;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>Smith and WQXI moved for attorney’s fees pursuant to OCGA § 9-11-68(b)(1); however, after a hearing, the trial Court denied Smith and WQXI’s motion for attorney’s fees and found that the scheme enacted under OCGA § 9-11-68 was unconstitutional and violated various provisions of the Georgia constitution.<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="line-height: 200%; margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 200%;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>In the <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">Baptiste</i> Opinion, Mr. Justice Carley sketched out the background of OCGA § 9-11-68.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>He wrote that OCGA § 9-11-68 was enacted as part of the Tort Reform Act of 2005.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The scheme enacted under OCGA § 9-11-68(a) specifies that in a tort claim either party may serve <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>on the other party a written demand or offer to settle that tort claim.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>If the settlement demand or offer is rejected, that party may be entitled to recover attorney’s fees pursuant to OCGA § 9-11-68(b).<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="line-height: 200%; margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 200%;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>Mr. Justice Carley opined that the Court previously found that OCGA § 9-11-68 may not be applied retroactively in Georgia.<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="line-height: 200%; margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 200%;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>The Georgia Supreme Court overturned the trial Court on the finding that OCGA § 9-11-68 violated the “uniformity” clause of the Georgia constitution.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The trial Court apparently found that OCGA § 9-11-68 was non-uniform in that it applied only to tort cases and not to civil cases including contract claims or other claims.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>That is, because it did not apply to the entire class of civil cases but only to tort claims inside civil cases it was therefore (in the trial Court’s opinion) unconstitutional.<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="line-height: 200%; margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 200%;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>The Georgia Supreme Court wrote that “our state Constitution only requires a law to have uniform operation across all laws.”<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">Baptiste, </i>at 88.<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="line-height: 200%; margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 200%;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>Because the Supreme Court found that OCGA § 9-11-68 applied uniformly across the state to all similarly situated tort claims, it was a general law and was therefore uniform across those types of claims.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>It was therefore constitutional.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">Id.<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><o:p></o:p></b></i></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt 1.5in; mso-list: l5 level1 lfo7; text-indent: -0.5in;"><b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14pt; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman";"><span style="mso-list: Ignore;">III.<span style="font-size-adjust: none; font-stretch: normal; font: 7pt/normal "Times New Roman";"> </span></span></span></b><b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14pt;">POTENTIAL CREATIVE SOLUTIONS <o:p></o:p></span></b></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt 1.5in;"><b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14pt;">TO THE RISK IMPOSED ON <o:p></o:p></span></b></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt 1.5in;"><b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14pt;">LITIGANTS BY OCGA § 9‑11‑68 <o:p></o:p></span></b></div><br />
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<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14pt;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>A.<span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span><u>New Impetus for High/Low Agreements<o:p></o:p></u></span></div><br />
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<div class="MsoPlainText" style="line-height: 200%; margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 200%;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>It may be that tort cases that generate substantial attorney’s fees on both plaintiff and defendant’s positions pose too must risk to employ any Offer of Settlement pursuant to OCGA § 9-11-68.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>That in the minds of counsel some cases will shift too much risk to a proposed jury outcome.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>While there appear to be no commentators that have discussed this in the context that OCGA § 9-11-68 in Georgia (because perhaps the statute is too new and was only found constitutional in 2010) a new impetus may develop for the use of “high/low, agreements in the future.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The high/low agreement drafted in the face of an unpleasant OCGA § 9-11-68 Offer of Settlement would (to make any sense under this statute) have to contain the agreement that neither side would pay the other side’s attorney’s fees under a high/low outcome.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>That is, the parties would enter in to a garden variety high/low agreement with the caveat that they would pay the high/low agreement and each party would bear its own attorney’s fees.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="line-height: 200%; margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 200%;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>While this author is unaware of any particular statute that authorizes the use of high/low agreements in Georgia, they are clearly discussed and acceptable to the Courts as contracts attempting to settle litigation.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>See, <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">Kuhl v. Shepherd</i>, 226 Ga. App. 439, 487 S.E. 2d 68 (1997) referring to the enforceability of a high/low agreement presented to an arbitrator in a personal injury suit.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>See also, <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">Dziwura v. Broda</i>, 297 Ga. App. 1, 676 S.E. 2d 400 (2009), allowing for a set-off (previously denied by the trial Court) based on an enforceable high/low agreement entered while jury deliberations were occurring in DeKalb State Court.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14pt;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>B.<span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span><u>Potential Issues of Malpractice<o:p></o:p></u></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt 1in; text-indent: 0.5in;"><u><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14pt;">Associated with OCGA § 9-11-68<o:p></o:p></span></u></div><br />
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<div class="MsoPlainText" style="line-height: 200%; margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-indent: 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 200%;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>OCGA § 9-11-68 Offer of Settlement sets out a new legal malpractice exposure for attorneys practicing in Georgia and representing clients with tort based claims.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The risk of legal malpractice seems, unfortunately, to be more heavily weighted toward plaintiffs counsel’s error than defense counsel error.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="line-height: 200%; margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-indent: 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 200%;">Consider the potential hypothetical where there is a million dollars at risk in a lawsuit.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>As the case matures through two years of pretrial discovery and motions both the plaintiff’s attorney and defense attorney have run up $200,000.00 of attorney’s fees respectively.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Assume that offers have been made and refused on behalf of plaintiff and defendant.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Since plaintiff is required to achieve at least 75% percent plus $1.00 of its demand or suffer defendant’s attorney’s fees, plaintiff may be at risk for any type of adverse dismissal causally related to plaintiff’s counsel’s error.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="line-height: 200%; margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-indent: 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 200%;">It would appear (unless we missed something in this analysis) that defendant’s counsel would not be subject to the same risk.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="line-height: 200%; margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 200%;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>Possible Coming Attractions to Georgia.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>There is a legal malpractice case in Connecticut that turned on, partially, a legal malpractice suit against the attorney for failing to assert an “Offer of Judgment,” in Federal Court in Connecticut pursuant to the Connecticut Offer of Judgment Rule, <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann.</i> § 52-192(a).<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Connecticut law (which is substantive law to be applied in federal court) allowed the recovery of attorney’s fees.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Since the Connecticut lawyer forgot to make the demand and did not recover the extensive attorney’s fees expended, he got sued.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The client won the legal malpractice case and the lawyer ended up owning the client in excess of the phantom of the $200,000 of<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>fees not collected in the underlying federal case.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">Kregos v. Stone</i>, 88 Conn.App. 459, 872 A.2d 901 (2005).<o:p></o:p></span></div><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 200%; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-fareast-font-family: Calibri; mso-fareast-language: EN-US;"><br clear="all" style="mso-special-character: line-break; page-break-before: always;" /> </span> <br />
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<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt 1in; text-indent: 0.5in;"><u><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14pt;">Offer of Settlement<o:p></o:p></span></u></div><br />
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<div class="MsoPlainText" style="line-height: 200%; margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 200%;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>It is unclear where the future of the settlement statutes such as Offer of Settlement will develop in the future in Georgia. <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>In the discussion on Offers of Judgment presented at the Symposium at Mercer Law School in 2006, the use of offers of judgment may develop into “[A] game of mutual assured destruction (“MAD”).” <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The author, Yoon, cites:<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Wolfgang, K. H. Panofsky, <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">The Mutual Hostage Relationship Between Russia And America</i>, 52 Foreign Affairs 109 (1973).<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>57 Mercer L. Rev. 825, 828 (2006).<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>This discussion is fleshed out in the 2011 paper by this author.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>[10].<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="line-height: 200%; margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 200%;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>If the parties in a significant tort based claim are aware that their use of the Georgia Offer of Settlement rule will become a game of Mutually Assured Destruction unrelated to the merits of the case, it is possible that sane, forthright and able counsel may simply enter into an agreement pre-litigation to not use OCGA § 9‑11‑68 in any portion of the proceeding to be filed.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14pt;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>D.<span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span><u>Reinventing the E&O Paradigm to Mitigate <o:p></o:p></u></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt 1in; text-indent: 0.5in;"><u><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14pt;">the Effects of OCGA § 9-11-68<o:p></o:p></span></u></div><br />
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<div class="MsoPlainText" style="line-height: 200%; margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 200%;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>Like the existing risk of legal malpractice that is presently insured by a handful of E&O carriers in Georgia, OCGA § 9-11-68 the Offer of Settlement rule injects yet another risk into the practice of law.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>While there is no particular insurance policy that this author knows of that would particularly or <u>specifically</u> bear the risk associated with OCGA § 9-11-68, it may be that some insurance company will offer some form of coverage against this risk.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Or, it may be that this risk is simply an inherent risk of any current lawyer’s E&O policy.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>However, the risk of loss or making an incorrect “bet” on the future is probably not due to the “negligence of counsel.”<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>It is more akin to the inability of human beings to predict the future outcome of a jury verdict within the parameters established by the Georgia General Assembly (75 % to 125 % of the jury verdict outcome).<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Whether this potential risk is currently covered by E&O carriers or whether a secondary market will develop as reinsurance on top of existing E&O carriers is something that the future will reveal.<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14pt;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>E.<span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span><u>Shifting the Risk of OCGA § 9-11-68 to the Client</u><o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
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<div class="MsoPlainText" style="line-height: 200%; margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 200%;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>For the first time post the Supreme Court’s finding of OCGA § 9-11-68 both constitutional and enforceable in <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">Smith, et al. v. Baptiste, et al</i>., 287 Ga. 23, 694 S.E. 2d 83 (2010), this author’s firm has included a clause in its firm’s fee agreement specifically shifting the risk of an adverse outcome under OCGA § 9-11-68 to the client. <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>It would appear that both under the State Bar Rules and current extant case law in Georgia, a law firm is allowed to shift the risk of an adverse outcome of an OCGA § 9‑11‑68 Offer of Settlement as long as all of the parameters are disclosed to the client and (the firm additionally) shifts the burden of an adverse outcome to the client.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>While this does nothing to mitigate the potential exposure to the underlying clients with regard to OCGA § 9-11-68, it does, perhaps, limit counsel’s exposure to the effects of OCGA § 9-11-68.<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-indent: 0.5in;"><b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14pt;">IV.<span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 68: <o:p></o:p></span></b></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt 0.5in; text-indent: 0.5in;"><b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14pt;">OFFER OF JUDGMENT<o:p></o:p></span></b></div><br />
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<div class="MsoPlainText" style="line-height: 200%; margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-indent: 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 200%;">The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure replaced the <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">Field Code</i> on September 16, 1938.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">Fed. R. Civ. P.</i> 68 or Rule 68, “Offer of Judgment,” appeared in its near current form on December 27, 1946.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="line-height: 200%; margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 200%;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>Originally Rule 68 required that a defendant make an Offer of Judgment at least ten (10) days before the date set for trial.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>In a revamp to the entire timing sequence of all Federal Rules, the timing in Rule 68 was changed in sub paragraph (a) to require that an Offer of Judgment must be made at least “14 days before the date set for trial.”<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>An Offer of Judgment must now be served at least fourteen (14) days before the date set for trial.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="line-height: 200%; margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 200%;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>In a case where liability has already been determined but the extent of liability must still be determined by the trial, the party at risk for liability must serve an Offer of Judgment at least fourteen (14) days before the hearing to determine the extent of the offering party’s liability.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Additionally, the change in the Rule now allows fourteen (14) days for the party receiving the offer to accept the Offer of Judgment by serving a written notice of acceptance.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Silverman and DeFranco, 2009 Amendments to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">The Checkoff</i>, Florida Bar Labor & Employment Law Section, Vol. 69, No. 3 (January 2010).<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
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<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 29.85pt 0pt 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14pt;">Fed. R. Civ. P. 68 Offer of Judgment Rule reads as follows:<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
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<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 29.85pt 0pt 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14pt;">Title VIII. Provisional And Final Remedies<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 29.85pt 0pt 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14pt;">As amended through December 1, 2010<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 29.85pt 0pt 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14pt;">Rule 68. Offer of Judgment <o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 29.85pt 0pt 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14pt;">(a) Making An Offer; Judgment On An Accepted Offer. At least 14 days before the date set for trial, a party defending against a claim may serve on an opposing party an offer to allow judgment on specified terms, with the costs then accrued. If, within 14 days after being served, the opposing party serves written notice accepting the offer, either party may then file the offer and notice of acceptance, plus proof of service. The clerk must then enter judgment.<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 29.85pt 0pt 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14pt;">(b) Unaccepted Offer. An unaccepted offer is considered withdrawn, but it does not preclude a later offer. Evidence of an unaccepted offer is not admissible except in a proceeding to determine costs.<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 29.85pt 0pt 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14pt;">(c) Offer After Liability Is Determined. When one party's liability to another has been determined but the extent of liability remains to be determined by further proceedings, the party held liable may make an Offer of Judgment. It must be served within a reasonable time-but at least 14 days-before the date set for a hearing to determine the extent of liability.<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 29.85pt 0pt 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14pt;">(d) Paying Costs After An Unaccepted Offer. If the judgment that the offeree finally obtains is not more favorable than the unaccepted offer, the offeree must pay the costs incurred after the offer was made.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>History. As amended Dec. 27, 1946, eff. Mar. 19, 1948; Feb. 28, 1966, eff. July 1, 1966; Mar. 2, 1987, eff. Aug. 1, 1987; Apr. 30, 2007, eff. Dec. 1, 2007; Mar. 26, 2009, eff. Dec. 1, 2009.<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
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<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt 1.5in; mso-list: l2 level1 lfo2; text-indent: -0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14pt; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman";"><span style="mso-list: Ignore;">B.<span style="font-size-adjust: none; font-stretch: normal; font: 7pt/normal "Times New Roman";"> </span></span></span><u><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14pt;">The Underlying Federal Statute Must Authorize Fees<o:p></o:p></span></u></div><br />
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<div class="MsoPlainText" style="line-height: 200%; margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 200%;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>While this author is somewhat reticent to comment on a United States Supreme Court case that is six (6) pages in the majority and fifty (50) some pages in the Dissent, I will wade into that pond.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The 1985 case of <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">Marek v. Estate of Chesny</i>, 473 U.S. 1, 105 S.Ct. 3012, 87 L.Ed.2d 1 (1985), provides a helpful overview of the workings of <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">Fed. R. Civ. P.</i> 68.<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="line-height: 200%; margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 200%;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">Marek, supra</i>, concerned the application of an Offer of Judgment where the underlying federal statute provided for an award of attorney’s fees.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>That analysis differs with the Georgia Offer of Settlement statute because the Georgia statute applies attorney’s fees to any tort case, whereas the Federal Rule does not.<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="line-height: 200%; margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 200%;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>In <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">Marek, supra</i>, Petitioner police officers (Marek) answered a domestic disturbance and unfortunately shot and killed Chesny, respondent’s, adult son.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Chesny as Administrator for his son’s estate filed suit in federal district court (Chicago, Illinois) under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Illinois state law.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Prior to trial, the police officers offered $100,000.00 and Chesny declined to accept it.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>At trial, Chesny recovered approximately $60,000.00 which was $40,000.00 less than the Offer of Judgment made by the police officers.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Since Chesny prevailed at trial, his attorneys filed a request for fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988 [Proceeding in Vindication of civil rights which provides for an allowance of attorney’s fees to the successful party].<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>It was denied by the Illinois Federal District Court but granted by the 7th Circuit.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">Chesny v. Marek</i>, 720 F.2d 474 (7th Cir. 1983).<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="line-height: 200%; margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-indent: 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 200%;">The Police officers then petitioned United States Supreme Court to determine whether they were required to pay attorney’s fees (couched as “costs” under Rule 68) for the period of time after Chesny rejected the Offer.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The Seventh Circuit found that under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 the police officers were required to pay the prevailing attorney’s fees.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>720 F.2d 480.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The United States Supreme Court in <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">Marek, </i>473 U.S. 1, Chief Justice Burger, reversed and indicated that the attorney’s fees were not part of the costs after the Offer.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>473 U.S. at 9 – 12.<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="line-height: 200%; margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 200%;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>While the mechanics of Rule 68 are obvious to any reasonably skilled practitioner employing them, actually obtaining an award granting attorney’s fees is another matter.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The dissent in <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">Marek, </i>473 U.S. 14,<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>is interesting in that it provides a laundry list of 63 federal statutes that specifically include attorney’s fees in the Rule 68 scheme for the collection of “costs.”<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">Marek, </i>473 U.S. at 44‑48.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>[7]<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="line-height: 200%; margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 200%;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Additionally, <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">Marek, </i>473 U.S. at 48-51, provides, in the dissent, a list of 49 federal statutes that specifically exclude attorney’s fees as part of the costs. [8]<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="line-height: 200%; margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 200%;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>Thus, while initially one might view the word “costs” as filing fees and perhaps expenses and deposition fees, it may very well include “attorney’s fees” under the particular federal statute.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Unlike the Georgia scheme where all reasonable attorney’s fees would be included in an OCGA § 9-11-68 Offer of Settlement, the federal Rules require the practitioner to look to the specific federal statute and determine whether fees are available to be shifted pursuant to that statute and then apply that fee shifting mechanism through Rule 68.<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt 1.5in; mso-list: l2 level1 lfo2; text-indent: -0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14pt; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman";"><span style="mso-list: Ignore;">C.<span style="font-size-adjust: none; font-stretch: normal; font: 7pt/normal "Times New Roman";"> </span></span></span><u><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14pt;">Federal (Georgia) Rule 68 Cases<o:p></o:p></span></u></div><br />
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<div class="MsoPlainText" style="line-height: 200%; margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 200%;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>The number of cases interpreting <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">Fed. R. Civ. P.</i> 68 in the 11th Circuit is certainly not expansive.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Unless the research has failed us, there appear to only be 12 cases cited from 1983 to the present focusing on the meaning of <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">Fed. R. Civ. P. </i>68.<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="line-height: 200%; margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 200%;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>A search for "Offer of Settlement," in the 11th Circuit and in the F. Supp. will take the reader, generally, to an interpretation of the Florida statute.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The federal court has found that the Florida Offer of Settlement statute, is substantive law and may be applied in federal court.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">Menchise <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>v. Senterfitt, et al.,</i> 532 F.3d 1146 (11th Cir. 2008).<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The number of Florida citations outnumber Georgia citations (and this is a rule of thumb) approximately 20 to 1.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The Florida statute, while not particularly relevant here, is Florida Statute § 768.79 (Offer of Settlement and Demand for Judgment) and its companion rule Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.442 (Proposals for Settlement). That statute and its companion civil rule provide the mechanism in Florida for obtaining legal fees and costs when a party in Florida rejects a formal offer to settle the case.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="line-height: 200%; margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-indent: 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 200%;">Florida Statute § 768.79 is a homegrown minefield.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>If you or your client find yourself on either side of a Florida offer for judgment, this author strongly suggest you retain competent counsel familiar with presenting and defending Offers of Judgment in Florida. <o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt 2in; mso-list: l1 level1 lfo3; text-indent: -0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14pt; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman";"><span style="mso-list: Ignore;">1.<span style="font-size-adjust: none; font-stretch: normal; font: 7pt/normal "Times New Roman";"> </span></span></span><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14pt;">Ekeberg v. Donny Shook (2010)<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
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<div class="MsoPlainText" style="line-height: 200%; margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-indent: 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 200%;">The language and terms of a federal offer are crucial.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>In <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">Ekeberg v. Donny Shook-Brown and Stanley Richardson</i>, Defendants the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia – Gainesville Division, Civil Action File No. 2:08‑CV‑0195‑RWS (April 15, 2010), Hon. Richard W. Story struggled with an issue on which there was no 11th Circuit authority.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">Ekeberg, supra</i>, concerned a 42 USC § 1983 allegation of a prisoner who alleged she was strip searched and fondled in the Towns County Jail.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Toward the end of discovery, the defendants made a <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">Fed. R. Civ. P</i>. 68 Offer of Settlement. <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The offer stated as follows:<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 29.85pt 0pt 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14pt;">COMES NOW the defendants, and, pursuant to Rule 68 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, hereby offer to allow judgment to be taken by plaintiff in the amount of $10,500.00 to discharge all claims against all defendants.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>This offer is in compromise of strongly disputed and doubtful claims."<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Ekeberg, Order of April 15, 2010 at 1.<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
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<div class="MsoPlainText" style="line-height: 200%; margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 200%;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>Apparently, the offer was mailed regular mail during a period of time that plaintiff was engaged in a day‑by‑day extensive discovery involving depositions.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The economic difference in attorney's fees between the date the offer was mailed and the date plaintiff eventually accepted the offer was many tens of thousands of dollars of additional attorney's time.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Judge Story struggled with the ambiguity under <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">Fed. R. Civ. P.</i> 68 concerning whether the offer made by the defendants stopped the running of all costs and fees or whether the attorney's fees and costs (which were allowed under 42 U.S.C. §§1983 and 1988) continued through the date of the acceptance of the offer.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Judge Story finally resolved this in favor of the plaintiff by providing reference to the old maxim that, “the drafter of the offer was the master of his offer.”<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Since it was ambiguous concerning whether costs and attorney's fees would be extended through the date of acceptance, he found against the drafter concerning the ambiguity.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">Id</i>.<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14pt;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 3;"> </span>2.<span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>Utility Automation (2002)<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
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<div class="MsoPlainText" style="line-height: 200%; margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 200%;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>The specific language included in the drafting of the offer is crucial under Fed. R. Civ. P. 68.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>In <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">Utility Automation 2000, Inc., v. Choctawhatchee Electric Cooperative, Inc., et al</i>., 298 F.3d 1238 (11th Cir. 2002), the 11th Circuit appears to have allowed an additional $61,000.00 of attorney's fees on top of an accepted Offer of Settlement under <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">Fed. R. Civ. P.</i> 68 for only $45,000.00.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>[Note:<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The additional $61,000.00 was remanded for a determination of whether it was reasonable and the record does not show what the District Court did on remand.]<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="line-height: 200%; margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 200%;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>In <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">Utility Automation 2000,</i> (the organization, “UA 2000”) <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>sued Choctawhatchee Electric Cooperative for misappropriation of trade secrets, breach of contract and intentional interference with business and contractual relationships.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Near trial, defendants made a <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">Fed. R. Civ. P.</i> 68 Offer of Settlement to UA 2000.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>It stated: <o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 29.85pt 0pt 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14pt;">Defendants … hereby make the following Offer of Settlement pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 68; that defendants shall pay plaintiff [UA 2000] the sum of $45,000.00 and 00/$100.00 ($45,000.00) with costs accrued, and the defendant, Chelco Services, Inc., shall refrain from competing with the plaintiff for a period of thirty (30) days from the date of acceptance of this offer.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>298 F.3d 1239, 1240.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
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<div class="MsoPlainText" style="line-height: 200%; margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-indent: 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 200%;">UA 2000 accepted the offer and then subsequent to the acceptance brought a motion for its attorney's fees on top of the $45,000.00.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Its theory was that the $45,000.00 constituted payment for a violation of the Trade Secret Act and that it was entitled to fees as the "prevailing party" for the $61,000.00 it took to get the $45,000.00 award.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Defendant Choctawhatchee Electric Cooperative took the position that the $45,000.00 included the fees.<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="line-height: 200%; margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 200%;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>The 11th Circuit said the issue was ambiguous and struggled to determine whether these were or were not included.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The 11th Circuit's analysis is lengthy, however it found that the Defendants' offer did not preclude a review of additional fees to the Plaintiff because the offer didn’t specifically prohibit it.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The 11th Circuit found that it had the authority to review it under <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">Marek v. Estate of Chesny, supra</i>, but it really didn’t want to wade into that issue.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Finally, it found that the Trade Secret Act specifically allowed for attorney's fees by statute and that Plaintiff had successfully pled for that relief.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>It further found that by the offer of the $45,000.00 by defendant and acceptance of the $45,000.00 by Plaintiff, Plaintiff became the "prevailing party" under the Trade Secret Act.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Therefore, the 11th Circuit found that the additional attorney's fees or $61,000.00 of attorney's fees necessary to obtain the award should be awarded.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>While the "reasonableness," was remanded to the District Court, the 11th Circuit wrote in warning to all practitioners who draft <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">Fed. R. Civ. P</i>. 68 offers of judgment the following:<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 29.85pt 0pt 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14pt;">We note, as have other Courts, that defendants can easily preempt the dispute exemplified here, as well as others, by clearly stating their intent in the Offer of Settlement.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>We echo the 7th Circuit in cautioning that '[t] the prudent defendant … will mention [attorney's fees] explicitly, in order to head off the type of appeal that we are wrestling with here.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Nordby, v. Anchor Hocking Packaging Company, 199 F.3d 390, 393 (7th Cir. 1999).<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Lastly, we have not had occasion to determine whether the amount UA 2000 requests for attorney's fees – approximately $61,000.00 – is in fact a reasonable sum.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Therefore, in remanding to the District Court, we do so with the expectation the District Court will determine a suitable amount of attorney's fees.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>298 F.3d. 1240.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
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<div class="MsoPlainText" style="line-height: 200%; margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-indent: 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 200%;">Both <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">Ekeberg</i>, being only a district order, and <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">Utility Automation 2000</i>, <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">surpa</i>, strongly caution against the drafting of an ambiguous offer in federal Court.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>If the practitioner wishes to make an offer that includes attorney's fees and costs in the Fed. R. Civ. P. 68 offer, the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia and the 11th Circuit strongly encourage the practitioner to state with specificity the inclusion or non‑inclusion of attorney's fees in its offer.<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt 2in; mso-list: l0 level1 lfo4; text-indent: -0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14pt; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman";"><span style="mso-list: Ignore;">3.<span style="font-size-adjust: none; font-stretch: normal; font: 7pt/normal "Times New Roman";"> </span></span></span><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14pt;">OCGA § 9‑11‑68 is Substantive Law in <o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
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<div class="MsoPlainText" style="line-height: 200%; margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 200%;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">Wheatley v. Moe's Southwest Grill, LLC, et al</i>. 580 F. Supp. 2d 1324 (N.D. Ga. 2008), sheds light on some of the difficulties of the enforcement of OCGA § 9‑11‑68 (the Georgia Offer of Settlement) in Federal Court.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>While many parts of this long and messy case go beyond a simple discussion of OCGA § 9‑11‑68, it turned on an offer of 50,000 shares of stock in Moe's and related corporations [Mama Fu's Noodle House, Inc. and Raving Brands Holding, Inc.] when Plaintiff, Wheatley, was promoted from employee to company vice president with an equity share.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>When Wheatley resigned from the corporation, she sought the 50,000 shares by written certificate.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Because of the lack of writing and ambiguity, litigation arose concerning whether the shares had to be issued.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="line-height: 200%; margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 200%;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>An award of OCGA § 9‑11‑68 attorney's fees may not be had for the attorney's fees incurred from an appeal from the District Court through the 11th Circuit and on remittitur back to the District Court.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Attorneys for Moe's Southwest moved for $49,000.00 of attorney's fees incurred while the case was appealed from the District Court through the 11th Circuit and back on remand to District Court.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia, the Honorable Timothy C. Batten, Sr., gave a short shrift to the request for attorney's fees on appeal in federal Court and wrote:<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>"The motion that seeks attorney's fees and expenses of litigation incurred on appeal is meritless.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The statute expressly limits the award of attorney's fees and expenses to those incurred from the date of the rejection of the Offer of Settlement to the date of entry of judgment … "<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>580 F. Supp. 2d 1326.<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="line-height: 200%; margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 200%;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>It is unclear, from <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">Wheatley</i> and similar cases, how practitioners are to deal with cases that are a combination of contract claims, tort claims and hybrid claims.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>In <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">Wheatley</i>, the Plaintiffs contended they were suing on contract for the 50,000 shares.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The defendants contended that it was a meritless tort suit, suit on breach of fiduciary duties, conversion and other counts.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The federal Court struggled with the question concerning whether an OCGA § 9‑11‑68 Offer of Settlement could properly be made to a case that had some contract claims buried in amongst tort claims.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>580 F. Supp. 2d 1325‑1327.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="line-height: 200%; margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 200%;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>While Judge Batten did not resolve this area of the law, he found that the statute applied to any suit that involved a "tort claim" in the action.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Thus, perhaps reading between the lines, one can make an Offer of Settlement if any portion of Plaintiff's complaint includes a well-defined "tort" claim.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>580 F. Supp. 2d 1327.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Perhaps the most important determination out of <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">Wheatley</i>, supra, is that the Court specifically and unequivocally held that OCGA § 9‑11‑68 offers apply as substantive law in federal Court.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>While the Plaintiff argued that the Georgia statute was merely procedural and could not be applied in federal Court, the Court found otherwise.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Citing, <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">Erie Railroad Company v. Tompkins</i>, 304 U.S. 64, 58 S.Ct. 817, 82 L. Ed. 1188 (1938) and its progeny, the Court found that it could (and perhaps was obliged to) apply state substantive law on this particular issue.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">Id</i>.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="line-height: 200%; margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 200%;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>The <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">Wheatley</i> case goes on to show that it certified three (3) questions to the Georgia Supreme Court.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Research reveals that while the record was transferred to the Georgia Supreme Court and the issues were placed before the Supreme Court, the parties settled their claims and the Supreme Court allowed the case to return to the District Court on remittitur without answering the certified questions posed in <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">Wheatley</i>.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>See, the Order of the Supreme Court of Georgia dated April 28, 2009 and <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">Wheatley</i>, returning the file to the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia without an answer.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Document 173 in United States District Court Northern District of Georgia Case. No. 1:05‑CV‑02174‑TCB.<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt 1.25in; mso-list: l2 level1 lfo2; text-indent: -0.25in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14pt; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman";"><span style="mso-list: Ignore;">D.<span style="font-size-adjust: none; font-stretch: normal; font: 7pt/normal "Times New Roman";"> </span></span></span><u><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14pt;">11<sup>th</sup> Circuit Certifies Florida’s Attorney Fee <o:p></o:p></span></u></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt 1.25in;"><u><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14pt;">Statutes to Florida Supreme Court for Guidance<o:p></o:p></span></u></div><br />
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<div class="MsoPlainText" style="line-height: 200%; margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 200%;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>While this overview is about Georgia law, it is worth noting that the 11<sup>th</sup> Circuit spent months trying to reconcile an Offer under the Florida Offer of Judgment and Demand for Judgment Statute.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">Fla. Anno. Stat</i>.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>§ 768.79 (2003).<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>[9]<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The 11<sup>th</sup> Circuit struggled with the fact that the “offer,” seemed to comply with the substance of the law in Florida, but not the procedure.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>A federal court, sitting in diversity must apply substance, but may avoid the procedural nuances of the home state.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14pt;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>In certifying the case, the 11<sup>th</sup> Circuit wrote:<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div style="margin: 5pt 29.85pt 5pt 0.5in;"><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="color: black; font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14pt;">In this diversity case, we certify four questions to the Florida Supreme Court, seeking guidance as to the application of Florida's offer of judgment statute, Fla. Stat. § 768.79, Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.442, and the fee-shifting provision of the Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act (" FDUTPA" ), Fla. Stat. § 501.2105.<o:p></o:p></span></i></div><br />
<div style="margin: 5pt 29.85pt 5pt 0.5in;"><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="color: black; font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14pt;">First, we ask whether an offer of judgment may be viable when it purports to settle " all claims," even though it does not [Page 1256]<o:p></o:p></span></i></div><br />
<div style="margin: 5pt 29.85pt 5pt 0.5in;"><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="color: black; font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14pt;">explicitly " state whether the proposal includes attorneys' fees and whether attorneys' fees are part of the legal claim" as required by Rule 1.442(c)(2)(F). Second, we ask whether the offer of judgment statute, which applies in " any civil action for damages" but generally does not apply to a case seeking both damages and non-monetary relief, applies to a lawsuit seeking damages or, in the alternative, specific performance. Third, we ask whether the FDUTPA's fee-shifting provision applies to an action with the following procedural history: the plaintiff filed an action alleging a FDUTPA claim and prosecuted that claim for seven months; the district court ruled at summary judgment that he could not pursue the FDUTPA claim because Florida law did not apply, but allowed him to prosecute the action under Arizona's unfair trade practices law instead; then he lost on the Arizona unfair trade practices claim at trial. Finally, if the FDUTPA's fee-shifting provision does apply, we ask whether it applies only to fees incurred during the seven months before the plaintiff's FDUTPA claim was defeated at summary judgment, or also to fees incurred during the subsequent litigation.<o:p></o:p></span></i></div><br />
<div style="margin: 5pt 29.85pt 5pt 0.5in;"><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="color: black; font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14pt;">We certify these questions because we are unable to find definitive answers in clearly established Florida law as set forth in case law or statutes. <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><o:p></o:p></span></i></div><br />
<div style="margin-bottom: 0pt;"><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="color: black; font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14pt; mso-bidi-font-weight: bold;">Alan Horowitch v.</span></i><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="color: black; font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14pt;"> <span style="mso-bidi-font-weight: bold;">Diamond Aircraft Industries, Inc</span></span></i><span style="color: black; font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14pt; mso-bidi-font-weight: bold;">., 645 F.3d 1254 (11th Cir. 2011).<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div style="line-height: 200%; margin-bottom: 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 200%;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span><b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;">V.<span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>CONCLUSION<o:p></o:p></b></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="line-height: 200%; margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 200%;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>The Georgia Offer of Settlement statute OCGA § 9-11-68 is a powerful tool to shift an opponent off the <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">status quo</i> and toward a resolution of the case.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>This paper has shown that the drafter of the Offer must carefully follow the statute.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>A plaintiff must recover more than 75% percent of a rejected offer or bear the defendant's fees and a defendant must be confident that a plaintiff can recover no more than 125% percent of a rejected offer or risk paying plaintiff’s counsel’s fees.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>This paper has reviewed the theoretical aspects concerning whether the Offer of Settlement statute <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>and has reviewed its potential for legal malpractice if an Offer is not made or not employed correctly.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>It has reviewed the recent finding of constitutionality of the statute and looked at additional recent cases.<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="line-height: 200%; margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 200%;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>This paper has also reviewed the similar Offer of Judgment rule in federal court:<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Fed. R. Civ. P. 68.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>It has contrasted the Georgia rule to the Federal Rule and shown that while attorney’s fees may be recovered in federal court the recovery in federal court may turn on the federal statute in litigation in federal court as opposed to merely using the federal Offer of Judgment.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Finally, the paper has shown that the Georgia Offer of Settlement has been determined to be substantive law in the federal court and it has reminded practitioners of the importance of being accurate in making a federal Offer of Judgment. [10]<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
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<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14pt;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">Hugh Wood, Esq.<o:p></o:p></i></span></div><br />
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<div align="center" class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-align: center;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14pt;">ENDNOTES<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
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<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 29.85pt 0pt 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">In 1989 the Georgia General Assembly, in its wisdom, gave us OCGA §§ 51-7-80 through 51-7-85.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>In that abusive litigation/malicious prosecution scheme we, as practitioners, had to stay within the confines of two paragraphs of OCGA § 51‑7‑84 to write a cogent and enforceable notice by certified mail to be able to enforce a claim after the end of the suit.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The General Assembly, in its wisdom, has now given us twenty-three (23) paragraphs under OCGA § 9-11-68 to make an appropriate Offer of Settlement during a case.<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
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<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 29.85pt 0pt 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">What if the Complaint, is part in tort and part in contract?<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>May one submit an OCGA § 9-11-68 Offer of Settlement for the tort portions of the action?<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The United States District Court, Northern District of Georgia struggled with this issue in <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">Wheatley v. Moe’s Southwest Grill, LLC, et al.</i>, 580 Fed. Supp. 2d 1324 (2008).<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Unfortunately, there is no clear answer from that case.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The Federal Court certified the question to the Georgia Supreme Court; however, the case then settled without an answer.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">Wheatly, supra</i>, contains and interesting “chart,” delineating “tort,” causes of action from “contract,” causes of action.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>586 Supp. 2d 1324, 1326.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>This author’s personal opinion, though is that this expands litigation and makes the offers unwieldy and unfair, but “yes,” one can make Offers of Settlement to the tort claims (inside) a larger complaint or petition.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
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<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 29.85pt 0pt 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">There are substantial nuances in the concerning the making of an Offer of Settlement with regard to a counter-offer and nuances with regard the effect of the withdrawal of an Offer on the collection of on attorney’s fees.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>These are beyond the scope of this article.<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
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<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 29.85pt 10pt 0.5in;"><span style="color: black; font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt; line-height: 115%;">David Glasgow Farragut (July 5, 1801 – August 14, 1870) was the commander-in-chief of the U.S. Navy during the American Civil War. He was both the first vice admiral and full admiral of the Navy. He is remembered in popular culture for his famous order at the Battle of Mobile Bay.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Not that facts would get in the way of emotions, Farragut’s strategy of “damn the torpedoes,” actually worked at the Battle of Mobile Bay.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Farragut overwhelmed the much </span><span lang="EN" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt; line-height: 115%; mso-ansi-language: EN;">smaller Confederate fleet led by Admiral Franklin Buchanan and took Mobile on August 5, 1864.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The actual historical quote was, “Damn the Torpedoes.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Go Ahead.”<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>However, it is generally cited as “Damn the Torpedoes. Full Speed Ahead.”<o:p></o:p></span></div><span lang="EN" style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt; line-height: 115%; mso-ansi-language: EN; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-fareast-font-family: Calibri; mso-fareast-language: EN-US;"><br clear="all" style="mso-special-character: line-break; page-break-before: always;" /> </span> <br />
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<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 29.85pt 10pt 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt; line-height: 115%;">[ A search in January of 2012 does not show an Appeal of this case.]<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 29.85pt 0pt 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">IN THE STATE COURT OF DEKALB COUNTY<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 29.85pt 0pt 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">STATE OF GEORGIA<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 29.85pt 0pt 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">URSULA JOHNSON, Plaintiff,<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 29.85pt 0pt 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">vs.<span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>CIVIL ACTION<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 29.85pt 0pt 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">PAUL TURNER,<span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>FILE, NO.: 08A981784<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 29.85pt 0pt 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">Defendant.<span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>)<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 29.85pt 0pt 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">ORDER<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 29.85pt 0pt 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">Re: Plaintiff's Motion. To Award Attorney's Fees Against Defendant Pursuant To O.C.G.A.§ 9-11-68, filed November 19, 2010, heard 3/10/2011.<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 29.85pt 0pt 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">In this personal injury action, the jury returned a verdict for $48,081.30 on November 8, 2010, and the Court entered judgment on November 22, 2010. Plaintiff had given the Defendant an offer of judgment of $12,000 pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 9-11-68 on or about July 13, 2010. The offer included settlement of any claims for punitive damages, attorney's fees or expenses. By letter dated August 13, 2010, Defendant rejected the offer and counter-offered $5,000. Because the jury returned a verdict 125% more than Plaintiff's offer of settlement of $12,000, Plaintiff demands attorney's fees in the full amount of the contingency fee contract of 40%. Alternatively, Plaintiff seeks hourly fees totaling $8,875 for Plaintiff's lead counsel and an attorney assisting in the case. The hourly fees claimed were for work done on behalf of the Plaintiff from the date of the rejection of the offer of settlement which was August 13, 2010, through the entry of judgment.<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 29.85pt 0pt 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">Under O.C.G.A. 911-68, a trial court has the ability to deny an award of attorney's fees if the court finds the offer of judgment was not made in good faith. Although the Defendant argued the offer to settle in the amount of $12,000 was not made in good faith, Defendant failed to articulate the basis for such an argument and did not submit any evidence in support thereof.<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 29.85pt 0pt 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">Contrary to this assertion, a demand of $12,000 when special damages are in excess of $10,000 seems quite reasonable, Therefore, as a matter of law, Plaintiff is entitled to an award of attorney's fees. The sole question before this Court is how much.<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 29.85pt 0pt 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">As a matter of law, an attorney cannot collect a contingency fee until the contingency occurs. Typically in personal injury cases, a plaintiff’s attorney is entitled to the contingency attorney's fees when a case is settled or when it is tried to a verdict. Ellerin & Associates v. Bralwey, 263 Ga. App. 860, 861 (2003). Moreover, if the lawyer was discharged by his client before the contingency occurs, absent contractual provisions addressing the payment of fees, the attorney is only entitled to the equitable remedy of quantum meruit under which the attorney can claim reasonable attorney's fees for services rendered on behalf of the client. Amstead v. McFarland, 279 Ga. App. 765, 770-771 (2006).<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 29.85pt 0pt 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">This is a case where the Defendant did not contest liability. In other words, the Defendant admitted fault in causing the accident. The Defendant was also made aware that medical expenses involved in this case exceeded $10,000 as early as filing of the complaint. It should be noted in defending this case where the only contest is causation of damages, the Defendant failed to put up any medical evidence that Plaintiff was not injured or injured to the extent she contends.<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 29.85pt 0pt 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">The purpose of O.C.G.A. §9-11-68 is to provide a hammer against a litigant who insists on going forward when everything before him or her, or her counsel, or her insurance carrier says settle it, resolve it. During the morning of the motion hearing, in response to the Court's question, counsel for Plaintiff stated in open court that he would waive the 9-11-68 attorney's fees if the Defendant would simply pay the judgment. Defendant's counsel made phone calls but nothing was offered except to proceed ahead.<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 29.85pt 0pt 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">There is no reason in this case for the Court not to exercise its discretion and award attorney's fees in the, full amount of the contingency of $19,232,52. The Court recognizes that it has<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 29.85pt 0pt 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">the discretion to award hourly fees of $8,875 which was hourly work done from the date the offer of settlement was rejected until the date the verdict was returned. However, it is well settled law that a plaintiff's attorney is not entitled to a fee until the contingency occurs. This case was tried to a verdict There is no reason the Plaintiff should not recover the full statutory benefit of O.C.G.A. 9-11-68. There is a price for "damn the torpedoes, full speed ahead." The Court orders the Defendant to pay attorney's fees under O.C.G.A. § 9-11-68 in the amount of $19,232.52.<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 29.85pt 0pt 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">SO ORDERED, this<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>14- day of March 2011.<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 29.85pt 0pt 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">ALVIN T. WONG<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 29.85pt 0pt 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">State Court of DeKalb County<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
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<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 29.85pt 0pt 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">Jason T. Schneider, Esq., [For Plaintiff] <o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 29.85pt 0pt 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">Allison M. McDonald, Esq., [For Defendant]<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
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<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 29.85pt 0pt 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12pt;">Clay, Jr., Charles "Chuck" and Paupeck, Michael, <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">Recent Decision Highlights Additional Issues with Georgia's Tort Reform Act</i>,<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Weinburg, Wheeler, Hudgins, Gunn & Dial, December 29, 2011.<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
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<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt 73.5pt; mso-list: l4 level1 lfo5; text-indent: -0.25in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman";"><span style="mso-list: Ignore;">A.<span style="font-size-adjust: none; font-stretch: normal; font: 7pt/normal "Times New Roman";"> </span></span></span><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">Attorney's Fees Referred to as "Costs"<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
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<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-indent: 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;"> 1. Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 552(a)(4)(E) and (F).<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-indent: 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;"> 2. Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. §§ 552a(g)(2)(B), 552a(g)(4)(B)<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-indent: 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;"> 3. Government in the Sunshine Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552b(i).<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-indent: 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;"> 4. Commodity Exchange Act, 88 Stat. 1394, as amended, 7 U.S.C. §§ 18(d) and (e).<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-indent: 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;"> 5. Packers and Stockyard Act of 1921, 42 Stat. 166, as amended, 7 U.S.C. § 210(f).<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-indent: 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;"> 6. Perishable Agricultural Commodities Act of 1930, 46 Stat. 534, as amended, 7 U.S.C. § 499g(b).<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-indent: 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;"> 7. Agricultural Fair Practices Act of 1967, 82 Stat. 95, 7 U.S.C. §§ 2305(a) and (c).<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-indent: 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;"> 8. Home Owners' Loan Act of 1933, 48 Stat. 132, as amended, 12 U.S.C. § 1464(q)(3).<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-indent: 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;"> 9. Bank Holding Company Act Amendments of 1970, 84 Stat. 1767, 12 U.S.C. § 1975.<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-indent: 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;"> 10. Clayton Antitrust Act, 38 Stat. 731, as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 15(a) and (b). <o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-indent: 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>11. Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, 90 Stat. <o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt 1in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">1394, 1396, as amended, 15 <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>U.S.C. §§ 15c(a)(2), 26.<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-indent: 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;"> 12. Unfair Competition Act of 1916, 39 Stat. 798, 15 U.S.C. § 72.<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-indent: 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;"> 13. Securities Act of 1933, 48 Stat. 82, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77k(e).<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-indent: 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;"> 14. Trust Indenture Act of 1939, 53 Stat. 1171, 1176, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77ooo(e), 77www(a).<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-indent: 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;"> 15. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 890, 898, as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78i(e), 78r(a).<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-indent: 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;"> 16. Jewelers Hall-Mark Act, 34 Stat. 262, as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 298(b)-(d).<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>17. Consumer Product Safety Act, 86 Stat. 1218, 1226, as amended, <o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt 0.5in; text-indent: 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">15 U.S.C. §§ 2060(c) and (f), 2072(a), 2073.<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-indent: 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;"> 18. Hobby Protection Act, 87 Stat. 686, 15 U.S.C. § 2102.<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-indent: 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;"> 19. Export Trading Company Act of 1982, 96 Stat. 1243, 15 U.S.C. §§ 4016(b)(1) and (4).<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-indent: 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;"> 20. National Cooperative Research Act of 1984, 98 Stat. 1817,<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt 0.5in; text-indent: 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>15 U.S.C. §§ 4304(a) and (b)(1982ed., Supp. III).<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-indent: 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;"> 21. National Historic Preservation Act Amendments of 1980, 94 Stat. 3002, 16 U.S.C. § 470w-4.<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-indent: 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;"> 22. Endangered Species Act of 1973, 87 Stat. 897, as amended, 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g)(4).<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-indent: 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;"> 23. Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978, 92 Stat. 3129, 16 U.S.C. §§ 2632(a) and (b).<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-indent: 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;"> 24. Copyright Act of 1976, 90 Stat. 2586, 17 U.S.C. § 505.<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-indent: 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;"> 25. Semiconductor Chip Protection Act of 1984, 98 Stat. 3353, <o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt 0.5in; text-indent: 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">17 U.S.C. § 911(f) (1982 ed., Supp. III).<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-indent: 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;"> 26. Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c).<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-indent: 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;"> 27. Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. § 2520.<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-indent: 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;"> 28. Jury System Improvement Act of 1978, 28 U.S.C. § 1875(d)(2).<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-indent: 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;"> 29. Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 92 Stat. 2982, 29 U.S.C. § 794a(b).<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-indent: 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;"> 30. Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977, 91 Stat. 503, 30 U.S.C. § 1270(d).<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-indent: 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;"> 31. Deep Seabed Hard Mineral Resources Act, 94 Stat. 573, 30 U.S.C. § 1427(c).<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-indent: 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;"> 32. Federal Oil and Gas Royalty Management Act of 1982, 96 Stat. 2458, 30 U.S.C. § 1734(a)(4).<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-indent: 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;"> 33. Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 86 Stat. 888, 33 U.S.C. § 1365(d).<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-indent: 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;"> 34. Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Act of 1972, 86 Stat. 1057, 33 U.S.C. § 1415(g)(4).<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-indent: 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;"> 35. Deepwater Ports Act of 1974, 88 Stat. 2141, 33 U.S.C. § 1515(d).<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-indent: 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;"> 36. Act to Prevent Pollution from Ships, 94 Stat. 2302, 33 U.S.C. § 1910(d).<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-indent: 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;"> 37. Safe Drinking Water Act, 88 Stat. 1690-1691, as amended, <o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt 0.5in; text-indent: 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">42 U.S.C. §§ 300j-8(d), 300j-9(2)(B)(i) and (ii).<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-indent: 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;"> 38. Voting Rights Act of 1965, 79 Stat. 445, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 19731(e).<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-indent: 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;"> 39. The Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, <o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt 0.5in; text-indent: 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">90 Stat. 2641, 42 U.S.C. § 1988.<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span> 40. Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act, 94 Stat. 350-351, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1997a(b), 1997c(d).<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-indent: 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;"> 41. Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 244, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-3(b).<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-indent: 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;"> 42. Title III of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 246, 42 U.S.C. § 2000b-1.<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-indent: 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;"> 43. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 261, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k).<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-indent: 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;"> 44. Privacy Protection Act of 1980, 94 Stat. 1880, 42 U.S.C. § 2000aa-6(f).<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-indent: 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;"> 45. Noise Control Act of 1972, 86 Stat. 1244, 42 U.S.C. § 4911(d).<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;"> 46. Comprehensive Older Americans Act Amendments of 1978, <br />
<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>92 Stat. 1555, 42 U.S.C. § 6104(e)(1).<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-indent: 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;"> 47. Energy Policy and Conservation Act, 89 Stat. 930, 42 U.S.C. § 6305(d).<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-indent: 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;"> 48. Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, 90 Stat. 2826, 42 U.S.C. § 6972(e).<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-indent: 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;"> 49. Clean Air Act, 84 Stat. 1686, 1706-1707, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7413(b), 7604(d), 7607(f).<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-indent: 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;"> 50. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, 91 Stat. 784, 42 U.S.C. § 7622(e)(2).<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-indent: 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;"> 51. Powerplant and Industrial Fuel Use Act of 1978, 92 Stat. 3335, 42 U.S.C. § 8435(d).<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-indent: 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;"> 52. Ocean Thermal Energy Conversion Act of 1980, 94 Stat. 990, 42 U.S.C. § 9124(d).<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-indent: 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;"> 53. Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act Amendments of 1978, 92 Stat. 657, 43 U.S.C. § 1349(a)(5).<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-indent: 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;"> 54. Railway Labor Act of 1926, 44 Stat. 578, as amended, 45 U.S.C. § 153(p).<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-indent: 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;"> 55. Shipping Act of 1916, 39 Stat. 737, as amended, 46 U.S.C. § 829.<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-indent: 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;"> 56. Merchant Marine Act of 1936, 49 Stat. 2015, as amended, 46 U.S.C. § 1227.<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-indent: 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;"> 57. Shipping Act of 1984, 98 Stat. 3132, 46 U.S.C.App. § 1710(h)(2) (1982 ed., Supp. III).<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-indent: 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;"> 58. Communications Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 1072, 1095, 47 U.S.C. §§ 206, 407.<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-indent: 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;"> 59. Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, 98 Stat. 2779, <o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt 0.5in; text-indent: 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">47 U.S.C. §§ 553(c)(2), 605(d)(3)(B) (1982 ed., Supp. III).<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-indent: 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;"> 60. Natural Gas Pipeline Safety Act, 90 Stat. 2076, as amended, 49 U.S.C.App. § 1686(e).<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-indent: 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;"> 61. Hazardous Liquid Pipeline Safety Act of 1979, 93 Stat. 1015, 49 U.S.C.App. § 2014(e).<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-indent: 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;"> 62. Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C. §§ 11705(d)(3), § 11710(b).<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-indent: 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;"> 63. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, 92 Stat. 1796, 50 U.S.C. § 1810(c).<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
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<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14pt;">[8]<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
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<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt 73.5pt; mso-list: l4 level1 lfo5; text-indent: -0.25in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman";"><span style="mso-list: Ignore;">B.<span style="font-size-adjust: none; font-stretch: normal; font: 7pt/normal "Times New Roman";"> </span></span></span><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">Attorney's Fees Not Referred to as "Costs"<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
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<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-indent: 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;"> 1. Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a(g)(4)B.<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-indent: 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;"> 2. Plant Variety Act, 84 Stat. 1556, 7 U.S.C. § 2565.<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-indent: 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;"> 3. Bankruptcy Act of 1978, as amended, 11 U.S.C. §§ 303(i), 362(h), 363(n), 523(d).<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-indent: 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;"> 4. Home Owners' Loan Act of 1933, 48 Stat. 132, as amended, 12 U.S.C. § 1464(d)(8)(A).<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-indent: 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;"> 5. National Housing Act, 48 Stat. 1260, as amended, 12 U.S.C. § 1730(m)(3).<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-indent: 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;"> 6. Federal Credit Union Act, 84 Stat. 1010, as amended, 12 U.S.C. 1786(p).<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-indent: 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;"> 7. Federal Deposit Insurance Act, 64 Stat. 879, as amended, 12 U.S.C. § 1818(n).<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-indent: 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;"> 8. Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act of 1974, <o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt 0.5in; text-indent: 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">88 Stat. 1728, as amended, 12 U.S.C. § 2607(d)(2)(b).<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-indent: 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;"> 9. <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978, 92 Stat. 3708, 3789, 12 U.S.C. §§ 3417(a)(4), 3418.<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-indent: 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;"> 10. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 899, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78u(h)(8).<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-indent: 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;"> 11. Trademark Act, 60 Stat. 439, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1117.<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-indent: 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;"> 12. National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966, 80 Stat. 724, 15 U.S.C. § 1400(b).<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-indent: 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;"> 13. Truth-in-Lending Act, 82 Stat. 157, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a).<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-indent: 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;"> 14. Consumer Leasing Act, 90 Stat. 259, 15 U.S.C. § 1667b(a).<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-indent: 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;"> 15. Consumer Credit Protection Act, 84 Stat. 1134, 15 U.S.C. §§ 168m(3), 1681o(2).<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-indent: 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;"> 16. Consumer Credit Protection Act, 88 Stat. 1524, 15 U.S.C. § 1691e(d).<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-indent: 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;"> 17. Consumer Credit Protection Act, 91 Stat. 881, 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a).<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-indent: 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;"> 18. Electronic Fund Transfer Act, 92 Stat. 3737, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1693m(a) and (f).<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-indent: 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;"> 19. Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act, 82 Stat. 595, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1709(c).<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-indent: 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;"> 20. Motor Vehicle Information and Cost Savings Act, <o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt 0.5in; text-indent: 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">86 Stat. 955, 963, as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1918(a), 1989(a)(2).<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-indent: 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;"> 21. Toxic Substances Control Act, 90 Stat. 2039, 2041-2042, <o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt 0.5in; text-indent: 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">15 U.S.C. §§ 2618(d), 2619(c)(2), 2020(b)(4)(C).<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-indent: 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;"> 22. Petroleum Marketing Practices Act, 92 Stat. 331, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2805(d)(1) and (3).<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-indent: 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;"> 23. Condominium and Cooperative Abuse Relief Act of 1980, <o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt 0.5in; text-indent: 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">94 Stat. 1677, 1679, 15 U.S.C. §§ 3608(d), 3611(d).<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-indent: 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;"> 24. Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act, 94 Stat. 2426, 16 U.S.C. § 3117(a).<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-indent: 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;"> 25. Navajo and Hopi Indian Relocation Amendments Act of 1980,<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt 0.5in; text-indent: 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>94 Stat. 934, 25 U.S.C. § 640d-27(b).<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-indent: 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;"> 26. Tax Reform Act of 1976, 90 Stat. 1665, 26 U.S.C. § 6110(i)(2).<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-indent: 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;"> 27. Judicial Code, 28 U.S.C. § 1927.<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-indent: 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;"> 28. Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2412(b).<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-indent: 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;"> 29. Norris-LaGuardia Act, 47 Stat. 71, 29 U.S.C. § 107.<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-indent: 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;"> 30. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 52 Stat. 1069, as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b).<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-indent: 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;"> 31. Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 73 Stat. 524, 29 U.S.C. § 431(c).<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-indent: 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;"> 32. Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 81 Stat. 604, as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 626(b).<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-indent: 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;"> 33. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, <o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt 0.5in; text-indent: 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">88 Stat. 891, as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g).<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-indent: 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;"> 34. Multiple Mineral Development Act, 68 Stat. 710, 30 U.S.C. § 526(e).<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-indent: 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;"> 35. State and Local Fiscal Assistance Act of 1972, 86 Stat. 919, as amended, 31 U.S.C. § 6721(c).<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-indent: 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;"> 36. Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act,<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt 0.5in; text-indent: 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">44 Stat. 1438, as amended, 33 U.S.C. § 928(a).<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-indent: 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;"> 37. Patent Infringement Act, 66 Stat. 813, 35 U.S.C. § 285.<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-indent: 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;"> 38. Servicemen's Group Life Insurance Act, 72 Stat. 1165, 38 U.S.C. § 784(g).<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-indent: 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;"> 39. Social Security Act, 49 Stat. 624, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 406(b).<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-indent: 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;"> 40. Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 68 Stat. 946, 42 U.S.C. § 2184.<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-indent: 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;"> 41. Legal Services Corporation Act, 88 Stat. 381, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2996e(f).<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-indent: 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;"> 42. Fair Housing Act of 1968, 82 Stat. 88, 42 U.S.C. § 3612(c).<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-indent: 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;"> 43. Mobile Home Construction and Safety Standards Act, <o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt 0.5in; text-indent: 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">88 Stat. 706, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 5412(b).<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-indent: 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;"> 44. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, <o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt 0.5in; text-indent: 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">and Liability Act of 1980, 94 Stat. 2792, 42 U.S.C. § 9612(c)(3).<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-indent: 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;"> 45. Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act Amendments of 1978, <o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt 0.5in; text-indent: 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">92 Stat. 658, 682, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1349(b)(2), 1818(c)(1)(C).<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-indent: 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;"> 46. Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act, <o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt 0.5in; text-indent: 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">94 Stat. 2430, 43 U.S.C. § 1631(c).<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-indent: 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;"> 47. Act of Mar. 2, 1897, 29 Stat. 619, 48 U.S.C. § 1506.<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-indent: 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;"> 48. Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C. § 11708(c).<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-indent: 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;"> 49. Household Goods Transportation Act of 1980, <o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt 0.5in; text-indent: 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">94 Stat. 2016, as amended, 49 U.S.C. §§ 11711(d) and (e).<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
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<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 29.85pt 0pt 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">Florida Annotated Statutes § 768.79 (2003)<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 29.85pt 0pt 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">§ 768.79: Offer of judgment and demand for judgment<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 29.85pt 0pt 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">(1) In any civil action for damages filed in the courts of this state, if a defendant files an <o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 29.85pt 0pt 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">offer of judgment which is not accepted by the plaintiff within 30 days, the defendant shall be entitled <o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 29.85pt 0pt 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">to recover reasonable costs and attorney's fees incurred by her or him or on the defendant's behalf <o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 29.85pt 0pt 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">pursuant to a policy of liability insurance or other contract from the date of filing of the offer if the <o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 29.85pt 0pt 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">judgment is one of no liability or the judgment obtained by the plaintiff is at least 25 percent less than <o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 29.85pt 0pt 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">such offer, and the court shall set off such costs and attorney's fees against the award. Where such <o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 29.85pt 0pt 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">costs and attorney's fees total more than the judgment, the court shall enter judgment for the defendant <o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 29.85pt 0pt 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">against the plaintiff for the amount of the costs and fees, less the amount of the plaintiff's award. If a <o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 29.85pt 0pt 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">plaintiff files a demand for judgment which is not accepted by the defendant within 30 days and the <o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 29.85pt 0pt 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">plaintiff recovers a judgment in an amount at least 25 percent greater than the offer, she or he shall <o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 29.85pt 0pt 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">be entitled to recover reasonable costs and attorney's fees incurred from the date of the filing of the <o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 29.85pt 0pt 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">demand. If rejected, neither an offer nor demand is admissible in subsequent litigation, except for <o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 29.85pt 0pt 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">pursuing the penalties of this section.<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 29.85pt 0pt 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">(2)<span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>The making of an offer of settlement which is not accepted does not preclude the <o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 29.85pt 0pt 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">making of a subsequent offer. An offer must:<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 29.85pt 0pt 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">(a)<span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>Be in writing and state that it is being made pursuant to this section.<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 29.85pt 0pt 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">(b)<span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>Name the party making it and the party to whom it is being made.<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 29.85pt 0pt 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">(c)<span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>State with particularity the amount offered to settle a claim for punitive <o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 29.85pt 0pt 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">damages, if any.<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 29.85pt 0pt 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">(d)<span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>State its total amount.<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 29.85pt 0pt 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">The offer shall be construed as including all damages which may be awarded in a final <o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 29.85pt 0pt 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">judgment.<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 29.85pt 0pt 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">(3)<span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>The offer shall be served upon the party to whom it is made, but it shall not be filed <o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 29.85pt 0pt 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">unless it is accepted or unless filing is necessary to enforce the provisions of this section.<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 29.85pt 0pt 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">(4) An offer shall be accepted by filing a written acceptance with the court within 30 days <o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 29.85pt 0pt 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">after service. Upon filing of both the offer and acceptance, the court has full jurisdiction to enforce the <o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 29.85pt 0pt 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">settlement agreement.<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 29.85pt 0pt 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">(5)<span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>An offer may be withdrawn in writing which is served before the date a written <o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 29.85pt 0pt 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">acceptance is filed. Once withdrawn, an offer is void.<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 29.85pt 0pt 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">(6)<span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>Upon motion made by the offeror within 30 days after the entry of judgment or after <o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 29.85pt 0pt 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">voluntary or involuntary dismissal, the court shall determine the following:<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 29.85pt 0pt 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">(a)<span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>If a defendant serves an offer which is not accepted by the plaintiff, and if the <o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 29.85pt 0pt 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">judgment obtained by the plaintiff is at least 25 percent less than the amount of the offer, the defendant <o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 29.85pt 0pt 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">shall be awarded reasonable costs, including investigative expenses, and attorney's fees, calculated in <o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 29.85pt 0pt 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">accordance with the guidelines promulgated by the Supreme Court, incurred from the date the offer <o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 29.85pt 0pt 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">was served, and the court shall set off such costs in attorney's fees against the award. When such costs <o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 29.85pt 0pt 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">and attorney's fees total more than the amount of the judgment, the court shall enter judgment for the <o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 29.85pt 0pt 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">defendant against the plaintiff for the amount of the costs and fees, less the amount of the award to the <o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 29.85pt 0pt 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">plaintiff.<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 29.85pt 0pt 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">(b)<span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>If a plaintiff serves an offer which is not accepted by the defendant, and if the <o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 29.85pt 0pt 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">judgment obtained by the plaintiff is at least 25 percent more than the amount of the offer, the plaintiff <o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 29.85pt 0pt 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">shall be awarded reasonable costs, including investigative expenses, and attorney's fees, calculated in <o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 29.85pt 0pt 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">accordance with the guidelines promulgated by the Supreme Court, incurred from the date the offer was <o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 29.85pt 0pt 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">served.<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 29.85pt 0pt 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">For purposes of the determination required by paragraph (a), the term "judgment <o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 29.85pt 0pt 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">obtained" means the amount of the net judgment entered, plus any postoffer collateral source payments <o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 29.85pt 0pt 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">received or due as of the date of the judgment, plus any postoffer settlement amounts by which the <o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 29.85pt 0pt 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">verdict was reduced. For purposes of the determination required by paragraph (b), the term "judgment <o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 29.85pt 0pt 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">obtained" means the amount of the net judgment entered, plus any postoffer settlement amounts by <o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 29.85pt 0pt 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">which the verdict was reduced.<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 29.85pt 0pt 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">(7) (a) Ha party is entitled to costs and fees pursuant to the provisions of this section, <o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 29.85pt 0pt 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">the court may, in its discretion, determine that an offer was not made in good faith. In such case, the <o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 29.85pt 0pt 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">court may disallow an award of costs and attorney's fees.<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 29.85pt 0pt 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">(b) When determining the reasonableness of an award of attorney's fees pursuant <o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 29.85pt 0pt 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">to this section, the court shall consider, along with all other relevant criteria, the following additional <o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 29.85pt 0pt 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">factors:<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 29.85pt 0pt 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">1.<span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>The then apparent merit or lack of merit in the claim.<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 29.85pt 0pt 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">2.<span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>The number and nature of offers made by the parties.<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 29.85pt 0pt 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">3.<span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>The closeness of questions of fact and law at issue.<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 29.85pt 0pt 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">4.<span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>Whether the person making the offer had unreasonably refused to <o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 29.85pt 0pt 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">furnish information necessary to evaluate the reasonableness of such offer.<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 29.85pt 0pt 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">5.<span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>Whether the suit was in the nature of a test case presenting questions <o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 29.85pt 0pt 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">of far-reaching importance affecting nonparties.<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 29.85pt 0pt 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">6.<span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>The amount of the additional delay cost and expense that the person <o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 29.85pt 0pt 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">making the offer reasonably would be expected to incur if the litigation should be prolonged.<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 29.85pt 0pt 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">(8)<span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>Evidence of an offer is admissible only in proceedings to enforce an accepted offer or <o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 29.85pt 0pt 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">to determine the imposition of sanctions under this section.<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
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<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 29.85pt 0pt 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.442<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 29.85pt 0pt 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">Rule 1.442: Proposals for Settlement<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 29.85pt 0pt 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">(a) Applicability. This rule applies to all proposals for settlement authorized by Florida <o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 29.85pt 0pt 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">law, regardless of the terms used to refer to such offers, demands, or proposals, and supersedes all other <o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 29.85pt 0pt 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">provisions of the rules and statutes that may be inconsistent with this rule.<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 29.85pt 0pt 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">(b) Service of Proposal. A proposal to a defendant shall be served no earlier than 90 days <o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 29.85pt 0pt 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">after service of process on that defendant; a proposal to a plaintiff shall be served no earlier than 90 days <o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 29.85pt 0pt 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">after the action has been commenced. No proposal shall be served later than 45 days before the date set <o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 29.85pt 0pt 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">for trial or the first day of the docket on which the case is set for trial, whichever is earlier.<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 29.85pt 0pt 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">(c)<span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>Form and Content of Proposal for Settlement.<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 29.85pt 0pt 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">(1)<span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>A proposal shall be in writing and shall identify the applicable Florida law <o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 29.85pt 0pt 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">under which it is being made.<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 29.85pt 0pt 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">(2)<span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>A proposal shall:<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 29.85pt 0pt 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">(A)<span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>name the party or parties making the proposal and the party or parties <o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 29.85pt 0pt 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">to whom the proposal is being made;<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 29.85pt 0pt 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">(B)<span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>identify the claim or claims the proposal is attempting to resolve;<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 29.85pt 0pt 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">(C)<span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>state with particularity any relevant conditions;<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 29.85pt 0pt 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">(D)<span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>state the total amount of the proposal and state with particularity all <o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 29.85pt 0pt 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">nonmonetary terms of the proposal;<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 29.85pt 0pt 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">(E)<span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>state with particularity the amount proposed to settle a claim for <o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 29.85pt 0pt 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">punitive damages, if any;<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 29.85pt 0pt 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">(F)<span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>state whether the proposal includes attorneys' fees and whether <o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 29.85pt 0pt 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">attorneys' fees are part of the legal claim; and<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 29.85pt 0pt 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">(G)<span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>include a certificate of service in the form required by rule 1.080(0.<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 29.85pt 0pt 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">(3) A proposal may be made by or to any party or parties and by or to any <o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 29.85pt 0pt 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">combination of parties properly identified in the proposal. A joint proposal shall state the amount and <o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 29.85pt 0pt 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">terms attributable to each party.<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 29.85pt 0pt 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">(d)<span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>Service and Filing. A proposal shall be served on the party or parties to whom it is <o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 29.85pt 0pt 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">made but shall not be filed unless necessary to enforce the provisions of this rule.<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 29.85pt 0pt 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">(e)<span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>Withdrawal. A proposal may be withdrawn in writing provided the written withdrawal <o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 29.85pt 0pt 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">is delivered before a written acceptance is delivered. Once withdrawn, a proposal is void.<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 29.85pt 0pt 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">(f)<span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>Acceptance and Rejection.<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 29.85pt 0pt 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">(1)<span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>A proposal shall be deemed rejected unless accepted by delivery of a written <o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 29.85pt 0pt 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">notice of acceptance within 30 days after service of the proposal. The provisions of rule 1.090(e) do <o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 29.85pt 0pt 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">not apply to this subdivision. No oral communications shall constitute an acceptance, rejection, or <o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 29.85pt 0pt 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">counteroffer under the provisions of this rule.<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 29.85pt 0pt 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">(2)<span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>In any case in which the existence of a class is alleged, the time for acceptance of <o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 29.85pt 0pt 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">a proposal for settlement is extended to 30 days after the date the order granting or denying certification <o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 29.85pt 0pt 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">is filed.<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 29.85pt 0pt 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">(g) Sanctions. Any party seeking sanctions pursuant to applicable Florida law, based on <o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 29.85pt 0pt 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">the failure of the proposal's recipient to accept a proposal, shall do so by serving a motion in accordance <o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 29.85pt 0pt 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">with rule L525.<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 29.85pt 0pt 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">(h)<span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>Costs and Fees.<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 29.85pt 0pt 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">(I) If a party is entitled to costs and fees pursuant to applicable Florida law, the <o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 29.85pt 0pt 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">court may, in its discretion, determine that a proposal was not made in good faith. In such ease, the court <o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 29.85pt 0pt 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">may disallow an award of costs and attorneys' fees.<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 29.85pt 0pt 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">(2) When determining the reasonableness of the amount of an award of attorneys' <o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 29.85pt 0pt 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">fees pursuant to this section, the court shall consider, along with all other relevant criteria, the following <o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 29.85pt 0pt 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">factors:<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 29.85pt 0pt 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">(A)<span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>The then-apparent merit or lack of merit in the claim.<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 29.85pt 0pt 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">(B)<span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>The number and nature of proposals made by the parties.<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 29.85pt 0pt 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">(C)<span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>The closeness of questions of fact and law at issue.<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 29.85pt 0pt 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">(D)<span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>Whether the party making the proposal had unreasonably refused to <o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 29.85pt 0pt 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">furnish information necessary to evaluate the reasonableness of the proposal.<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 29.85pt 0pt 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">(E)<span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>Whether the suit was in the nature of a test case presenting questions <o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 29.85pt 0pt 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">of far-reaching importance affecting nonparties.<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 29.85pt 0pt 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">(F)<span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>The amount of the additional delay cost and expense that the party <o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 29.85pt 0pt 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">making the proposal reasonably would be expected to incur if the litigation were to be prolonged.<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 29.85pt 0pt 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">(i)<span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>Evidence of Proposal. Evidence of a proposal or acceptance thereof is admissible only <o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 29.85pt 0pt 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">in proceedings to enforce an accepted proposal or to determine the imposition of sanctions.<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 29.85pt 0pt 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">(j)<span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>Effect of Mediation. Mediation shall have no effect on the dates during which parties <o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 29.85pt 0pt 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">are permitted to make or accept a proposal for settlement under the terms of the rule.<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
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<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 29.85pt 0pt 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">In my previous overview of this statute, OCGA § 9-11-68, I wrote extensively on whether OCGA § 9-11-68 is, in fact, a gaming statute, whether it is “fair,” since no one can control its application, whether it and similar statutes reduce litigation and what empirical studies (including Nevada’s day to day real life study) show about OCGA § 9-11-68 and similar statutes.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>If the reader is interested, 30 or 40 additional pages review these aspects of OCGA § 9-11-68 may be found in the 2010 ICLEGA Article I wrote on OCGA § 9-11-68, but that are not again reproduce herein.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
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</div>Hugh Woodhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/01021049579391065763noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2321320695584069696.post-23088344132645015592011-12-16T21:14:00.000-08:002011-12-16T21:14:47.737-08:00OCGA Sec. 13-6-11 Attorney's Fees Are Generally for A Jury<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjOAtjByuvFlFyCnNLVltM225gyFeZK-_bAaNS38NrB-xISswuivp7JYp8hy_WArEr2YQqC5K2R-jF7iw1Il8HFx0CC992v1cg4RAWCTtl5PdYXSjCUPRVg5ZlTdkInZdEl4H454k7dbhbo/s1600/fees1.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="clear: right; float: right; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-left: 1em;"><img border="0" height="240" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjOAtjByuvFlFyCnNLVltM225gyFeZK-_bAaNS38NrB-xISswuivp7JYp8hy_WArEr2YQqC5K2R-jF7iw1Il8HFx0CC992v1cg4RAWCTtl5PdYXSjCUPRVg5ZlTdkInZdEl4H454k7dbhbo/s320/fees1.jpg" width="320" /></a></div><span style="font-size: large;">In the land of attorney’s fees, the Georgia Supreme Court held that attorney’s fee sought for by a litigant under OCGA § 13-6-11 may not be awarded by the Court, sitting without a jury, IF the issue associated with the OCGA § 13-6-11 attorney’s fees is a pure jury issue. If the issue is a mere bench trial issue (where the trial court may sit as the trier of fact) the Court may rule upon and issue OCGA §13-6-11 attorney’s fees. This provides a significant new defense against challenges for attorney's fees, if the issue is a pure jury fact issue on which fees are sought.</span><br />
See:<br />
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696 S.E.2d 649 (Ga. 2010)<br />
287 Ga. 445<br />
COVINGTON SQUARE ASSOCIATES, LLC<br />
v.<br />
INGLES MARKETS, INC.<br />
No. S10G0459.<br />
Supreme Court of Georgia.<br />
June 28, 2010<br />
Page 650<br />
Michael A. Kessler, Alpharetta, for appellant.<br />
Adam N. Struletz, Atlanta, for appellee.<br />
CARLEY, Presiding Justice.<br />
Covington Square Associates, LLC (Covington) leased space in a <br />
shopping center to Ingles Markets, Inc. (Ingles). After selling the <br />
shopping center in 2004, Covington brought suit against Ingles for <br />
damages allegedly resulting from its failure to pay a portion of the <br />
cost to hire a security guard. In December 2005, Ingles mistakenly <br />
sent a check for its portion of real estate taxes to Covington instead <br />
of the new landlord. Ingles notified Covington of the mistake and <br />
demanded return of the funds. However, Covington retained the funds as <br />
partial payment of the claimed security costs. Ingles then filed this <br />
action for conversion, attorney fees pursuant to OCGA § 13-6-11, and <br />
punitive damages, which was stayed pending the outcome of the other <br />
litigation. That litigation ended when the Court of Appeals affirmed <br />
the grant of Ingles' motion for summary judgment, ruling that the <br />
lease did not require payment of security guard expenses. Covington <br />
Square Assoc. v. Ingles Markets, 283 Ga.App. 307, 641 S.E.2d 266 <br />
(2007).<br />
Thereafter, the trial court in the case at bar granted partial summary <br />
judgment in favor of Ingles, ruling that Covington wrongfully asserted <br />
dominion or control over Ingles' property and that Ingles is entitled <br />
to attorney fees and punitive damages, but leaving for trial <br />
determination of the amounts thereof. The trial court based its <br />
attorney fees ruling on the fact that Covington refused to refund the <br />
money despite the outcome of the other litigation and caused Ingles <br />
the unnecessary trouble and expense of bringing suit where no bona <br />
fide controversy existed.<br />
The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's rulings as to the <br />
conversion claim and attorney fees, but reversed as to punitive <br />
damages. With respect to attorney fees, the Court of Appeals held that <br />
they can be awarded on summary judgment if the movant is entitled to <br />
them as a matter of law and that, " [a]pplying the any evidence <br />
standard under these circumstances, [cit.] the trial court did not err <br />
in ruling that Ingles was entitled to attorney fees as a matter of <br />
law...." Covington Square Assoc. v. Ingles Markets, 300 Ga.App. 740, <br />
744(2), 686 S.E.2d 359 (2009). Having granted certiorari to review <br />
this holding, we conclude that the language of OCGA § 13-6-11 prevents <br />
a trial court from ever determining that a claimant is entitled to <br />
attorney fees as a matter of law.<br />
[287 Ga. 446] In its entirety, OCGA § 13-6-11 provides as follows:<br />
The expenses of litigation generally shall not be allowed as a part of <br />
the damages; but where the plaintiff has specially pleaded and has <br />
made prayer therefor and where the defendant has acted in bad faith, <br />
has been stubbornly litigious, or has caused the plaintiff unnecessary <br />
trouble and expense, the jury may allow them.<br />
For many years, the Court of Appeals has recognized that " [t]he <br />
intent of the law, as shown by the words, ‘ the jury may allow them,’ <br />
is to leave the matter of expenses of litigation to the jury trying <br />
the case. [Cit.]" Taylor v. Estes, 85 Ga.App. 716, 719(2), 70 S.E.2d <br />
82 (1952). See also Hyde v. Gill, 236 Ga.App. 729, 734(3), 513 S.E.2d <br />
278 (1999); American Medical Transport Group v. Glo-An, 235 Ga.App. <br />
464, 467(3), 509 S.E.2d 738 (1998); J.M. Clayton Co. v. Martin, 177 <br />
Ga.App. 228, 232(6), 339 S.E.2d 280 (1985); Brannon Enterprises v. <br />
Deaton, 159 Ga.App. 685, 687, 285 S.E.2d 58 (1981); Sapp v. Howe, 79 <br />
Ga.App. 1, 3(4), 52 S.E.2d 571 (1949); Patterson & Co. v. Peterson, 15 <br />
Ga.App. 680, 684(4), 84 S.E. 163 (1915).<br />
As a result, " ‘ it has long been held ... that in suits where the <br />
expenses of litigation might be recovered as part of the damages, it <br />
is error for the trial court to direct a verdict therefor. The matter <br />
of such expenses is left solely to the jury. (Cits.)’ [Cit.]" Polma, <br />
Inc. v. Coastal Canvas Products Co., 199 Ga.App. 616, 618(7), 405 <br />
S.E.2d 531 (1991). See also Tab Sales v. D & D Distrib., 153 Ga.App. <br />
779, 780(2), 266 S.E.2d 558 (1980); Patterson & Co. v. Peterson, <br />
supra. Whether a plaintiff has " met any of the preconditions for an <br />
award of attorney fees and litigation expenses set forth in OCGA § 13<br />
-6-11[is] solely a question for the <br />
Page 651<br />
jury. [Cit.]" City of Atlanta v. Broadnax, 285 Ga.App. 430, 440(6), <br />
646 S.E.2d 279 (2007) (affirming judgment on jury verdict in favor of <br />
defendant). " [S]uch an award under this statute necessitates jury <br />
determination. [Cits.]" Fontaine Condo. Assn. v. Schnacke, 230 Ga.App. <br />
469, 471(3), 496 S.E.2d 553 (1998) (vacating trial court's award of <br />
attorney fees after it denied jury trial thereon).<br />
Consistent with this precedent, the Court of Appeals has correctly <br />
held that, because both the liability for and amount of attorney fees <br />
pursuant to OCGA § 13-6-11 are solely for the jury's determination, a <br />
trial court is not authorized to grant summary judgment in favor of a <br />
claimant therefor. Hyde v. Gill, supra; American Medical Transport <br />
Group v. Glo-An, supra; Page v. HSI Financial Svcs., 218 Ga.App. 283, <br />
286(5), 461 S.E.2d 239 (1995), rev'd on other grounds, Henderson v. <br />
HSI Financial Svcs., 266 Ga. 844, 471 S.E.2d 885 (1996); [287 Ga. 447] <br />
Joseph Camacho Assoc. v. Millard, 169 Ga.App. 937, 939(2), 315 S.E.2d <br />
478 (1984); Fountain v. Burke, 160 Ga.App. 262, 264(3), 287 S.E.2d 39 <br />
(1981); Pritchett v. Rainey, 131 Ga.App. 521, 522, 206 S.E.2d 726 <br />
(1974).<br />
Ingles argues that the Court of Appeals, citing City of Marietta v. <br />
Holland, 252 Ga. 299, 304(3), 314 S.E.2d 97 (1984), has stated that " <br />
[e]xpenses of litigation under OCGA § 13-6-11 can be awarded on <br />
summary judgment, but the movant must be entitled to them as a matter <br />
of law. [Cit.]" Rivergate Corp. v. BCCP Enterprises, 198 Ga.App. 761<br />
(2), 403 S.E.2d 65 (1991) (reversing summary judgment). See also <br />
Rasmussen v. Nodvin, 174 Ga.App. 203, 205(4), 329 S.E.2d 541 (1985) <br />
(reversing summary judgment). However, the Holland opinion does not <br />
state that litigation expenses under the statute can be awarded on <br />
summary judgment. Instead, this Court examined whether there was any <br />
genuine issue of material fact as part of its determination that the <br />
trial court not only erroneously granted plaintiff's motion for <br />
summary judgment, but also erred in denying summary judgment in favor <br />
of the defendants. Therefore, rather than authorizing summary judgment <br />
for a claimant under OCGA § 13-6-11, Holland is explained by the <br />
proposition that " [o]nly in the rare case where there was absolutely <br />
no evidence to support the award of expenses of litigation would the <br />
trial court be authorized to grant summary adjudication on such <br />
issues." American Medical Transport Group v. Glo-An, supra. See also <br />
Brito v. Gomez Law Group, 289 Ga.App. 625, 628(2), 658 S.E.2d 178 <br />
(2008). Other cases relied on by Ingles, as well as statements that <br />
determination of the preconditions in the statute is " generally" for <br />
the jury, are also explained by the simple proposition quoted above <br />
from American Medical Transport Group v. Glo-An, supra. Merlino v. <br />
City of Atlanta, 283 Ga. 186, 191(4), 657 S.E.2d 859 (2008); Tyler v. <br />
Lincoln, 272 Ga. 118, 122(2), 527 S.E.2d 180 (2000); Stargate Software <br />
Intl. v. Rumph, 224 Ga.App. 873, 878(4), 482 S.E.2d 498 (1997); <br />
Webster v. Brown, 213 Ga.App. 845, 846(2), 446 S.E.2d 522 (1994).<br />
Both Ingles and the Court of Appeals relied on D & H Constr. Co. v. <br />
City of Woodstock, 284 Ga.App. 314, 318-319(2), 643 S.E.2d 826 (2007) <br />
and Graves v. Diambrose, 243 Ga.App. 802, 803-804(2), 534 S.E.2d 490 <br />
(2000). However, neither decision states that summary judgment can be <br />
granted in favor of a claimant under OCGA § 13-6-11. Furthermore, <br />
contrary to Ingles' argument and the Court of Appeals' opinion here, <br />
it is not at all clear that the trial court in either case granted <br />
summary judgment on the claim for attorney fees. The Court of Appeals' <br />
application of the " ‘ any evidence’ standard of review" in D & H <br />
Constr. Co. v. City of Woodstock, supra at 319(2), 643 S.E.2d 826, as <br />
well as its determination that the trial court " could have properly <br />
found" a statutory basis for attorney fees in [287 Ga. 448] Graves v. <br />
Diambrose, supra at 804(2), 534 S.E.2d 490, was entirely inconsistent <br />
with any such grant of summary judgment. Indeed, we note that, even if <br />
attorney fees could be awarded pursuant to OCGA § 13-6-11 on summary <br />
judgment, the Court of Appeals still erred in this case by utilizing <br />
the " any evidence" standard. " Although the trial court may grant <br />
attorney fees or litigation expenses under OCGA § 13-6-11 where it <br />
sits as the trier of fact, [cit.], it is not a trier of fact on a <br />
motion for summary judgment." Page v. HSI Financial Svcs., supra. See <br />
also Rasmussen v. Nodvin, supra. Compare <br />
Page 652<br />
Artzner v. A & A Exterminators, 242 Ga.App. 766, 773(4), 531 S.E.2d <br />
200 (2000) (where Court of Appeals looked for any evidence showing <br />
that the grant of summary judgment to defendant was error).<br />
Accordingly, the trial court erred by awarding expenses of litigation <br />
pursuant to OCGA § 13-6-11 to Ingles on its motion for summary <br />
judgment. American Medical Transport Group v. Glo-An, supra; Joseph <br />
Camacho Assoc. v. Millard, supra. The judgment of the Court of Appeals <br />
must therefore be reversed to the extent that it affirms the trial <br />
court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Ingles with respect to <br />
its claim for attorney fees. Our holding does not affect the remaining <br />
rulings of the Court of Appeals.<br />
Judgment affirmed in part and reversed in part. <br />
All the Justices concur.<br />
Overruling the 13-6-11 portion of the Court of Appeals Holding in:<br />
686 S.E.2d 359 (Ga.App. 2009)<br />
300 Ga.App. 740<br />
COVINGTON SQUARE ASSOCIATES, LLC<br />
v.<br />
INGLES MARKETS, INC.<br />
No. A09A2145.<br />
Court of Appeals of Georgia.<br />
November 3, 2009<br />
Page 360<br />
Michael A. Kessler, Cumming, for appellant.<br />
Hartman, Simons, Spielman & Wood, Samuel R. Arden, Jill R. Johnson, <br />
Atlanta, for appellee.<br />
MIKELL, Judge.<br />
Ingles Markets, Inc. (" Ingles" ) sued Covington Square Associates, <br />
LLC (" Covington" ), for conversion, unjust enrichment, attorney fees, <br />
and punitive damages arising out of its refusal to return a check <br />
Ingles alleged it paid by mistake. The trial court granted partial <br />
summary judgment to Ingles on its <br />
Page 361<br />
claims for conversion, attorney fees, and punitive damages, ruling <br />
that Covington wrongfully asserted dominion or control over Ingles's <br />
property; that Ingles is entitled to attorney fees and punitive <br />
damages; and that the amounts of those damages are to be determined at <br />
trial. Covington appeals these rulings. For the following reasons, we <br />
affirm the trial court's ruling as to the claims for conversion and <br />
attorney fees, but reverse as to the claim for punitive damages.<br />
Our review of the grant of summary judgment is de novo.[1]<br />
To prevail at summary judgment, the moving party must demonstrate that <br />
there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the undisputed <br />
facts, viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, <br />
warrant judgment as a matter of law. Where the movant is the <br />
plaintiff, she has the burden of presenting evidence to support her <br />
claim and the burden of piercing the defendant's affirmative <br />
defenses.[2]<br />
So viewed, the record reflects that in 1987, Ingles and a prior owner <br />
of Covington Square Shopping Center in DeKalb County (the " Shopping <br />
Center" ) entered into an agreement for Ingles to lease certain space <br />
in the Shopping Center (the " Lease" ). Under the terms of the Lease, <br />
Ingles paid a portion of the real estate taxes for the Shopping <br />
Center. In 1994, Covington purchased the Shopping Center and became <br />
Ingles's landlord. According to Ron Freeman, Ingles's chief financial <br />
officer, Ingles fully paid all real estate tax charges to [300 Ga.App. <br />
741] Covington during the time it owned the Shopping Center. Ingles <br />
also paid a portion of the cost to hire a security guard for the <br />
Shopping Center.[3] IN 2004, NORTHEAST ENTERPRISES, INC. (" NORTHEAST <br />
ENTERPRISES" ) purchased the Shopping Center from Covington.<br />
On November 15, 2005, Ingles received a real estate tax statement from <br />
Northeast Enterprises for the amount of $32,584.85, to cover 2005 <br />
county property taxes. On December 20, 2005, Ingles mistakenly sent a <br />
check in the amount of $32,584.85 to Covington, its former landlord, <br />
rather than Northeast Enterprises. According to Freeman, the check <br />
represented Ingles's payment of its 2005 property taxes for the <br />
Shopping Center.[4] Covington cashed the check, and Ingles had to <br />
issue another check in the amount of $32,584.85 to Northeast <br />
Enterprises to satisfy its property tax obligation. On February 3, <br />
2006, Ingles notified Covington of its mistake and demanded return of <br />
the funds. On February 13, 2006, Covington notified Ingles that it <br />
would retain the funds as partial payment of the unpaid security costs <br />
at issue in the DeKalb litigation.<br />
Ingles filed the instant action on February 24, 2006. The trial court <br />
stayed the case pending the outcome of the appeal in the DeKalb <br />
litigation, and on December 14, 2007, following our ruling in the <br />
DeKalb litigation, Ingles again demanded return of the funds. There is <br />
no evidence in the record that Covington has returned the funds.<br />
1. Covington contends that the trial court erred in granting summary <br />
judgment to Ingles because " [t]he mistaken payment by Ingles amounts <br />
to nothing more than an overpayment under the Lease. Therefore, <br />
Ingles' claim to recover the payment sounds in contract and not in <br />
tort or conversion." Covington does not dispute that Ingles is <br />
entitled to a refund due to the DeKalb litigation,<br />
Page 362<br />
but disputes that there was a conversion. Covington relies on Kline v. <br />
Atlanta Gas Light Co. [5] and Levenson v. Word, [6] to support its <br />
argument.<br />
[300 Ga.App. 742] With regard to Kline, the trial court correctly <br />
distinguished that case because the excess payment was used to pay an <br />
undisputed outstanding debt; [7] here, the alleged outstanding debt <br />
was in dispute, and Covington specifically sued Ingles in the DeKalb <br />
litigation to recover the disputed amount. Levenson is likewise <br />
distinguishable and does not require reversal. In that case, there was <br />
no dispute that the criminal defendant owed the retainer fee to the <br />
defendants, and the plaintiff could not prove that the defendants' <br />
exercise of dominion over the funds was wrongful. [8] Since any <br />
outstanding debt in this case was in dispute at the time Ingles <br />
mistakenly mailed the check to Covington, Kline and Levenson are <br />
inapplicable.<br />
Conversion consists of an unauthorized assumption and exercise of the <br />
right of ownership over personal property belonging to another, in <br />
hostility to his rights; an act of dominion over the personal property <br />
of another inconsistent with his rights; or an unauthorized <br />
appropriation. Any distinct act of dominion wrongfully asserted over <br />
another's property in denial of his right, or inconsistent with it, is <br />
a conversion. It is unnecessary to show that the defendant applied it <br />
to his own use, if he exercised dominion over it in defiance of the <br />
owner's right, or in a manner inconsistent with it.[9]<br />
One way to prove that a defendant has exercised unauthorized dominion <br />
over the property and has thereby converted the property is to present <br />
evidence that " a defendant, who has lawfully come into possession of <br />
the plaintiff's property, unlawfully refuses to return the plaintiff's <br />
property after the plaintiff demands its return." [10] In this case, <br />
Ingles mistakenly mailed to Covington a check intended for its current <br />
landlord to cover its property tax bill. When Ingles realized the <br />
error, it immediately notified Covington of the clerical error, <br />
expressly noted that it had intended to submit the payment to its <br />
current landlord, and demanded return of the check. The elements of <br />
conversion have been satisfied.<br />
We find Covington's arguments on this issue disingenuous. Covington <br />
filed the DeKalb litigation specifically because the " Common Area" <br />
costs for security charges were in dispute and because [300 Ga.App. <br />
743] Ingles refused to pay Covington for these costs. In the face of a <br />
disputed debt embroiled in litigation and an immediate demand letter, <br />
it strains credulity for Covington to argue that it is guilty of <br />
merely failing to refund an overpayment, and not guilty of conversion. <br />
The trial court did not err in ruling that Covington converted the <br />
check.[11]<br />
2. Covington next contends that the trial court erred in granting <br />
summary judgment to Ingles on its claim for attorney fees under OCGA § <br />
13-6-11 because this issue must be resolved by a jury. The trial court <br />
found that " [Ingles] is entitled to [attorney] fees based on <br />
Covington's refusal to refund the money in spite of the outcome of the <br />
DeKalb litigation and causing [Ingles] to bear the unnecessary expense <br />
of bringing suit where no bona fide controversy exists" and ruled that <br />
the amount of attorney fees is to be determined at trial. We affirm <br />
this ruling.<br />
OCGA § 13-6-11 provides that:<br />
Page 363<br />
The expenses of litigation generally shall not be allowed as a part of <br />
the damages; but where the plaintiff has specially pleaded and has <br />
made prayer therefor and where the defendant has acted in bad faith, <br />
has been stubbornly litigious, or has caused the plaintiff unnecessary <br />
trouble and expense, the jury may allow them.<br />
While questions of bad faith, stubborn litigiousness, and unnecessary <br />
trouble and expense are generally for the jury to decide, expenses of <br />
litigation under this Code section can be awarded on summary judgment, <br />
provided the movant is entitled to them as a matter of law.[12] The <br />
amount of the award of attorney fees as damages, however, is to be <br />
determined by a jury.[13]<br />
In D & H Constr. Co., [14] a case very similar to this case, we <br />
affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment to the plaintiff <br />
on its claim for attorney fees, where the appellant retained a <br />
duplicate payment to which it had no rightful claim. As in D & H <br />
Constr. Co., the record here reflects that Covington accepted a [300 <br />
Ga.App. 744] payment from Ingles that was intended for Ingles's <br />
current landlord and applied it to security costs, knowing that Ingles <br />
disputed the security costs debt; that Covington refused to return the <br />
check even after Ingles informed it of the mistake; and that Ingles <br />
was forced to bring this lawsuit to recover the mistaken payment. <br />
Additionally, as discussed in Division 1, supra, Covington's defense <br />
was unreasonable and incredible. Applying the any evidence standard <br />
under these circumstances,[15] the trial court did not err in ruling <br />
that Ingles was entitled to attorney fees as a matter of law, and we <br />
do the same here.[16] THE TRIAL COURT WAS also authorized to allow a <br />
jury to determine the amount.<br />
3. Covington contends that the trial court erred in granting summary <br />
judgment to Ingles on its claim for punitive damages because this <br />
issue must be resolved by a jury. We agree.<br />
OCGA § 51-12-5.1(b) provides that:<br />
Punitive damages may be awarded only in such tort actions in which it <br />
is proven by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant's <br />
actions showed willful misconduct, malice, fraud, wantonness, <br />
oppression, or that entire want of care which would raise the <br />
presumption of conscious indifference to consequences.<br />
Subsection (d) of that Code section further provides:<br />
(1) In any case in which punitive damages are claimed, the trier of <br />
fact shall first resolve from the evidence produced at trial whether <br />
an award of punitive damages shall be made. This finding shall be made <br />
specially through an appropriate form of verdict, along with the other <br />
required findings. (2) If it is found that punitive damages are to be <br />
awarded, the trial shall immediately be recommenced in order to <br />
receive such evidence as is relevant to a decision regarding what <br />
amount of damages will be sufficient to deter, penalize, or punish the <br />
defendant in light of the circumstances of the case. It shall then be <br />
the duty of the trier of fact to set the amount to be awarded <br />
according to subsection (e), (f), or (g) of this Code section, as <br />
applicable. [17]<br />
This Code section expressly provides that a jury must determine [300 <br />
Ga.App. 745] whether a complainant is entitled to punitive damages and <br />
if so, the amount to be awarded. Although a trial court-and the <br />
appellate courts-must consider whether there is any evidence to <br />
support an award of punitive damages, the question of whether to <br />
impose such an award is <br />
Page 364<br />
for the trier of fact.[18] Because we have found no authority and <br />
Ingles cites to none holding that a trial court can grant summary <br />
judgment to a claimant on its claim for punitive damages, we reverse <br />
that portion of the trial court's order granting summary judgment to <br />
Ingles on its claim for punitive damages and affirm the portion of the <br />
order ruling that a jury must determine the amount of punitive <br />
damages.<br />
Judgment affirmed in part and reversed in part. <br />
JOHNSON, P.J., and ELLINGTON, J., concur.<br />
---------<br />
Notes:<br />
[1] Smith v. Gordon, 266 Ga.App. 814(1), 598 S.E.2d 92 (2004).<br />
[2] (Footnotes omitted.) Id.<br />
[3] See Covington Square Assoc. v. Ingles Markets, 283 Ga.App. 307, <br />
641 S.E.2d 266 (2007) (" Covington Square I " or the " DeKalb <br />
litigation" ). This is the second appearance of these parties before <br />
this Court. As explained in Covington Square I, shortly after selling <br />
the Shopping Center in 2004, Covington sought to collect unpaid <br />
portions of security guard costs it billed to Ingles. When Ingles <br />
refused to pay, Covington sued Ingles for breach of contract seeking <br />
damages for unpaid rents under the Lease. Id. at 308, 641 S.E.2d 266. <br />
We affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment to Ingles, <br />
ruling that the Lease did not require Ingles to pay security guard <br />
costs. Id. at 311(1), 641 S.E.2d 266.<br />
[4] Although we cannot tell from the poor copy included in the record <br />
on appeal, Freeman avers that the check indicates on its face that it <br />
was for payment of Ingles's 2005 property taxes. In its order, the <br />
trial court also notes that the check indicates on its face that it <br />
was for payment of Ingles's 2005 property taxes.<br />
[5] 246 Ga.App. 172, 538 S.E.2d 93 (2000).<br />
[6] 294 Ga.App. 104, 668 S.E.2d 763 (2008).<br />
[7] Kline, supra at 173-174, 538 S.E.2d 93.<br />
[8] Levenson, supra at 106-107(1), 668 S.E.2d 763.<br />
[9] (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Maryland Cas. Ins. Co. v. <br />
Welchel, 257 Ga. 259, 261(1), 356 S.E.2d 877 (1987).<br />
[10] (Citation and footnote omitted.) Williams v. Nat. Auto Sales, 287 <br />
Ga.App. 283, 285(1), 651 S.E.2d 194 (2007).<br />
[11] See, e.g., D & H Constr. Co. v. City of Woodstock, 284 Ga.App. <br />
314, 643 S.E.2d 826 (2007) (summary judgment on conversion claim <br />
proper where evidence showed that plaintiff tendered to defendant <br />
duplicate check; that plaintiff notified defendant of error and <br />
demanded return of the check; and that defendant refused to return the <br />
check); Rivergate Corp. v. BCCP Enterprises, 198 Ga.App. 761(2), 403 <br />
S.E.2d 65 (1991).<br />
[12] See D & H Constr. Co., supra at 318-319(2), 643 S.E.2d 826. See <br />
also Graves v. Diambrose, 243 Ga.App. 802, 803(2), 534 S.E.2d 490 <br />
(2000).<br />
[13] See American Med. Transport Group v. Glo-An, Inc., 235 Ga.App. <br />
464, 466(3), 509 S.E.2d 738 (1998).<br />
[14] Supra.<br />
[15] MDC Blackshear, LLC v. Littell, 273 Ga. 169, 174(5), 537 S.E.2d <br />
356 (2000) (" [a]n award of fees and expenses [under OCGA § 13-6-11] <br />
must be affirmed if there is any evidence to support it" ) (footnote <br />
omitted).<br />
[16] D & H Constr. Co., supra at 319(2), 643 S.E.2d 826.<br />
[17] OCGA § 51-12-5.1(d)(1) & (2).<br />
[18] Morales v. Webb, 200 Ga.App. 788, 790, 409 S.E.2d 572 (1991); <br />
Petrolane Gas Svc. v. Eusery, 193 Ga.App. 860, 862(1), 389 S.E.2d 355 <br />
(1989). See also Wal-Mart Stores v. Forkner, 221 Ga.App. 209, 210, 471 <br />
S.E.2d 30 (1996) (following bench trial on damages, trial court <br />
awarded plaintiff punitive damages).<br />
---------<br />
End<br />
Hugh Wood, Esq.<br />
Wood & Meredith, LLP<br />
3756 LaVista Road<br />
Suite 250<br />
Atlanta (Tucker), GA 30084<br />
<a href="http://www.woodandmeredith.com/">www.woodandmeredith.com</a><br />
<a href="mailto:hwood@woodandmeredith.com">hwood@woodandmeredith.com</a><br />
<a href="http://www.hughwood.blogspot.com/">www.hughwood.blogspot.com</a><br />
twitter: USALawyer_<br />
Phone: 404-633-4100§<br />
Fax: 404-633-0068Hugh Woodhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/01021049579391065763noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2321320695584069696.post-45186205697780671502011-11-29T05:24:00.000-08:002011-11-29T05:24:07.204-08:00Georgia Appellate Standards of Review<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjzdGPYNIM5NzlcEUY9or4iKlASD_ZwfFOwsn24tajoP2Y708_KMnSjgZfLmYcH5tJy8IpUX3jBZjTJe4zpbwPq2Bc3R8SQZsyaCQGex7n_7KRAdZT3SE2f_nHCdSBwKumOVodb0a_BrGJX/s1600/SealGACOA.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="clear: right; float: right; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-left: 1em;"><img border="0" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjzdGPYNIM5NzlcEUY9or4iKlASD_ZwfFOwsn24tajoP2Y708_KMnSjgZfLmYcH5tJy8IpUX3jBZjTJe4zpbwPq2Bc3R8SQZsyaCQGex7n_7KRAdZT3SE2f_nHCdSBwKumOVodb0a_BrGJX/s1600/SealGACOA.jpg" /></a></div><span style="font-size: large;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; line-height: 115%;">In researching standards for a recent appeal, I was surprised to find that the Georgia Court of Appeals has reorganized its website.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Now, the “standard of review,” for each type of claim is clearly stated on its website.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>While the criminal standards go on for pages, I post below only the civil standards.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><o:p></o:p></span> </span><div class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;"><br />
</div><span style="font-size: large;"> </span><div class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12pt; line-height: 115%;"><span style="font-size: large;">Appellant Standards of Review – Georgia:</span></span></div><div class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;"><br />
</div><div style="margin-bottom: 12pt;">Selection of jurors. Reviewed for abuse of discretion but trial court is no longer permitted to rehabilitate jurors by using "loaded" questions to justify retaining biased jurors. Walls v. Kim, 250 Ga. App. 259 (549 SE2d 797) (2001).</div><div style="margin-bottom: 12pt;">Discovery rulings. Control over discovery including the imposition of sanctions is reviewed for "clear abuse of discretion." Time Warner Entertainment Co. v. Six Flags Over Georgia, 245 Ga. App. 334, 350 (3) (b) (537 SE2d 397) (2000).</div><div style="margin-bottom: 12pt;">Decision to bifurcate trial. Reviewed for clear and manifest abuse of discretion. Whitley v. Gwinnett County, 221 Ga. App. 18, 19 (2) (470 SE2d 724) (1996).</div><div style="margin-bottom: 12pt;">Evidentiary ruling. Decision to admit or exclude evidence including relevant evidence is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Dept of Transp. v. Mendel, 237 Ga. App. 900, 902 (2) (517 SE2d 365) (1999).</div><div style="margin-bottom: 12pt;">Qualification of witness as expert. Ruling will not be disturbed absent manifest abuse of discretion. Williamson v. Harvey Smith, Inc., 246 Ga. App. 745, 749 (5) (542 SE2d 151) (2000).</div><div style="margin-bottom: 12pt;">Construction of a contract. Reviewed de novo on appeal. Question of law for the trial court unless after the application of the rules of construction, the contract remains ambiguous. Sagon Motorhomes v. Southtrust Bank of Ga., N.A., 225 Ga. App. 348, 349 (484 SE2d 21) (1997).</div><div style="margin-bottom: 12pt;">Denial of motion for mistrial. Reviewed for abuse of discretion. Whitley v. Gwinnett County, 221 Ga. App. 18, 25 (11) (470 SE2d 724) (1996).</div><div style="margin-bottom: 12pt;">Submission of special verdict form to jury. Reviewed for abuse of discretion. Southern Water Technologies v. Kile, 224 Ga. App. 717, 719 (1) (481 SE2d 826) (1997).</div><div style="margin-bottom: 12pt;">Grant of summary judgment. On appeal of a grant of summary judgment, the appellate court must review the evidence de novo to determine whether the trial court erred in concluding that no genuine issue of material fact remains and that the party was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Rubin v. Cello Corp., 235 Ga. App. 250 (510 SE2d 541) (1998).</div><div style="margin-bottom: 12pt;">Denial of motion for directed verdict. On appeal, the standard of review of the trial court's denial of a motion for directed verdict is the "any evidence" standard. F.A.F. Motor Cars v. Childers, 181 Ga. App. 821 (1) (354 SE2d 6) (1987).</div><div style="margin-bottom: 12pt;">Directed verdict or judgment notwithstanding the verdict. The standard of review of a directed verdict and a judgment n.o.v. is the same: a directed verdict is appropriate only when there is no conflict in the evidence as to any material issue, and the evidence introduced, construed most favorably to the party opposing the motion, demands a particular verdict. St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co. v. Meeks, 270 Ga. 136, 137 (1) (508 SE2d 646) (1998).</div><div style="margin-bottom: 12pt;">Denial of judgment n.o.v. The standard of appellate review for the denial of a motion for judgment n.o.v. is the "any evidence" test. Under this test, the determinative question is not whether the verdict and the judgment of the trial were merely authorized, but whether a contrary judgment was demanded. Signsation, Inc. v. Harper, 218 Ga. App. 141, 142 (2) (460 SE2d 854) (1995).</div><div style="margin-bottom: 12pt;">Motion for directed verdict/motion for new trial. Both as to a motion for directed verdict and motion for new trial based on the general grounds, the proper standard on appellate review is the "any evidence" test. The court construes the evidence most favorably towards the party opposing the motion. Jordan v. Stephens, 221 Ga. App. 8, 10 (2) (470 SE2d 733) (1996).</div><div style="margin-bottom: 12pt;">Jury verdict. After approval of a jury verdict by the trial court, the judgment entered thereon will not be disturbed on appeal if supported by any evidence, in the absence of any material error of law. Horan v. Pirkle, 197 Ga. App. 151, 153 (2) (397 SE2d 734) (1990).</div><div style="margin-bottom: 12pt;">Validity of verdicts. Since there is a presumption in favor of the validity of a verdict, all the evidence and every presumption and inference arising from the evidence must be construed most favorably toward upholding the verdict. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Wiley, 220 Ga. App. 442, 443 (2) (469 SE2d 302) (1996).</div><div style="margin-bottom: 12pt;">In the absence of legal error, an appellate court lacks jurisdiction to interfere with a verdict supported by some evidence even when the verdict may be against the preponderance of the evidence. Jeff Goolsby Homes Corp. v. Smith, 168 Ga. App. 218, 219 (1) (308 SE2d 564) (1983).</div><div style="margin-bottom: 12pt;">Motion for new trial. The grant or denial of motion for new trial is a matter within the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed if there is "any evidence" to authorize the trial court's ruling. Professional Consulting Svcs. of Ga. v. Ibrahim, 206 Ga. App. 663, 665 (1) (426 SE2d 376) (1992).</div><div style="margin-bottom: 12pt;">In reviewing an order on a motion for new trial, appellate courts do not weigh the evidence or give an opinion on where the greater weight of the evidence lies but determine merely whether the record contains sufficient evidence to authorize the trial court's judgment. Milam v. Attaway, 195 Ga. App. 496, 497 (1) (393 SE2d 753) (1990).</div><div style="margin-bottom: 12pt;">Bench trials. The trial court's factual findings will not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, meaning that they will not be disturbed when there is any evidence to sustain them. Sam's Wholesale Club v. Riley, 241 Ga. App. 693 (527 SE2d 293) (1999).</div><div style="margin-bottom: 12pt;">Trial court's findings of fact. Reviewed under clearly erroneous standard. City of McDonough v. Tusk Partners, 268 Ga. 693, 696 (492 SE2d 206) (1997).</div><div style="margin-bottom: 12pt;">Question of law. De novo or independent review on appeal. Since no deference is owed to the trial court's ruling on a legal question, the "plain legal error" standard of review is applied. Suarez v. Halbert, 246 Ga. App. 822, 824 (1) (543 SE2d 733) (2000).</div><div style="margin-bottom: 12pt;">Damage awards. A reviewing court will not interfere with a jury's award of damages unless the amount is so small or so excessive that it justifies an inference of gross mistake or undue bias. Green v. Proffitt, 248 Ga. App. 477, 478 (1) (545 SE2d 623) (2001).</div><div style="margin-bottom: 12pt;">FELA damages. The jury's determination of FELA damages is otherwise inviolate, absent an award so excessive or inadequate as to shock the judicial conscience and raise an irresistible inference that passion, prejudice or another improper cause invaded the trial. Norfolk Southern R. Co. v. Jones, 219 Ga. App. 602, 608 (4) (a) (466 SE2d 260)(1995).</div><div style="margin-bottom: 12pt;">Attorney fees under OCGA § 13-6-11. Reviewed under the any evidence standard. City of Warner Robins v. Holt, 220 Ga. App. 794, 796 (1) (470 SE2d 238) (1996).</div><div style="margin-bottom: 12pt;">Attorney fees under OCGA § 9-15-14. Under subsection (a), reviewed under the any evidence standard. Under subsection (b), reviewed for abuse of discretion. Bankhead v. Moss, 210 Ga. App. 508, 509 (1) (436 SE2d 723) (1993).</div>Motion to open default. Reviewed for abuse of discretion, meaning that the trial court's ruling will stand unless there is no evidence to support a finding that the statutory grounds set forth in OCGA § 9-11-55 were met. K-Mart Corp. v. Hackett, 237 Ga. App. 127, 128 (1) (514 SE2d 884) (1999).<br />
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</div><div class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;"><span style="color: #333333; font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12pt; line-height: 115%;">Hugh Wood, Esq.<br />
Wood & Meredith, LLP<br />
3756 LaVista Road<br />
Suite 250<br />
Atlanta (Tucker), GA 30084<br />
<a href="http://www.woodandmeredith.com/"><span style="color: #336688;">www.woodandmeredith.com</span></a><br />
<a href="mailto:hwood@woodandmeredith.com"><span style="color: #336688;">hwood@woodandmeredith.com</span></a><br />
<a href="http://www.hughwood.blogspot.com/"><span style="color: #336688;">www.hughwood.blogspot.com</span></a><br />
twitter: USALawyer_<br />
Phone: 404-633-4100<br />
Fax: 404-633-0068<o:p></o:p></span></div>Hugh Woodhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/01021049579391065763noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2321320695584069696.post-78553157626806226292011-09-28T06:49:00.000-07:002011-09-28T06:49:21.216-07:00How to Determine Whether A Borrower can Stop a Foreclosure based on the Lack of a Proper Assignment<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiZL2uHM__a5z3NI151GEpE9-c8mkhyE5dCr-KEHbln7V6W6N5Ak9_3tUH6L87xJgsulBfFKcoLu1RM_bAQgaEs8TfBukipzZjP69JNrQUfaZnlyRjK1PChpd4rGsnXIgVaZqj79yb42-fY/s1600/house1.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="clear: right; float: right; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-left: 1em;"><img border="0" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiZL2uHM__a5z3NI151GEpE9-c8mkhyE5dCr-KEHbln7V6W6N5Ak9_3tUH6L87xJgsulBfFKcoLu1RM_bAQgaEs8TfBukipzZjP69JNrQUfaZnlyRjK1PChpd4rGsnXIgVaZqj79yb42-fY/s1600/house1.jpg" /></a></div><div class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; line-height: 115%;"><span style="font-size: large;">My firm seems to answer the following question, again and again:<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Can I (borrower) stop my foreclosure in a Georgia Superior Court (generally, the County in which the house or property is located) by filing some action against the foreclosing lender?<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span></span></span></div><div class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; line-height: 115%;"><span style="font-size: large;">Well that action would be a Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order (OCGA § 9-11-65(b)) [1] or a Motion for a Permanent Injunction -- which must be filed shortly after the TRO, if granted, anyway.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>TRO’s only last for thirty (30) days by law and then expire.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span></span></span></div><div class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: large; line-height: 115%;">The first thing we look for is whether the Security Deep upon which the lender if foreclosing is recorded as the last assignment.</span></div><div class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: large; line-height: 115%;">For Example:<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Assume you (borrower) borrowed $250,000.00 from Wells Fargo (original lender) in 2004.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Wells Fargo then sold the Note and Security Deed to Bank of New York/Mellon in 2007.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Then assume, Bank of New York/Mellon sold the Noted and Security Deed to Bank of America in 2009.</span></div><div class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; line-height: 115%;"><span style="font-size: large;">To determine whether you (borrower) have any chance of obtaining a Georgia TRO, examine the last Assignment of Record.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>I will ignore the Mortgage Electronic Registration System (MERS) in this analysis, since the Georgia Supreme Court has yet to issue an opinion prohibiting nominee assignments by MERS.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span></span></span></div><div class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: large; line-height: 115%;">To determine whether you (borrower) have any chance of blocking the foreclosure sale on lack of a proper corporate assignment, conduct the following search.</span></div><div class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: large; line-height: 115%;">Examine the Notice of Sale that was mailed to you by the lender and determine which lender is publishing the foreclosure.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>It should read the last lender of record – or, in the above case, Bank of America.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>If you cannot find it, search on-line for it at:</span><span style="color: #333333; font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; line-height: 115%;"></span></div><div class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;"><span style="font-size: large;"><br />
</span><br />
<span style="font-size: large;"> <span style="color: #336688;"><a href="http://georgiapublicnotice.com/">http://georgiapublicnotice.com</a></span></span><br />
<span style="font-size: large;"><br />
</span><br />
<span style="color: #333333; font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";"><span style="font-size: large;">Then you will need to search online for the last filed assignment.<o:p></o:p></span></span></div><span style="font-size: large;"> </span><br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin: 0in 0in 10pt;"><span style="color: #333333; font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: large;">The last filed assignment should be available online at:</span><br />
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<span style="font-size: large;"><br />
</span><br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;"><span style="font-size: large;"> <span style="color: #336688;"><a href="http://gsccca.org/">http://gsccca.org</a></span></span><br />
<span style="font-size: large;"><br />
</span><br />
<span style="font-size: large;"><br />
</span><br />
<span style="color: #333333; font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: large;">Unfortunately, you will have to pay money to see your own assignment.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Unless you have a monthly account with GSCCCA, they will require you to purchase the viewing or printing of it with a credit card (sorry about that).</span><br />
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</span><br />
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: large; line-height: 115%;">When on GSCCCA, using the search routine for your county, search to see if the last assignment is of record.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>In the above example, it should be something like:<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Bank of New York/Mellon to Bank of America.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>However, it could be MERS to Bank of America.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Also, it could be something strange like Wells Fargo and MERS to Bank of America (with the Bank of New York/Mellon not visible because it went through MERS).<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The last assignment needs to be to Bank of America, since that is the lender that is publishing the foreclosure.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>[2]</span><br />
<span style="font-size: large;"><br />
</span><br />
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: large; line-height: 115%;">Thus, in the above example is to the Bank of America, you probably will not be able to make out any claims associated with the Assignment.</span><br />
<span style="font-size: large;"><br />
</span><br />
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: large; line-height: 115%;">If however there is no assignment of record and/or the last assignment is to the First National Bank of Willacoochee, you (borrower) may have a shot at stopping the sale.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>[3]</span><br />
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</span><br />
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; line-height: 115%;"><span style="font-size: large;">Thus, if you (borrower) cannot stop the sale based on a faulty assignment or no assignment, you may need to consider looking to stop the sale with a Chapter 13 or Chapter 7 filing in bankruptcy.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>A Chapter 7 will, in the long run, require the surrender (or allow the foreclosure of) the property.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> [4]</span></span></span><br />
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<span style="color: #333333; font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; line-height: 115%;"><span style="font-size: large;">Hugh Wood, Esq.<br />
Wood & Meredith, LLP<br />
3756 LaVista Road<br />
Suite 250<br />
Atlanta (Tucker), GA 30084<br />
</span><a href="http://www.woodandmeredith.com/"><span style="color: #336688; font-size: large;">www.woodandmeredith.com</span></a><br />
<span style="font-size: large;"> </span><a href="mailto:hwood@woodandmeredith.com"><span style="color: #336688; font-size: large;">hwood@woodandmeredith.com</span></a><br />
<span style="font-size: large;"> </span><a href="http://www.hughwood.blogspot.com/"><span style="color: #336688; font-size: large;">www.hughwood.blogspot.com</span></a><br />
<span style="font-size: large;"> twitter: USALawyer_<br />
Phone: 404-633-4100<br />
Fax: 404-633-0068</span></span><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12pt; line-height: 115%;"><o:p></o:p></span></div></div><div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin: 0in 0in 10pt 0.5in;"><br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12pt; line-height: 115%;">[1]</span></div><div style="margin-left: 0.5in;"><span style="mso-bidi-font-weight: bold;">OCGA § 9-11-65. <nllcatch>Injunctions And Restraining Orders </nllcatch></span></div><br />
<div style="margin-left: 0.5in;">(a) Interlocutory injunction.</div><br />
<div style="margin-left: 0.5in;">(1) Notice. No interlocutory injunction shall be issued without notice to the adverse party.</div><br />
<div style="margin-left: 0.5in;">(2) Consolidation of hearing with trial on merits. Before or after the commencement of the hearing of an application for an interlocutory injunction, the court may order the trial of the action on the merits to be advanced and consolidated with the hearing of the application. Even when this consolidation is not ordered, any evidence received upon an application for an interlocutory injunction which would be admissible upon the trial on the merits shall become a part of the record on the trial and need not be repeated upon the trial. This paragraph shall be construed and applied so as to save any rights of the parties which they may have to trial by jury.</div><br />
<div style="margin-left: 0.5in;">(b) Temporary restraining order; when granted without notice; duration; hearing; application to dissolve or modify. A temporary restraining order may be granted without written or oral notice to the adverse party or his attorney only if: </div><br />
<div style="margin-left: 0.5in;">(1) It clearly appears from specific facts shown by affidavit or by the verified complaint that immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or damage will result to the applicant before the adverse party or his attorney can be heard in opposition; and </div><br />
<div style="margin-left: 0.5in;">(2) The applicant's attorney certifies to the court, in writing, the efforts, if any, which have been made to give the notice and the reasons supporting the party's claim that notice should not be required.</div><br />
<div style="margin-left: 0.5in;">Every temporary restraining order granted without notice shall be endorsed with the date and hour of issuance, shall be filed forthwith in the clerk's office and entered of record, and shall expire by its terms within such time after entry, not to exceed 30 days, as the court fixes, unless the party against whom the order is directed consents that it may be extended for a longer period. In case a temporary restraining order is granted without notice, the motion for an interlocutory injunction shall be set down for hearing at the earliest possible time and shall take precedence over all matters except older matters of the same character; when the motion comes on for hearing, the party who obtained the temporary restraining order shall proceed with the application for an interlocutory injunction; and, if he does not do so, the court shall dissolve the temporary restraining order. On two days' notice to the party who obtained the temporary restraining order without notice or on such shorter notice to that party as the court may prescribe, the adverse party may appear and move its dissolution or modification; and in that event the court shall proceed to hear and determine the motion as expeditiously as the ends of justice require.</div><br />
<div style="margin-left: 0.5in;">(c) Security. As a prerequisite to the issuance of a restraining order or an interlocutory injunction, the court may require the giving of security by the applicant, in such sum as the court deems proper, for the payment of such costs and damages as may be incurred or suffered by any party who is found to have been enjoined or restrained wrongfully. A surety upon a bond or undertaking under this Code section submits himself to the jurisdiction of the court and irrevocably appoints the clerk of the court as his agent upon whom any papers affecting his liability on the bond or undertaking may be served. His liability may be enforced on motion without the necessity of an independent action. The motion and such notice of the motion as the court prescribes may be served on the clerk of the court, who shall forthwith mail copies to the persons giving the security if their addresses are known.</div><br />
<div style="margin-left: 0.5in;">(d) Form and scope of injunction or restraining order. Every order granting an injunction and every restraining order shall be specific in terms; shall describe in reasonable detail, and not by reference to the complaint or other document, the act or acts sought to be restrained; and is binding only upon the parties to the action, their officers, agents, servants, employees, and attorneys, and upon those persons in active concert or participation with them who receive notice of the order by personal service or otherwise.</div><br />
<div style="margin-left: 0.5in;">(e) When inapplicable. This Code section is not applicable to actions for divorce, alimony, separate maintenance, or custody of children. In such actions, the court may make prohibitive or mandatory orders, with or without notice or bond, and upon such terms and conditions as the court may deem just.</div><br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12pt; line-height: 115%;">[2]</span></div><div class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12pt; line-height: 115%;">And for you diehards who persist in the “show me the Note,” challenge and/or look for the assignment of the Note, there is no public database (that is available to the public) to visualize the assignment of the Note.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>As far as the author is aware (and I invite caselaw from anyone to the contrary – and I will post it) there is no body of law in Georgia that will stop a state foreclosure, based on a mere “show me the Note” challenge to the lender prior to foreclosure.</span></div><div class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12pt; line-height: 115%;">[3]</span></div><div class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12pt; line-height: 115%;">But do not be surprised if the lender produces the proper assignment on the Monday before the Tuesday sale.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Can the lender do that?<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Yes.</span></div><div class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12pt; line-height: 115%;">[4]<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span></span></div><div class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12pt; line-height: 115%;">And be prepared for the Judge’s first question if you do file something (except in bankruptcy).<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>“Why didn’t you just pay the mortgage?”<o:p></o:p></span></div></div>Hugh Woodhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/01021049579391065763noreply@blogger.com1tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2321320695584069696.post-4619949804897448332011-09-24T22:30:00.000-07:002011-09-24T22:30:45.802-07:00How To File An Answer to a Complaint<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEg5J0cijQ_qFot_oKzOwoxtyLr_b2vSu6BkaeJZQn9buabcJ_kVBODhePaDdRCcIHvxh_vH4-eBPc2CVFR2MnEAKXeT8cRHs2b-RkjAbUwD02dlKnSboap3yYVj91kuHlhXgoPdpAkK8rLi/s1600/JudgeonBench.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="clear: right; float: right; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-left: 1em;"><img border="0" height="259" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEg5J0cijQ_qFot_oKzOwoxtyLr_b2vSu6BkaeJZQn9buabcJ_kVBODhePaDdRCcIHvxh_vH4-eBPc2CVFR2MnEAKXeT8cRHs2b-RkjAbUwD02dlKnSboap3yYVj91kuHlhXgoPdpAkK8rLi/s320/JudgeonBench.jpg" width="320" /></a></div><div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin: 0in 0in 10pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";"><span style="font-size: large;">“I was served last month with this Complaint thing and I think I need to do something,” or so many telephone conversations have gone over the years.<o:p></o:p></span></span></div><span style="font-size: large;"> </span><br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin: 0in 0in 10pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";"><span style="font-size: large;">I am surprised how, out of lack of knowledge, paralysis or just fear, many business owners and individuals just panic when they are formally served with a complaint.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>They just do nothing.<o:p></o:p></span></span></div><span style="font-size: large;"> </span><br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin: 0in 0in 10pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";"><span style="font-size: large;">“When is the answer due?”<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>I will ask.<o:p></o:p></span></span></div><span style="font-size: large;"> </span><br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin: 0in 0in 10pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";"><span style="font-size: large;">“Um.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Tomorrow, I think.” they will say.<o:p></o:p></span></span></div><span style="font-size: large;"> </span><br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin: 0in 0in 10pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";"><span style="font-size: large;">And so it goes.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><o:p></o:p></span></span></div><span style="font-size: large;"> </span><br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin: 0in 0in 10pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";"><span style="font-size: large;">Then the panic sets in.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><o:p></o:p></span></span></div><span style="font-size: large;"> </span><br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin: 0in 0in 10pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";"><span style="font-size: large;">If you fail to file a written answer, you will be in default.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>[1]<o:p></o:p></span></span></div><span style="font-size: large;"> </span><br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin: 0in 0in 10pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";"><span style="font-size: large;">So, file an answer.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Almost any written answer is better than no answer.<o:p></o:p></span></span></div><span style="font-size: large;"> </span><br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin: 0in 0in 10pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";"><span style="font-size: large;">While an answer does take some time to prepare, a Motion to Open a Default is a much more dicey affair.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>A defendant has to show they were not served, or they were not served properly or there was some legal form of excusable neglect (like they were in the ICU or were dead for awhile).<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>It is an uphill battle to open a default.<o:p></o:p></span></span></div><span style="font-size: large;"> </span><br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin: 0in 0in 10pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";"><span style="font-size: large;">Do not rely on this Blog, but instead read your Summons.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Generally, in Georgia a defendant has thirty (30) days from the date of service of a Complaint [2] to file a written answer with the Clerk of Court. [3]<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>If you miss the 30 day window, all is not lost.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>A Defendant may move (as a matter of right – you do not have to ask the Court or Judge) to open default by paying all costs associated with Plaintiff’s filing of the Complaint and filing a Motion to Open Default (which will be granted as a matter of right) pursuant to the Official Code of Georgia (hereinafter the “OCGA”) 9-11-55 [4].<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><o:p></o:p></span></span></div><span style="font-size: large;"> </span><br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin: 0in 0in 10pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";"><span style="font-size: large;">There are certain complaints that may be heard prior to thirty (30) days.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Any type of injunction hearing probably will be heard prior to the thirty (30) days.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>An answer to a Writ of Possession Suit (Eviction) is due within Seven (7) days.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>And an answer in federal court (this article is not about a federal pleadings) is due within twenty one (21) days of service. [5].<o:p></o:p></span></span></div><span style="font-size: large;"> </span><br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin: 0in 0in 10pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";"><span style="font-size: large;">While there is no particular “style,” in which the answer must<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>be prepared (see the OCGA for the vague outline), it must be in writing, it must respond (paragraph by paragraph) to the Complaint and it must be filed with the Clerk prior to the time for Default.<o:p></o:p></span></span></div><span style="font-size: large;"> </span><br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin: 0in 0in 10pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";"><span style="font-size: large;">In a Georgia State or Superior Court the below template of an answer may be conformed to your particular needs.<o:p></o:p></span></span></div><span style="font-size: large;"> </span><br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin: 0in 0in 10pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";"><a href="http://www.scribd.com/doc/66234330/Blank-Civil-Answer"><span style="color: blue; font-size: large;">http://www.scribd.com/doc/66234330/Blank-Civil-Answer</span></a><o:p></o:p></span></div><span style="font-size: large;"> </span><br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin: 0in 0in 10pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";"><span style="font-size: large;">While I am reticent to cite to another States Court system, the Judiciary of the State of New Jersey has prepared a rather comprehensive overview for the filing of a civil answer in New Jersey.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>While the dates for filing an answer and other pleadings differ in New Jersey (for example, you have 35 days and have to pay a fee to file in New Jersey) from Georgia, the document s is a well written overview of how to prepare a general answer.<o:p></o:p></span></span></div><span style="font-size: large;"> </span><br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin: 0in 0in 10pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";"><a href="http://www.judiciary.state.nj.us/prose/10554_ans_cmplt.pdf"><span style="color: blue; font-size: large;">http://www.judiciary.state.nj.us/prose/10554_ans_cmplt.pdf</span></a><o:p></o:p></span></div><span style="font-size: large;"> </span><br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin: 0in 0in 10pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";"><span style="font-size: large;">Affirmative Defenses.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><o:p></o:p></span></span></div><span style="font-size: large;"> </span><br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin: 0in 0in 10pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";"><span style="font-size: large;">There are some things that must be included in your answer or they are waived or abandoned.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>They are things like: accord and satisfaction, arbitration and award, assumption of risk, contributory negligence, discharge in bankruptcy, estoppel, failure of consideration, fraud, illegality, injury by fellow servant, laches, license, payment, release, res judicata, statute of frauds, statute of limitations, waiver, and any other matter constituting an avoidance or affirmative defense. Generally, Affirmative Defenses are listed Prior to the response in a paragraph by paragraph format.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>However, they may be listed anywhere in the answer.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>[6]<o:p></o:p></span></span></div><span style="font-size: large;"> </span><br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin: 0in 0in 10pt;"><span style="color: #333333; font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12pt;"><span style="font-size: large;">Counterclaims and Cross-claims.<o:p></o:p></span></span></div><span style="font-size: large;"> </span><br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin: 0in 0in 10pt;"><span style="color: #333333; font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";"><span style="font-size: large;">You really should consult an attorney if you feel compelled to assert a counterclaim or cross-claim.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>I would avoid mentioning the counterclaim, except that if you have a compulsory counterclaim you must file it with your answer or lose it.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>If the counterclaim arises out of the same set of facts as the complaint, it generally is compulsive and you must file it or lose it.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>If it is some other set of unrelated facts but still about the same Plaintiff (Hey, he owes me $200,000 on a different piece of real estate) then it is probably a permissive counterclaim and may be filed with the answer or later as a separate complaint.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Here is the statute that sets out base meanings for same.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>[7]<o:p></o:p></span></span></div><span style="font-size: large;"> </span><br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin: 0in 0in 10pt;"><span style="color: #333333; font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";"><span style="font-size: large;">Don’t Argue Your Side of the Story in Your Answer.<o:p></o:p></span></span></div><span style="font-size: large;"> </span><br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin: 0in 0in 10pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";"><span style="font-size: large;">An answer is NOT the place to argue your case or argue why your side of the “story,” is the correct side of the story.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Simply, admit or deny the claims made by the Plaintiff and sit down.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The time for your side of the story (unless you include brief outlines of same in your Affirmative Defenses and/or your Counterclaim) will come later in the lawsuit.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>You will have plenty of opportunities to tell the Judge and Court how “wrong,” the Plaintiff facts are and how much of error it was for the Plaintiff to sue you.<o:p></o:p></span></span></div><span style="font-size: large;"> </span><br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin: 0in 0in 10pt;"><span style="color: #333333; font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";"><span style="font-size: large;">While this little article may provide a place to start working on an answer, I would encourage the reader to hire counsel or review resources concerning Civil Procedure prior to preparing and filing an answer.<o:p></o:p></span></span></div><span style="font-size: large;"> </span><br />
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<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin: 0in 0in 10pt;"><span style="color: #333333; font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";"><span style="font-size: large;">Hugh Wood, Wood & Meredith, LLP<br />
3756 LaVista Road<br />
Suite 250<br />
Atlanta (Tucker), GA 30084<o:p></o:p></span></span></div><span style="font-size: large;"> </span><br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin: 0in 0in 10pt;"><span style="color: #333333; font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12pt;"><a href="http://www.woodandmeredith.com/"><span style="color: blue; font-size: large;">www.woodandmeredith.com</span></a><br />
<span style="font-size: large;"> </span><a href="mailto:hwood@woodandmeredith.com"><span style="color: blue; font-size: large;">hwood@woodandmeredith.com</span></a><br />
<span style="font-size: large;"> </span><a href="http://www.hughwood.blogspot.com/"><span style="color: blue; font-size: large;">www.hughwood.blogspot.com</span></a><br />
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Phone: 404-633-4100<br />
Fax: 404-633-0068</span> <o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
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<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin: 0in 0in 10pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12pt;">ENDNOTES<o:p></o:p></span></div><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12pt;"><o:p><span style="font-family: Arial;"> </span></o:p></span><br />
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<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin: 0in 0in 10pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12pt;">This Article is for those who have waited to late to hire an attorney to file the answer or are simply going to file an answer on their own.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>If you file an answer on your own, the Court will formally refer to you as a Pro Se Defendant. This Article is only about Georgia law. Although any written answer is better than no answer, check your own state's civil procedure prior to filing an answer.</span></div><br />
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<span style="color: black; font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; mso-bidi-font-weight: bold;">OCGA § 9-11-8. General Rules Of Pleading </span><span style="color: black; font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";"><o:p></o:p></span><br />
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<span style="color: black; font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";">(a) Claims for relief.<o:p></o:p></span><br />
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<span style="color: black; font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";">(1) "Action for medical malpractice" defined. As used in this Code section, the term "action for medical malpractice" means any claim for damages resulting from the death of or injury to any person arising out of:<o:p></o:p></span><br />
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<span style="color: black; font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";">(A) Health, medical, dental, or surgical service, diagnosis, prescription, treatment, or care rendered by a person authorized by law to perform such services or by any person acting under the supervision and control of a lawfully authorized person; or <o:p></o:p></span><br />
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<span style="color: black; font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";">(B) Care or service rendered by any public or private hospital, nursing home, clinic, hospital authority, facility, or institution, or by any officer, agent, or employee thereof acting within the scope of his employment.<o:p></o:p></span><br />
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<span style="color: black; font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";">(2) Form of complaint, generally; action for malpractice. An original complaint shall contain facts upon which the court's venue depends; and any pleading which sets forth a claim for relief, whether an original claim, counterclaim, a cross-claim, or a third-party claim, shall contain: <o:p></o:p></span><br />
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<span style="color: black; font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";">(A) A short and plain statement of the claims showing that the pleader is entitled to relief; and <o:p></o:p></span><br />
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<span style="color: black; font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";">(B) A demand for judgment for the relief to which the pleader deems himself entitled; provided, however, that in actions for medical malpractice, as defined in this Code section, in which a claim for unliquidated damages is made for $10,000.00 or less, the pleadings shall contain a demand for judgment in a sum certain; and, in actions for medical malpractice in which a claim for unliquidated damages is made for a sum exceeding $10,000.00, the demand for judgment shall state that the pleader "demands judgment in excess of $10,000.00," and no further monetary amount shall be stated.<o:p></o:p></span><br />
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<span style="color: black; font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";">Relief in the alternative or of several different types may be demanded.<o:p></o:p></span><br />
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<span style="color: black; font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";">(3) Sanctions. If the provisions of subparagraph (B) of paragraph (2) of this subsection are violated, the court in which the action is pending shall, upon a proper motion, strike the improper portion of the demand for judgment and may impose such other sanctions, including disciplinary action against the attorney, found in Code Section <a href="http://www.itislaw.com/NLLXML/getcode.asp?userid=PRODSG&interface=NLL&statecd=GA&codesec=9-11-37&sessionyr=2010&Title=9&datatype=S&noheader=0&nojumpmsg=0"><span style="color: blue;">9-11-37</span></a> as are appropriate.<o:p></o:p></span><br />
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<span style="color: black; font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";">(b) Defenses; form of denials. A party shall state in short and plain terms his defenses to each claim asserted and shall admit or deny the averments upon which the adverse party relies. If he is without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of an averment, he shall so state, and this has the effect of a denial. Denials shall fairly meet the substance of the averments denied. When a pleader intends in good faith to deny only a part or a qualification of an averment, he shall specify so much of it as is true and material and shall deny only the remainder.<o:p></o:p></span><br />
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<span style="color: black; font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";">Unless the pleader intends in good faith to controvert all the averments of the preceding pleading, he may make his denials as specific denials of designated averments or paragraphs, or he may generally deny all the averments except such designated averments or paragraphs as he expressly admits; but, when he does so intend to controvert all its averments, he may do so by general denial subject to the obligations set forth in Code Section <a href="http://www.itislaw.com/NLLXML/getcode.asp?userid=PRODSG&interface=NLL&statecd=GA&codesec=9-11-11&sessionyr=2010&Title=9&datatype=S&noheader=0&nojumpmsg=0"><span style="color: blue;">9-11-11</span></a>.<o:p></o:p></span><br />
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<span style="color: black; font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";">(c) Affirmative defenses. In pleading to a preceding pleading, a party shall set forth affirmatively accord and satisfaction, arbitration and award, discharge in bankruptcy, duress, estoppel, failure of consideration, fraud, illegality, injury by fellow servant, laches, license, payment, release, res judicata, statute of frauds, statute of limitations, and waiver. When a party has mistakenly designated a defense as a counterclaim or a counterclaim as a defense, the court on terms, if justice so requires, shall treat the pleadings as if there had been a proper designation.<o:p></o:p></span><br />
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<span style="color: black; font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";">(d) Effect of failure to deny. Averments in a pleading to which a responsive pleading is required, other than those as to the amount of damage, are admitted when not denied in the responsive pleading.<o:p></o:p></span><br />
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<span style="color: black; font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";">Averments in a pleading to which no responsive pleading is required or permitted shall be taken as denied or avoided.<o:p></o:p></span><br />
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<span style="color: black; font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";">(e) Pleading to be concise and direct; alternative statements.<o:p></o:p></span><br />
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<span style="color: black; font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";">(1) Each averment of a pleading shall be simple, concise, and direct. No technical forms of pleading or motions are required.<o:p></o:p></span><br />
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<span style="color: black; font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";">(2) A party may set forth two or more statements of a claim or defense alternatively or hypothetically, either in one count or defense or in separate counts or defenses. When two or more statements are made in the alternative and one of them, if made independently, would be sufficient, the pleading is not made insufficient by the insufficiency of one or more of the alternative statements. A party may also state as many separate claims or defenses as he has, regardless of consistency and whether based on legal or on equitable grounds or on both. All statements shall be made subject to the obligations set forth in Code Section <a href="http://www.itislaw.com/NLLXML/getcode.asp?userid=PRODSG&interface=NLL&statecd=GA&codesec=9-11-11&sessionyr=2010&Title=9&datatype=S&noheader=0&nojumpmsg=0"><span style="color: blue;">9-11-11</span></a>.<o:p></o:p></span><br />
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<span style="color: black; font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";">(f) Construction of pleadings. All pleadings shall be so construed as to do substantial justice.<o:p></o:p></span><br />
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<span style="color: black; font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; mso-bidi-font-weight: bold;">OCGA § 9-11-12. Answer, Defenses, And Objections; When And How Presented And Heard; When Defenses Waived </span><span style="color: black; font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";"><o:p></o:p></span><br />
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<span style="color: black; font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";">(a) When answer presented. A defendant shall serve his answer within 30 days after the service of the summons and complaint upon him, unless otherwise provided by statute. A cross-claim or counterclaim shall not require an answer, unless one is required by order of the court, and shall automatically stand denied.<o:p></o:p></span><br />
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<span style="color: black; font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";">(b) How defenses and objections presented. Every defense, in law or fact, to a claim for relief in any pleading, whether a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, shall be asserted in the responsive pleading thereto if one is required, except that the following defenses may, at the option of the pleader, be made by motion in writing: <o:p></o:p></span><br />
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<span style="color: black; font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";">(1) Lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter; <o:p></o:p></span><br />
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<span style="color: black; font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";">(2) Lack of jurisdiction over the person; <o:p></o:p></span><br />
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<span style="color: black; font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";">(3) Improper venue; <o:p></o:p></span><br />
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<span style="color: black; font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";">(4) Insufficiency of process; <o:p></o:p></span><br />
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<span style="color: black; font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";">(5) Insufficiency of service of process; <o:p></o:p></span><br />
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<span style="color: black; font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";">(6) Failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted; <o:p></o:p></span><br />
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<span style="color: black; font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";">(7) Failure to join a party under Code Section <a href="http://www.itislaw.com/NLLXML/getcode.asp?userid=PRODSG&interface=NLL&statecd=GA&codesec=9-11-19&sessionyr=2010&Title=9&datatype=S&noheader=0&nojumpmsg=0"><span style="color: blue;">9-11-19</span></a>.<o:p></o:p></span><br />
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<span style="color: black; font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";">A motion making any of these defenses shall be made before or at the time of pleading if a further pleading is permitted. No defense or objection is waived by being joined with one or more other defenses or objections in a responsive pleading or motion. If a pleading sets forth a claim for relief to which the adverse party is not required to serve a responsive pleading, he may assert at the trial any defense in law or fact to that claim for relief. If, on a motion to dismiss for failure of the pleading to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, matters outside the pleading are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as provided in Code Section <a href="http://www.itislaw.com/NLLXML/getcode.asp?userid=PRODSG&interface=NLL&statecd=GA&codesec=9-11-56&sessionyr=2010&Title=9&datatype=S&noheader=0&nojumpmsg=0"><span style="color: blue;">9-11-56</span></a>, and all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to present all material made pertinent to such a motion by Code Section <a href="http://www.itislaw.com/NLLXML/getcode.asp?userid=PRODSG&interface=NLL&statecd=GA&codesec=9-11-56&sessionyr=2010&Title=9&datatype=S&noheader=0&nojumpmsg=0"><span style="color: blue;">9-11-56</span></a>.<o:p></o:p></span><br />
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<span style="color: black; font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";">(c) Motion for judgment on the pleadings. After the pleadings are closed but within such time as not to delay the trial, any party may move for judgment on the pleadings. If, on a motion for judgment on the pleadings, matters outside the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as provided in Code Section <a href="http://www.itislaw.com/NLLXML/getcode.asp?userid=PRODSG&interface=NLL&statecd=GA&codesec=9-11-56&sessionyr=2010&Title=9&datatype=S&noheader=0&nojumpmsg=0"><span style="color: blue;">9-11-56</span></a>, and all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to present all material made pertinent to such a motion by Code Section <a href="http://www.itislaw.com/NLLXML/getcode.asp?userid=PRODSG&interface=NLL&statecd=GA&codesec=9-11-56&sessionyr=2010&Title=9&datatype=S&noheader=0&nojumpmsg=0"><span style="color: blue;">9-11-56</span></a>.<o:p></o:p></span><br />
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<span style="color: black; font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";">(d) Preliminary hearings. The defenses specifically enumerated in paragraphs (1) through (7) of subsection (b) of this Code section, whether made in a pleading or by motion, and the motion for judgment mentioned in subsection (c) of this Code section shall be heard and determined before trial on application of any party unless the court orders that the hearing and determination thereof be deferred until the trial.<o:p></o:p></span><br />
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<span style="color: black; font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";">(e) Motion for more definite statement. If a pleading to which a responsive pleading is permitted is so vague or ambiguous that a party cannot reasonably be required to frame a proper responsive pleading, he shall nevertheless answer or respond to the best of his ability, and he may move for a more definite statement. The motion shall point out the defects complained of and the details desired.<o:p></o:p></span><br />
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<span style="color: black; font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";">If the motion is granted and the order of the court is not obeyed within 15 days after notice of the order, or within such other time as the court may fix, the court may strike the pleading to which the motion was directed or make such order as it deems just.<o:p></o:p></span><br />
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<span style="color: black; font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";">(f) Motion to strike. Upon motion made by a party within 30 days after the service of the pleading upon him, or upon the court's own initiative at any time, the court may order stricken from any pleading any insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter.<o:p></o:p></span><br />
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<span style="color: black; font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";">(g) Consolidation of defenses in motion. A party who makes a motion under this Code section may join with it any other motions provided for in this Code section and then available to him. If a party makes a motion under this Code section but omits therefrom any defense or objection then available to him which this Code section permits to be raised by motion, he shall not thereafter make a motion based on the defense or objection so omitted, except a motion as provided in paragraph (2) of subsection (h) of this Code section on any of the grounds there stated.<o:p></o:p></span><br />
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<span style="color: black; font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";">(h) Waiver or preservation of certain defenses.<o:p></o:p></span><br />
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<span style="color: black; font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";">(1) A defense of lack of jurisdiction over the person, improper venue, insufficiency of process, or insufficiency of service of process is waived: <o:p></o:p></span><br />
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<span style="color: black; font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";">(A) If omitted from a motion in the circumstances described in subsection (g) of this Code section; or <o:p></o:p></span><br />
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<span style="color: black; font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";">(B) If it is neither made by motion under this Code section nor included in a responsive pleading, as originally filed.<o:p></o:p></span><br />
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<span style="color: black; font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";">(2) A defense of failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, a defense of failure to join a party indispensable under Code Section <a href="http://www.itislaw.com/NLLXML/getcode.asp?userid=PRODSG&interface=NLL&statecd=GA&codesec=9-11-19&sessionyr=2010&Title=9&datatype=S&noheader=0&nojumpmsg=0"><span style="color: blue;">9-11-19</span></a>, and an objection of failure to state a legal defense to a claim may be made in any pleading permitted or ordered under subsection (a) of Code Section <a href="http://www.itislaw.com/NLLXML/getcode.asp?userid=PRODSG&interface=NLL&statecd=GA&codesec=9-11-7&sessionyr=2010&Title=9&datatype=S&noheader=0&nojumpmsg=0"><span style="color: blue;">9-11-7</span></a>, or by motion for judgment on the pleadings, or at the trial on the merits.<o:p></o:p></span><br />
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<span style="color: black; font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";">(3) Whenever it appears, by suggestion of the parties or otherwise, that the court lacks jurisdiction of the subject matter, the court shall dismiss the action.<o:p></o:p></span><br />
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<span style="color: black; font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";">(i) Officer's defense of service. The officer making service of process and the principal officer in charge of service made by a deputy need not be made a party to any action or motion where the defense or defenses under paragraph (2), (4), or (5) of subsection (b) of this Code section are asserted by motion or by answer. Any party to the action may give notice of the objection to the service, made pursuant to such paragraphs, to the officer making the service and to the principal officer in case of service made by a deputy, and the court shall afford the officer or officers opportunity to defend the service, in which case the decision on the question of service shall be conclusive on the officer and on his principal in case of service by a deputy.<o:p></o:p></span><br />
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<span style="color: black; font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";">(j)(1)<i>Stay of discovery.</i>If a party files a motion to dismiss before or at the time of filing an answer and pursuant to the provisions of this Code section, discovery shall be stayed for 90 days after the filing of such motion or until the ruling of the court on such motion, whichever is sooner. The court shall decide the motion to dismiss within the 90 days provided in this paragraph.<o:p></o:p></span><br />
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<span style="color: black; font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";">(2) The discovery period and all discovery deadlines shall be extended for a period equal to the duration of the stay imposed by this subsection.<o:p></o:p></span><br />
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<span style="color: black; font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";">(3) The court may upon its own motion or upon motion of a party terminate or modify the stay imposed by this subsection but shall not extend such stay.<o:p></o:p></span><br />
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<span style="color: black; font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";">(4) If a motion to dismiss raises defenses set forth in paragraph (2), (3), (5), or (7) of subsection (b) of this Code section or if any party needs discovery in order to identify persons who may be joined as parties, limited discovery needed to respond to such defenses or identify such persons shall be permitted until the court rules on such motion.<o:p></o:p></span><br />
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<span style="color: black; font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";">(5) The provisions of this subsection shall not modify or affect the provisions of paragraph (2) of subsection (f) of Code Section 9-11-23 or any other power of the court to stay discovery.<o:p></o:p></span><br />
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<span style="color: black; font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; mso-bidi-font-weight: bold;">OCGA § 9-11-55. Default Judgment </span><span style="color: black; font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";"><o:p></o:p></span><br />
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<span style="color: black; font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";">(a) When case in default; opening as matter of right; judgment. If in any case an answer has not been filed within the time required by this chapter, the case shall automatically become in default unless the time for filing the answer has been extended as provided by law.<o:p></o:p></span><br />
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<span style="color: black; font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";">The default may be opened as a matter of right by the filing of such defenses within 15 days of the day of default, upon the payment of costs. If the case is still in default after the expiration of the period of 15 days, the plaintiff at any time thereafter shall be entitled to verdict and judgment by default, in open court or in chambers, as if every item and paragraph of the complaint or other original pleading were supported by proper evidence, without the intervention of a jury, unless the action is one ex delicto or involves unliquidated damages, in which event the plaintiff shall be required to introduce evidence and establish the amount of damages before the court without a jury, with the right of the defendant to introduce evidence as to damages and the right of either to move for a new trial in respect of such damages; provided, however, in the event a defendant, though in default, has placed damages in issue by filing a pleading raising such issue, either party shall be entitled, upon demand, to a jury trial of the issue as to damages.<o:p></o:p></span><br />
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<span style="color: black; font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";">An action based upon open account shall not be considered one for unliquidated damages within the meaning of this Code section.<o:p></o:p></span><br />
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<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin: 0in 0in 10pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12pt;">Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin: 0in 0in 10pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12pt;">Rule 12. Defenses and Objections: When and How Presented; Motion for <o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin: 0in 0in 10pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12pt;">Judgment on the Pleadings; Consolidating Motions; Waiving Defenses; <o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
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<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin: 0in 0in 10pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12pt;">(a) Time to Serve a Responsive Pleading.<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin: 0in 0in 10pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12pt;">(1) In General. <o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin: 0in 0in 10pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12pt;">Unless another time is specified by this rule or a federal statute, the time for serving a responsive pleading is as follows:<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin: 0in 0in 10pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12pt;">(A) A defendant must serve an answer: (i) within 21 days after being served with the summons and complaint; <o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
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<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin: 0in 0in 10pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12pt;">(ii) if it has timely waived service under Rule 4(d), within 60 days after the request for a waiver was sent, or within 90 days after it was sent to the defendant outside any judicial district of the United States.<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin: 0in 0in 10pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12pt;">(B) A party must serve an answer to a counterclaim or crossclaim within 21 days after being served with the pleading that states the counterclaim or crossclaim. <o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin: 0in 0in 10pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12pt;">(C) A party must serve a reply to an answer within 21 days after being served with an order to reply, unless the order specifies a different time.<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
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<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12pt;">Affirmative Defenses<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
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<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12pt;">Examples<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
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<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12pt;">* civil law<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
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<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12pt;">o accord and satisfaction<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12pt;">o assumption of risk (when the plaintiff knowingly entered into a dangerous situation)<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12pt;">o authority<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12pt;">o consent<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12pt;">o defense of property<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12pt;">o estoppel<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12pt;">o contract specification<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12pt;">o contractual provision (when the defendant's liability for causing the plaintiff's injuries had been waived in the contract; however, these provisions are typically unconscionable in many situations.)<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12pt;">o contributory negligence (when the plaintiff's actions contributed to his own injury)<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12pt;">o fair use<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12pt;">o laches (similar to statute of limitation)<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12pt;">o merger doctrine<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12pt;">o repossession<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12pt;">o statute of frauds<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12pt;">o statute of limitations (too much time has elapsed between the tort and the complaint)<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12pt;">o waiver<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
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<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12pt;">o necessity<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12pt;">o duress<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12pt;">o self defense<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12pt;">o statute of limitation<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12pt;">o truth<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
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<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12pt;">A defendant offers an affirmative defense when responding to a plaintiff's claim in common law jurisdictions, or, more familiarly, in criminal law. Essentially, the defendant affirms that the condition is occurring or has occurred but offers a defense that bars, or prevents, the plaintiff's claim. An affirmative defense is known, alternatively, as a justification, or an excuse, defense.[1] Consequently, affirmative defenses limit or excuse a defendant's criminal culpability or civil liability.<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
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<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12pt;">A clear illustration of an affirmative defense is self defense.[2] In its simplest form, a criminal defendant may be exonerated if he can demonstrate that he had an honest and reasonable belief that another's use of force was unlawful and that the defendant's conduct was necessary to protect himself.<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
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<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12pt;">"Mistake of fact" is not an affirmative defense: it does not require proof but it does introduce doubt. In mistake-of-fact defenses, the defendant asserts that his mistaken belief prevents the establishment, beyond a reasonable doubt, of the required mens rea. It can be used with other defenses such as self defense. Self defense would still be available even if the defendant mistakenly believes that he was in imminent danger of harmful or offensive bodily contact.<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12pt;">Among the most controversial affirmative defenses is the insanity defense,[3] whereby a criminal defendant seeks to be excused from criminal liability on the ground that a mental illness, at the time of the alleged crime, prevented him from understanding the wrongful nature of his actions.<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
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<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12pt;">Most affirmative defenses must be pled in a timely manner by a defendant in order for the court to consider them, or else they are considered waived by the defendant's failure to assert them. The classic unwaivable affirmative defense is lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. The issue of timely assertion is often the subject of contentious litigation.<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12pt;">Because an affirmative defense requires an assertion of facts beyond those claimed by the plaintiff, generally the party who offers an affirmative defense bears the burden of proof.[4] The standard of proof is typically lower than beyond a reasonable doubt. It can either be proved by clear and convincing evidence or by a preponderance of the evidence. In some cases or jurisdictions, however, the defense must only be asserted, and the prosecution has the burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defense is not applicable.[citation needed]<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12pt;">Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure governs the assertion of affirmative defenses in civil cases that are filed in the United States district courts. Rule 8(c) specifically enumerates the following defenses: "accord and satisfaction, arbitration and award, assumption of risk, contributory negligence, discharge in bankruptcy, estoppel, failure of consideration, fraud, illegality, injury by fellow servant, laches, license, payment, release, res judicata, statute of frauds, statute of limitations, waiver, and any other matter constituting an avoidance or affirmative defense."<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12pt;">Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires that affirmative defenses be based on "knowledge, information, and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances," and cannot consist of a laundry list of all known affirmative defenses.[5]<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12pt;">An affirmative defense can be different from a negating defense. A negating defense is one which tends to negate an essential element of the state's case. An example might be a mistake of fact claim in a prosecution for intentional drug possession, where the defendant asserted that he or she mistakenly believed that the object possessed was an innocent substance like oregano. Because this defense simply shows that an essential element of the offense is not present, the defendant does not have any burden of persuasion with regards to a negating defense. At most the defendant has the burden of producing sufficient evidence to raise the issue<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
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<span style="color: black; font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; mso-bidi-font-weight: bold;">OCGA § 9-11-13. Counterclaim And Cross-claim </span><span style="color: black; font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";"><o:p></o:p></span><br />
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<span style="color: black; font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";">(a) Compulsory counterclaims. A pleading shall state as a counterclaim any claim which at the time of serving the pleading the pleader has against any opposing party, if it arises out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the opposing party's claim and does not require for its adjudication the presence of third parties of whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction. But the pleader need not state the claim if (1) at the time the action was commenced the claim was the subject of another pending action, or (2) the opposing party brought an action upon his claim by attachment or other process by which the court did not acquire jurisdiction to render a personal judgment on that claim, and the pleader is not stating any counterclaim under this Code section, or (3) the claim is not within the jurisdiction of the court.<o:p></o:p></span><br />
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<span style="color: black; font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";">(b) Permissive counterclaims. A pleading may state as a counterclaim any claim against an opposing party not arising out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the opposing party's claim. But any such permissive counterclaim shall be separated for the purposes of trial, unless the parties otherwise agree.<o:p></o:p></span><br />
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<span style="color: black; font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";">(c) Counterclaim exceeding opposing claim. A counterclaim may or may not diminish or defeat the recovery sought by the opposing party. It may claim relief exceeding in amount or different in kind from that sought in the pleading of the opposing party.<o:p></o:p></span><br />
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<span style="color: black; font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";">(d) Counterclaim against the state. This Code section shall not be construed to enlarge beyond the limits fixed by law the right to assert counterclaims or to claim credits against the state or an officer or agency thereof.<o:p></o:p></span><br />
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<span style="color: black; font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";">(e) Counterclaim maturing or acquired after pleading. A claim which either matured or was acquired by the pleader after serving his pleading may, with the permission of the court, be presented as a counterclaim by supplemental pleading.<o:p></o:p></span><br />
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<span style="color: black; font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";">(f) Omitted counterclaim. When a pleader fails to set up a counterclaim through oversight, inadvertence, or excusable neglect, or when justice requires, he may by leave of court set up the counterclaim by amendment.<o:p></o:p></span><br />
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<span style="color: black; font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";">(g) Cross-claim against coparty. A pleading may state as a cross-claim any claim by one party against a coparty arising out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter either of the original action or of a counterclaim therein or relating to any property that is the subject matter of the original action. The cross-claim may include a claim that the party against whom it is asserted is or may be liable to the cross-claimant for all or part of a claim asserted in the action against the cross-claimant.<o:p></o:p></span><br />
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<span style="color: black; font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";">(h) Additional parties may be brought in. When the presence of parties other than those to the original action is required for the granting of complete relief in the determination of a counterclaim or cross-claim, the court shall order them to be brought in as defendants as provided in this chapter, if jurisdiction of them can be obtained.<o:p></o:p></span><br />
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<span style="color: black; font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";">(i) Separate trials; separate judgments. If the court orders separate trials as provided in subsection (b) of Code Section<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>9-11-42 judgment on a counterclaim or cross-claim may be rendered in accordance with the terms of subsection (b) of Code Section 9-11-54 when the court has jurisdiction to do so, even if the claims of the opposing party have been dismissed or otherwise disposed of.<o:p></o:p></span><br />
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<div style="text-align: center;"><span style="color: black; font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";">&&&&</span></div><br />
<span style="color: black; font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";"> Form Answer Below:</span><br />
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<span style="color: black; font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";"><span style="font-family: "Arial","sans-serif";"><o:p>_______________________________________________________________</o:p></span></span><br />
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<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; mso-pagination: none;"><b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span style="font-family: "Arial","sans-serif";"><span style="mso-tab-count: 3;"> </span>Plaintiff,<span style="mso-tab-count: 2;"> </span><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>CIVIL ACTION <o:p></o:p></span></b></div><br />
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<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; mso-pagination: none;"><b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span style="font-family: "Arial","sans-serif";">_____________________<span style="layout-grid-mode: line;">,<span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span> [4]<span style="mso-tab-count: 2;"> </span></span></span></b></div><br />
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<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; mso-pagination: none;"><b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span style="font-family: "Arial","sans-serif"; layout-grid-mode: line;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 2;"> </span><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>Defendant.<span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span></span></b></div><br />
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<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-align: center;"><b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span style="font-family: "Arial","sans-serif";">DEFENDANT(S) ANSWER, and<o:p></o:p></span></b></div><br />
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-align: center;"><b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span style="font-family: "Arial","sans-serif";">AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES [6]<o:p></o:p></span></b></div><br />
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<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%; margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-indent: 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Arial","sans-serif";">COMES NOW, ___________________[3], <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Defendant herein and hereby Answers, Responds, Replies and interposes Affirmative Defenses in response to Plaintiff’s Complaint filed in the _____________[1] Court of _____________[2] County, Georgia.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%; margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-indent: 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Arial","sans-serif";">Defendant shows the Court as follows:<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
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<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%; margin: 0in 0in 0pt; mso-pagination: none; text-indent: 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Arial","sans-serif"; layout-grid-mode: line;">Plaintiff’s Complaint against _____________[4] fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted and therefore, same should be dismissed.<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; mso-hyphenate: none; mso-outline-level: 1; mso-pagination: none; page-break-after: avoid; tab-stops: -.5in; text-align: center;"><b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span style="font-family: "Arial","sans-serif"; layout-grid-mode: line; letter-spacing: -0.15pt;">SECOND DEFENSE<o:p></o:p></span></b></div><br />
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<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%; margin: 0in 0in 0pt; mso-pagination: none; text-indent: 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Arial","sans-serif"; layout-grid-mode: line;">Plaintiff asserts [___] [7] insufficiency of process and/or [___] insufficiency of service of process, pursuant to OCGA § 9-11-4.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
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<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%; margin: 0in 0in 0pt; mso-pagination: none; text-align: center;"><b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span style="font-family: "Arial","sans-serif"; layout-grid-mode: line;">THIRD DEFENSE<o:p></o:p></span></b></div><br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%; margin: 0in 0in 0pt; mso-pagination: none; page-break-after: avoid;"><span style="font-family: "Arial","sans-serif"; layout-grid-mode: line;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>To the extent as may be shown through discovery or pleadings in this action, _____________[3] raises all affirmative defenses as set forth in OCGA § 9‑11‑8(c), to the extent each on is checked: <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>[___] accord and satisfaction, [___] duress, [___] estoppel, [___] promissory estoppel, [___] payment, [___] set-off, [___] failure of consideration, [___] fraud, [___] illegality, [___] laches, [___] payment, [___] release, [___] res judicata, [___] statute of frauds, [___] statute of limitations, and [___] waiver.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
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<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%; margin: 0in 0in 0pt; mso-pagination: none;"><span style="font-family: "Arial","sans-serif"; layout-grid-mode: line;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>By way of response to the specific allegations contained in Plaintiff’s Complaint against _____________[4] <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>and subject to all of the defenses set forth herein, _____________ [4] shows to this Court as follows:<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span style="letter-spacing: -0.15pt;"><o:p></o:p></span></b></span></div><br />
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt 0.5in; text-align: center; text-indent: -0.5in;"><b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span style="font-family: "Arial","sans-serif";">COMPLAINT<o:p></o:p></span></b></div><br />
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<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt 0.5in; text-align: center; text-indent: -0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Arial","sans-serif";">1.<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="line-height: 200%; margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-indent: 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Arial","sans-serif"; font-size: 12pt; line-height: 200%;">This Defendant is without sufficient knowledge or information to admit or deny this averment therefore this averment stands Denied.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%; margin: 0in 0in 0pt 0.5in; text-align: center; text-indent: -0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Arial","sans-serif";">2.<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="line-height: 200%; margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-indent: 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Arial","sans-serif"; font-size: 12pt; line-height: 200%;">This Defendant is without sufficient knowledge or information to admit or deny this averment therefore this averment stands Denied.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt 0.5in; text-align: center; text-indent: -0.5in;"><b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span style="font-family: "Arial","sans-serif";">JURISDICTION AND VENUE<o:p></o:p></span></b></div><br />
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt 0.5in; text-align: center; text-indent: -0.5in;"><b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span style="font-family: "Arial","sans-serif";"><o:p></o:p></span></b></div><div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%; margin: 0in 0in 0pt 0.5in; text-align: center; text-indent: -0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Arial","sans-serif";">3.<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="line-height: 200%; margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-indent: 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Arial","sans-serif"; font-size: 12pt; line-height: 200%;">This Defendant is without sufficient knowledge or information to admit or deny this averment therefore this averment stands Denied.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%; margin: 0in 0in 0pt 0.5in; text-align: center; text-indent: -0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Arial","sans-serif";">4.<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="line-height: 200%; margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-indent: 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Arial","sans-serif"; font-size: 12pt; line-height: 200%;">This Defendant is without sufficient knowledge or information to admit or deny this averment therefore this averment stands Denied.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%; margin: 0in 0in 0pt 0.5in; text-align: center; text-indent: -0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Arial","sans-serif";">5.<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="line-height: 200%; margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-indent: 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Arial","sans-serif"; font-size: 12pt; line-height: 200%;">This Defendant is without sufficient knowledge or information to admit or deny this averment therefore this averment stands Denied.<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%; margin: 0in 0in 0pt 0.5in; text-align: center; text-indent: -0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Arial","sans-serif";">6.<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="line-height: 200%; margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-indent: 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Arial","sans-serif"; font-size: 12pt; line-height: 200%;">This Defendant is without sufficient knowledge or information to admit or deny this averment therefore this averment stands Denied.<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%; margin: 0in 0in 0pt 0.5in; text-align: center; text-indent: -0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Arial","sans-serif";">7.<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="line-height: 200%; margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-indent: 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Arial","sans-serif"; font-size: 12pt; line-height: 200%;">This Defendant is without sufficient knowledge or information to admit or deny this averment therefore this averment stands Denied.<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%; margin: 0in 0in 0pt 0.5in; text-align: center; text-indent: -0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Arial","sans-serif";">8.<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="line-height: 200%; margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-indent: 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Arial","sans-serif"; font-size: 12pt; line-height: 200%;">This Defendant is without sufficient knowledge or information to admit or deny this averment therefore this averment stands Denied.<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%; margin: 0in 0in 0pt 0.5in; text-align: center; text-indent: -0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Arial","sans-serif";">9.<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="line-height: 200%; margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-indent: 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Arial","sans-serif"; font-size: 12pt; line-height: 200%;">This Defendant is without sufficient knowledge or information to admit or deny this averment therefore this averment stands Denied.<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%; margin: 0in 0in 0pt 0.5in; text-align: center; text-indent: -0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Arial","sans-serif";">10.<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="line-height: 200%; margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-indent: 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Arial","sans-serif"; font-size: 12pt; line-height: 200%;">This Defendant is without sufficient knowledge or information to admit or deny this averment therefore this averment stands Denied.<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="line-height: 200%; margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-indent: 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Arial","sans-serif"; font-size: 12pt; line-height: 200%;">Any paragraph of the Complaint not specifically admitted is hereby denied.<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-indent: 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Arial","sans-serif"; font-size: 12pt;">WHEREFORE, Defendant, with regard to Plaintiff’s Complaint, prays that this Court:<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
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<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt 0.75in; mso-list: l0 level1 lfo1; text-indent: -0.25in;"><span style="font-family: "Arial","sans-serif"; font-size: 12pt; mso-fareast-font-family: Arial;"><span style="mso-list: Ignore;">1)<span style="font-size-adjust: none; font-stretch: normal; font: 7pt/normal "Times New Roman";"> </span></span></span><span style="font-family: "Arial","sans-serif"; font-size: 12pt;">Deny all relief that Plaintiff prays for in its Complaint; and,<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
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<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt 0.75in; mso-list: l0 level1 lfo1; text-indent: -0.25in;"><span style="font-family: "Arial","sans-serif"; font-size: 12pt; mso-fareast-font-family: Arial;"><span style="mso-list: Ignore;">2)<span style="font-size-adjust: none; font-stretch: normal; font: 7pt/normal "Times New Roman";"> </span></span></span><span style="font-family: "Arial","sans-serif"; font-size: 12pt;">That Plaintiff’s Complaint be dismissed with all costs of this action cast upon the Plaintiff. <o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
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<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Arial","sans-serif"; font-size: 12pt; mso-fareast-font-family: "MS Mincho";"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>This _____ day of __________________, 20___.<span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span><o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
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<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Arial","sans-serif"; font-size: 12pt; mso-fareast-font-family: "MS Mincho";"><span style="mso-tab-count: 6;"> </span>Respectfully submitted, <o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
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<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Arial","sans-serif"; font-size: 12pt; mso-fareast-font-family: "MS Mincho";"><span style="mso-tab-count: 6;"> </span>_x______________________<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Arial","sans-serif"; font-size: 12pt; mso-fareast-font-family: "MS Mincho";"><span style="mso-tab-count: 6;"> </span></span><span style="font-family: "Arial","sans-serif"; font-size: 12pt;">_____________, <o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Arial","sans-serif"; font-size: 12pt;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 6;"> </span>Pro Se</span><span style="font-family: "Arial","sans-serif"; font-size: 12pt; mso-fareast-font-family: "MS Mincho";"><o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
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<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Arial","sans-serif"; font-size: 12pt;">___________________<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
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<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Arial","sans-serif"; font-size: 12pt;">___________________<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
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<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Arial","sans-serif"; font-size: 12pt;">___________________<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
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<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Arial","sans-serif";">of Defendant<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
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</div><div class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Arial","sans-serif";"><o:p>_______________________________________________________________</o:p></span> </div><div class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><br />
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<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; mso-hyphenate: none; mso-pagination: none; tab-stops: center 3.0in; text-align: center;"><b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span style="font-family: "Arial","sans-serif"; layout-grid-mode: line; letter-spacing: -0.15pt;">IN THE _____________ [1] COURT OF ___________ [2] COUNTY<o:p></o:p></span></b></div><br />
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<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; mso-pagination: none;"><b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span style="font-family: "Arial","sans-serif";"><span style="mso-tab-count: 3;"> </span>Plaintiff,<span style="mso-tab-count: 2;"> </span><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>CIVIL ACTION <o:p></o:p></span></b></div><br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; mso-pagination: none;"><b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span style="font-family: "Arial","sans-serif";"><span style="mso-tab-count: 6;"> </span><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>FILE NO.<o:p></o:p></span></b></div><br />
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<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt 0.5in; mso-pagination: none; text-indent: 0.5in;"><b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span style="font-family: "Arial","sans-serif";"><span style="mso-tab-count: 4;"> </span><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>________________<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>[5]<o:p></o:p></span></b></div><br />
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<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; mso-pagination: none;"><b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span style="font-family: "Arial","sans-serif"; layout-grid-mode: line;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 3;"> </span>Defendant.<span style="mso-tab-count: 2;"> </span></span></b></div><br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; mso-pagination: none;"><b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span style="font-family: "Arial","sans-serif"; layout-grid-mode: line;">________________________________<span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span></span></b></div><br />
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<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; mso-pagination: none; text-align: center;"><b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span style="font-family: "Arial","sans-serif"; layout-grid-mode: line;">CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE OF<o:p></o:p></span></b></div><br />
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-align: center;"><b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span style="font-family: "Arial","sans-serif";">_____________’S ANSWER, and<o:p></o:p></span></b></div><br />
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-align: center;"><b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span style="font-family: "Arial","sans-serif";">AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES<o:p></o:p></span></b></div><br />
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<div class="MsoPlainText" style="line-height: 200%; margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Arial","sans-serif"; font-size: 12pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.5pt; mso-fareast-font-family: "MS Mincho";"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>I hereby certify that I have served a copy of: <o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-align: center;"><b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span style="font-family: "Arial","sans-serif";">_____________’S ANSWER, and<o:p></o:p></span></b></div><br />
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-align: center;"><b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span style="font-family: "Arial","sans-serif";">AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES<o:p></o:p></span></b></div><br />
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<div class="MsoPlainText" style="line-height: 200%; margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Arial","sans-serif"; font-size: 12pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.5pt; mso-fareast-font-family: "MS Mincho";">on the Plaintiff by placing a true and correct copy of same in the United States Mail, First Class, postage prepaid, addressed to the Defendants as follows:<span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span></span><span style="font-family: "Arial","sans-serif"; font-size: 12pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.5pt;"> <o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt 0.5in; mso-layout-grid-align: none;"><b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span style="font-family: "Arial","sans-serif";">[Name and Address of Plaintiff’s Attorney, or, if none –Plaintiff]<o:p></o:p></span></b></div><br />
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<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Arial","sans-serif"; font-size: 12pt; mso-fareast-font-family: "MS Mincho";"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>This _____ day of __________________, 20___.<span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span><o:p></o:p></span></div><span style="font-family: "Arial","sans-serif"; font-size: 12pt; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-fareast-font-family: "MS Mincho"; mso-fareast-language: EN-US;"><br clear="all" style="mso-special-character: line-break; page-break-before: always;" /> </span> <br />
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<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Arial","sans-serif"; font-size: 12pt; mso-fareast-font-family: "MS Mincho";"><span style="mso-tab-count: 3;"> </span><span style="mso-tab-count: 2;"> </span>Respectfully submitted, <o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
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<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Arial","sans-serif"; font-size: 12pt;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span><span style="mso-tab-count: 2;"> </span><span style="mso-tab-count: 2;"> </span>Pro Se</span><span style="font-family: "Arial","sans-serif"; font-size: 12pt; mso-fareast-font-family: "MS Mincho";"><o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
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<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Arial","sans-serif"; font-size: 12pt;">___________________<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
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<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Arial","sans-serif"; font-size: 12pt;">___________________<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
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<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Arial","sans-serif";">Address and Phone Number <o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Arial","sans-serif";">of Defendant<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<span style="font-family: "Arial","sans-serif";"><o:p>_______________________________________________________________</o:p></span><br />
<span style="font-family: "Arial","sans-serif"; font-size: 12pt; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-language: EN-US;"><br clear="all" style="page-break-before: always;" /> </span><span style="font-size: xx-small;"> </span><br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt 0.5in; mso-layout-grid-align: none;"><span style="font-family: "Arial","sans-serif";"><span style="font-size: xx-small;">FORM NOTES<o:p></o:p></span></span></div><span style="font-size: xx-small;"> </span><br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Arial","sans-serif";"><span style="font-size: xx-small;">[1]<o:p></o:p></span></span></div><span style="font-size: xx-small;"> </span><br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Arial","sans-serif";"><span style="font-size: xx-small;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>In Georgia, this will be either the SUPERIOR, or STATE or MAGISTRATE <span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>Court.<o:p></o:p></span></span></div><span style="font-family: "Arial","sans-serif";"><span style="font-size: xx-small;">[2]<o:p></o:p></span></span><br />
<span style="font-size: xx-small;"> </span><span style="font-family: "Arial","sans-serif";"><span style="font-size: xx-small;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>In Georgia, this will be one of the 159 Counties.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>For example, Fulton, DeKalb, <span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>Cobb, Gwinnett, Chatham, Muscogee, Bibb, etc. <o:p></o:p></span></span><br />
<span style="font-size: xx-small;"> </span><br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Arial","sans-serif";"><span style="font-size: xx-small;">[3]<o:p></o:p></span></span></div><span style="font-size: xx-small;"> </span><br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Arial","sans-serif";"><span style="font-size: xx-small;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>Name of the Plaintiff who/that filed the suit.<o:p></o:p></span></span></div><span style="font-size: xx-small;"> </span><br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Arial","sans-serif";"><span style="font-size: xx-small;">[4]<o:p></o:p></span></span></div><span style="font-size: xx-small;"> </span><br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Arial","sans-serif";"><span style="font-size: xx-small;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>Name of the Defendant(s), who/that have been sued.<o:p></o:p></span></span></div><span style="font-size: xx-small;"> </span><br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Arial","sans-serif";"><span style="font-size: xx-small;">[5]<o:p></o:p></span></span></div><span style="font-size: xx-small;"> </span><br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Arial","sans-serif";"><span style="font-size: xx-small;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>This Number will be on the Complaint and Summons.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>It needs to be written or <span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>typed onto your Answer prior to filing.<o:p></o:p></span></span></div><span style="font-size: xx-small;"> </span><br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Arial","sans-serif";"><span style="font-size: xx-small;">[6]<span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span><o:p></o:p></span></span></div><span style="font-size: xx-small;"> </span><br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Arial","sans-serif";"><span style="font-size: xx-small;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>An Answer is mandatory.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Affirmative Defenses are not mandatory; however, if <span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>they are not raised in the initial answer they are waived.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Additionally, if <span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>Defendant(s) chooses to file a Counterclaim, it should be listed (additionally) in <span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>this header.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>If you file a Counterclaim, you must ask for a Jury Trial at the time <span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>you file your Counterclaim or it is waived.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Plaintiff may have already <span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>petitioned for one in the main Complaint.<o:p></o:p></span></span></div><span style="font-size: xx-small;"> </span><br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Arial","sans-serif";"><span style="font-size: xx-small;">[7]<o:p></o:p></span></span></div><span style="font-size: xx-small;"> </span><br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Arial","sans-serif";"><span style="font-size: xx-small;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>Any box such as <span style="layout-grid-mode: line;">[___] indicates that Defendants should check any that apply.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>Or, if it retyped (which it should be), list only the Affirmative Defenses that <span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>apply.</span><o:p></o:p></span></span></div><span style="font-size: xx-small;"> </span>Hugh Woodhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/01021049579391065763noreply@blogger.com7tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2321320695584069696.post-11343117171549671542011-09-07T09:52:00.000-07:002011-09-07T09:52:41.589-07:00Can A Lender Assign A Mortgage After The Advertisement Is Published?<span style="font-size: large;"><span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;"> <span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;"> </span><span style="font-family: "Arial","sans-serif";"><span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;">Georgia is a non-judicial foreclosure state that requires strict performance with the notice requirements for a courthouse steps foreclosure sale.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Can a lender after it starts the advertising process assign the debt to another lender, record the assignment and proceed to the stairs to foreclose?<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Well, in Georgia, we really don't know.</span><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span></span></span></span><br />
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<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Arial","sans-serif";"><span style="font-size: large;"><span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>In this rarified world of "who owns the debt on the date of sale," the assignments of secured debt prior to foreclosure (and even immediately prior to sale) are not uncommon.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><o:p></o:p></span></span></span></div><span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: large;"> </span><br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Arial","sans-serif";"><span style="font-size: large;"><span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>An assignment of a Security Deed after the advertisement runs in Georgia seems to set up three (3) potential problems with a foreclosure sale.</span></span></span></div><span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: large;"> </span><br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Arial","sans-serif";"><span style="font-size: large;"><span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>1.<span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>The post in time assignment and recording of same creates inaccurate information concerning the defined lender in the advertisement;<o:p></o:p></span></span></span></div><span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: large;"> </span><br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Arial","sans-serif";"><span style="font-size: large;"><span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>2.<span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>The post in time assignment and recording of same creates a potential argument by the borrower to later assert that the sale by different lender "chilled the bidding," as a matter of fact; and, </span></span></span></div><span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: large;"> </span><br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Arial","sans-serif";"><span style="font-size: large;"><span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>3.<span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>The post in time assignment and recording of same sets up a factual challenge to the foreclosure under the new OCGA § 44-14-162.2 "contact the lender" requirements.<o:p></o:p></span></span></span></div><span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: large;"> </span><br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Arial","sans-serif";"><span style="font-size: large;"><span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>With regard to challenges 1 and 2 stated above, the Georgia Court of Appeals recently reversed the grant of a summary judgment to a lender who assigned its security deed and debt AFTER the advertisement on the foreclosure had run.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>In returning the case to the trial court, the Georgia Court of Appeals focused on the possible factual errors associated with the assignment and recording of the transfer of the security deed AFTER the advertisement had run in the legal organ.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><o:p></o:p></span></span></span></div><span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: large;"> </span><br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Arial","sans-serif";"><span style="font-size: large;"><span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>While it is a heavily fact-based analysis, the Georgia Court of Appeals wrote:<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><o:p></o:p></span></span></span></div><span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: large;"> </span><br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Arial","sans-serif";"><span style="font-size: large;"><span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;"> <em>The dispositive question is whether the secured creditor exercised the power of sale 'fairly and in good faith.' <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>[Citations omitted.]</em><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><em>The May 19 and May 30 advertisements contained inaccurate information regarding the foreclosing party.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>But other evidence shows that interested persons had at least constructive notice of the proper party prior to sale.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>So the record does not demonstrate that, as a matter of law, the bidding was chilled or the sale was unfair; and the trial court erred in setting aside the foreclosure sale on summary judgment.</em><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><o:p></o:p></span></span></span></div><span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: large;"> </span><br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Arial","sans-serif";"><span style="font-size: large;"><span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> <em> </em></span><em>We cannot agree with the secured creditor, however, that it was entitled to summary judgment regarding the validity of the foreclosure sale.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>As noted above, the secured creditor did not file the assignment document until four days before the sale.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Moreover, it has pointed to no evidence conclusively showing that, as a matter of law, the misinformation in the advertisement did not impact the bidding or that the sale was otherwise conducted fairly and in good</em> <em>faith.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Simply put, questions or facts remain as to the sale's validity.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Accordingly, we reversed [the summary judgment granted to lender in the lower court].</em> <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>"Amirfazli v. Vatacs Group, Inc., et al., </i>Georgia Court of Appeals, Case Nos. A11A1165; A11A1166; MC051; and, MC052.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>(July 21, 2011).<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span></span></span></span></div><span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: large;"> </span><br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Arial","sans-serif";"><span style="font-size: large;"><span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>The Scribd document of <em>Amirfazli</em> may be found at:</span></span></span></div><div class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><br />
</div><div class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Arial","sans-serif";"><a href="http://www.scribd.com/doc/64135785/AmirfazlivVATACSGroupIncGACOA07212011">http://www.scribd.com/doc/64135785/AmirfazlivVATACSGroupIncGACOA07212011</a></span></div><span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: large;"> </span><br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Arial","sans-serif";"><span style="font-size: large;"><span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>With regard to the third (3) issue listed above, it may be that a post assignment and recordation of an assignment runs afoul of the publishing requirements associated with OCGA § 44-14-162.2.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Generally, the new advertising notices contain statements including the name, address and telephone number of the individual or entity who shall "have full authority to negotiate, amend, and modify all terms of the mortgage with the debtor … " OCGA § 44-14-162.2(a).<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>If and in the event a Security Deed and Note is assigned after the advertisement runs, it is almost a certainty (but it is possible that the same servicer will service both lenders) that the listing of the individual or entity given legal authority to negotiate the debt has changed.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Thus, the stated person to modify the loan would now be different from the assigned and recorded entity post end time to the advertisement.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>This change in the advertising data may set up a fatal error associated with the non-judicial foreclosure.<o:p></o:p></span></span></span></div><span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: large;"> </span><br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Arial","sans-serif";"><span style="font-size: large;"><span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>While most borrowers simply have no resources to challenge these issues (and we long ago quit representing borrowers on any type of contingency arrangement) if any lenders are taken to task on post end-time assignments, borrowers may have new factual arguments under the <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">Amirfazli,</i> supra, case and may be able to assert that the information required under OCGA § 44-14-162.2(a), is factually wrong.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><o:p></o:p></span></span></span></div><span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: large;"> </span><br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Arial","sans-serif";"><span style="font-size: large;"><span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>Additionally, if a lender attempts to proceed to a deficiency judgment claim (albeit it would be rare in an assignment case immediately prior to sale), a borrower would have a good defense to a post OCGA § 44-14-161 confirmation action.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>This new defense to confirmation would exist because the information listed and published with the foreclosure would be at variance with the strict requirements of the publication of foreclosure.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><o:p></o:p></span></span></span></div><span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: large;"> </span><br />
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgCslqjXKJHlZKdzA92AUMX886njB5VxgoiBpYYzPWz9qwZonGluj35CtMhOXR5W-v9DcsE8jPhyphenhyphenYKpXTPzYAcLqf4rmds8i8_PQ7727wdXCVPISPPYB1PWGdPXrnEoqYAR-g4xx4Vhq4_R/s1600/RickAlembik.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="clear: right; float: right; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-left: 1em;"><img border="0" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgCslqjXKJHlZKdzA92AUMX886njB5VxgoiBpYYzPWz9qwZonGluj35CtMhOXR5W-v9DcsE8jPhyphenhyphenYKpXTPzYAcLqf4rmds8i8_PQ7727wdXCVPISPPYB1PWGdPXrnEoqYAR-g4xx4Vhq4_R/s1600/RickAlembik.jpg" /></a></div><div class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Arial","sans-serif";"><span style="font-size: large;"><span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>The above interesting thoughts and ideas arose from a conversation with the ever creative and “out of the box” thinking attorney Rick Alembik, Decatur, Georgia.<o:p></o:p></span></span></span></div><span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: large;"> </span><br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Arial","sans-serif";"><span style="font-size: large;"><span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif;">Hugh Wood<o:p></o:p></span></span></span></div><span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: large;"> Wood & Meredith, LLP<br />
3756 LaVista Road<br />
Suite 250<br />
Atlanta (Tucker), GA 30084</span><a href="http://www.woodandmeredith.com/"><span style="font-family: Times, "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: large;">www.woodandmeredith.com</span></a><br />
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Fax: 404-633-0068</span>Hugh Woodhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/01021049579391065763noreply@blogger.com1tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2321320695584069696.post-48674241604075102322011-08-30T23:36:00.000-07:002011-08-30T23:36:03.081-07:00Federal Appellate Court Sanctions Lender's Attorney for Inaccurate Foreclosure Information<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiVbW3vaBny9fJKqwXgbWTxzconUZHD0C1tUNCeHuEtzR5FQ-hEhcxvQWHsVCjYLidHeCiiokgccP-38Zg4qT_X92DORf3D8u6h9J3N63BHLjAYvIewqzRQCPUJww-gR1wqwn17hQfqmAkJ/s1600/Rule11.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="clear: right; float: right; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-left: 1em;"><img border="0" height="256" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiVbW3vaBny9fJKqwXgbWTxzconUZHD0C1tUNCeHuEtzR5FQ-hEhcxvQWHsVCjYLidHeCiiokgccP-38Zg4qT_X92DORf3D8u6h9J3N63BHLjAYvIewqzRQCPUJww-gR1wqwn17hQfqmAkJ/s320/Rule11.jpg" width="320" /></a></div><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14pt;">The United States Court of Appeals for the 3<sup>rd</sup> Circuit upheld a Bankruptcy Court’s imposition of Rule 11 [actually R. Bank. P. 9011] sanctions against high-volume lenders attorneys who filed pleadings in Bankruptcy Court with no review of the accuracy of the information listed in the pleadings.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>It sanctions the attorneys, in part, because the attorneys had no real ability to determine the accuracy of the information in the pleadings.<o:p></o:p></span><br />
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<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14pt;">The law firm sanctioned and it signatory managing attorney represented lender HSBC.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Lender forwarded all data to the law firm via a third party vendor LPS.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The information conduit owned and run by vendor LPS was known as NewTrak. The computer system (NewTrak) funneled information on borrowers, in this case debtors in bankruptcy, concerning their arrearages and their default – which would lead to a Lift the Stay Motion and Foreclosure by the HSBC.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14pt;">When the Bankruptcy Court became concerned that the lender’s filings were significantly inaccurate (and in fairness, the debtor’s information was inaccurate) the bankruptcy court scheduled a hearing requiring the lender law firm to show how it arrived at the information in the HSBC pleadings.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The associate for the law firm appeared and indicated the he could not even reach a human being at HSBC despite numerous attempts and he had no further information other than the NewTrak data.<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14pt;">When the lender firm could not substantiate the HSBC information, the bankruptcy court scheduled a Rule 9011 [similar to Rule 11] hearing to determine whether to sanction the firm and the attorneys.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>When the attorneys presented no further information from HSBC at the sanctions hearing, other than the information received from NewTrak which was inaccurate, the Court sanctioned the law firm and attorneys for failing to conduct even a minimal investigation prior to filing factual pleadings with the Court.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The Court was particularly concerned with the fact that once HSBC loaded inaccurate information into the computer pipeline there became no easy way for anyone (actually there was no way) to confirm or deny the accuracy of the information.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Thereafter, the Court found that each level beyond the loading of the information – including the attorneys – either denied actual knowledge of the factual basis of the information or simply blamed the inaccuracies on the technology of the information pipeline.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The Court was particularly concerning that no human being at the law firm interfaced with the lender, HSBC.<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14pt;">The District Court reversed the Bankruptcy Court; however, the 3<sup>rd</sup> Circuit reversed the District Court and reinstated the Rule 11 sanctions against the law firm and managing attorney.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>HSBC was sanctioned and failed to appeal.<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14pt;">The Scribd to the case is listed below and the text of the opinion is listed in the footnotes.</span></div><div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><br />
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<a href="http://www.scribd.com/doc/63633990/Taylor-v-Deangelis-United-States-Court-of-Appeals-for-the-3rd-Circuit-No-10-2154-March-22-2011">http://www.scribd.com/doc/63633990/Taylor-v-Deangelis-United-States-Court-of-Appeals-for-the-3rd-Circuit-No-10-2154-March-22-2011</a><br />
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<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14pt;">Hugh Wood<o:p></o:p></span></div><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14pt;">Atlanta, GA<o:p></o:p></span><br />
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<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><br />
</div><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14pt;">Wood & Meredith, LLP<o:p></o:p></span><br />
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14pt;">3756 LaVista Road<o:p></o:p></span><br />
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14pt;">Suite 250<o:p></o:p></span><br />
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14pt;">Atlanta (Tucker), GA 30084<o:p></o:p></span><br />
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<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14pt;">www.woodandmeredith.com<o:p></o:p></span></div><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14pt;"><a href="mailto:hwood@woodandmeredith.com">hwood@woodandmeredith.com</a><o:p></o:p></span><br />
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<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14pt;">twitter: USALawyer_<o:p></o:p></span><br />
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14pt;">Phone: 404-633-4100<o:p></o:p></span><br />
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14pt;">Fax: 404-633-0068<o:p></o:p></span><br />
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<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";"><span style="font-size: large;">EndNotes<o:p></o:p></span></span></div><br />
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<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">PRECEDENTIAL<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">No. 10-2154<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">In re: NILES C. TAYLOR; ANGELA J. TAYLOR,<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">Debtors<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">ROBERTA A. DEANGELIS, Acting United States Trustee,<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">Appellant<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">On Appeal from the District Court<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">(No. 09-cv-02479, 07-cv-15385 (bankruptcy))<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">District Judge: Honorable John P. Fullam<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">Argued March 22, 2011<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">Before: FUENTES, SMITH and VAN ANTWERPEN,<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">Circuit Judges <o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">(Opinion Filed: August 24, 2011)<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">Frederic J. Baker, Esq.<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">Robert J. Schneider, Esq.<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">George M. Conway, Esq.<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">United States Department of Justice Office of the United States Trustee 833 Chestnut St., Suite 500<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">Philadelphia, PA 19107<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">Ramona Elliott, Esq.<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">P. Matthew Sutko, Es.q<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">John P. Sheahan, Esq. (argued)<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">United States Department of Justice<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">Executive Office for United States Trustees<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">20 Massachusetts Ave. NW, Suite 8100<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">Washington, DC 20530<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">Attorneys for Appellant<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">Jonathan J. Bart, Esq. (argued)<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">Wilentz Goldman & Spitzer, P.A.<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">Two Penn Center Plaza, Suite 910<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">Philadelphia, PA 19102<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">Attorney for Appellees<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">OPINION<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">Fuentes, Circuit Judge<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">The United States Trustee, Region 3 (“Trustee”),5HJLRQ ^ ^ ^ ^ 37UXVW1= appeals the reversal by the District Court of sanctions<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">originally imposed in the bankruptcy court on attorneys Mark<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">2<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">J. Udren and Lorraine Doyle, the Udren Law Firm, and HSBC for violations of Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 9011. For the reasons given below, we will reverse the District Court and affirm the bankruptcy court^s¶V ^ imposition of sanctions with respect to Lorraine Doyle, the Udren Law Firm, and HSBC.1 However, we will affirm the District Court^ s reversal of the bankruptcy court^s sanctions with respect to Mark J. Udren.<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">I.<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">A. Background<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">This case is an unfortunate example of the ways in which overreliance on computerized processes in a high-volume practice, as well as a failure on the part of clients and lawyers alike to take responsibility for accurate knowledge of a case, can lead to attorney misconduct before a court. It arises from the bankruptcy proceeding of Mr. and Ms. Niles C. and Angela J. Taylor. The Taylors filed for a Chapter 13 bankruptcy in September 2007. In the Taylors^ bankruptcy petition, they listed the bank HSBC, which held the mortgage on their house, as a creditor. In turn, HSBC filed a proof of claim in October 2007 with the bankruptcy court.<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">We are primarily concerned with two pleadings that HSBC^s attorneys filed in the bankruptcy court²(1) the request for relief from the automatic stay which would have permitted HSBC to pursue foreclosure proceedings despite the Taylors^ bankruptcy filing and (2) the response to the<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">1 Although HSBC was sanctioned by the bankruptcy court, it did not participate in this appeal.<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">3<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">Taylors^ objection to HSBC^ s<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>proof<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>of+ claim. W e ar e also1 ^ FODLP concerned with the attorneys^ conduct in court in connection FRXUW ^ LQ ^ FR with those pleadings. We draw our facts from the findings of<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">the bankruptcy court.<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">1.<span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>The proof of claim (Moss Codilis law firm)<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">To preserve its interest in a debtor^s estate in aDWH ^ LQ ^ D<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">personal bankruptcy case, a creditor must file with the court a proof of claim, which includes a statement of the claim and of its amount and supporting documentation. Tennessee Student Assistance Corp. v. Hood, 541 U.S. 440, 447 (2004); Fed. R. Bank. P. 3001; Official Bankruptcy Form 10. In October 2007, HSBC filed such a proof of claim with respect to the Taylors^ mortgage. To do so, it used the law firm Moss Codilis.2 Moss retrieved the information on which the claim<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">was based from HSBC ^s computerized mortgage servicing PRUWJDJH ^ VHUYLFLQ database. No employee of HSBC reviewed the claim before filing.<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">This proof of claim contained several errors: the amount of the Taylors^ monthly payment was incorrectly stated, the wrong mortgage note was attached, and the value<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">2 Moss Codilis is not involved in the present appeal. However, it is worth noting that the firm has come under serious judicial criticism for its lax practices in bankruptcy<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">proceedings. “In total, 3[th e court knows] of 23 instances in ^ NQRZV@ ^ RI ^ ^ ^ ^ L which [Moss Codilis] has violated [court rules] in this District alone.” Ini re Greco, 405 B.R. 393, 394 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2009); see also In re Waring, 401 B.R. 906 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2009).<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">4<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">of the home was understated by about $100,000. It is not<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">clear whether the errors originated in HSBC^s database or LQ ^ +6%&¶V ^ GDWDE whether they were introduced in Moss Codilis^s filing.3LQJ<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">2.<span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>The motion for relief from stay<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">At the time of the bankruptcy proceeding, the Taylors were also involved in a payment dispute with HSBC. HSBC believed the Taylors^ home to be in a flood zone and had<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">obtained “forced insurance” for the property,<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>the cost of^ SURSHUW\^ ^ WKH ^ which (approximately $180/month) it passed on to the Taylors.<span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>The Taylors disputed HSBC^s position and continued to pay their regular mortgage payment, without the additional insurance costs.4 HSBC failed to acknowledge that the Taylors were making their regular payments and instead treated each payment as a partial payment, so that, in its records, the Taylors were becoming more delinquent each month.<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">Ordinarily, the filing of a bankruptcy petition imposes an automatic stay on all debt collection activities, including<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">foreclosures. McCartney v. Integra ,Nat’l Bank North, 106P/oDQN^ IRUWK<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">F.3d 506, 509 (3d Cir. 1997). However, pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(1), a secured creditor may file for relief from the stay<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>“for cause, including the lack of adequate protection of an interest in property” of the creditor, in order to permit it to commence or continue foreclosure proceedings. Because<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">3 HSBC ultimately corrected these errors in an amended court filing.<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">4 This dispute has now been resolved in favor of the Taylors. (App. 199.)<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">5<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">of the Taylors^ withheld insurance payments, HSBC^s records ^ ^ +6%&¶V ^ UHFRUGV indicated that they were delinquent. Thus, in January 2008,<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">HSBC retained the Udren Firm to seek relief from the stay.<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">Mr. Udren is the only partner of the Udren Firm; Ms. Doyle, who appeared for the Udren Firm in the Taylors^ case,¶ is a managing attorney at the firm, with twenty-seven years of experience. HSBC does not deign to communicate directly with the firms it employs in its high-volume foreclosure work; rather, it uses a computerized system called NewTrak (provided by a third party, LPS) to assign individual firms discrete assignments and provide the limited data the system deems relevant to each assignment.5 The firms are selected and the instructions generated without any direct human involvement. The firms so chosen generally do not have the capacity to check the data (such as the amount of mortgage payment or time in arrears) provided to them by NewTrak and are not expected to communicate with other firms that may have done related work on the matter. Although it is technically possible for a firm hired through NewTrak to contact HSBC to discuss the matter on which it has been retained, it is clear from the record that this was discouraged<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">5 LPS is also not involved in the present appeal, as the bankruptcy court found that it had not engaged in wrongdoing in this case. However, both the accuracy of its data and the ethics of its practices have been repeatedly called into question elsewhere. See, e.g., In re Wilson, 2011 WL 1337240 at *9 (Bankr. E.D.La. Apr. 7, 2011) (imposing<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">sanctions after finding that LPS had issued “sham”/ affidavits ^ LVVXHG ^ 3VKDP' ^ DI and perpetrated fraud on the court); In re Thorne, 2011 WL 2470114 (Bankr. N.D. Miss. June 16, 2011); In re Doble, 2011 WL 1465559 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. Apr. 14, 2011).<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">6<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">and that some attorneys, including at least one Udren Firm attorney, did not believe it to be permitted.<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">In the Taylors^ case,<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>NewTrak provided the Udren Firm with only the loan number, the T aylors^ name and address, payment amounts, late fees, and amounts past due. It did not provide any correspondence with the Taylors concerning the flood insurance dispute.<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">In January 2008, Doyle filed the motion for relief from the stay. This motion was prepared by non-attorney employees of the Udren Firm, relying exclusively on the information provided by NewTrak. The motion said that the debtor “has failed to discharge arrearages on said mortgage or has failed to make the current monthly payments on said<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">mortgage since” the filing of theI bankruptcy petition. (App.XSWF\^ SHWLWLRQ C 65. ) I t identified “the failure t o3 make<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>. . . post-petition ^ PDNH monthly payments” as stretching<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>from November 1,f<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>2007 to1 January 15, 2008, with an “amount per month”<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>of $1455 (a RI F] ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ monthly payment higher than that identified on the proof of claim filed earlier in the case by the Moss firm) and a total in arrears of $4367. (App. 66.) (It did note a “suspenseHQVH^ balance” of $1 040, which it subtracted from the ultimate total sought from the Taylors, but with no further explanation.) It stated that the Taylors had “inconsequential or no equity” inU ^ QR ^ HTXLW\' ^ LQ ^ the property.6 Id. The motion never mentioned the flood insurance dispute.<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">6 The U. S. Trustee now points out that the motion also claimed that the Taylors were not making payments to other creditors under their bankruptcy plan and argues that this claim was false as well. Since the bankruptcy court did not<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">7<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">Doyle did nothing to verify the information in the<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">motion for relief from stay besides check it against “screenJDLQVW ^ 3VFUHHQ ^ prints” of the<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>NewTrak information. She did not even access^ 6KH ^ GLG ^ QRW ^ HYJ NewTrak herself. In effect, she simply proofread the document. It does not appear that NewTrak provided the Udren Firm with any information concerning the Taylors^RUV¶ ^ equity in their home, so Doyle could not have verified her statement in the motion concerning the lack of equity in any way, even against a “screen print.”3VFUHHQ^SULQW<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">At the same time as it filed for relief from the stay, the Udren Firm also served the Taylors with a set of requests for admission (pursuant to Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 7036, incorporating Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 36) (“ RFAs” ). The RFAs sought formal and binding admissions that the Taylors had made no mortgage payments from November 2007 to January 2008 and that they had no equity in their home.<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">In February 2008, the Taylors filed a response to the motion for relief from stay, denying that they had failed to make payments and attaching copies of six checks tendered to HSBC during the relevant period. Four of them had already been cashed by HSBC.7<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">make any findings with respect to this issue, we will not consider it.<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">7 It is not clear from the briefing whether the last two checks, for February and March 2008, had actually been submitted to HSBC at the time the motion was filed; appellees deny that they were. However, appellees do not dispute that checks for<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">8<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">3.<span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>The claim objection and the response to the claim objection<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">In March 2008, the Taylors also filed an objection to<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">HSBC^s proof of claim.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The objection stated that HSBC had ^ VWDWHG ^ WKDW ^ + misstated the payment due on the mortgage and pointed out the dispute over the flood insurance. However, the Taylors did not respond to HSBC^s RFAs. Unless a party responds properly to a request for admission within 30 days, the “matter is [deemed] admitted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 36(a)(3).<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">In the same month, Doyle filed a response to the objection to the proof of claim. The response did not discuss<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">the flood insurance issue at all. However, i t<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>stated that “[a]l l^ +RZHYHU ^ ^ LW ^ VW figures contained in the proof of claim accurately reflect actual sums expended . . . by Mortgagee . . . and/or charges to which Mortgagee is contractually entitled and which the Debtors are<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>contractually obligated to pay.”^ (App. 91.) This WR^ SD\^ ' ^ ^<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">was indisputably incorrect, because the proof of claim listed an inaccurate monthly mortgage payment (which was also a different figure from the payment listed in Doyle^s<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>ownZQ motion for relief from stay).<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">4.<span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>The claim hearings<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">In May 2008, the bankruptcy court held a hearing on both the motion for relief and the claim objection. HSBC was represented at the hearing by a junior associate at the Udren Firm, Mr. Fitzgibbon. At that hearing, Fitzgibbon ultimately<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">October and November 2007 and January 2008 had been cashed.<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">9<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">admitted that, at the time the motion for relief from the stay was filed, HSBC had received a mortgage payment for November 2007, even though both the motion for stay and the<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">response to th e Taylo rs^ objection to the proof of claim statedVR ^ WKH ^ SUR otherwise.8 Despite this, Fitzgibbon urged the court to grant the relief from stay, because the Taylors had not responded to<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">HSBC^s<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>RFAs (which included the “admission” that 3th erPLVVLRQ' ^ WKDW ^ Taylors had not made payments from November 2007 to January 2008). It appears from the record that Fitzgibbon initially sought to have the RFAs admitted as evidence even though he knew they contained falsehoods. (App. 101-102.)9<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">8 Appellees concede that, by the time the May hearing was held, HSBC had received all of the relevant checks.<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">9 Appellees now<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>claim that<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>“[i]t is clear from th e record, that Mr. Fitzgibbon honestly disclosed to the Court that these checks had just been received by [the] Udren [Firm] and that<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">the only issue was that o f flood insurance.” (App^ee Br. 16.)VXUDQF1HIH M ^ However, this disclosure did not occur until after Fitzgibbon had attempted to enter the RFAs, which made contrary<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">claims, as evidence, lan d debto r^s counsel raised the issue. AsDLVHG ^ WKH ^ LVVXH the bankruptcy court described it, “[Fitzgibbon] first argued that I should rule in HSBC^s favor . . . On probing b y the court, he acknowledged that as of the date of the continued hearing, he had learned that [the Taylors] had made every payment.” (App. 196, emphasis added.) In a Rule 9011/11 proceeding such as the present one, one would expect the challenged parties to be scrupulously careful in their representations to the court.<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">10<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">The bankruptcy court denied the request to enter the<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">RFAs as evidence, noting that the<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>firm “closed their eyes to ^ WKHLU ^ H\HV ^ WR the fact that there was evidence that . . . conflicted with the very admissions that they asked me [to deem admitted]. They . . . had that evidence [that the assertions in its motion were not accurate] in [their] possession and [they] went ahead like [they] never saw it.” (App. 108-109.) The court noted:<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">Maybe they have somebody there churning out<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">these motions that doesn^t talk to<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>the peopleW ^ WDON ^ WR ^ WKH ^ SHR that²you know, you never see the records, do you? Somebody sends it to you that sent it from somebody else.<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">(App. 109. )^ “ I really find this<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>motion to be in questionable7 W good faith,” the court concluded. (App. 112.)<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">After the hearing, the bankruptcy court directed the Udren Firm to obtain an accounting from HSBC of the Taylors^ prepetition payments so that the arrearage on the mortgage could be determined correctly. At the next hearing, in June 2008, Fitzgibbon stated that he could not obtain an accounting from HSBC, though he had repeatedly placed requests via NewTrak. He told the court that he was literally unable to contact HSBC²his firm^s client²directly to verify information which his firm had already represented to the court that it believed to be true.<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">At the end of the June 2008 hearing, the court told Fitzgibbon: “I^m 3issuing an order to show cause on your firm, too, for filing these things . . . without having any knowledge.<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">And<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>filing answers . . . without any^<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>knowledge.” (App. 1 19.)\^ NQRZOHGJH ^ ' ^ ^ ^ $ Thereafter, the court entered an order sua sponte dated June<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">11<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">9, 2008, directing Fitzgibbon, Doyle, Udren, and others to appear and give testimony concerning the possibility of sanctions.<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">5.<span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>The sanctions hearings<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">The order stated that the purpose of the hearing<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">included “to investigate the practices employed in<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>this case byLFHV ^ HPSOR\HG ^ LQ ^ V HSBC and its attorneys and agents and consider whether sanctions should issue against HSBC, its attorneys and agents.” (App 96-98.) Among those practices were “pressingZHUH ^ 3SUHVVLQJ ^<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">a relief motion on admissions that were known to be untrue, and signing and filing pleadings without knowledge or<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">inquiry regarding the matters pled therein.” Id. The order WKHUHLQ ^ ' ^ ^<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">noted that<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>“[t]he details are identified on the record of theHQWLILHG ^ RQ ^ WKH [ hearings which are incorporated<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>herein.” Id. In orderingJHLQ ^ ' ^ ^ Doyle to appear, the order noted that “the motion for relief,KDW^ 3WKH^ PRWLRQ the admissions and the reply to the objection were prepared over D oyle^s name<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>and signature.”<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Id. However, this order was no t formally identified as “an order to show cause.” ^ RUGHU ^ WR^ VKRZ ^ FDX'<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">The bankruptcy court held four hearings over several days, making in-depth inquiries into the communications between HSBC and its lawyers in this case, as well as the general capabilities and limitations of a system like NewTrak. Ultimately, it found that the following had violated Rule 9011: Fitzgibbon, for pressing the motion for relief based on claims he knew to be untrue; Doyle, for failing to make reasonable inquiry concerning the representations she made in the motion for relief from stay and the response to the claim objection; Udren and the Udren Firm itself, for the conduct of its attorneys; and HSBC, for practices which caused the failure to adhere to Rule 9011.<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">12<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">Because of his inexperience, the court did not sanction Fitzgibbon. However, it required Doyle to take 3 CLE credits in professional responsibility; Udren himself to be trained in the use of NewTrak and to spend a day observing his employees handling NewTrak; and both Doyle and Udren to<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">conduct a training session for the firm^s relevant lawyers in^ ILUPTV ^ UHOHYDQW [ the requirements of Rule 9011 and procedures for escalating inquiries on NewTrak. The court also required HSBC to send a copy of its opinion to all the law firms it uses in bankruptcy proceedings, along with a letter explaining that direct contact with HSBC concerning matters relating to H SBC^s case wasWR^ +6%&¶V ^ FDVH ^ permissible.10<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">B.<span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>The District Court’s DecisionW¶V ^'HFLVLRQ<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">Udren, Doyle, and the Udren Firm (but not HSBC) appealed the sanctions order to the District Court, which<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">ultimately overturned the order. The District Court^s decisionHFLVLRQ ^ was based on three considerations: that the confusion in the case was attributable at least as much to the actions of<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">10 Taylor^s counsel was also Zultimately sanctioned andWHO\^ VDQFWLRQH removed from the case.<span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>Counsel did not perform competently, as is evidenced by the Taylors^ failure to contest HSBC^s<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>RFAs. Sh e also made a number of inaccurate statements in her representations to the court. However, it is clear that her conduct did not induce the misrepresentations by HSBC or its attorneys. As the bankruptcy court correctly noted, “the process<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>employed by<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>a<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>mortgagee and its counselWJDJHH must be fair and transparent without regard to the quality of<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">debtor^s counsel since many debtors are unrepresented and ^ DUH ^ XQUHSUHVHQ cannot rely on counsel to protect them.”<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>(App. 214.)HFW ^ WKHP ^ ' ^ ^ ^<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">13<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">Taylor^s counsel as to Doyle, Udren, and the Udren Firm; thatDQG ^ WKH ^ 8GUHQ ^ )L the bankruptcy court seemed more concerned with “sending aGLQJ ^ D ^ message” 'to the bar concerning the use of computerized systems than with the conduct in the particular case; and that, since Udren himself did not sign any of the filings containing misrepresentations, he could not be sanctioned under Rule 9011. Although HSBC had not appealed, the District Court overturned the order with respect to HSBC, as well.<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">The United States trustee then appealed the District Court^s decision to this court.11<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">II.<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">Rule 9011 of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, the equivalent of Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, requires that parties making representations<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">to the<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>court<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>certify that “the allegations and other factualOHJDWLRQV ^ DQG ^ contentions have evidentiary support or, if specifically so<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">identified, are likely to have evidentiary support.” Fed. R.HQWLDU\^ VXSSRUW Bank. P. 901 1(b)(3). 12 A party must reach this conclusion based on<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>“inquiry3 reasonable under the circumstances.” Fed.PVWDQFHV ^ '<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">R. Bank. P. 9011(b). The concern of Rule 9011 is not the truth or falsity of the representation in itself, but rather whether the party making the representation reasonably<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">11 The bankruptcy court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 157(a). The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1), except as discussed below. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 158(d).<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">12 “[C]ases decided pursuant to [Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 ] apply to Rule 9011.” In re Gioioso, 979 F.2d 956, 960 (3d Cir. 1992).<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">14<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">believed it at the time to have evidentiary support. In determining whether a party has violated Rule 9011, the court need not find that a party who makes a false representation to<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">the court acted in bad faith. “ The imposition<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>3of Rule<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>11SRVLWLRQ ^ RI F] 5XOH sanctions . . . requires only a showing of objectively unreasonable conduct.” Fellheimer, Eichen & Braverman, P.C. v. Charter Tech., Inc., 57 F.3d 1215, 1225 (3d Cir. 1995). We apply an abuse of discretion standard in reviewing the decision of the bankruptcy court. See Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 405 (1990). However, we review its factual findings for clear error. Stern v. Marshall, - -- U. S. ---, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2627 (2011) (Breyer, J., dissenting).<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">In this opinion, we focus on several statements by appellees: (1) in the motion for relief from stay, the statements suggesting that the Taylors had failed to make payments on their mortgage since the filing of their bankruptcy petition and the identification of the months in which and the amount by which they were supposedly delinquent; (2) in the motion for relief from stay, the statement that the Taylors had no or inconsequential equity in the property; (3) in the response to the claim objection, the statement that the figures in the proof of claim were accurate; and, (4) at the first hearing, the attempt to have the requests for admission concerning the lack of mortgage payments deemed admitted. As discussed above, all of these statements involved false or misleading representations to the court. 13<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">13 Appellees expend great energy in questioning the factual findings of the bankruptcy court, but we, like the District Court before us, see no error.<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">15<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">A. Alleged literal truth<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">As an initial matter, the appellees^ insistence thatQFH^ WKDW^<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">Doyle^s<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>and Fitzgibbon^s statements were “literally true”ZHUH ^ 3OLWHUDOOT should not exculpate them from Rule 9011 sanctions. First, it should be noted that several of these claims were not, in fact, accurate. There was no literal truth to the statement in the request for relief from stay that the Taylors had no equity in their home. Doyle admitted that she made that statement simply as “part 3of the form pleading,” and “acknowledged' ^ DQG ^ having no knowledge of the value of the property and having made no inquiry on this subject.” (App. 215.) Similarly, the statement in the claim objection response that the figures in the original proof of claim were correct was false.<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">Just as importantly, appellees cite no authority, and we are aware of none, which permits statements under Rule 9011 that are literally true but actually misleading.<span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>If the<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">reasonably foreseeable effect of Doyle^s or Fitzgibbon^sLW]JLEERQ¶V ^ representations to the bankruptcy court was to mislead the court, they cannot be said to have complied with Rule 9011. See Williamson v. Recovery Ltd. P’ship, 542 F.3d 43, 51 (2d<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">Cir. 2008) ( a party violates Rule 11 “by making false,H ^ ^ ^ ^ 3E\^ PDNLQJ C misleading, improper, or frivolous representations to the court”) (emphasis added).<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">In particular, even assuming that Doyle^s andQG ^ Fitzgibbon^s statements as to the payments made by the Taylors were literally accurate, they were misleading. In attempting to evaluate whether HSBC was justified in seeking a relief from the stay on foreclosure, the court needed to know that at least partial payments had been made and that the failure to make some of the rest of the payments was due<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">16<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">to a bona fide dispute over the amount due, not simple default. Instead, the court was told only that the Taylors had “failed to make regular mortgage payments” from November 1, 2007 to January 15, 2008, with a mysterious notation concerning a “suspense balance” following. (App. 214-15.)ZLQJ^ ^ ^ A court could only reasonably interpret this to mean that the Taylors simply had not made payments for the period<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">specified. As the bankruptcy court found, “[f]or at best aG ^ ^ 3>I@RU ^ DW ^ EH' $540 dispute, the Udren Firm mechanically prosecuted a motion averring a $4,367[] post-petition obligation, the aim of which was to allow HSBC<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>to foreclose on [the Taylors^]^ RQ ^ >WKH ^ 7D\ORUV house.” (App. 215.) Therefore, Do yle^ s' and Fitzgibbon ^s )LW] JLEERQ¶V ^ statements in question were either false or misleading.<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">B.<span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>Reasonable inquiry<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">We must, therefore, determine the reasonableness of the appellees^ inquiry before they made their false<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">representations. Reasonableness has been<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>defined as “an GHILQHG ^ DV F] 3 D ^ objective knowledge or belief at the time of the filing of a challenged paper that the claim was well-grounded in law and<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">fact.” ^Ford Motor Co. v. Summit Motor Prods., Inc., 930<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">F.2d 277, 289 (3d Cir. 1991) (internal quotations omitted). The requirement of reasonable inquiry protects not merely the court and adverse parties, but also the client. The client is not expected to know the technical details of the law and ought to be able to rely on his attorney to elicit from him the information necessary to handle his case in the most effective, yet legally appropriate, manner.<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">In determining reasonableness, we have sometimes<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">looked at several factors: “the amount of time available to theQWEIRIEIWLPHEI<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">signer for conducting the factual and legal investigation; the<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">17<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">necessity for reliance on a client for the underlying factual information; the plausibility of the legal position advocated; . . . whether the case was referred to the signer by another member of the Bar . . . [; and] the complexity of the legal and factual issues implicated.” <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Mary Ann Pensiero, Inc. v. Lingle, 847 F.2d 90, 95 (3d Cir. 1988). However, it does not appear that the court must work mechanically through these factors when it considers whether to impose sanctions. Rather, it should consider the reasonableness of the inquiry under all the material circumstances. “ [T]he applicable standard is one of reasonableness under the circumstances.” Bus. Guides, Inc. v. Chromatic Commc’ns Ents., Inc.,<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>498 U.S. 533, 551 (1991); accord Garr v. U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 22 F.3d 1274, 1279 (3d Cir. 1994).<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">Central to this case, then, is the degree to which an attorney may reasonably rely on representations from her<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">client. An attorney certainly “is not always foreclosed fromFORVHG ^ IURP ^ relying on<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>information from other persons.” Garr, 2 2 F.3 dRQV ^ ' ^ ^ 1278. In making statements to the court, lawyers constantly and appropriately rely on information provided by their clients, especially when the facts are contained in a client^sW¶V ^ computerized records. It is difficult to imagine how attorneys might function were they required to conduct an independent investigation of every factual representation made by a client before it could be included in a court filing. While Rule 9011<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">“does not<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>recognize a „pure heart an d gempty h ead^ defense,”G ^ HPSW\^ KHDG¶ ^ GI In re Cendant Corp. Derivative Action Litig., 96 F. Supp. 2d 403, 405 (D.N.J. 2000), a lawyer need not routinely assume the duplicity or gross incompetence of her client in order to meet the requirements of Rule 9011. It is therefore usually reasonable for a lawyer to rely on information provided by a client, especially where that information is superficially<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">18<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">plausible and the client provides its own records which appear to confirm the information.<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">However, Do yle^s behavior was unreasonable, both as a matter of her general practice and in ways specific to this<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">case. First, reasonable reliance on a<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>client^s representations ^ FOLHQW¶V ^ UHSUH` assumes a reasonable attempt at eliciting them by the attorney. That is, an attorney must, in her independent professional judgment, make a reasonable effort to determine what facts are likely to be relevant to a particular court filing and to seek those facts from the client. She cannot simply settle for the information her client determines in advance²2 by means of an automated system, no less²that she should be provided with.<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">Yet that is precisely what happened here. “[I]tW r]<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">appears,” the ' bankruptcy<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>court observed, “that Doyle,^ theOH ^ ^ WKH ^ manager of the Udren Firm bankruptcy department, had no relationship with the<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>client, HSBC.” (App. 202. ) By working ' ^ ^ solely with NewTrak, a system which no one at the Udren Firm seems to have understood, much less had any influence over, Doyle permitted HSBC to define²perilously<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">narrowly²the information she had about the<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Taylors^ matter. ^ WKH ^ 7D\ORUV¶ ^ PI That HSBC was not providing her with adequate information through NewTrak should have been evident to Doyle from the face of the NewTrak file. She did not have any information concerningJ the Taylors^ equity in the home, though she madeRPH ^ ^ WKRXJK ^ VKH C a statement specifically denying that they had any.<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">More generally, a reasonable attorney would not file a motion for relief from stay for cause without inquiring of the client whether it had any information relevant to the alleged<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">cause, that is, the debtor^s failure to make payments. Had ^ SD\PHQWV ^<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">19<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">Doyle made even that most minimal of inquiries, HSBC presumably would have provided her with the information in its files concerning the flood insurance dispute, and Doyle could have included that information in her motion for relief from stay²or, perhaps, advised the client that seeking such a motion would be inappropriate under the circumstances.<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">With respect to the Taylors^ case in 7particular, DoyleVH ^ LQ ^ SDUWLFXODL ignored clear warning signs as to the accuracy of the data that she did receive. In responding to the motion for relief from stay, the Taylors submitted documentation indicating that they had already made at least partial payments for some of the months in question. In objecting to the proof of claim, the Taylors pointed out the inaccuracy of the mortgage payment listed and explained the circumstances surrounding the flood insurance dispute. Although Doyle certainly was not obliged to accept the Taylors^ claims at face value, they indisputably put her on notice that the matter was not as simple as it might have appeared from the NewTrak file. At that point, any reasonable attorney would have sought clarification and further documentation from her client, in order to correct any prior inadvertent misstatements to the court and to avoid any further errors. Instead, Doyle mechanically affirmed facts (the monthly mortgage payment) that her own prior filing with the court had already contradicted.<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">Doyle^s reliance on HSBC was particularly problematic because she was not, in fact, relying directly on HSBC. Instead, she relied on a computer system run by a third-party vendor. She did not know where the data provided by NewTrak came from. She had no capacity to check the data against the original documents if any of it seemed implausible. And she effectively could not question<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">20<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">the data with HSBC. In her relationship with HSBC, Doyle essentially abdicated her professional judgment to a black box.<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">None of the other factors discussed in the Mary Ann Pensiero case which are applicable here affect our analysis of<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">the reasonableness of appellees^ actions. This was no t a^ 7KLV ^ ZDV ^ QRW ^ matter of extreme complexity, nor of extraordinary deadline pressure. Although the initial data the Udren Firm received was not, in itself, wildly implausible, it was facially<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">inadequate. ,In short, then,<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>w e find that Doyle^s inquiryKDW ^ 'R\OH¶V ^ LQTX before making her representations to the bankruptcy court was unreasonable.<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">In making this finding, we, of course, do not mean to suggest that the use of computerized databases is inherently inappropriate. However, the NewTrak system, as it was being used at the time of this case, permits parties at every level of the filing process to disclaim responsibility for inaccuracies. HSBC has handed off responsibility to a third-party maintainer, LPS, which, judging from the results in this case, has not generated particularly accurate records. LPS apparently regards itself as a mere conduit of information. Appellees, the attorneys and final link in the chain of transmission of this information to the court, claim reliance<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">on NewTrak^s records. Who, precisely, ca n be heldVHO\^ ^ FDQ ^ EH ^ IC accountable if HSBC^s records are<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>inadequately maintained,DGHTXDWHO\^ PDLQ` LPS transfers those records inaccurately into NewTrak, or a law firm relies on the NewTrak data without further investigation, thus leading to material misrepresentations to the court? It cannot be that all the parties involved can insulate themselves from responsibility by the use of such a system. In the end, we must hold responsible the attorneys<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">21<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">who have certified to the court that the representations they are making are “well-grounded in law and fact.”<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">C.<span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>Notice<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">Doyle, Udren, and the Udren Firm also argue on appeal that they had insufficient notice that they were in<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">danger of sanctions.14 Rule 9011 directs that a court<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>“[o]n itsW ^ D ^ FRXUW ^ 3>R@Q [ own initiative . . . may enter an order describing the specific conduct that appears to violate [the rule] and directing an attorney . . . to show cause why it has not violated [the rule].”H ^ UXOH@ ^ ' ^ ^<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">Fed. R. Bank. P. 9011(c)(1)(B). Due process in the<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">imposition of Rule I9011 sanctions requires “particularizedUHTXLUHV ^ 3SDUWLF. notice.” Jones v.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Pittsburgh Nat’l Corp., 899 F.2d 1350,^ 135 7<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>(3 d Cir.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>1990). The meaning<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>of “particularized notice” RI ^ 3SDUWLFXODUL]H has not been rigorously defined in this circuit. In Fellheimer, we noted that this requirement was met where the sanctioned party “was 3 provided with sufficient, advance notice of exactlyDGYDQFH ^ QRWLFH ^ R which conduct was alleged to be sanctionable.” Fellheimer,FWLRQDEOH ^ ' ^ ^<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">57 F.3d at 1225. In Simmerman v. Corino, 27 F.3d 58, 64 (3d<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">Cir. 1994),1 Fwe held that “the party sought to be 3sanctioned isW\^ VRXJKW ^ WR ^ EH C entitled to particularized notice including, at a minimum, 1) the fact that Rule 11 sanctions are under consideration, 2) the reasons why sanctions are under consideration . . . .”<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">The bankruptcy court^s June order ^ was clearly inHU ^ ZDV ^ FOHDUOT substance an order to show cause, even if it was not<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">14 Any claim regarding a due process right to notification of the form of sanctions being considered has been waived by appellees, as it was not raised in their papers, either here or in the district court. United States v. Pelullo, 399 F.3d 197, 222 (3d Cir. 2005).<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">22<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">specifically captioned as such. The more difficult question is<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">whether the court adequately described “the specific<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>conductLEHG^ 3WKH^ VSHFLIL that appear[ed] to violate” Rule 9011, so as to give sufficient^ ^ ^ ^ ^ VR^ DV ^ WR^ J notice of “exactly3 which conduct was Falleged to beDV^ DOOHJHG^ WRC sanctionable.” As mentioned<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>above, the court^s June order ^ WKH ^ FRXUW¶V ^ -X identified “pressing a relief motion o n admissions that were RQ ^ DGPLVVLRQV ^ -0 known to be untrue, and signing and filing pleadings without<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">knowledge or inquiry regarding th e matters pled therein”<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>asDWWHUV ^ SOHG ^ WK] the conduct the court wished to investigate. (App. 119) The<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">judge also<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>told Fitzgibbon, “I^m issuing an<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>order<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>to<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>showXLQJ ^ DQ ^ RUGHU ^ W cause on your firm, too, for filing these things . . . without<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">having any knowledge. And filing answers . . . without any<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">knowledge.” Id. The June order also made specific reference<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">to “the 3 motion<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>for relief, the admissions and the reply<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>to theVVLRQV ^ DQG ^ WKH C objection.”LRQ ^ ' ^ ^<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">In these particular circumstances, the notice given to appellees was sufficient to put them on notice as to which aspects of their conduct were considered sanctionable. At that point in the case, the Udren Firm lawyers had only filed three substantive papers with the court²totaling six (substantive) pages²and the court found all of them<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">problematic. Appe llees ^ claim that they believed<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>that the^ WKH\^ EHOLHYHGF only issue at the time of the hearing w as Fitzgibb on^sHDULQJ ^ ZDV ^ )LW]J: inability to contact HSBC is simply not plausible in light of the language of the June order and the bankruptcy co urt^sNUXSWF\^ FRXUW¶V C statements at the hearing, which were incorporated by reference into the June order. In a case in which more extensive docket activity had taken place, the bankruptcy court^s order might no t have been sufficient to informQEI VXIILFLHQW ^ WR [ appellees as to which of their filings were sanctionable, but, given the unusual circumstances here, it was. But see Martens v. Thomann, 273 F.3d 159, 178 (2d Cir. 2001)<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">23<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">(requiring specific identification of individual challenged statements to uphold imposition of sanctions).<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">D. The Udren Firm and Udren’ s individual ^ LQGLYLGXDO ^ liability<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">We also find that it was appropriate to extend sanctions to the Udren Firm itself. Rule 11 explicitly allows the imposition of sanctions against law firms. Fellheimer, 57 F.3d 1215 at 1223 n.5. In this instance, the bankruptcy court found that the misrepresentations in the case arose not simply from the irresponsibility of individual attorneys, but from the system put in place at the Udren Firm, which emphasized high-volume, high-speed processing of foreclosures to such an extent that it led to violations of Rule 9011.<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">However, we do not find that responsibility for these failures extends specifically to Udren, whose involvement in this matter was limited to his role as sole shareholder of the firm.<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">E.<span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>The District Court’s reversal of sanctions against HSBC<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">Ordinarily, of course, a party which does not appeal a decision by a district court cannot receive relief with respect to that decision. “[T]he mere fact that a [party] may wind up with a judgment against one [party] that is not logically consistent with an unappealed judgment against another is not alone sufficient to justify taking away the unappealed<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">judgment in favor of a party not before the court.” Repola v.RUH ^ WKH ^ FRXUW ^ ' [ Morbark Indus., Inc., 980 F.2d 938, 942 (3d Cir. 1992). However,<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>“where the disposition as to one party<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>isV F1 WR ^ RQH ^ SDU<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">24<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">inextricably intertwined with the interests of a non-appealing<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">party,” it 'may be “impossible 3to grant relief to<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>one partyQW ^ UHOLHI ^ WR^ R without granting relief to the other.” United States v. Tabor Court Realty Corp., 943 F.2d 335, 344 (3d Cir. 1991). In Tabor Court Realty, a contract dispute, the assignee of a property had failed to appeal a decision, while the assignor had (and had ultimately prevailed). Given that the dispute was over the disposition of the property, it was impossible to grant relief to the assignor without also granting relief to the assignee.<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">In this instance, whether the lawyers at the Udren Firm violated Rule 9011 is a question analytically distinct from whether HSBC was responsible for any violations of Rule 9011. A court might find that HSBC was responsible for violations, whereas, say, Udren himself was not. It was entirely possible for HSBC to comply with the sanctions ordered (a letter to its firms informing them that they are permitted to consult with HSBC) without affecting the interests of the lawyers at the Udren Firm. Therefore, the interests of the lawyers at the Udren Firm and HSBC were not “ineHIicabl intertwined” and the Disthbt Qflrt lacked jurisdiction to reverse the sanctions against HSBC.<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">F.<span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>Alternative basis for the District Court’s¶V ^ decision<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">,In reversing the bankruptcy court^s decision,^ theXUW¶V ^ GHFLVLRQ ^ District Court focused on that court^s apparent attention to theWWHQWLRQ ^ WR ^ WK broader problems of high-volume bankruptcy practice in imposing sanctions. It is true that the bankruptcy judge noted that appellees were not the first attorneys to run into these sorts of difficulties in her court. But she nonetheless made<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">25<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">individualized findings of wrong-doing after four days of hearings and issued sanctions thoughtfully chosen to prevent the recurrence of problems at the Udren Firm based on what she had learned of practices there. Insofar as she considered the effect of the sanctions on the future conduct of other attorneys appearing before her, such considerations were<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">permissible. After all,<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>“the prime<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>goal [of Rule 1 1<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>sanctions] JRDO ^ >RI ^ 5XOH ^ ^ ^ C should be deterrence of repetition o f improper conduct.”Q ^ RI E] LPSURSHU ^ FR Waltz v. County of Lycoming, 974 F.2d 387, 390 (3d Cir. 1992).<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">G.<span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>Conclusion<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">We appreciate that the use of technology can save both litigants and attorneys time and money, and we do not, of course, mean to suggest that the use of databases or even certain automated communications between counsel and client are presumptively unreasonable. However, Rule 11 requires more than a rubber-stamping of the results of an automated process by a person who happens to be a lawyer. Where a lawyer systematically fails to take any responsibility for seeking adequate information from her client, makes representations without any factual basis because they are included in a<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>“form pleading” she has been trained to fill out, and ignores obvious indications that her information may be incorrect, she cannot be said to have made reasonable inquiry. Therefore, we find that the bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion in imposing sanctions on Doyle or the Udren Firm itself. However, it did abuse its discretion in imposing sanctions on Udren individually.<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">III.<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">26<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">For the foregoing reasons, we will reverse the District Court with respect to Doyle and the Udren Firm, affirming<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">the bankruptcy court^s imposition of sanctions. With respectE] VDQFWLRQV ^ ^ ^ :LVA to HSBC, as discussed previously, the District Court lacked jurisdiction to reverse the sanctions, as do we; therefore, we vacate the District Court^s order with respect to that party, leaving the sanctions imposed by the bankruptcy court in place. We will affirm the District Court with respect to Udren individually, reversing the bankruptcy^s courtRXUW ^ imposition of sanctions.<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">27<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
<div class="MsoPlainText" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt;">END.<o:p></o:p></span></div><br />
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